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CHAPTER 1

PROLEGOMENA

The problem stated
Many of the ancient Stoics never experienced any
serious pt"oblem concerning the e,dstcmce of God because they

tended to be pantheistic.

The orthodox St oic could put his

hand a11ywhere in the universe a.?td affirm with confidence,
"Rexe · is god. 0•
11

Flato • s °'highest good•~ and Aristotlee s

unmoved rnove;:u are actually monothe;sttc proofs.

Beth of

these men accepted the traditional gods of Greece but they
were searching for a metaphysical ultimate to account for
all reality.

However when one encounters St. Thomas in the

thirteenth century he discovers that these metaphysical
ultimates of the ancients resemble t he Christian God. l

S·t .

Thomas calmly presents five classic proofs for the existence
of what others called!!!! tealissimum.

Four hundred years

later Im.~anuel Kant startled Europe with his scholarly
refutation of these hoary arguments.

(Actually he was

refuting "the badly presented rationalist arguments of
1st. Thomas rejects their theology but employs their
arguments from first principles.

2

Wolff.")2

Now the problem for consideration is whether or

not Kant 's withering criticism i.s valid.

The problem justified

This problem is worthy of our attention because of the
strategic positions occupied by these tt""'O thinkers.

The

former is recognized as the official theologian of Roman
Catholicism,3 whereas some consider the latter to be "the
philosopher of Protestantism.••4

Both men wield a tremendous

amount of influence in the theological arena and their
reGpective po sitions cannot fail to affect the reflections
of modern man.

Furthermore this problem demands serious

consideration because in our day there is a resurgence of
dialectical materialism with its evil concomitant of atheism.
Can an intelligent person still believe in the existence of
God?

Or must this traditional concept be relegated to the

2 ~ Fulton J. Sheen, ~hilgso~hz 2!, Religion (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts» 1948)~ p.5. ~ also Christiano
Wolfio 9 Cqgitationes Rationales~ Vii;:ibus lntellectus
Humani Earumgue Usu Legitirno Ie Veritatis Cognitione
(Edition secundus; Francofurti & Lipsiae: Prostat In Bibliop
Rengeriano 9 1735), pp. 47-54. Vide also his work entitled
Pstcholqgia Rationalis (Francofurti & Lipsiae: Prostat In
Of~icina Libraria Rengeriana,. 1734), p.a. Vid! also a
later edition of Psychologii Rationalis (Editio Nova Priori
Emendatior; Francofurti & L psiae; Prostat In Officina
Libraria Rengeriana, 1740), pp. 530-32; 536a38; 568f.
3 some modern . Catholics prefer St. Augustine.
4vide Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types

2f. r1,dern Th,logx
i:54), p. 4.

(London: Nisbet & Company. LTD, reprinted

3

realm of other infamous "As If" philosophies?
The problem defined
All possible theistic proofs can be classified as (a)
theoretical~ and (b) non°theoretical.

The theoretical argu•

ments are the more impressive and appeal to both inductive
and deducti ve reasoning.

All inductive proofs are based

upon contact with external reality, that is, they are!
QS?St~rior~.

One makes a judgment only after he has en•

counte~ed sense data.

However most of these inductive argu-

ment ~ begin with A prior! assu~ptions.

Hence they are

really a composite of innate principles &'ld empirical data.

Moreover all of the inductive proofs are grounded upon the
concept of Causality derived from Aristotle.
The f irst inductive proof is the Cosmological.

It

rests securely upon the Stagirite's efficient cause and is
divided into three parts, namely, motion, efficient causation, and contingent being.
of being.s

The second is from gradations

It is based upon Aristotle's final cause.

third is from gover11artce of the world. 6

The

It is undergirded

5Kant's restatement of this celebrated proof is called
the Moral Argument. He affirms, "Das !)asein Gottes, als
ei:n Postulat der reinen praktischen Vernunft. 11· ~
UKritik der praktischen Vemunft," lromanvel ~tpt•s Wcrke
(Gesammtausgabe in zehn Baenden; Leipzig: No es und
Baumann, 1838), Vierter Band, pp. 245-54.
6Protestant divines generally refer to this proof as
the Teleological argument.
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by both the formal and the final causes of Aristotle.

(This

argument is built upon one 8 s experience of order in the
world.)7

The~e is only one example of a deductive proof for the
existence of God, namely, the famous Ontological argument.
This proof appears in a variety of different forms but the
underlying principle is invariably the same, namely, reality
is inferred ftrom an!. s-imultaneo concept .8
The ll2.ll- .!:.l1eoretical proofs are classified as direct,

and indizeet.

However there is only one direct theistic

argument , namely~ the mystical.
God os existence theoretically.
directly.

The mystic does not prove
Rather he experiences God

For example; a certain bishop was voyaging on the

ocean once when he over-heard an atheist denying the existence
of God to a fellow-passenger.
unbeliever and remarked,

0

The bishop walked over to the

Isn•t that strangel

I just talked

to Him this morn.i ng. 11
The first indireci: proof is the pragmatic argument of
a brilliant French philosopher named Blaise Pascal.

It is

based upon evidence in the lives and cultures of peoples

where the idea of God is taken seriously.

Experience shows

7ceorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770•1831) employed this
proof quite forcefully. Hegel (a) deplor·e d the fact that
pious people regarded the theoretical proofs so lightly, and
(b) re~tored a seriousness in philosophy for these arguments.
8 1n Rene Des-c artes t-he god-idea is the san.c tion for his
·e ntire system.

5

that those wl:io believe in God are a better class of people
than those who disbelieve.

It is a great gamble to be an

atheist : (l) One loses nothing if God exists, whereas (2)
he loses everything if God does not exist.
The second indirect proof is the existential argument

of Erich Prank.

He declares that the most convincing proof

for the existence of God is the agonizing attempt to deny
His existence.
The problem delimited
Since this fascinating subject is inexhaustible the
scope of the present dissertation must of necessity be confined ~nthin very specific limitations.

Hence the author

will not attempt to examine every theistic proof of mediaeval
and modern9 theology.

Rather he will strictly delimit his

field of investigation to (a) the five classic arguments of

st. Thomas Aquinas, and (b) the negative Kantian criticism.
However in order to understand this particular. problem
one must be cognizant of the philosophical context in which
it appears.

The reader cannot hope to appreciate the full

significance of Kant's brusque attack unless he comprehends

(a) the one and only 4 prior~ proof for God's existence, (b)
the empirical view of Causality, and (o) certain fundamental

9E.g.~ vis]e George R. Riffert, gr t PX£amid Pr29f Qi
fi2.s! (10th impression; Haverhill, 'Massac usett:s: Destiny
Publishers., 1947).

6

6

tenets of Scholasticism.10
The Sources for the Study

The primary sources for this investigation will be the
monumental Summa T.heologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, and two

of Immanuel Kan.t • s critiques, namely, l,<ritik
~

~

reinen

(1781), and Kritik de[ 2raktischen Vernunft: (1788).

The secondaTy sources will consist of diverse philosophical
and theological works ·which deal with this special problem.11
'!'he Method of Procedure

The method of procedure ,:\rill be as follows: First the
author will thoroughly examine the subtle Ontological argu-

ment as it appea~s in the ~n:itings of one mediaevatl2 and
t wo u.,od.e rn13 philosophers.

Then he will proceed to expound

Hume's controversial doctrine of Causality.

Next he will

elucidate a few relevant areas of Neo•Thomism and explain
some pertinent Scholastic terminology.

Then he will care

0

fully p!resent the Five Ways of St. Thomas, and meti.culously

lOE.g., t he official Roman Catholic theory of knowledge.
llpreference will be given to contempo ary Thomistic
writers who are recognized authorities int eir respective
fields, e.g., Sertillanges, Garrigou-Lagrange, Pegis,
Haritain, Gilson, Glenn, Sheen, Toohey, Phillips, and
Coples ton.

6

12

st.

Ansel1n ( 1033-1109).

13Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Baruch Spinoza (16321677).

7

analyze Kant 's scathing criticism.

Finally he will objective-

ly evaluate the Kantian assault in the light of Holy Scrip•

ture and modern thought.14

----

14Apropos biographical data concerni11g these five men
will be added sparingly uassim in order to throw an additional ray of light upon this perplexing pr oblem.

CHAPTER II
ST. ANSELM' S CLASSIC PORl'illLATION OF THE

ONTOLOGICAL ARGID~ENT
Introduction
St. Augustine died in the year of our Lord 430 and the
next important thinker in the orthodox Catholic tradition
did not appear until the eleventh century,1 namely, St.
Anselm . 2

1109 .

He was born at Aosta3 in 10334 and died April 21,

At twenty-seven he en tered the famous Abbey of Bec5

in Normandy.

Here he studied under Lanfranc and later

succeeded him to the office of Abbot.

In 1093 he became the

Archbishop of Canterbury.
It is said that Anselm "possessed an innate disposition

lFrederick B. Artz,

!~5, t!!Ds!
2,.{ the !11dd.le Ages (New
p. 256.

York: Alfred A. luiopf, 19

2w111 Durant leaps from Aristotle (p. 106) to Francia
Bacon (p. 107) in The Stor,,v S2i Philosophy (New 'lork: Garden
City Publishing Company, c.1927). Yet the subtitle of his
work is, "The Lives And Opinions Of The Greater Philosophers.n

3This is in Piedmont.

4Paul J. Glenn, History 2f. Philosoihv (11th impression;
St. Louis & London: Herder 1945)t p. 1 3. Johann Eduard
Erdmann gives the date as lo35. See
History 91. Philosophy,
3 vols., translation from the German edited by Williston s.
Hough (Re,print; London: Ruskin House, 1922), I, 303.

a

5The Benedictine Order.·
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for speculation,"6 and he was perhaps "the most original
teacher' 7 of his age.

Re is called ttthe second Augu·s tine"8

and ttthe father of the school-men."9 He was a leader 1n the
great moveraent which culminated in the thirteenth century.IO
The inspiration for Anselm's intellectual interest is
to understand what he already believes.11

He is a believer

first , and a theologian second.12 His very first principle13
is~ "££edo, ~ intelligam. 0 14 He sought the assistance of

6J .• A. Hohle:r: 11 The Li?e 2!, it• Anselm, translated from
the German by Henry Rymer London: T. Jones; 1842), p. 19.

7Hartin Rule, The Life mid Times

volumes (London : Kegan

Paui',Trench

&

2!

St. Anselm

2

1883) 1 I, 173.

Company,

8Paul Lacroix, Science and Literature in the Middle

Ages (New York: D. App eton,1878), P•

47. -

-

9John T. Driscoll, Chr..istian Philosophy (New York:
Benziger BrothersQ 1900), p. 65.
lOJames w. Walsh, The Thirteenth: Greatest of Centuries
( New York: Catholic Summer School Press, l9lO), p.° 80.

lll{enry Osborn Taylor, The Media1=va.l ~ ' 2 volumes
(London: Macmillan, 1911), I7z'7K.
12Ibid. 11 P• 277.
13Anselm borrowed this from Augustine.
14Frederick Copleston A History 2! Fhilos~~hf, 6
volumes ( Westminster, Hary{and: Newman, 1§46• l O £.), II,
156. Translated this reads,"! believe in order that I may
understand ... Vide D. P. Simpson, Cassell's New
Qiction@li (New°Yo~k: Funk & Wagnalls, 1960)7"'P.
• This
is extremely significant in view of the fact that so many
today follow Abelard and take the opposite position,~••
"I understand in order that I may believe."

L3fg'1
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philosophy to undergird his faith.

The doctrines of the

Church are· both true and rational, and a person ought to
understand them.

Reason and revelation are both gifts from

God and there must be a harmony between thern.15
Whatever God has revealed is true, and faith accepts
what God has revealed with an implicit credence which
disdains all idea of any need of demonstration to
establish its credibility. To think such demonstration necessary were to set out for Olympus provided
with poles and ropes and other usual appliances for
the support of tottering edifices, in hope of making
the mountain so firm as not to shake and topple over
before the first person who sho.u ld stumble at its
base. Nevertheless; true though it be that the subjectmatt er of revelation has no need of demonstration by
t he efforts of reason, yet, inasmuch as reason as well
as faith is the gift of God, it is inconceivable that
t:he legitimate deductions formed by the one should be
at variance with the fa~ts recognized by the other;
so t hat reason rightly exercised plays her proper part
in suggesting the credibility of what is already
believed 0 il1 exhibiting and elucidating its correspondence with her own deductions, and thus in justi•
fying and making good its claim on us. Her office is
erobare.16
Anselm wrote (a) M2nologium, (b) Proslogium, (c) Cur Deus
tto~q? and other books.

Cur

Deus

Homo? is a study of the

Incarnation$ whereas the other two works both have one objective in view 0 namely, to prove the existence of God. 17
In the i.JppoloiiU.'!! we find "the dry and the formal method of

15Artz, 12s,. cit.
16Rule, !ll?• .£!S.•, PP• 175£.
17Alfred Weber, 1-listo'f of Philosoph;i, translated from
the German by Frank Thilly
York"": Scribner's Sons,
c.1896), p. 217.

New

11

reasoning • • • • ,,18

There is an emotionalism in the

Pr2slo&j.Ym,~ yet. it fails to "throb with the red blood of
Augustine 0 s Co~f.essions,u19 the treatise which influenced
it most .

In chapte~s two, three, and four of the Proslogium we
find his famous proof20 for God.

The roots of this argu-

ment can be traced back to Augustine21 but Anselm is the
first to present the proof u in scientific form. 11 22

Hartin

Rule affirms that this is "the first !! pri,2ri argument in

proof of the existence of the Supreme Being which human
genius had as yet constructed.u23

So we do not feel that he

is merely Hsearching through the 'pantries• of the Fathers
or culling the choice flowers of their 'meadows. rn24

18.raylox, 9.2• s;it.; I 11 276.
19lbid..

20Kant and other modern writers call it the Ontological
argument.
2 lvid~h e .• g., "Concerning The Nature of Good, u chapter
I~ translated from the Latin by A. H. Newman, Basic t'1ritin~
tl Sat-nt Augustine, 2 vols., edited by Whitney J. Oates C d

printing; New York: Random Housei c.1948), I, 431.
22oriscoll 9 lgs. cit.

23aule, 22• si.l•, I, 199.

24:raylor, 22• si.t.•, I,. 275.
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'l'he 1·1Qnolpgium25

The background
Maurice and others26 besought Anselm to write out the
oral instructions which he had given them "in familiar conversation .u27 They desired an e ssay proving that there is
harmony bet:·ween "the dogmas of revelation" and 0tthe

~

priori

conclusions of reason ,u28 The p.r lncipal area which they
wanted him to cover was the Divine Being.

At first Anselm

refused but their endless requests ("rather than . . . . my
ab11itytt )29 at last brought his assent.

~2nolo.&ipr~.

The r esult was the

It was published before the summer of 1078 but

a. f ew years elapsed before it bore the title of Anselm'..~
Honoi s>sioq. 30

---25I.e.,
··-·-·--·----A Soliloquyt' .
11

~ the preface to the

u Proslog1umu in .tt.• Ans~l.:!u, translated from th~ Latin by

Sidney Norton Deane (Reprint; La Salle, Illinoi s: Open
Court 11 1944), p. 3. The term means 0 meditation° in the
sense that a person mentally solves an intellectual problem. Vide Rule 0 22• s!t,., I~ 177.
26nQuidwn fratrestt.

Vide t he preface to the Honol9gium,

re11censuit Franci.s·cu-s Salesi.us Schmitt (Bormae Sumptibus
Petri Hanstein, 1929), p. 1:. ~:..Oehler asserts that they are
Anselm• s studen·t s 2 and this is probably correct. Vide his
1
.
worK~
.22·
cit. , p. 20.

-

27These words appear in the preface to the "~10nologium,"
~. Anse?::..,i, translated by Deai1e, p. 35.

28Rule, loc. cit.
29

.

Preface to the "Monclogium," §!_. bJ!selm, translated

by Deane,

.l2£. c.i t.

3 0i~ule, 22.• cit., I, 195.
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This fatr'<Ous book is a meditation on the Being of God. 31
Clayton defines it as "a colloquy of the soul with itself11 32
concerning God's essence.

However in this chapter we will

be interested only in that portion of the fi1onologium which
deals with theistic proofs.33

It is interesting to note that 1n this treatise Anselm
"works out the proofs of God's existencen34 without any
reference wb.atever to the Bible.

He believes

• • • that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the
authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever conclusion of independent investigation should declare to
be true, should, in an unadorned style, with common
proofs and with a simple argument, be briefly enforced
by the cogency
reason, and plainly expounded in the
light of truth.

S!

His first proof: gooclness36
All men wish to enjoy only those things which appear
good.

Hence it is to be expected that upon some occasion a

man should turn and examine that which makes. these entitie·s

3lvide the preface to the "Honologium," .§S• Anselm,
translated by Deane, loc. cit.

32Joseph Clayton 9 Saint Anselm (Milwaukee: Bruce
Publishing Company, c.1933), p. i1i.

33chapters I, IIl> III,

&

IV.

34~t,. Anselm, published anonymously (St. Louis: Herder,

1911), p. 76.
35

Preface to the "i1.-l 0nologium," .§!.
by Deane, p. 38.

Anselm, translated

36vidfi Copleston, 22• cit. , I, 158£.
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good.

Thus a s the light of reason leads the way a person

encount e r s t ruths which are new to him.
One may easily commune with his own heart thus: The
goods in l ife are so numerous that they cannot be counted.

We e,cpe1"ience their diversity by sense and discern. them by
intellect.

Therefore is it not necessary to infer that all

the good which we observe is a participat ed goodness stemming f rom " some one thing0 ?3 7 or. is their goodness

der ived f r om various sources?
However this much is definite and obvious (for those

who will to see): Whenever two entities possess the same
a t t ribute in such a manner that, when compared mutually, a
per so11 may say they possess this perf action in greater, less•

or equal degree--then we affirm that both have the attribut e because of something else which is immutable.
t hi rd "somet hing" never changes.

This

lt is the same in every

instance regardless of ,~1ether it eKists in equal or unequal
degree.

just:.

For example, certain things may be described as

Now, when they are compared with each other it makes

no difference whether they are equal, or more, or less.

None of them can be called '*just" apart from the quality of
iustice--and _justice neveT varies.

It is always the same,

regardless of where it is found.38
3 7°Honologium,11

Deane, p. 38.
38!l!!s!•, p. 39 •

Chapter I,~· Anselm, translated by

15
Now it is undeniable that if all goods were mutually
compared they would be found to be either equal or unequal
in goodness.

Therefore!) all are good because of their parti•

cipation in the irmnutable quality we call 2,.q2,.dn!,.~•

This

quality is always the same, no matter where it is found.
Nevertheless sometimes things are called "good" for different
reasons .
is strong.

For example, a horse is called ttgood0 because he
A

horse is good on a.ccount of strength and

swiftness , but these two qualities are not ide11tical.

noreover there is a marked contrast between a strong,
swift: horse and a strong, swift robber.
i s good, whereas the robber is evil.

Namely, the horse

Why?

horse is usef:ul and the robber is harmful.

Because the
In fact nothing

is usually regarded as good unless it possesses some utility,
f or example, safety, &"1.d beauty.

Hence, all things which

are truly good, are good by necessity, because of that same
being which underlies all goods--whatever that being may be.
But since all goods exist by virtue of this being, who
could doubt but that this being is itself a great good?

And

since it is the cause of every good, i,.t must be a rtgood
through itself.u39
Therefore (a) all goods receive their goodness by parti•
cipation frem a being distinct and separate from themselves,
and (h) o~ly this particular being

39rbid., p. 40.

0

is good through

16

itself. 0 40

Hence nothing is supremely good except that

a l one whi ch "is good t hrough itself."

This being is supreme:

i t i s so supe rior to all e l se that nothing equals or excels·.
it.

Horeover t hat which possesses supreme goodness also

pos se.s se s grea tness41 in the same degr ee .

T!.1e refore • one

be ing exiRt s in the ui1i ver se which is supreme ly good and
supremely great ..

This being is t he ultimate42 o f all

existing beings.43
His second proof : greatn ess4·4

It has j ust been demonstrated that one supremely good
bei.ng exists because all goods receive their goodness by

part ici pation in one be;Lng *'which is good t hrough itself . u45
Hence it is necess ary to infer the existence of a .s upremely
gr eat being ttwhi ch is great through itsel.f. tt 46
However I do not have reference t o physical greatness.

40Tbid.
~

41Anselm probably ha$ no reference to ext ension.
t he fiqno l ogio2, Chapter II , rencensuit Schmitt, P• 8.

See

42The best, greatest~ and highest.
43'rhis entire proof is contained in the first chapter
of the ~-1onologiurn
.•
.
'

44i'his proof is found in the second chapter of the
Hqnologiym.
45°Monologium,.n Chapter II, .§.t.. a_nselm, translated by
Deane, p, 40.
46lbj.q.
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For example, we say a material entity is great.47

Rather I

mean that w'nich is better or more t-K:1rthy in proportion to

its increase in greatness, for example, wisdom.

Now

nothing

can be supremely great without also being supremely good.
Therefore, a being necessarily exists which is best and
greatest, namelyp "the highest of all existing beings.•1 48

His third proof: be1ng49
Frcm the foregoing proofs it follows that (a) all good
things a~e good by their participation in goodness, (b) all
great things are great by their participation in greatness,
and (c) all things that are, exist by participatio11 in

existence.

Every being owes its existe11ce to either (a)

something!) or (b) nothing.

But it is L-npossible for any-

thing to exist through nothing.

This is inconceivable.SO

Hence everytbilig owes its existence to something, ai.,d
this "something" is either singular o:r plural.
one being, er more than one.

It is either

If more than one, either (a)

they all derive their existence from another, or. (b) each

47E .g., a huge rock.
48rbid.~ p. 41.
49This p1-oof appears in the third chapter of the
·1ongiogium, but the subject is continued in chapter four.
50nl·'lonologium, n Chapter III,
Deane, p. 41.

g,. Anselm, tra..11slated

by

1a
exists independently of the others, or (e) they all owe

their mutual existence to each other.

Now i f all these be!.ngs derive their e,tist:ence from
another b eit'lfh then all contingent things a re dependent

upon this one being for their existence.

On the other hand

i f each is self sufficient and exists independently of the
0

o thers , yet the:-e is some power by which they thus exist,
and this power is doubtless one.
exist~nce t o this one being.

Hence all things owe their

Except for it nothing could

exist.

Reason denies the possibility of. mutual existence to
these things .

It is irrational to suppose that one being

could derive its existence from anothez being upon which it

confers exist ence .

Not even master and servant exist rout.:ual•

l y (the one through the other), because "these relations

exist t hrough the subjects to which they are x-eferred . 11 51
That being by which all things exlst is nec-e ssarily
oneu

because truth excludes any other supposition.

But

since all thb1gs receive their existence from this one being,
it certainly must exist through itself . 52

It is the only

being in the entire .universe which does not owe its existence to something else.

Now that which is dependent upon

another is less than that which exists through itself .
5 1Tb-l
r1
~.
~

P• 42.

5 21t alone is independent; all else is contingent.
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Therefore, that being "which exists through 1tself"53
possesses existence in the supreme degree.

Thus t here is one being (and only one) whose degree of
existence is highest and greatest .

But this ultimate being

which confers existence upon everything that is great ot:·

good..• this being is by necessity supremely great, supremely

good "and the highest of all existing beings.n54

If a person tri.ll observe the nature of entities he will
perceive that all things a.re not equal in quality, that is,
there is a hierarchy of values in the universe .

For example,

a h.orse i s h igher in the scale than a block of wood.

wise a man is more excellent than a horse.

Like-

(He who denies

this distinction i s unworthy of being called a man. )

Now

it is undeniable that certain essences are superior to

others.

21or eover we are persuaded by reason that there is

an apex to this ttpyramid", that is, among these many natures
there is one which

0

is so preeminent • • • that it has no

superior. '' .55
Of course if the number of degre.e s in this hierarchy
is infinite, then that supreme essence "than which no higher

can be foundn56 is non-existent.

53~.
54
·

Ibid. , p. 43.

(This is the end of chapter three.)

55lh!g., Chapter IV .
56 Ibid

- ·

But if this is true we
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must also admit an infinite number of essences; and only an
extr emely foo l ish person would believe this.

Hence it is

necessary t o concl ude that there is an essence which is so
superior to all t he rest (or to just one) that it cannot be
classi fied as inferior.
Now this essence is e i ther singular or plural.

There

i s ei ther one, or more than one--and 1£ t here is more than
one 0 ea ch i s equal 1n perfection.

But if this is true it is

apparent t hat each has derived its perfection from the same
cause .
The

~ sence of

thi s cause is either identical with the

e s s ence of these several effects, or it is not.

If it is

the same , then the nature of this cause and the nature of its
effect ar e also the same.57

If these different essences

have derived their greatness from another it is obv~ous that
they are inferior to their benefactor, for an effect is
never superior to its cause.
not supremel y great.

Therefore, these natures are

Something exists which is higher.

Now _if it i s i mpossible to have a- plurality of supreme
natures either

by

means of what they are themselves or

any"!"

thing ext raneous to themselves, then there can be but one
nature than which nothing else can be more excellent.

Hence

57Two points should be kept in mind here viz., (a)
the essence of these diverse natures is sin~ar';-and (b)
Anselm is using sssence and nature as synonymous terms.
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we conclude that there exists one single nature ••which is
so super ior to others that it is inferior to none.n58

But

that wh ich can be thus described is surely the best and
grea t est among .all real entities.

Hence one essence exists

which is the highest in the order of reality.

However this

is i mpossible tmless it is totally self-sufficient and every
other be ing is dependent upon it.

We have already seen that a self-existent being; v1hich
confers exi stence upon all other beings, is the ultimate

among exi s ting beings.

On the other hand this highest being

" exist s t hrough i t self,. and all others through it~"59 or
ther e ~,ill be a plurality of supreme beings.
But it i s apparent that by necessity there is only one
being t11hich is supreme.

Therefore, we conclude that there

is one Substance which is good and great through itself.

It

i s what it is solely on account of itself, and confers exist•
ence upon every other being in the order of reality.

This

subsisting being is supremely great and supremely good.
is

19

It

the highest of all existing beL"lgs. 9' 60

A summary

These thi-ee theistic proofs may appear a bit involved

S,S lbid-. ,• p. 44.

591bid.
60.I.!u:.£., p. 45.
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but they can be epitomized as follows:
a* All good things participate in the same goodness.
But u this goodness must be the good-in-itself. • • • u61
It is the s~preme good and incommunicable.
b. All things are not on the sai.~e level of perfection.
Rather there are degrees of perfection. Now it is
impossible that the number of degrees should be
inf il1ite. Hence there must be a perfection that is
highest and infinite.
c. No finite entity possesses being of itself. It
must receive this being from a supreme being, an.ct
this being is self-existent.

The basis for all these proofs is the existence of finite
entities.

Then from the fact that they are hierarchical in

nature~ Anselm infers the existence of "a Being at the summit
of the scale.u62

Hence (',o,d is the Summum Bonum. 63

Copleston sees just one argument here with three parts,
namely, a proof developed u·f rom the degrees of perfection
which are found in creatures.n64 Anselm first applies the
argument to (a) goodness,65 then to (b) greatne,s s, 66 and

finally to (c) being.67
61M.aurlce de Wulf, fiist2a 2f. i1edii:i.sval Phil9sophI, 3
vol s., definitive translation of the si:ic.t'fi French edition by
Ernest c. Messenger (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, LTD, Vol.

I~ 1952), I, 161.
621bid.

63vtde Taylor, 22• cit., I, 277.
64copleston, SU!• p;!;t., II, 158.

65~onologiµm, Chapter I.
661!?.!£., Chapter II.

-··

671bid

Chapter III,

~ Copleston, 22• cit., I, 158£.
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The Proslogium68
The background
However, Anselm's inquiring mind was not fully satisf ied with the M,onolgfGit141.l.

There is a chain of inductions69

i n this wor k but it proved unsatisfactory to both the Saint
and his pupils.70

"That which he had here sought in a

mmu,e r very abstruse, he wished afterwards to arrive at in

a more s imple way, by the unravelling of deep consideration."71
He ~~ndered if it might be possible to formulate just one72
argument for the existence of C-od that would be brief and
s1mpl e 73_~a proof that ~10uld depend on nothing except the
p rt11.ciple of Contradiction. 74

nat . 75

The idea was bold and origi-

The possibility haunted him by day and by night.76

681. e. 11 n A Discourse''. Vide the pref ace to the
''Proslogi um, 11 ~ . Ans~lmG tr. Deane , p. 3.
69Anselm describes i t as a 0 book • • • knit together by
t he linking of many arguments". See 1!?!.d•, p. 1.
7°'faylor~ loc. cit.

71Mohler, ml• cit.; p. 20.
72~
the preface to the ~onologion, rencensuit
Schmitt, l'• 6.
73Rule, 22• cit•, I, 195.
74
Etienne Gilson, The Spirit 2f !:iediaeval Philosoe1fY,
translated from the French by A.H. c. Downes (New 'lor:
Scribner's, 1936), p. 59.

75aule, 2R• £it., I, 196.
76~. Anselm (published anonymously by B. Herder Book
Company,,, SU?•~., P• 77.
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The idea obsessed him to the extent that it prevented him

from eating, drinking, and sleeping.77

It interfered wi.th

his work.78 and even distracted him at riatins. 79

l1oreover

this mental unrest persisted for years.80
Food~ drink, and sleep, indeed, were of slight
i mportance to him; what alarmed him was that his
quest of .a n argument in proof of the e.x istence of the

Supreme Being should mar the homage he paid Him.Bl

Sti l l the elus:i.ve proof evaded his every effort.

fesses 9

"•

••

He con-

it wholly ava<led my mental vision, •

• • tt82

In fac t i t seemed that his task was utterly hopeless,83 and
in a mood of despair he almost abandoned his search.84 At

l ast he decided that the very idea itself was from Satan
and de terrnined to purge it from his mind.
his

r esolution , the more in·s istent

bec.axne

HB.ut the

stronger

the question. 11 85

He tells us that ''it began to force itself upon me, with a

17 Rule ll l&s,. £!.1=..•

78~. {mse;&;m (Herder Book Company), loc.

ill•

79n.ule, loc • .s!!•
80Artz~ 22•

~.D

p. 256.

81Rule, lpc. cit.

82Preface to the HProslogium, 11 St. Anselm,, translated
by Dea.11e, p. 2.

83Rule~ J:..Q£• pit.
84 Preface to the HProslogium," .§.£. Anselm, translated

by Deane, loc.• .s!S•
85
,ll. Anselm, published by Herder, p. 78.
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kind of importunity.•• 86 11:1.s tortured intellect fo\.ll'ld no
pee.ce87 until f i nally on e da y at Ha t.i ns "the gra ce of God

f.looded h i s heart trl.th l i ght , and t he whol e matter lay clear
befor e hi s mind, and f ille d his inmos t soul with an immense
joy

ai1d

jubilation . 01 88

Th e argument which he sought now

a ppea:-e d clear and l uminous befor e the :inner eye of his
int e l lect:> and "his inmost soul was del uged with unspeakable
joy aii.d gladness.u 89

As he stood in his stall in the sombre gloom of the
sca r cely illuminat e d choi r, his large white hood drawn
over his head{ none observed his emotion, or saw the
t ears that r o l ed down. his t hin ethereal face, or
dreamed tha t he, their prior, had descried and grasped
a proof of the exis tence of God which should henceforth
throughout a ll time compel the wonder and admiration

of our race.90

The very next morning Ar1selm wrote t he n-e w argument on wax

tablets91 and entrust e d t hem t o a f ellow-monk for safeSome days later he asked for~, but alas, t hey

keeping.

-

-

86pr~face to t he ttProslogium, 11
by Oem1e , l oc. ,cit.

.§S.

Anselm, translated

87Rule, 22• ~· ~ I, 196.
88quoted anonymously in fili• Anselm: Ar chbisho~ Qi.
Canter bur y , an anonymous biography of the saint de icated
"TO THE POSTERITY OF THOSE WHOM ANSELN HELD I N OBEDIENCE
UNDER GOD•• THE CHILDREN OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ENGLAND. h

( London

&

Ed1 nburgh: Sands

&

Company, 1911), P• 78.

8 9Quoted anonymo1.tsly by Rule, loc •
90
:tbid.

.si.t•

91 stmilar to what we now read in Chapters II, III, & IV
of the 1:f2.slogium.

See

.ills!•,

Ii, 197.
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had disappeared.92

A search was made, but in va1n.93

Accordingly Ansel m again wrote the proof upon wax tablets,94
but t bis time he delivered them into the hands of a monk who
was more careful.95

This zealous brother96 took special

pr ecautions;, that i s, he h i d them 1n97 his bed. 98

The next

morning he was dismayed to find them on the floor with their

precious wax coating scattered in co\.D'ltless fragments all
over his r oomt 99

With a sad heart he gathered all together

and t ook t h.em t o Anselm' s room.LOO

Undaunted, the Saint

reconst :ructed the debrislOl and thus recovered the sublime
words t hat he had wr itten .

But fearing lest another accident

mi ght compl etel y dest roy his valuable manuscript, Anselm

order ed "in t he name of the Lordu102 that the work should
92Ibig.

93.[t,(I t\p.selm, published by Her der , p. 78.

94Rule, 19c. ~ .
95§.t.. Apselm, published by Herder, 1,Qs. cit.
96r{ule t hinks this is the same ·monk.

~ his book,

.l9c . c it.

97l.e!D,.

98Another account reads "under" his bed.
published by Herder, !2s,. cit.

See

a.

Anselm,

99u.ule, SU?.• cit., I, 197£.
lOOiS.• Ansel m, published by Herder, lgc. cit.

lOlAs an archa-eologist might reconstruct a shattered epi•
taphy down in t:he Catacombs. yide Rule, 22• c~t., I, 198.
102An anonymous quotation in~. ooselm, published by
Herder , p. 78.
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be transferred to parchment.103

This he called

Proslogion

because ilt it he speaks both to God and to himself.104

Clayton define s i t as nan address to the foolish person who
says there is no God.n105

Chapter one opens with a majestic

ex..~ort:ation:
Up now~ slight mm~! Flee, for a little while, thy
occupations; hide thyself, for a time, from thy disturbing thoughts. Cast aside; now; thy burdensome
cares 0 and put away thy toilsome business. Yield room
for some little time to God; and rest for a little time
in him. Enter the inner chamber of thy mind; shut out
all thoughts save that of God, and such as can aid
thee in seeking him; close thy <loor and seek h1m.l06
!'1oreover this chapter closes \iith an eamest prayer:

I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity,
for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that;
but I long to u..1:1derstand in some degree thy truth,
which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek
to under.stand that l may believe, but I believe in
order t o understand. For this also I belieya,·•that
tmless
I believed; I should not u..11derstand.
·, , ;.
Henry Osborn Taylor compares the quality of feeling in the

Pre§logite9 witb Dante's Paradiso.108

103Rule~ 1:2.2.• cit,
104a. Ansjlm; published by Herder 11 P• 79.

105clayton 11 22• 9it., p. 139.
106ttproslogium," ~. Ans.e lm, translated by Deane, P• 3.-

1071bi9., pp. 6f.

lO&raylor, SU?• s!.£·~ I, 276.
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His proof: Chapter Il
By faith we believe that God is "a being than which
nothing greater can be conceived. 11 109

But is this true?

Could we be mistaken?

"The fool hath said in his heart:

There is no God.ollO

Yet time~ Hthis very foo1nlll hears

about this being than which nothing greater can even be conceived-•he understands!

He grasps the idea but imagines

that it is.non-existent.

Now there is a difference in merely having a mental
image of something 9 and realizing that this entity exists.
When an artis t first decides to paint a picture, that
picture exists only in his mind.

Afterward it exists both

in his mind and also on canvas.112
Even a fool admits that this being than which nothing
greater ca.~ be conceived--this being••exists in the intellect.

This is apparent because he understands the concept

when he hears it.
in his mind.

But whatever a person understands exists

Horeover it is certainly impossible for this

being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist

109uproslogium, 11

~.

Anselm, translated by Deane, P• 7.

~ib\g•

llOpaalm 13:1, Ill!. ll9.l'l
Douay-Rheims Version
(New York: Benziger Brothers, c. 41), p. 517. (N.B. that
this is Psalm 14 in the King James Version.)
1110 Proslogium,u .§S. Anselm, translated by Deane, loc. cit.

-·

ll2tbid
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in the intellect alone.

If it exists only in my mind, then

I can t hink of it as existing on a higher lev~l, namely, in
reality.113
Hence if this being than which nothing greater can be

conceived exists only in the intellect, then it is an inferior being than which a greater can be conceived.
course this is an impossibility.

But of

Therefore (a) it is un-

de.nia.ble that a being exists than which nothing greater can
be conceived, and (b) it exists not only in the understanding,
but also in reality.114.

His proof: Chapter III
Furthermore the existence of this being than which a
greater cannot be conceived is so certain that one cannot
think of it as non-existent.

For it is possible to think

of a being which cannot be conceived as non-existent; and
such a beil'lg is greater than one which a perso·n can think

of as not existing.

Hence if it is possible to thi11k of

that being :han which nothing greater can be conceived. as

non-existent, then it is not that being than which nothing
greater can be conceived!
dictio11.

But this is a hopeless contra-

Therefore, the existence of this being than \-lhich

nothing greater can be conceived, is so certain that it is

113Ihid.,. P• 8.
1141pid.
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impossible fore person even to conceive of it as not
e:tis t ing--and th:i.s being is God .115

If it were possible for the human mind to conceive of
a being more excellent than God~ then the creature would
e1.:cel the Creator, which is most absurd.

The intellect can

conceive of everything (except God) as being i10n•existsnt.
Therefore it is the prerogative of God a lone to exist more
truly and in a higher degree than any other being.

Thus it

is evident to a rational intellect that God alone exists in
the supreme degree!
\.Jhy t hen has the fool said in his heart, "Non est Deus0 ?
1' \·

hy , e~{.cept that he i s dull and a fool? n 116

His proof: Chapter IV
But how could the fool say in his heart that which it
was impossible for him to conceive?

Or why was he unable to

understand the words of his heart?

Because saying something

in one's heart and conceiving, are identical.
But si11ce this fool both conceived, 117 and did not say

in his heart,118 it appears that there is more than just one

manner in which a person can conceive or say in his heart,

11s1bid., pp. 8f.

116Ibid., P• 9.

117Because he said in his heart.
118Because he was unable to conceive.
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namely, one conceives an entity ,men he understands the
meaning of the word which signified it, and when he under•
stands the entity itself.
Hence God can be conceived as non-existent in the former sense 9 but not in the latter.

For example$ the person

who understands the nature of fire and \~ater might confuse

the two if he only heard the 'WOrds; but he could never confuse the essences.

Likewise the person who understands the

meaning of the term G9d can never conceive of God as nonexistent~ whether or not he understands the meaning of the

wo~ds119 which he repeats in his heart.

This is true because

God is that being than which a greater cannot be conceived.
The person who fully comprehends this realizes that the
existence of this being is so certain that it cannot be nonexistent, not even in concept.

Therefore, if a man truly

understands that God is, then he cannot even think that God
is not.120
I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what
I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now so understand
by thine illumination, that if I were unwilling to believe that thou dost exist, 1 sh9uld not be able not
to understand this to be true.121
A

summary
In this subtle argument Anselm presupposes that the fool
l l 9li2n. u.t, ~ .

120ttpro·s logium,u .§.t.. Anselm, translated by Deane, P• 10.

121Ibid.

Thus Chapter IV closes with a prayer of adoration.

1
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understands what he says when he denies God's existence, and
tries to prove that the fool contradicts himself . 122 How•
ever Gilson has "no excessive admiration" for the "technical
mechanism"l23 of the proof in the Proslogion.

Anselm's

statement is a bit tedious but it can be epitomized as
follows:

a. L"fy idea of God is necessary.
b . Therefore, God exists.124
Or thus;
a . I have in my mind the idea of an absolutely perfect
being.
b. Now perfection implies existence.
c . Therefore, God exists.125
Henry Osborn Taylor comments:

By very definition the word Q.29. means the greatest con•
cei vable being. This conception exists even in the
atheist's mind, for he knows what is meant by the words,
the absolutely greatest. But the greatest cannot be
in the intellect alone, for then conceivably there
would be a greater which would exist 1n reality as well.
And since, by definition God is the absolutely g ~gtest,
He must exist in reality as well as in the mind.

1

122Erdmann, 2.2• cit., I, 305.
123Gilson, 22• s.!I.•, p. 59.

l24clayton, 212• s.!.S.•, P• 139.
125vide Weber, SU?.• cit., p. 217.

126taylor, 9.1?.• £!!.., I, 278.
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The very fact Uthat we can think of God proves that there
i s a God. 0127 God ie the highest thought of which the human
mind is capable.128 His existence is so necessary that it
i s impossible for Him to be non-existent, even in our
thought.129
In this argument Anselm infers the existence of God

from our idea of God . 130 He insists "that what exis t s in
thought exists in real 1ty. ul31
j ectively

in

Thus if God exists sub-

my mind, he also exists objectively outside my

rnind! l32

Gaunilon•s Critic ism
Anselm's position
Gaunilon , an aged monk133 at the monastery of Narmoutiers
in Touraine, 134 immedi atelyl35 challenged Ansel m's argument

12701enn, 21?•

£!.S.. , p. 195.

128Er dmann, .2.2.• cit., I, 304.
129Gilson , QJ?• pit., p. 60.

130clayton, loc. £!.S..
131Ibid., p. 140.
132tbid. , p. 139.
131Gaunilon; the for mer lord of Nontigny, did not enter
the monastery until after he had passed the seventieth year
of his age. ~ide Erdmann, 21?• c it . , I, 305 .
134weher, Loe.

ilt.•

135c1ayton, loc. cit.
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in a br ief e ssay entitled, Liber

EIQ..

Insipiente adversus

Anselmi ln, P~oslggi o ratiocinationem.136 Be firat states
Anselm ' s posi.tion , n arnely • if a person either denies er

doubts t he existence of a being whose nature is such that
nothing greater can be conceived j he is given the following
answer: The existence of this being is pr oved, first, by
the fac t t hat you (by your very doubt or denia l ) have in
your mind an i dea of t his being; for when you hear a person
speaking abou t thi s being you understand what he means.
Thus the proo f is based upon the fact that an idea
understood by t he mind necessarily has its counterpart in
the world of real i ty.137

Moreover this is demonstrated in

the following manner : I t is greater to exist both inside
the intell ect ~ and outside i n reality, than to exist in the
mind a l on e.

Now if this being exists only in the understand-

ing9 then even anything which has truly existed in the past

will . be superior to it.

Hence that which was greater than

all beings , wil l be infe.rior to some being, instead of greater
than all.

But t his is an obvious contradiction.138

Ther efore, t his being which is greater than a11139 must

1361n this dissertation the author will refer to it as
In Behalf of t he Fool. Vide the complete text in §S. Anselm,
translatedby-De°ane;-'pp. -rzi3'.53.

137tbid • ., p. 145.
138lll!g.
mind.

139He has already proved that this being exists in the

•

35

necessarily exist both in the intellect and in reality,
1

•otherwise it w:tll not be greater than all other beings.'' 140

The fool's reply

After summarizing Anselm's position, Gaunilon next
proceeds to state what might be the fool's reply, namely,
it is said tha t this being already exists i n my intellect

because 1 understand the meaning of the term.

But is this

not also t1-ue of a multitude of imaginery objects?
exist in my mind but none of them are real.

They all

Existence is

not confe rred upon these things sirnply by the fact that I

understand ·w hat a per.son means when I hear him talking about
them! 141
Certainly this is true 0 unless it can be shown that

the nature of t his being is such that "it cannot be held in
conceptul42 (as those entities whose existence is either

unreal or uncertain).

Hence when I hear about it I can

neither conceive of itp nor hold it in concept.

Yet it is

necessary for me to understand it and to have it in my in•
tel1ect

9

because it seems that I can conceive it only by

understanding it, that is, by knowing that it exists in

reality.
1401big.
141];bid., P• 146.

142Ibid.
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But if this 1s true U: annih ilates sequence 1n t i me ;

that is, it bre~ks the distinction between that which comes

before, and that which fol lows, for example, the picture
which existed in the mind of the artis t befoie he transferred
it to canvass .

11oreover it can hardly be admitted that when

one speaks of this being, or hears of this being, he cannot

conceive of it as non- existent in the same manner in which
even Gud cru1 be conceived of as non-exis tent .

Otherwise

~ha~ is the point in hurling this argument against someone
who either den1.es or doubts the existence of such a being? 14.3

Finally you affirm that this being exists in such a

~anner that a person cannot perceive it ~ith a mind con-

vinced of its own unques tionable existence--unless he con•
ceives of this being later.

However I should like to have

this proved by an a~gument which is beyond dispute, rather

than t he one which you have advanced, namely, that 'What I
comp1·ehencl:, \.Jhen I heaT. it, already exists

i11

my intellec t .

For I am ·still of the opinion that in my min<l there -~ould be

a ll ktncls of entities whose existence is either uncer tain

or fictitiouso if sumeone mention~d them in language that I
0

could underst and .

A~d mor e so if I should be deluded ( as

frequently happens ) and believe that they are real: " though
I do not yet believe 111 the being whose existence you

- ·

l 43I bid

1

37

would p1.ove . u144
You state that a picture exists in the mincl of the
painter before it exists on canvass .
not harmonize with your argument .

But this example does

The picture, prior to

being painted~ is latent in the skillz of the a1'"ti.et ; and
anythi 1g like this» existing in the ability o f an a1.""tificcr,

is not h ing more than a por tion of his inte llect .

For

e :i~a~p l e, St . Augustine declare s that when a carpenter is

about t o build a box, t hat box exists fir st in the skill of
Now the actual box is not life, but the

the ca~pente r .

potent ial box is .

Foz all these things are in the living

soul of t he carpenter before he produces them.

But why are

these entities life in the carpenter's animated soul, unless
it i s because they are only the understa.."lding or knowledge

of t he soul i t sel f ?l45
E1lcept for those fac ts -which ai:'e r ecognized as apper-

taining to t he mental nature, whatever the mind hears and
thinks about D :c perceives as real, without: do1.,b t there is

a distincti on between the real ent ity itself anrl the intellect
which gras ps it . 146 Hence even if it were true that a being
than which e greater is inconceivable exists, even then ,
this being p when hoard a!>out and understood, is no t similar

..
14 4,!bid •., P• 147 .
1'>5 rbid

- ·

l461bid .

(Gaunilon•s t hought is slightly ambiguous here.)
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to the potential p ict.m:e in the mind o f the painter.

Now let us r.e t:urn to the point rne11tioned a bove, in
ref e r ence to thi s being which .is great er t han all that can
be conce i v ed , a.l'ld which , it i.s affi rmed;

0

c a.a be non e other

t han God himse lf.0147.
1 :, so far as actual k1,.owledge of t he object, either
from its specific or general character, is concerned,
am as little able to co nce i v e .of this being ·when I
hear of it, or to have it in my understandµig, as I
a m t o con c e i ve o f o ,: vn d..:!rstand God hims elf: whom:1

indeedll f or this very reason I can conceive not to

exis t .

}8

For I do not perceiv e that reality which is identical with
God ; nor is i t possi ble fo r me to surmi.se what that reality

is by observing a similar reality .

For you yourself affirm

t ha t this t'e&l i t.y is unique .

Suppose I s hould hear a statement concernL,g an abson
l u te· otranger

3

a man °of who se very existence I was une.war~ .u149

1.' hr ough my knowledge of universals, by whi ch I know humanity,
I could f orm a ~nenta.1 concept of this .t1&n .

And yet it would

be possi bl e~ if my informant had deceived me, that the man

of whom I had conceived was non~existent; because the universal th~ough which I conceived hi m (although an unqeniable
f act) was never theless not this particular man, but !!!.ml in

general .
147 Ii.:id.,
1..
p. 148.
net quoting Anselm.)

-·
-·

148Ibid

149Ibid

(This is Gaunilon speaking.

He is

1
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Hence it is impossible for me150 to hold "that being
of which you speak,tt l 51 either in concept or i n tmderstanding 9 when I hear the tenn Q2£, or the statement~
~ fil .other beings.152

!?!i n& ueater

For I am able to

think of the man according to something t hat is familiar to
me; but I could never think of God , or of a being that is
greater t han all other beings, except accor ding to the word
only.

t-:or eover an ent i t y can scarcely or never be conceived

after this manner .

For when a person grasps something in

t his fashion 9 i t is not so much the wo~dl53 itself that he
understands when he hear s it 9 as it is the meaning o.f the
word .

But this is not apprehended like a person who knows

the general meani ng of the term.
like one

~mo

Rather it is conceived

i s not acquainted with the object, and who

thinks of it only according to the mental image produced by
his intell ee t.

And it would be suprising if the mind would

eve r be abl e to attain this goal.154
So when I hea.r a per son affirm that t here is a being

gr eate~ tha n all concei vable beings and ·understand his

150xn the manner t hat I should grasp this f ictitious
be ing in underst anding or in concept.

-·

l51Ibid

152lbid.

153of course the WO£d i s a r eal enti~y, i.e., the sound
of t he syllables and letters.

154Ibid., p. 149.
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assertion , thi s being exists 1n my 1ntellect!l55
Furthermore I am to l d that this being must necessarily
exists not just in the intellect, but also in reality.

And

this affi rma tion i s proved in the following way: If this
being wer e non... exi stent, then i t would be i nferior to anything exis ting outside the mind.

And then this being which

exists in my L,t ellectl56 will not be superior to all other

beings. 157

1 answer : I f it should be asserted that in the mind
there e,ds ts a bei ng which a person cannot even conceive in

terms of any r eality~ I do not deny the existence of this

being in my intellect.

But this fact does not enable that

being to rise t o t he level of .I§.!! existence.

Ther e f ore, l

deny its exis tence in reality until I shall be convinced
otherwi se by a certain proof.158
Be who ar gues that this being exists 11because other•
wise t he being which is greater than all will not be greater
t han a11ul59... this person is uncircu.-nspect wit h his words.
~For • • • 1 even deny or doubt that this being 1.s greater

- ·

155I bid

156This has already been proved.

-

l57Ihid.

158tbid.~ p. 150.

-

159Ibid.
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than any real object. 0 160

In fact the only existence 1161

concede to this being is that which it has when the intellect
hears a word and then attempts to form a mental picture of
an object that it knows absolutely nothing about.
How then can you prove to me that this being truly
exists by merely assuming that it is superior to all beings?l62
Por I would st!.11 deny your assertion, or doubt your demon•
stration 9 to a certain extent; that 1s, I would refuse to
admit that t his being is in my mind and thought as many
objects are whose actual existence is doubtful and uncertain.
A person should first prove that this being itself
exists in reality somewhere; "and then, from the fact that
it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that
it also subsists in itself."163

For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is
an isla.11d, which, because of the difficulty, or rather
the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist,
is called the lost island. And they say that this is•
land has an inestimable wealth of all manner of riches
and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of
the Islands of. the Blest; and that having no owner or
inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other countries~ which are inhabited by mankind, in the abundance
with which it is stored.

160llis·

1611£ I may call it existence.
16 2.rhus the argument is based upon a mere hypothesis.
163.iw.

1

Now if some one should tell me that there is such an
island, I should easily understand his words, in which
there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on
to s ay, as if by a logical inference: '*You can no
l onger doubt · that this island which is more excellent
than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no
doubt that it is· in your understanding. And since it
is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone,
but to exist both in the understanding and in reality,
for t his reason it must exist. For if it does not
exist, any land which really exists wil l be more ex•
cellent than it; and so the island already understood
by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent ...
If a man should try t o prove to me by such reasoning
that this island truly exists, and that its existence
should 110 longer be doubted 9 either I should believe
t hat he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to
regar.d as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I
should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose
that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island. ~or he ought to show first that
the hypothe~ical excellence of this island exists as
a r eal and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any un..
real object, or oyg whose existence is uncertain, in
my understanding. 4
This is how the fool would answer the arguments
time ••

0

in the mean

• • 11165

Furthermore when he is assured that this being is so
lofty that it is impossible to think of it as not existing,
and t'lhen t his is proved by resorting to the fact that other'tdse this being would be less than all things-.. then the fool

may reply the same as before and add:

~en did l affirm that

sny being like thisl66 really exists?--that upon this basis
you should prove to me that it also exists in the real world

l64Ibid., pp. 150£.

165l!?J..g., P• 151.
166

I.e., a Supreme Being.
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to such an extent that its non-existence is conceivable?

Where.as you should f irst (a) prove that a supreme nature
exi.sts; so that from this fact we may be able (b) to prove

what attributes it necessarily possesses .167

Noreover i t is asserted t hat to think of this being as
non..,e-xiste11t is inconceivable .

to affirm

11

Perhaps it would be better

t ha.t its non ... existence, or the possibility of its

non.,.existence:i is unintelligible. 0 168
fictitious entities are unintelligible.

For stt>ictly speaking,
Yet a person can

think of t hem a~ exi.sting in the same manne'!' a s t he fool
t hought of God a s not ex1.sting.

I am conscious of my own

exist ence; yat I realize that i t is possible for me not to
exist.

No1:eover I am certain I understand that God ·e ?{ists

and it is i mpossible for him not to exist ..

But I am uncer-

tain whether it is possibl e for me to conceive of myself as
non-existent i n the san,e moment that ! am most aware of my
existence.

If I can~ ·w hy then am 1 unable to think of the

nonDexistence of everything else which 1 perceive with the

sa.~e degreG of certainty?

But if I cannots then God i s not

the only being whose non-existence it is impossible to con•
ceive.

The Christian spirit of Gaunilon is evident from the
manner in which he concludes his reply:

-·~

167rbid

P• 152.

168lb\g_.

__J
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The other par ts of this book are argued with such
truth; such brilliancy, such grandeur; and are so replete wit:h usef ulness , so f r agr ru:1t wi th a certain

perfume of devout and holy feeling, that though there
are matters in t he beginning which, however r ightly
sensed, are weakly presented, t he r est of the work
should not be r e j ected on this a ccount . The rather
ought these ea r lier mat ters to be rea soned more
cogently, and the
to be rec eived with gr eat
res pec t and honor . ·

l%ele

A summary
Gaunilon maintains t hat Anselm's reasoning is unconvincing for an atheist.170

In fact a person coul rl "prove"
the ~xistence of «an enchanted island017 1 by the very same

method .

If we acc e p t Anselm's argument we might as well

assert that t he most beautiful island imaginable must exist
somewhere , because we can conceive of it.172
The Ontological ar gument, if valid, would prove too
much ! l 73 We are no t permi t ted to infer t he existence of an
entity fro,a its definition .174
leap

O

Anselm has made an illicit

f rom the log i cal to t he r eal order." 17 5

Weber remarks:

169rb~d., PP· 1s2f.
170oe Wulf , 2.12.• cit., I, 162.
171This is Weber 's phrase.

~ 22•

sit.• ! P• 217.

Erdmann r efer s to it as ai1 island Atlantis.

I, 305.
172Coplest on, 22• cit., II, 163.
17 3oe Wulf,

l.2.£. ill•

174Tayl or, 5lll• .£!.t.•
i ,· I,
. 278·•
175copleston,

loc.

cit.

~

22• cit.,
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. . . . we hardly know what to admire most,•-St. Anselm's
broad and deep conception, or the sagacity of his
opponent \vtio, in the seclusion of his cell, g1J.tici•
pa tes the 'rransoer1dental Dialectic of Kant.176

Anselm's Apologet:ic
Introductioi'l

Anselm di d not permit t he challenge of his opponent to
go unanswered .

Rather he replied in a work entitled Liber

.....

Ap2logetiS,"US contr.a Gaunilonem
responden$:em ~ Insipiente.177
.
'
.....................
....
.

In t he Pref ace he asserts that he is &1swering 0 the
Catholic0 178 rather than the insipiens.179

He declares:

It was a f ool against whom the argument of my Proslogium
was directed. Seeing, however, that the author of
thes,e obj ections is by no means a fool, and is a
Catholic, speaking in behalf of the foolA I think it
suffic~ent that I answer the Catholic.l8v

Rebuttal
Anselm first states Gaunilon'sl81 objection, namely•

l76ue ber , 22• ci.t ., p. 218.

1771n this dissertation the author will refer to it as

AnseJ:m' ~ ~J?S!logetic.

Vida the full text in ~. Anselm,

tra.11slated by Deane, pp:-1'53•70.
17 8Ibid., p. 153.
179 r.e., the fool.

VidS Copleston, 2.2• cit., II, 162.

180"Anselm' s Apologetic, 11 §!.. Anselm, translated by
Deane, loc. cit. ·

lSlu • • • whosoever you may be* who say that a fool is
capable of making ,t hese statements • • • •" Ibid.

46

you affirm that a being than which a greater cannot be con..
ceived is in the intellect in precisely the same manner as
fictitious beings which could not possibly exist in reality.
Furthermore you maintain that to infer the real existence of
this being from the fact that it exists in the mind is as
wrong as to infer the certain existence of a lost island
from the fact that when a person hears a description of this
island he is convinced that it exists in his mind.182
Then Anselm replies:

If a being than which a greater

cannot be conceived is not understood, and is not in the
mind 0 then either God is not such a being, or he is not under•
stood, and does not exist in the intellect.

nsut I call on

your faith and conscience to attest that this is most
false. 0 183
mind .

Hence this being is understood and is in the

Therefore, either the premises upon which you attempt

to refute me are false:. or your conclusion is unjustified.
But you believe that even though a person understands
a being than which a greater is inconceivable, still he may
not infer that this being exists in his mind; and that if
this being is in his mind, he dare not infer that it exists
in reality.184
My answer is that if it is possible to conceive of this

182l!?!s!·
18312.i-!!•,
b
4
p. 15.

1841b1d.
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being as existing, then it must truly exist.

For it is im-

possible to think of that than which a greater cannot be con•
ceived, except as having no beginning.

"But whatever can ha

conceived to exist, and does not exist, can be conceived
to exist through a beginning. 0 185

Henc:e this is not that

being than ~vhich a greater is inconceivable.

The.r efore, if

a person is able to think of this being as existing, it
exists by necessity.
Furthermore if it is possible to thi nk of this being at
all, it must exist.

For nobody who doubts or denies the

existence of such a being, doubts or denies that if it did
exist, it could not be non-existent, either in the mind or
in reality.

Otherwise this being would not be that than

which a greater is inconceivable.

But as to a fictitious

entity in the mind (if it did exist) its non-existence 'WOUld.
be possible, either in the intellect or in the real world.
Therefore, if it is possible to think of a being than which
a greater cannot be conceived, it must exist.186
But suppose this being is non-existent, even though it
can be imagined.

Any fictitious being that can be conceived

(if it existed) would not be that being than which a greater

cannot be thought.

If then a being should exis-t g+eater

than which is unthinkabl.e,. it would not be that than which

l85Ib1fl.

_.,

l86Ibid

p. 155.

a greater is incon.c eivable••which is extremely ridiculous .
Flenae if it is possible to think of a being than which a

greater cannot be conceived, it is untrue to deny its existence; and more sol) if a person can understand this being,
or if th:ts being exists mentally.
Moreover I 9 l l venture to say that doubtless any entity
which is non~existent at any time or place (even if it does
exist somewhere or sometime) can be thought of as never
existing anywhere, as it is non-existent somewhere at some
time.

Fo r t hat which is today, but yesterday was not, can

be grasped by the mind as never having existed-•in the same
way as the mind knew that it was non-existent yesterday.
That which is absent from this particular place 0 but exists
somewhere) can be imagined to be nowhere, the same as it is
not here.

'£hus concerning an entity whose component parts

are non-existent at the same times oT places: this entire
object can be thought of as existing nowhere or never.187
It is asserted that time is etenial and the world is

omnipresent; yet time as a whole does not exist always, and
the world as a whole does not exist everywhere.

And since

the constituent parts of time do not exist simultaneously,
a person can imagine that they never exist.

And since the

component parts of the world are non-existent where other

portions exist, they can be thought of as existing nowhere.
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Furthermore, that which consists of parts can be annihilated
in thought and become non-existent.

Therefore, it is im-

possible to con~eive of anything composed of parts as not
existing--even though it exists.188
But that being th.an which a greater is inconceivable,
if. i t t ruly exists~ cannot be imagined as n~n-existent.

Ot herwise i t is not that ~han which a greater is inconceiva bl e : whi ch i s contradictory.

So it always exists every-

where as a whole.
Now do you believe that it is possible to conceive or
under-st and this being? Or that this being can exist in con•
cept?

Otherwis e it is impossible to undezstand these

t hings ttwith refere11ce to it. 0 189

But if you affirm that it

is absent from the mind 11 a.nd that i -t is not understood

because it is not comprehende<l,190 then you should assert
that a person 1vho cannot look dire-ctly at the sun does not
even see

S'Unlight.

11 the

l ight of day/' 191 which is nothing more than

Certainly a being than which a greater is incon-

ceivable exists and is in the intellect--at least to the
extent that these statements about it are understood.

No\V 3 ! affirmed in my argument that when the fool hears
188~•• p. 156.
189lbid.

1901 • e •

i>

19llbid.

understood thoroughly.
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somebody mention a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, he understands the meaning of these words .

The

person wao fails to perceive ·when he hears a well-known

language~ either has a very dull understanding, or none at
all .

Furthermore, as stated previously, if a person under-

stru~ds this being, it exists in his mind.

But can a being

exist necessarily in. reality; and be absent fr.om every
intellect?
But you will object that: even though it i s in the mind,
we da~e not infer that it is un9erstood.
understood unless it is tn the mind.
dent than this? 192

But it cannot be

What can be more evi-

Afterwards I affirmed that if this being exists only in
the mind, it can also be thought of as existing in reality.which is greater.

Now, if the existence of this being is

mental only;, then ''obviously the very being than which a

greater cannot be conceived is one than which a greater can
be conceived.n193. What can be more logical?

For if this

being ex1.sts in the intellect alone, is it not possible to
conceive of it as existing also in reality?

And if a person

is able to think of that being in this way, is it not true
that he conceives of something which is greater--if it

exists only in the intell~ct?
192l.1l.!g.,
b
p. 1-57.
l93Ibid

-·

Therefore, I am consistent

I
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when I infer that if a. being than ·which a greater is incon-

ceivable has only a mental existence, then it is not that
bei ng than. lA'hich a gr.eater is inconceivable.194

But certainl y nobody thinks that a being than tvhich a
greater can ba concei ved, is identical with a being than
which a gr eater cannot be conceived.

Hence may I not infer

t hat if a being than wbich a greater is inconceivable exists
i n my mind, that it does not exist here alone?

For if it

exist s onl y mentally, then it is a being t han which a greater
can b e co11ceiv ed.

But you assert that this is li.ke affirming the real
existence of a l ost island, because the person

"~mo

hears it

de scribed ea sily understands what he hears. 11 195
Now I pr omise confidently that if any man shall devise
anything existing either in reality or in concept
alo1'le ( exce pt that than which a g"S:"eater cannot be con•
ceived) to which he can adapt the sequence of my

reasoning, I will discover that thi ng, and will give
him his lost island, not to be lo,s t again.196

But the basis of this proof is so firm that it is impossible
to imagine the non-existence of that being than which a
greater cani1o·t be conceived; otherwise it would be totally
non-existent.
So if anyone asserts that he conceives of this being

19411?!9.., p. 158.
195Ibig.

Gatmilon.

196:r.bid.

These are Anselm's \,rords.

He is not quoting

52

as not existing, I affirm that he simultaneously either
thinks of a being than which a .greater cannot be conceived,
or he does not think at all.

"If he does not conceive, he

does not conceive of the non.existence of that of which he
does not conceive.ul97

But if he does think, he surely

t hinks of that which cannot even be conceived as nonexistent.

For if a person were able to think of this being

as not existing 9 he could then imagine it as having a begin-

ning and a terminus.

But

He, the11~ who conceives of this being conceives of a
being which cannot be even conceived not to exist; but
he ,~10 conceives of this being does not conceive that

it does not exist; else he concei ves what is incon°

ceivabl e. The non-existence~ then, of that than !hich
a gr eater cannot be conceived is inconceivable.I 9

I mainta in that it is impossible to s::2nceiye of this supreme
being as not existing, but you o'bject to my terminol,ogy.

You

think it migh t be bet·t er to say that one cannot understand

the non~existencen or even the possibili ty , of the non•
exist ence of t his being.

But it is more proper to say conceive: for if I had
asserted that it is :Lmpossible to understand the object as
non~existent, perhaps you yourself would have objected that
••nothing which is can be understood not to be, for the non•
existence of what exis.t s is unreal • • • • ul9 9 Hence. there
197Thb'1A
d.
~ · ; p .. 159.

198Ibid.

1991.e!.q., PP• 159£.
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would be entities other than God whose non•existence it is

impossible to understand.

Thu.s- a person can understand one

of those real beings as not existing in the same manner that
he understands other things in reality to be non~existent.
But if a person pays close attention he certainly Will
not be able t:o hurl this objection against ·t he term c29c"ption.

No real being-a ca,.--i be understood as non-existent; yet all
entities-ii except the supreme being 9- can be conceived as not

e:u.sting.

The only objects which can be conceived as non-

existent ar.e those which (a) have a beginning!t (b) an end,
(c) parts, or tvbich (d) do not exist as a unit at any place

That being alone, on the other hand; cannot be con-

ceived not to exist, 111 which ai1y conception discovers
neither beginning nor end nor composition of parts,
and which ~ooconception finds always and everywhere
as a whole.

It is possible for you to think of yc,urself as not existing,
even though you are convinced that you exist.
that you admit your ignorance on this point.

I am astonished
For we imagine

the non;:.existence of many objects that we know are real and

the e,tistm1ce of many which we know are fictitious: not by

convincing ourselves that they exist 1n this manner, but by
surmising that they exist as we think of them.
It is possible for us to conceive of an entity as not

existing when we know that it exists., because we are able to
2001b~d., P• 160.
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t:hin:k of the former and know the latter simultaneously.

But

it is impossible for us to conceive of an object as not

existing when we know that it exists, because we cannot
think of existence and non-existence at the same time.
Thus 1£ a per.son will distinguish these two senses he
will understand that (a} as long as he knows an entity
existsll he cannot conceive of it as non-existent, and (b)
he can conceive of everything which he knows to exist as
non-existent, ~hat is~ all except that being than which a
greater is inconceivable.
Hence Goel alone cannot be thought of as non-existent;
and yet (i.n a sens~) the same is true of numerous real ob•
But I have already shown the particular way in which

jects.

this is applicable to God.201

Your other objections are all minor and I had intended
to pass them in silence, but since it is reported that some
people have been impressed, I shall discuss them briefly.

First, you repeatedly point out that I affirm (a) the exist~
ence of this supreme being in the intellect, and (b) if it
exists mentally~ it also exists extramentally, hfor other•
wise the being which is greater tha11 all would not be greater
than a11.n202
However a demonstration of this nature cannot be found
201

1.l?!s!•,

202Ibid.

p. 161.

(These are Anselrn•s ~rds.)
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in ,my of my ,rriting s.

For it is ir,1po ssible to e1:i.ploy the

s.ame method f or pr oving the real existence cf a bei1"1.g

e rea ter th.:n all other beings , and a. being than which is
g reater is i n conceivable.
If :Lt s1:.ould be ol)je cted tl1a t a bei ng than ~·711.ich a
~re0.t er· c a:m.1 .ot ba conceived ( a ) ~s non-eY..istcnt in reality,
or ( b) there is a possibility t hat it does n o t exi st , or
(c) a ~)c rson c an c onc e ive of it as no t e.l-cisti-..1g , such a de-

clar ation will not be diff icult to refut e .

For t he non-

ex:i.stcncc of t h e n on - exis te.1.t is possibl e , and an e n tit.,"
w:dciJ. might not exist c an be. thought of :i s n on-existent .
But anything which c an be conceive.d as not e:dsting (if
it e:dsts) i s n ot 'i::Ck.".1.t than which a grc.:!t~r is inconceivable;

but if it i.s non-exis t ent , i t woul<i. not be (even if it d id

.

.)

C XJ.$1:

a being t rian which a r~rcater is ii.-iconce ivable.

it i s impossible to affirm that (a) a being than whi ch a

gr ent c-! r cannot be conc eiv ed (if re.al) is not a being than
·which a a r eater c a nnot be conce ived; or ( b ) i f it ucre real ,
.
.
.
. ·1 203
it would not be th"', t than which a greater i s J.nconceivao e .

1~tus it is obvious that (a ) this being exists , (b) it

is i mpossible for i t to be non-existent, and (c) it cannot
be c onceived as n ot e.."Cisting . 204
However it appears more difficult to prove t ~i s
20 3'.!.._
bi" d . , p . 162
· .

204

-

Ibi d .

•
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concerning a being greater than all other beings.

For it

is not so apparent that what can be thought of as non•
existent is not greater than. all real beings, as it is that
it is not a being

than which a greater is inconceivable.

Nor is it so unquestionable that if a supreme being does

exist 9 it is 11one other than the being than which a greater
cannot be conceived, or that if it were a being of this k.ind,
there might not be others just like t.t-• •as it is certain

concen1ing a being i-m.ich, posited hypothetically, as one
thar.i wh:i.ch a greater :ls inconceivable,
Consi der: If a person should assert that (a) there is
a supreme being, but this being can be conceived as non•
existooti, and (b) a greater being (although non.,.existent)

can be conceived to exist: is the infe~ence that (a) this
being is not greater than all others, as apparent as the
inference that (b) it is not the being than whtch a greater

is inconceivable?205 This is because the first conclusion
demai'ldS a premise in addition to "&{eater st>zan

ill other

beings.,u206 whereas in my proof the predication"! be.ing
~ 'Which

.a

srea-t .er pamiot ~ conceived"207 is sufficient.

The existence of this being than which a greater cannot

205zw.' P·• 163.
206.1bt;d.

207Jbid •
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be conceived can be demonstrated: for a person cannot identify
this being with any other than that which alone is supreme.
This being than \~1ioh a greater is inconceivable is W1der•
stood, e.."tists ili: the mind and also in re~lity; likeWise that

being which is g1:eater than all other beings is understood,
is in the mind, and therefore its existence in reality is a
necessary inference.
You see, then, wlth how much justice you have compared
me with your fool 9 who, on the sole ground that he
understands whot is describ~d to him,. 't·rould affirm

that a lost island ex1sts.208

Anothe r objection is that any beings, whose existence
is fictitious or doubtful, can be understood and can exist
both in the intellect and in reality, the same as this
supreme being.

I am amazec that you thought of this diffi•

culty, for I was trying to demonstrate something still un•

certai11 0 ancl at f irst I was satisfied to prove that "this
be1l.11g is understood in any way 1 " 209 and exists mentally.
And I had intended to deliberate whether this being also exists
in reality.

For if entities whose existence is tmcertain or

imaginary, are understood in this manner and exist in the
mind simply because a person understands when he hears them
spoken of, then n there is no reason \>my th.at being of which
I spoke should not be understood a..'ld be in the understanding. 0210
2081~1d.
20 9.I.2!.i!.

-·

210tbid

1

p. 164.
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Fux-thermo:re, how can you reconcile these t,,ro statements

of your~ 0 name ly~ t hat ( a ) if a person should speak of any
fic t itious objects whatever, you would understand what he

mea~t ; an<l (b) tn1en you hear of the bei ng which exists,211
you would ref use t o admit that you hold i t in concept-because you a ffir m t he only way it is possible for you to
conceive of th1.!1 be ing, 1~ to understand iti, that is, 'to com-

prehend i ts existence i n reality? 212
Again, you a sser t it 1s pe~i1aps beyond belief that when
a person hears o f t his being, it is impossible for hL~ to
think of it as non- existent 111 the same mann~r that he ca.~
th ink of God as being non- existent .
A difficulty o f this kind could be refut~d by those who
have hut l i ttle skill in dialectics.

Is it reasonable for

a person to deny the existence of some thing he mlderstands,
because it is asserted that this is the being which he de•
clares to be non-existent Ubecauae he does :not understand
1tu7213

Or, if at times the e xistence of this being is

denied because it is only partially unde rstood, and that
which is mist~~derstood completely is identical to him:

is

it not easier to demonstrate something which is undecided

conce.r ning a being that exists in some mind , than of a being

which exists in no mind?

-------

211And not as imaginary entities are conceived.
212l b1d e9 p. 165.

21JTb.;~

~ ·,

P• 166.
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Hence it 1s impoesible to belteve that anybody denies
t he exintence o f. a being t han t-:hich a g "eater is tnconceiv•

able , which, \ihen he hears , he partially understands:

it is

unbelievable tha t any man denies the existence of this being
becaus~ he affirmn th&t God214 does not exict.
person asserts t:hat anothex entity is

Or if a

on... e..:istent because

he understru.1da it not at allQ yet is it not easier t o demon•

s t rate the exi tence of something which is only partially
w.dcrstood 9 tha..\1 of something concerning which we are totally
igno rant?

Thus i t was not irrational to employ the hypothesis of
a be ing than ~m ich a greater is inconceivable, to counter the
foo l for the demonstration of God's e:cistence:

because the

fool would have some understanding of such a being, but he

could not understand God at alt. 215
Furthermore, it was unnecessary for you to prove that
the being than which a greater is inconceivable is unlike
the picture in the mind of the artist before he paints it .
I did not have this in mind when I sugges ted this illustra•
tion.

I had no intention of affirming that this being i s

analogous to the preconceived picture .

1 merely wished to

prove that something which i s tmderstood to be non- existent
can exist mentally.
21

4-iie does not conc eive of God by sense at all .

215Jbig ..

1
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Again , you asse:t't that whe n you hear of a being than
which e. greater c anno t b e con ceived, you. are unable e ither
t.:o thtnk of t t in rela t~ions h i p to any particular or general

en tit y kno,-m. to you , o r t o poss es s i t in your i ntel l ec t-because::216 you <lo not knot~ t he e ~se:nce of such a being , and

you cannot form a men t a l representation of i t f ro~ a..~yt h ing

,m1ch resembles i t .
l3ut this is pl ai n ly false , for every being which i s l ess
goorl ( to the e:ittent tha t it: i s good) resenbl es the gr eate'.!:

good.

Ther e fore , i t is obvious to any r ational i ntellect

that if we ascend the scale of goodness from the l esser to
the grcaater 11 tie ea:n f orm a notable con cept of a being t han

which a greater cannot be conceived.
Fo r example , a good tihic h has bot h a be ginning and an

end 9 is inf erior to a good which begi ns but never ceases t o
be; and a good which has nei t he r begL?Jning nor and, i s
s uperior t o both.

And furthermore , a being (v1het her real

or fictitious) i.11 which t here i s no ne ces s i ty f or either
change ox motion , i s mor e excell ent tha.~ el l three . 217

Now9 is thi s inconcei vable?
being ·which is con ceivabl e?

Or i s the~e some greater

Or i s t his no t formL."lg a con•

cept f rom beings than which a great e r is conceivable, of
216AS
.
A
•
ft
you
8..t.1ffiJ. t •
217I,bic! .. I) p . 167 .
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that being t:han which n e:v.-eater is 1nconce:l:vable?218
Thus "t.lTe can refute t he fool who refuses to accept

hallowed author.ity, if he denies the possibility of forming
a concept from other entities of a be1:i.1g than which a greater

car~~ot be conceived .

But if any Catholic denies this, let

him not for.get. that: the i nvisible things of God "from the
creation of the 'Wi>Zld, are clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made, even his eter.nal power and Godhead.tt219
Now i f it wez-e L-npossible to understa.'!'lcl or think of a

bei.ng than which a greater cannot be conceived, yet this
being than. ·w hich a greater is inconcei,.,able is both " c on•

ceiv.:iblP. and intelligible."220

In fact one could say

ineffablej even though that which is ineffable ca.'tl.not be

· descxibed.

u1.nco11ceivabl,!, is conceivable~ although that to

t1nich the word inconceivable can be applied is not conceiv•
able . u221

2'reater

li

So when a person asserts"~ ~han, ~~ nothing
c,2ncllivabl;e,n 2 22 his words are without doubt both

concai.vable and understandable, although the being than
which a greater is inconceivable, can be neither conceived
nor understood .
218~ . D P~ 168.
219.n,1s;1.

- ·

220Ibid

~·

221Ibic1

222J:.~i,s!.

(Anselm is quoting ·'omans 1:20. )
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Or if t here is a person f.oolish enc,ugh t o affirm that
no beili.g ~xists than whi~h a greate;.:- c annot be co-;. 1.cei ved,
still he will

l'li)t

be so brazen as t ,l assert that he h im-

self: is unable eit :,.er to conceive or understand his own
wor.cls .

If there i s such a man, his ~-ords ought t o be r e•

jectetl, and he himself should be despi9ecl.
Al'1ybody who deni e s the existence o f a be ing than which

a greater cannot be conceived at l eas t conceives nnd understru1ds his

w11

asse?"tion .

nut this t~uld be impossible

::rithout the constituent parts of the denial, a11d one of

thee terms is "a oe:ing than which a greater cannot be conceivccl . t1 223

Therefore, a.~y pe ~son making this denial bath

conceives aid understands that than ~hieh a greater is in-

conceivable.
Noreover~ :tt i s evident t hat 1n the same way it is
possibl e to CQnceive of and understand a being whose
110ncoxistence is imf~Ssible ; but he who conceives of
this conceives of a greater being than one whose nonexistence ii:: possible. Hence :i wh.en a baing than
which a greater is inconceivable i s conceived, if it
is a being vtnose non°e1c.istence i.s possible that is
conceived, it is not a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. But an object c&,not be at once

conceived and not conceived . Hence he ~ho conceives
of a being than which a greater i s inconceivable,
does not conceive of that whose non-existence is
possible, but of that whose non- existence is L~possi•
ble. Therefore, ~-mat he conceives of must exist; for
a..~yt hi11g ~"hose non-exi~~~nce is possible, is not that
of which he conceiv~s.
223,L~iq., P• 169.
22411?19..
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I believe I have proved by a compelling argument that 1n my
book 1 demonstrated the true existence of a being than which
a greater is in.conceivable; and I am confident that this
proof cannot be nullified by the validity of any objection.
For the potency of this reasoning is such that the being
than which a greater cannot be conceived (a) exists in reality
b y necessity 11 and (b) is

0

whatever we should believe of the

divL'l'le substance, 0 225 because this being is either conceived

or understood.
Fo~ we ascribe to God anything of which the positive is
conceived to be better than the negative; for example. eternity is better than time 11 good is better than evil 11 even
goodness itself, rather than badness.

Now 9 every attribute

of thi s nature is necessarily a characteristic of that being
t han 'lmich a greater cannot be conceived.

Hence this being

must be everything which should be ass·i gned to the divine
essence.
1 thank you for your ktndness both in your blame and
in your praise for my book. For since you have commended
so generously those parts of it which seem to you worthy
of acceptance~ it is quite evid-ent that you have criti•
cized in no unkind s~irit those parts of it which
seemed to you weak.226
Summary

In Anselm's reply he declares that his proof is not
225lbid., p. 170.
226Ibid.

1
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based upon an entity 0 quod majus omnibus estu227 but rather
from the nquo majus cogitari nequit. 11 228

The fool must admit

that he conceives of God as truly existing, or he is making
a statement ,~1ich he himself does not believe.

Anselm thus

imparts a very subjective tone to his proof but in this form
it is more valuable than when it appears in its later form

(as used by Wolff and others).229
The existence we conceive is necessary
God0 because his very essence is to exist.

II in

the case of

But ••in the case

of the perfect islandu230 this existence is only contingent.
Granted that the wrd QQ.g. means an absolutely perfect
Being 9 and absolute perfection implies existence, then this
Being necessarily exists; whereas the existence of the most
beautiful island is not absolutely necessary.231
The idea of God and the idea of this island are not on
the same level, not even in the mental order!

If the exist-

ence of God is possible, that is, if there is no contradic•
tion involved in the idea of an absolutely perfect, necessary
Being, then God~ exist!

It would be a contradiction 1n

227Erdmann, 22• s.J:!., I, 305.
228Ibig.
229tbid.

230oe Wulf, SU?• s!.£., I, 162.
231

Tbe concept o f an island implies impe rf ect ion b e•
cause it involves quantity.
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terms to speak of

0

a merety pgssible pecesea.a Be1ngn;232

but there is no contradiction if one speaks of a merely
possible beautiful island. 233
An Evaluation

The proof stated

Numerous attempts have been made to epitomize Anselm's
f anous argument but it may be stated as follows:
a. The term God means "that than which a greater cannot
be con~!1ved", that is, an absolutely perfect
being.

b. Now I have a mental imJge235 of this being; that is,
it ~xists in my mind. 2 6
c. But if this being exists S!n1.z in my intellect it is
not absolutely perfect, becau~~ real existence is
higher than mental existence. 7

232copleston, SU?• cit.~ II, 163.

233In modern times the opinion has frequently been ex•
pressed that the Ontological argument stands or falls wit h
Realism. However this view is incorrect. Vide Friedrich
Ueberweg, ~ist9rx 2f. Philosophy, 2 vols . , translated from
the fourth German edition by Geo . s. Morris, with additions
by Noah Porter (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1892), I, 385.
234vlde Copleston, 22•
2351.e., an idea.

.s!.£. , II, 162.

236This is true even in the mind of the atheist, because
he understands the meaning of the term when he hears it .
237This is obvious because all ideal beings lack an
attribute of perfection, vi:z., existence. Hence if this
being exists only inside my mind I can conceive of a being
that is greater, yiz. , one that exists also in reality.

•
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d. Hence this being must have both (a) a logical, and
(b) an ontological existence.238
e. Ther efore , Go1 necessaril y exists .

However t he t erm ontological argument is both " unfor tunate
and misleading" because, for example, " It savours o f
Kantism. • • • " 239

The proof criticized
Histor ians disagree concer n ing both the value and the
meani ne of the Onto logi cal pr oof . 240

St . Bona venture and

Duns Sc:otu s li.ke t he proof . 241

Furt:her mor e Descartes,
Le i bniz, and especial l y Hegel , are at tracted t o it.24 2

In

f act Hegel rega.rds i t as the one t rue a rgument f or the

existence of God .2 43

Naur ice De Wulf de clar es :

Considered f rom t he logical point of view, t he obj ections of Gaunilo and St. Tho~as are peremptory.
Ru t Anselm8 s argu.rnent is mor e than the cold analysis
of a concept, or a dry logical decomposition of the
i.4t ~ of God. He presupposes an intimate and living
presence o f God i n the soul. The vague and imperfe ct
i dea of the Infinite results from a fir s t mysterious
contact which is not subject to the restraints of

2381 . e ., it must exist inside my intellect, and also
my intellect in the real wo~ld.

2y tsi2,!

239ne Wulf, 22.• cit. , t, 163.
2401bid.

~ the footnote .

24lclayton, 22• s!S• , P• 139.
242Ibid. , P• 140.

243John. v. Flynn, s . J . Fr. Flynn was one of the
author' s professor s in the realm of Theodicy at Fordham

University •

I

67

syllogistic reasoning and constitutes a sort of
~!~~~~~if;
if the infinitely

;,a~!terT~:o::!::.:~4

Driscoll writes :
For upwards of one thousand years it 'has been eagerly

and fiercely discussed in the schools and has been
proposed in slightly different ways 1n the hope that

each succeeding preaentat1on would stand firm against
future criticisrn.245

And again:
The fact, however, that so many acute and brilliant
minds have been intpres sed with one o r more of its
forms leads the thoughtful student to suspect that it
is not altogether lacking in f orce, and gives the hope
that if presented in the proper manner , it may have a
well~grounded basi~ though not so readily grasped by
the ordinary mind. 46
However St . Thomas247 (and the Scholastics in general) rejected Anselm's argument as being inadequate.

St. Th~s

astutely points out that the proposition 11 Deue esttt is self•
evident of itself, but !!Q!. to us.248
observation.

This is a shrewd

It is self-evident for example that the whole

is greacex than any of its parts.

The subject is such in

reality that it involves the predicate.
2L}4ne Wulf,

It is knowable249

12£• £!.S•

245oriscoll, 21?• cit., P• 65.
246Ibid. 9 P• 64.
247clayton,

2.2,.

cit. ,

p. 139.

248sanctus Thomae Aquinatis, "Utrun.1 Oeum esse sit per
se notum," Sunma IJ:mologi,1e, cura et studio Sac. Petri

Carrunello ; cum textu ex. recetlsione Leonina (Tomi tres;
Taurini, Romae: Marietti, 1952) 9 Prima Pars, QUaestio II,
Art1culus 1, Respondeo, Tomus I, p 4 10.

249I.e. , self•eyident.
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in itself.

ilut we do not know what God is.

Our knowledge

o-f Gotl is r1ot known to involve the pr edicate.250
not gras p God by concepts~

We

do

If we could know what God is we

tv0uld be face to face with God himself.

A person knows ·that

God exists when he grasps esse.251
Now, it is true that spirits do not take up any space;
but this is known only to t he leanted.
to t he ordinary man.

It is not knowable

It is knowable in itself, but it is

no t knowable by us on account of the wealaless of our intellects .

- -

Now Deus est i s knowable in itself to anyone who

could grasp God, but nobody by natural knowledge can do this.
Therefore~ the existence of God is not self-evident to us.
Thi s must be proven from His erfects.252
,Ieber admires the monk at Marmoutiers and even agrees
with his r epl y.

He declares:

The criticism is just. Indeed, the ontological argument \-rould be conclusive, only in case the 1.dea of God
and the existence of God in the human :nind were ·1denti•
cal. If our idea of God is God himse~f, it is evident
t hat this idea is the immediat!sfld incontrovertible
proof oft.he existence of God.
Gilson thinks Anse lm's mistake was a failure to realize that

the necessity of affirming God' s existence is nothing more
than the grounds fer an inductiun••it is not a deductive
250or ,.

existen~S•

251.Fr. Flynn.
252FZ" • Flynn.
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theist i c pr.x,f in itself. 25!1-

0

what St. Ans~lm only half

di·vi n e<l was lef t f or other s to put in a clear light.11255

I n the science of Metaphysics we learn that being256 is
split into two radi ca lly different orders, namely (a) Real
being, and (b) Hental being.

Every entity in t he universe

can ba ca t alogued i n one or the other of these two c lassifica t ions (or in both).257

.1_~~1 being is that which is258
of exi st ence outside of an idea.

for exampl e,

J.\

r ational anj_mal.

by its own proper act

It has its own existence~

On the. ot her hand Hental

being i s that which i s only within an idea thi nking it.

It

has jus t a borrowea259 existence, for eX&~ple a pe rfected

space ship.

This idea has en tered our world but it has no

s hadow of its own reality..

I t is like ru.1. Hunborn child., a t

present, but some day t he pr oper cause might catapult this
idea over into the real ~10rld.

(Wireless t elegraphy had

only a mental existence unti l Gugiel a10 Marconi gave it real
254a11son, S?.R• c i t., p .• 60 ..
255llll:s;!.
2561.e., something which ll.• (You cannot define U•
I t means that ,;,.1hich is presen t in the univer se. Moreover
ther e are two ways of bein~ present, viz., (a) on your own,

and (b) only in a thought.)

257w. Norris Clarke, s. J. Fr. Cl.arke was the author's
professor in Hetaphys,i cs at Fordham Univer si ty.
25 8or, exists.
259or, bottle existeppe.
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existence.)260
But not every idea can leap across this chasin into the
real ·wo r ld !

Some are

doo~ed to an "etemal" mental exist-

ence0 for examples negat1ons261 and laws of relationships
between thoughts in logic and nathematics.

These ideas can

never exist an:rwh.ere outside of the mind.
Now t hose mental beings which are non-existent at present9 but could became real beings, are called Possibles;
those which could never bridge the gap and become real are
c a l l ed fJent11.! f&m~t:ruct§.

Thus all being can be classified

a s follows :
I. Real Being

I!. Hen te.l Being
A. Possibles
B. Mental constructs
1. Negations

2. Laws of relationships262
Howeve1: it is not always easy for

!:!.§.

t.o determine just

exactly what can and what cannot really exist, for example,
a flying elephant.
It is undeniable that the idea o f ~ exists in the

260rhis is also true concerning radio, television,
steamboats, automobiles, jet airplanes,~ cetera.
261
E.g,~ p~th1nff..Bess, emptiness.
262Fr. Clarke.
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mental r e~lma•but is this idea possible?

groat h'Ulf and become real?

Can it: cross the

This is the crucial question as

we objecti.vely ~xamine the Ontological argument, and the

simple answer is :

soluble from an~

We do not knowt263

The question is in•

Jllior! st andpoint .

'»ls a glass mour,tai.11 possible?"

YeR, because it is

obvious that quantitative increase or decrease does not
interfer e with· glass as such .

high? 0

atwhat about a tree a mile

Yes, this too is possible, and for t he same reason.

These entities are not actu§l264

and

they probably never

will be, yet t hey could exist .in rerum natura.265
ncould you have a human being without an i ntellect?"
No, for ( natura lly s peaking) this

l'-10\tld

~·le can answer these questio1'\S but

principle be the form o f a bod:,? 0

0

not be a human being.
can a spiritual

P.ere ive must confess that

we do not know because we are confronted t-vith t wo levels of

reality which are specifically distinct.
s·imple question of more

Ot'

This is not a

less of the other.

Just by con•

s iderlng a spiritual soul a."ld a body, it: is impossible for

us to ascertain whether or not they can form a composite.
0

Could you have a body without graviution?"

It is

263Fr. Flynn.
2641 • e., t"1iey are no·t exist.e nt •

265 Paul J. Glenn, Qntolqgz (10th printing; St. Louis:
Herder, 1955), p. S9 •
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impossiblf~ fo '2:' one t.o reply ~ither.- in t ho affinnative or in

t he ne.;ative.
"Could r,hysical fire ca.use pah"l in the separated soul?

He do not !tl1ow.

In fact we cannot kl10w ,a priori because we

do not have sufficient information to make a judgment.
"I s i t possible for the second Person ll'l the Blessed

Trinity to assu-aie human nature?"
because we do not know.

Again we cannot answer

We can believe.it by revelation but

§ ariori we are unable to see either the possibility or thG
impossibility of it.

He

cannot be certaL, whether the con-

cept expresses what is (a) actual, or (b) possible, or (c)
neither .. 266
There is a vast dif f e:cence bet\1een the thinkable and

the possible 0

ano

the ultimate test is experience.

1 know

a glass mountatn is possible because in my experience I have
found (a ) glass a.~d (b) qitantity.

Furthermore , I know that

quantity is only an accident and could be more or less.

But

wh.G:in I get beyonc1 the accidents t am d9pendent l.\pon experl•

ence.

In the Ontological argument I am only thinking, and this
being does not necessarily represent eit her the possible or
the actual..

If I think of a most real being 1 think of it

as existing, but I do not know that it exists .

-----·-

This is because

266-rhe writer is indebted to Fr. Flynn for most of the·

questions cited above.

73
l do not l<:;.1ow i:ha.t I have d<:::rb.,cd it from exp~rienr;e , and I
c mi...'W ··· ref er it: back to experience.

It is juet an idea--and

rsmains just: an idea .

I can think of this being as existing but it is still
in the ord~r of thought.

I can think of George Washington

as existing 3 but it is only a concept.

r

could not know

that what is expressed 1s i n eKistence.
Now; if !

ca11.

think of the greatest pos s ible being 9 I

can conceive of. it as actually existing.
t his object has t he note of existenee.

Then I infer that
I must think of it

as exist ing but I cannot say that this entity exists in
reality independent of my thought.
th<: object

liU?!'te

present .

This is possible only if

Then tne 1:eally existing thing

could · force me t o ju<lge that there is in reality something
greater than which ca.11. be thought .

But this evidence is not

contained in mere concepts .

Thi© p~oof involves an illicit passage from the order
of thought to the order of t hings • • I have a concept of God
but I do not knoiy that it expresses evei."1. that which is possi•

ble, although on the othe~ hm1d 9 I do not see that it ex•
presses anything impossibl.e.

Nor can I proceed any further .

I am left with a rnere concept, an<i cannot know whether or
not God e'.Jcists •.267

Copleston has SUt-n.~arized the major difficulty in few
267Fr. Flynn.

1

1l.,

wor ds.

He s tates:

The mai.n objection to St. Anselm's proof, which was
r aised against l)escartes and which Leibniz tried to
a11swer, is that we do not lu1ow a vriori that the idea
of God , the idea of infinite and aS~oiute Perfection,
is t he idea of a 1:bs~bl.e Being. li! may not see any
contr adicti o1'l 1.n t e idea.,. but:t say t he objectors,
t his 91 nega.tiveH possibility is not the same as
" positive ~~ possi bility; it does 11.ot show that there
r eal ly is no contradiction in the idea. '£hat there
is no contradiction in the idea is clear i~ly when we

have sho\\711.

!!,

RP steriori that God exists. 2

Doubtless this i s deeply disappoint i ng to some •. But we cannot even hope to demonstrat e God• s existence by a.~ A 1?£igri
proof , because nothing is prior to t he nature of God~

Conclusion
Assumption
"The consci ousness of the human race bears testimony
to t he i dea of God."269 This is indeed true.

Yet we must

reject t he famous Ontological argut!1ent as invalid.

Anselm

begina wi t h t he assumption that we already believe in the
existence of this Being than. which no greate~ can be con-

ceived.

Then he points out that in this particular case it

is self evident that the greatest possible Being would involve
0

t he attr ibute of existence.
After we know that God exists we cannot but understand

268copleston 9 22• £1£. 9 II, 163£.
26 9nr1scoll, 22• c·i t., P• 63.
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that he is Godi> nor. think of him as non-existent.

Yet from

this it does not follow that one cannot deny God's existence,
nor think that God is not.

The human intellect is capable

of t hinki..t'lg that no bei.ng of this kind is 1> namely• a being
greater than nothing can be thought.

Thus Anselm's argument

proceeds upon the supposition that there is already in exist ...
ence a Being greater than what can be conceived.270

Summary
Technically the O~tological argument is an analysis,
rather than a proof.
nothb1g.

It is not a proof because it proves

If a person is already a confirmed monotheist,

then _A nselm's subtle reasoning will doubtless strengthen his

faith in the existence of a Supreme Being; but if he is
grovelling in the mire of atheism, then (in all probability)
he will receive but little help from St. Anselm.

The most

which this argument can do for an atheist is to lift him to
the level of agnosticism, because here we are dealing with
a concept whose validity it is impossible to ascertain§.
2ri9ri.

Perhaps the most charitable judgment we can render

in this matter is to assert that the Ontological argu1uent is

an excellent supplement to the five Classic Proofs of St.

Thomas.
270pr. Flynn.
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REN.r~ DESCARTES 11 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Introduc t ion
Somebody once commen ted satirical l y t hat the r esults of
Ca rtes ian philo sophyl are small in compar ison to the huge
a mount of l abor which Oescartes2 had done to develop it.

The celebra ted t hinker replied by distinguishing two kinds
of innovators » namely, (a) those who strive f or ori ginal

conc!,usione 9 and (b) those who are concerned chiefly with
t he .t_~asoning which unde rlies the concl usions.

He r i diculed

Campanel la and Bruno because they had advanced i mprobable
innova tions a s ends in themselves.

Oesca:ct:es believed that

all philo sophical principles can be reduced to t hree, namely,
( a ) a transcendent God 9 (b) a spiritual soul , anrl {c) an
extended uni verse.
these concept s.
old t r.uths .

However he did not claim originalit y for

He merely suggested new proof s f or the se

This is his contr ibution .

"Yet i n offering

l This wave of thought (idealistic philosophizing) which
Descartes inaugerated flows through Kant, Hegel, Fichte,
Lotze, and Schopenhauer. The other current (experimental
philosophizing) which began to sweep over Europe in the
middle of the seventeenth century originated with Francis
'Bacon and exerted an influence through Locke, Berkeley, Hu.-ne,
Hill, Spencer, Darwin, anct Huxley. Vide Frank. Sewall,
"Introduction," .P hilosophx of B~nedict Oe S:einoza, translated
by R. H. M. Elwes (New "iork:T.udor Publishing Company, n.d.),
P• v.
2
Born 31 March, 1596; died February 11, 1650.

17
new proofs, he wa s obliged to change the conten t of the conc l usi on s much more than he cared t o admit. 0 3

This i s clearly

di s cern ibl e in hi s proofs for the existence of God.
The purpose of this chapt er i s t o el ucidate fur t her t he
Ontological argu.ment by t he pen of a modern philosopher.
However in order to observe Descartes• schol arly formulation
of this proof in cont ext, i t wil l be necessa~y to consider
t he background, as l1el l as his other (less known) t h eistic

proof .

(This i s because of the integral relationship existing

between these t hree areas . )
The author gratefully acknowledges t he a ssist ance which
he received in writing t hi s .c hapter from Elizabeth G. Salmon,
one of his e rudite professors i n the graduate s chool a t

Fordham Uni.vers ity .

Dr . Salmon holds a doctorate from the

University o f Louvain and is a r ecognized author~t y on
Cartes i an philosophy.
The Back ground
His method4·

--------

3James Collins, 6, t-!istoey 21 Modem Euro~ean Phil~stohy
( t-;i l waukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, c. l 54), p. 6 :

4nescartes published Discoure llil k,! f·;ethode in 1637.
He wrote in his native Frencli and designed "his book "for a
s. emi.. popular audience.a1 Vide Norman Kemp Smith,
Studies
in the Philosophy 2!, ~escartes (Lon don : Nacmillan, 952),
P•
Dr. Salmon o serves that the D\seourse is "like an
introdµction to Geometry. 11

Ney

m.
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••te hons sen.s "S is the item which is most evenly dis-

tributed among men.

Every man believes that his own supply

is abundant and usually does not desire more .

1~ow it is

unreaeonabl.e to suppose that eve17one is i n error .
ability t.o separate tt"uth &,cl fal s ehood

egale en tou!.ll les horrunes • • • • 116

91

The

est na.turellement

The diver.se opinions of

mankind "ne vient pas de ce que les uns sont plus raisonnables
que les .autres ~ •~ 7 but from their various methorls of thinking.

A person needs more than j.ust an excellent: mind; he must
also employ it properly.
great erro~s .

A

Great intellects a~e capable of

slow orthodox thinker will accomplish more

in the end than a fas t heterodox thinker.
Descartes never considered himself to be above the
average in intelligence.

Rather he frequently ,vlshed that

h~ were equal to others .

It is reason alone ~-hich marks the

difference between men and "des bites,H and

0

je veux croire

quge1le est tout entiere en un chacun. • • • u8
of s, greater" and

11

The degrees

less" are applicable only to accide.nts in

a given species; never to forms .

Descartes took a very lowly

51 . e ., Reason, 1'la puissance de hien juger et di.stinguer
le vr ai ci8 ave-c le faux. • • • " Vide Re1:1J Descartes, 't:t)iscours
De La !1~thode»° Fremiet"e Partie,"'o'e'u,rr.es Choisies, avec tm
avant-propoa e·t des notes de Louis Dimier ( Deu~t. tomes; Paris:
Librairie Garni.er Fr~res, n.d.), I, 2.
&.

0

I bid.

7!bid.
Stbid. , P• 3 •

79

estimate of hi~ own ability, yet he derived great satisfaction f rom the H~thod~ 'i.1hich he had discovered, and from
the fact that he had selected Philosophy for an occupation.
Sti ll 9 he humbly admits the possibility of being in error.
HToutefois i l se peut faire que j e me trompe, et ce n•e~t
peut ~t re qu ' un peu de c •li ..,re et de v~ri-e que j e prends

pour de 1 9 or et des diamants . u9 However he proceeds to
describe the paths which his feet have followe~ so that his
readers may fot-m their own opinions.

Hi.s purpose is not to

I

teach his methode but merely to repeat his personal experi•
ences .

He expresses a desire that his words will .help some

without harmi1:1g any.

Descarte s was familiar with letters from childhood but
by the time he had completed his course of study he was

besieged wi th doubts . lo He was convinced that his education
had succeeded in doing nothing more than reveal his own
ignorance.11

He even concluded that Qis <X,ncepts of a ll the

sciences had been false.
I

His favorite subject was mathemati9ues because of the

certitude i.fu.ich it afforded .

- ·

He was amazed to discover that

9Ibid

lOoescartes doubts methgdic.ally rather than ~
.
Vide Paul J. Glenn, The His to~ 2!, Philoso~hy ( llt'Ei"i:iiipres sion;
~t. Louis: Herder, 1954) , p . 98.
11 Dr. Salmon point s out that the Discourse is a criticism of his education at La Fleche t o a certain extent.
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so little ~rork had been done in this area.12

"Comme au

I

contraire je comp~rais les ecrits des anciens paiens qui
traitent: des moeurs ,

a dea

palais fort superbes ·et fort

magnif iques qui n 9 ~taient batis que sur du sable et sur de
la boue. .. • • " 13
Desc~rtes respected theology but felt incapable of
judging it with feeble human reason.

When he was confronted

with Divine science he recognized his need for the light of
x-evelat:lon . 14

When he gazed at philosophy he f.elt: discouraged.

This

field had been studied by eminent men for centuries, and yet
every principle was open to serious doubt.15
I

I

I

''. • • elle a
I

ete cul ti·11ee par les plus excellents esprits qui aient vecu
depuis plusieurs siecles, et que n~anmoins il ne s•y t r ouve

e11coze aucune chose dont on ne dispute, et pa!' consequent
'

12pe~haps Desc.a rtes is first a scienti fic man and only
a philosopher. secondarily. Cf. Lucien Levy-Bruhl , History
et Hodem Pl}ilosoph;x in France (Chicago: Ope11 Court, 1899 ,
p. ,. Sometimes we have read Descartes too much in terms
of philosophy. He was a scientist and his first interest
was in mathematics and mathematical physics. His metaphysics
1s sort of a justification of his physical science. (His
schetilfl of science is from metaphysics downward.)
13nescartes, " Uiscours De La MC:thode, 0 Premi~re Partie,

!lll• cit., Vol. I, 7.

14oescartes never doubted his theology. He believed
that the ma..'Uler i..~ which one conducts his reason is totally
independent of his theologie. (His main problem was to
justify his new physics.)
15
Descartes considered Scholastic philosophy as null and
void, and attempted to destroy it utterly. Vide Levy-Bruhl,
22• cit. , P• 4-,.
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ul6

qui ne soit douteuse • • • •
\-Jhen he observed the number
of conflictil~g opi nion s there were on a sin gle point , he
decided that everything in t he realm of the p_r9ba9le is
'

1

well•nigh false. fl 17

The other science s <lid no t at tract himlB because thei r
ba sic principles had been borrowed from philosophy.

He wa s

thankf ul t hat his f inanci al condition did not compel l him
to be a mercenar y .

Hence he fo rsook the study of letters

Completely and resolved HdOetudier E!USSi en IrtOi• m~e, e t

a

d 0 employer toutes les forces demon esprit
choisi r les
chelt1in s que je devais suivre • • • • 019 The r emai11der of his
youth was s pent traveling, int erviewing men in variou s posi-

t ions,~ cete£!.

Then he t urned his thoughts inward and

wa s mo r e succe s sfu l t h &"'l i f he ha d s t a ye d a t home a.'l'ld s t udied

books .
One winter he spent an entire da y in seclusion. ·
This a fforded an excellent opportuni ty for reflection , 20 and
l 6oescartes , 11 Piscour s De La ~-t~thode , n ls2s.• m,.
1 7Rene Desc a r t es, Il9.scour se 2n ~ Method 2f. I!,ight ly
§.onducth,ig ~ Reason and Seeking frit h !n ~ Sci ences, trans-

lat ed anonymously from the French

th e:dition; iZdinbu!:gh:

William Bl ackwood an d Son s, 1873), p. 51_.

18However we should not f o rget that he had a particular
inter est in lJ1 ;egesi e .
1 9De sca:rtesP "Di scours De La HJ thode, t' Pre:m1.er e Partie,

2.Jl•

.s!.t•, Vo l . I, 9.

20-r~is " son ge" came as a revelation from heaven. Vide
Jacques ~1arital11, I.1'!!, Dr eam S?!, Oesca rtft!, transla te~ from
the French by Mabelle L. Andison ( New 'iork: The Philosophical
Library, c.1944), p. 26.
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one of his first thoughts was this:

Usually the work of

"'llll

seul archii:eete" 21 is more perfect than that which has be-en
produced by many masters.

example.
tuze ..

This ! s evident in buildings, for

Later '' i mprovements'' on ly mar t he original struc•

1'he same is true of cities.

At first a small town

has or derly streets and attractive buildings, ,1aereas many
additions in later years result in crooked streets and grotes•
que structures .

that they just

I n fact some c ities give one the impr~ssion
0

grew0 fortuitously, in spit e of the fact

that certain city officials were undoubtedly charged with
preventing this ve ry condition.

Now the same is probably

true of instU:utions found in advanced civilizat1ons22 which
have progressed f rom a state of semi-barbarism, that is,
their laws h~ve evolved slowly by necessity and today their
institutions are decidedly less perfect than those found 1n
communities which have never departed from the wise maxims
of a single lawgiver.

Hence natural religion must be

superioz- to all others S) because it was originally given by
pie~.

Sparta was preeminent in the past 9 not because each

particular law was good, but beca.tise "elles tendaient toutes

a mame

fin . t, 23

The same is true concerning t he information

21 Descart.es, "Discou!"S De La 'i' ~~thode 11 Deuxieme Partie,
9
2l2• .£!.t.., t, 10.
0

22A s,

~.g.,

the Roman Catholic Church?

23
l.sig., I, 11.
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found in books.

<.

The multitudinous opinions of o \

are vastly inferior to the deductions which one may draw from
his own experience.

Furthermore every man, i.n the process

of growing to n1aturity; has been govexned by desires and

teachers.

Hence it is almost. certain that a person's judg-

ments would be more nearly correct 1f he had only been born
with mature Reason, and had followed it to the exclusion of
all else.
One never demolishes an entire city24 in order to rebuild
it more artistically, but frequently an individual will wreck

his own house f or the expresi;, purpose of reconstruction.
Now no aiere man is c.a pable of reforming an entire state; or

even an educattonal system 0 25 but he can "reform" himself;
that is 9 he can discard all of his old opinions and select
others to replace th.em.

Descartes. was firmly convin·c ed that

he l«>Uld succeed in life if he thus built upon the new
foundation of Reason rather than upon the old bases which he
had accepted by faith 1n his youtb,26

He recognized certain

attendant difficulties but considered them insignificant in
eomparison to those a~companying public reform.

However he

2401d Descartes forget about Nero?
251s he disregarding Luther?
. 26nescattes deliberately ignored philosophers who had
preceded him. He realized that much truth ha9 been dis•
covered prior to the time he formulated his Hethode, but he
wanted to discover truth for himself. Vide Levy-Bruhl, 9.J?•
£it ••

P• 2.

,

I

84

did not recommend this dangerous course of action to others.
''La seule resolution of se defaire de toutes les opinions
qu 8 on a re!ues auparavant en sa creance, n•est pas un
exemple que chacun doive suivt,"e. 11 27

This is true for two

reasons; namely, (a) if those who are over-confident in
their own ability were to follow this course they would never
arr-i.ve at any settled convictions for the remainder of their
lives& and (b) those who recognize their own mental limitations ought to be content to accept the conclusions reached
by the authorities.

Descartes admits that he ~~uld have been in the latter
group if he had never sat under more thai, one teacher, or if
he had been ignorant of the copious divergent opinions exhibited in the history of philosophy.

While in college he

had leamed that the mos·t absurd ideas were held by ph1lo•

sophers.

•t· •

••

I

on ne saurait rien imaginer de si etrange

et si peu croyable, qu' 11 n *ait
philoso·p hes. • • •" 28

et•e dit par quelqu' un des

Later he traveled and discover-ed that

an idea is not false just because people in the West have
rejected it.

~there are folk in other cultures who can employ

their Reason very profitably, and yet they hold concepts

which contradict westem ideology.

How different some people

27.o escartes, ttotscours De La MEfthode,tt Deuxieme Partie,
S!n• cit. , I,. 13.

28
l.9!d.., I, 14. (These 'NOrds occur in a sentence which
is c. 2~ines in length. )

I
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would be i f they had been reared among the Chinese instead
o f t he Germans or the French.

The fashion of dress which

pleased us t en years ago is now repugnant to us. Descartes
1-,as convinced that "c Oest: bien plus la coutume e t l eexemple
qui nous persuade qu'aucune connaissance cer taine • • • • u 29

Sometimes one pe rson can discover truth bett er t han the
Amme M ""a.r.et; s.

Now since he was unable to deter.:nu,e who

was r ight ~ he deci ded to conduct his life as ~30 thought
best .

n • • • j e ne pouvais choisi r personne dont les opinions

I\
I
~
I
me semblas sent devoir etre
preferees
a' eelles des autres, et

j e me t rouva1s comme contraint d 9 entreprendre moi meme ~e
0

me condutr e .u31

At first it was l.i ke walking in t he dark.

0 •••

je me

I

:resolus d ' .allet" si l ent ement et d'usar de tant de circon•
spections en toutes choses,. que si je n 8 avancais que fort
peu p j e me gar del'ais bi en au moins de tomber • • • • 1132 He

29xbid.
30Frledrich Ueberweg observes that Descartes• system is.,
neither Catholic nor Protestant. Rather it is "an independent effort to attain to truth on the ground and under the
inspiration of that apodictical certainty which is illus
t r ated in mathematics and in mathematical physics."
his work entitled ijtstory 2!, Philo-so:ehY, 2 vols. , trans ated
from the fourt h G.e rman editionliy Geo. s. Morris, with addi•
0

Yif_e

tions by Noah Porter (New "iork: Scribner's Sons, 1892), II,

45 ..

sm~

31 oescart es, noise.o urs De La M.$ thode," Deuxieme Partie,
·£!t.11, I, 15.
32~.

I

I
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proceeded slowly because he felt it was better to accomplish
but little than to tumble into error.
0

He wishes to seek for

la v:raie mtthode1t of obtaining knowledge. 33
Logi~ was useless.

Syllogisms are applicable only to

the communication of knowledge already possessed.

They do

not help one delve into the mysteries of the g,:eat unknown.34
Some of the precepts in logic are corr~ct but so many others
usont ou nuisibles ou superflus,u35 At, cetera, that it is
exceedingly difficult to distu,guish the true from the false.

uNodem" algebra. was likewise unsuited for his special pur•
pose because the final result of its rules is "un art confus
et obscur qui embarrasse l 8 esprit • • • • u36 Nor could he employ anctent analysis because it ttfatiguer bea'.lcoup

l v imagination • • • • u37

a

methqg~

·rhus he was compelled to seek for

\ilhicb would give him the advantage of these three

sciences without encumbering him with their defects.

Further-

more he concluded that a few laws administered rigidly are

33nescartes thought that his method of demonstration
was the most perfect:. Vidi L. J. Beck, ~ t1ethod S?f. pescattes
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 9S.2), p. 100.
34-rhe syllogism does not invent knowledge. It is just
a technique of teaching.
35oescartes, "Discours De La M~thode," ls!s.• cit.
36!.2.!:.s!. , I, 16.
37 b
lla.s.t• By ~a~inati@ he means "the Representative
Facultyu. V~de teootnote in Discourse, translated anonymously,, 21?• c~t • ., P• 60 •

,
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superior to ma~y laws.

Hence he formulated the following

rules:
ta.

Never accept anything as true if there exists the
slightest ground for doubt.J~

b. Take all the difficulties and divide them into as
many different parts as possible, and as the aolu•
tion demands.
c . Arrange all objects in a logical scale from the most
simple t o the mo·s t complex. 39

~8

d. Review
omitted.

enumerate so thoroughly that no fact is

Descar tes' laiowledge of geometry41 had led him to believe
that there is a mutual link connecting everything within the
range of

hu.11&1

knowledge, and if one employs his intellect

properly he cru, attain to all knowledge.

Moreover he was
I

not "beaucoup en peine de chercher par lesquelles il etait
besoi11 de commencer,o42 because he believed that "c 1 &tait
I
A
4J and
par les plus simples et !es plus aisees
a' connaitre";

381:>escartes, "Discours De La Methode,n loc. cit.

39The difficulty in Descartes• M;thode is in the role
of experience. No experiment is necessary. In fact all.
experiment is excluded by definition. (On the other hand
Pascal and Newton n.e ver fonnulated laws 1.mless they were
based upon experiment.)

l.OAs Descartes grew older he noticed difficulties in
thi s fourth rule. Maybe it is not too difficult to apply
in Hechanics, but what about Astronomy and Biology? Do you
ever have a pure science until this fourth requir·ement has
been met?
41 Descartes invented Analytical Geometry,
42lbi;d., I• 17.
43Ibid.

I
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because

mu th~ mathematicians

t i n g t,:uth.

have succeeded in demonstra-

Hence he decided to begin by examining the sim-

plest i .tems.

He d'-d not i n tend to become an authority on

mathematics but he decided to study pr opos:f..tions 1n t heir

most general forml) .f!S. cete:t>a..

Since it 1--:ould be necessary

at times to consider t hem individually 9

~

c et·e ra,

0

j e les

devai s suppos~r en des lignes • • • • u44 Noxeover to facili•
tate m~norization~

~

quelques chiff res. u45

cetg~ , he woul d designate each npar

Thus he believed he could abstract

the best fa:om both algebr a and anal ysis, and at the same
time correct their defects.46
6y carefull y f ollowing t hese rules for two or three

months Descartes achieved gr eat success in s tttdying questions

which pertained t o the se two s ciences.
that now he knew

haw'~7 t o arrive at all possibl e solutions

1.11 thes~ par.ttcular ar eas .
I

In fact it seemed

He was convinced that "n'y ayant

I

que wie verite de chaque chose;u and that nqui conque la trouve
en sa.it autA.nt qu•on peut savoir ... • ..n 4 8

44 ~ . 9 I» 18.
451J2!.g.

46Nsgr. Glenn observes that "during a winter's inactivity
in camp he sketched a plan for th~ coni32lete reconstruction
2f. science." Vide his book, s;m. cit~, p. 291:
47nescartes believed that it was possible to formulate
philosophy "With such mathema tica l clarit y and exactness that
it must appeal t:o all minds as indisputably true.n Ibid.; P• 2.92.
l~8
Descartes, "T>iscours De La HJthode,.11 12£• cit. (When
a chilc~ adds t~ and tl-K> correctly he may be assured that he

has reached the limits of human knowledge at this point.)
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However Descat'tes tt1as pleased ·with his new methode

chiefly because he believed that he could now exercise his

reason in ever y other field of scientific knowledge.49
Fuzthermor e he observed that these men tal gymnastics
sharpen ed his :lntellect.

But he· cli.d not proceed immediately

to examtne the cl:J.f ficult1es he perce.i ved in other sciences.

Ra the"t he pauAed upon the threshold of this great discovery
because of: his i mmattir:l.ty50 and other considerations .
he thus rema:u:led

O

While

dormant" in this situation of suspended

juclgynent he adopted51 the follmd.ng nmorale par provisiontt :·52

a . To obey civil. !aws and adhere firmly to· the Catholic

faith.

b. When i.n doubt to follow the course ·w hich appears most

probable.

c . To conv,~t his desil:es rather than "l'ordre du

monde. 0

49nescartes

11

drea.medtt of a ·s ingle science that could

accoui'lt fo.r everything.

V~.d.9 Maritain,

la.£. cit. Dr. Salmon

points out that his first great insight was that all science
of quantity is one science... His tt·~ u wa~ the problem of
the unification of mathematical knowl:edge WLth physics.
50Desc$-:ttes was only twe..'l"tty-three at the time.

51uebe1:weg quotes Bossuet as follows,

oescartes was
always afraid of be:b 1g branded by the church, and accordingly
we see him taking precautions which reached even to excess."
0

YJ..de Ueberweg, loc. s!t• (Note Ueberweg 9 s extensive biblio•
graphy on cartesianism. 22• c11;;. t • 11, 42-44.)

I
'
11 Troisieme
52Descartes, "Discours De La Nethode,
Partie,
!2.a• cit., ! 9 20.
53Ipid.l) I, 22.

90
He concluded by determinil'1g to devote his entire life54 to

the cultivation o f his reason and the application of his
m~thode.

God has endowed every man ·w ith the power of judg•

ment a~d therefox~ Deacartes believed that he ought never
accept the opi.11.ions of others "by faith."
He t hen under.took the formidable t ask o f o shP.dding••

the rem~inder of his pre ... conc~ived i deas.

.. •

• • j e jugeai

que pour tout le reste de mes opinions je pouvais librement
entri::prend,:e de m'en cl~faire . n55

So he traveled for nine

years 0 but at the end of this time he had not yet even
started to saek for first !)rinciples.

However when he heard

it rumored that he had already completed his iliquiry, he

retired to Holland56 in orclet' to accomplish t his very pr.0°
ject.

Later he re~o:rded the procedur'! whereby he had arrived

at hia first principle:57

a

Ainsi~
cause que nos sens nous trompent quelquefois,
jc voulus supposer qu'il n'y avait aucune chose qui fut
telle qu' 1ls nous la font imaginer; et 9 parce ~u'il y ·
a des hornmes qui se meprennent en raiso~'"'la.-r.it meme
'
I
I
i e, ~e y
touchant les plus simpl es matie~es
de geome~r
9
font des paralogismes, jugeant que j etais sujet a
faillir autai.,t qu•aucun autre, je rejetai co1mne faus ses

54oescartes• future l ife- ~rk was revealed to him during
a dream. V.1<!.~ Maritain, 2.J?• ill• 11 p. 13.
55nescartes, ''Discours De La HJ thode,u ·rroisieme Partie,

2.2•

s!..£•,

1, 25.

56
vide f?otnote in the Discourse, translated anony-

mously, 2.2• cit., P• 73.
57 The first pr inciple of Descartes• phi losophy is the
0
1°. I present to myself think.

I
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toutes les raisons que j 1 avais prises auparavant PQUr
demonst~at ion s; et enfin, considdrant que toutes les
memes pensees que nous avons 6tant eveilles, nous peuvent
aussi venir quand nous dormons sans qu'il yen ait
auc:une pour lor s qui soit vraie; je me resolus de
feindr e que t outes les choses qui ra 9 etaient jamais
entrEfos en 1 8esprit n' f1taient non plus vraie.a que les
illusions de mes songes. Mais aussitot apres je pris
&ar de que, pendant que J, voulais ainsi penser que tout
etait:. f aux, il f all ait necessair ement que moi qui le
pens a is fusse quelque chose; et remarquant que cette
v'6rit e: ~ pens.t, .QQll£
etai t si ferme et si
a ssur'6e que touteifl:es plus extravagantea S'3P?OS1t1ons
des scept iques n•etaient pas capables de l 9 ebranler, je
jugeai que je pouvais la recevoir sans scrupule pour
le premier pr i ncipe de la philosophie que je cherchais. 58

.a ~.

Next Descartes examined himself carefully and concluded that
( a} he was a substance whose essence is thought, and (b)
this substance is i ndependent of every material object.

Thus

the mind is separate f r om the body. 59 Then he decided that

whatever the i.ntellect conceives Hfort - clairement60 et fort
distinctement" 61 is true.

But we should remember that this

is true "noest assureI qu• a\ cause que Dieu e.st ou exi ste, et

qu 0 il est un etr e parfait, et que tout ee qui est en nous
vient de lui.

-

• •

•

u62

This he accepted as t he basis of the

58nescartes, "Dis.c ours De La M~thode, 0 Quatrieme Partie,
Qeuvr es 11& Descartes (New edition; Paris: Charpentier.
Li br a r le-·E diteur,-is'57), PP• 21£.

59For Descartes the very essence of matter is quantity.
60rhe term clear denotes that which is immediately given.
.
When something is clear (a pe·r son '' sees" it.
61The term distinct means that which is unrelated in
and hx itself. It is distinct from all else, e.g., one may
perceive intense pain clearly 9 but never distinctly.
62~ues.cartes, uoiscours
. De La Hethode,"
I
Quat:rieme Partie,
Oeuvres £hoisies, 2£• ',.~ t. • · I, 34.
1

,
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certitude derived from his first principl.~, namely. "Cog1to,
.fil'.&2. sum. u 63

Now inasmuch as Descartes, an imperfect being, had
doubted, he t"Ondered how he had conceived anything to be mol'e
/

perfect than Rene Descartes.

The result was that he recog•

ni2ed the source to be a more perfect Nature.

Nmnerous

external objects64 presented themselves to his senses, but
t heir origin appeared less puzzling because he felt superior
to t hem.

Thus if they were real, his mind had created them,

and if they were unreal, it was due to an imperfection of
his intellect.

Natur e which

However this could not be applicable to a

i"1SS

superior to Descartes!

This is true be-

cause this ooneept ceuld not have originated in non-being,
and t he less cannot be the efficient cause of the greater.

Hence the idea must of ne.c essity have originated from a

Nature more perfect than Descartes' intellect, and one which
possesse:s all the attributes of ,mich Des.c artes could poss1°

bly conceive.

Now this Nature is identical with Deity.

Therefore» God exists.
Furthermor.e Descartes concluded that since he was con-

scious of some imperfections in himself, he could not be a
solitary being.

There was "une nature qui fut veritablement

63n1 think, therefore I exist .. 0

6""Tc;.g •• earth, sky, heat» light, etc.
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plus parfa1tett65 who had given to Descartes all he possessed,
and upon whom Descartes was dependent.

This is obvious be-

cause if Descartes were the only being in exi.stence66 his
finite perfection would arise from no other than himself
alone.

Hence it would be possible for him to draw upon the

same source for the remainder of his perfection.

Thus Rene'

Descartes could attain absolute perfection, "avoir t.outes
les perfections que je pouvais remarquer ~tre en Dieu,.,.67
But the absurdity of this is very glaring.

God is the author

of all that men possess. and no finite entity is capable of
subsisti11g for a single moment without Him.

Moreover

oascartes conceives of existence as an attribute of perfec-

tion.68 He states:
• • • car 9 par exemple 9 je voyais bien qu.e, supposant
un triangle, il fallait que ses trois angles fussent
~gaux deux droits 11 mais je ne voyais rien pour cela
"' qu'il
. y eut
" au monde aucun triang l e; au
qui mtassurat
lieu que, revenant
examiner l'idee que j•avais d'un
Etre parfa1ti je trouvais que l'existence y etait
comprise en meme fa9on qu*11 est eom,i>ris en celle d'un
triangle que ses trois angles sont egaux
deux droits,
ou en celle d•·un sphere que toutes ses parties sont

a

a

a

6 5W...S.•, I, 30.

661.e., absolutely independent.
671.!?!si•, I, 31. (De·s cartes could thus possess all the
perfections of "1 1 Etre parfait" by d-rawing upon himself alone.)

68There is a striking resemblance betwee~ this proof and
the 10ntological argument of St. Anselm. Cf. ttienne Gilson,
~
R!S~Ur§ .2.1ll Id!. Methode (Texte Et Commentaire;
Paris: ll>ra£rie P losophique J. vr!n, 1947), p. 350.

pet~
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egalet"1lent distanteS de SOn centre, OU meme encore plus

evider:nment; et que, par cons,quent, il est pour le
mains auss1 certain que Dieu, qui est cet etre si
pa~fait, est ou existe, qu•aucune demonstration de
geomet:rie le saurait etre.69

Finally Oescar.tes points out that the existence of God is
more cer~ain than the existence of material objects.70

In

a dr.eam one can imagine that he inhabits another body, dwells
upon &1.other planet, and beholds other stars.

these are all
assaTties

0

Now obviously

illusions«, yet one cannot prove it Wlless he

J. 9 existenc~

~

pieu because (a) this is the only

factor which assures one concerning the truth of what he conceives clearly and distinctly to, be correct, (b) God possesses
perfection, and (c) everything possessed by man is derived
from God.

Therefore every real concept proceeds ultimately

f?"Om Deity and must of necessity be true in proportion to
its distinction and clarity.

False concepts 1n the intellect

invariably proceed from non•being.71

It is no more dis-

tasteful to designate JU&y as the source of imperfection
than to assu.-ne that truth originates from nothing..

However

if we were not eertaL., that God is the cause of all truth
and reality possessed by man, we would hav·e no basis for our

69oescartcs, "Discours De La ME{thode," Quatrieme Partie,
Q£gxres 12! pescartes, SW.• cit.; p. 24.
70E.g., the earth, the stars, or one's own body.
711deas participat.e in negation because of impe·r fection
in the human species.

1

95
assur nn c t, of t h e.fa."' truth . 72
It i s pocs ible f or a man t<, be d eceived during his
.

wakin~~ hours

7 . .,
.;1

us 1ell ..is wben he i :., asleep.

3u't truth is

t 1~uth e:v~n though :i.t i s a c quired while on e is s l eeping . 74
But whether ;:isl cep or nwa 1"..c , our reason ou:;ht al·ways tc
a ccei)ted a s t ~Le f inal judge concerning the truth o:..~ false -

hood of. ,:m y thing .

For ~zample, ( a ) t h.0. su n appeare <;u ite

tiny to t he nake<l eye ; 75 ( b )

11 • • •

ct n ous pou vons bicn

72 But if God rrrust underwrite the simplest c.trgument, who
will u n derw:eite the a r gu ment for l 'existence de Dieu ? This
uoultl be a " syllog istic circle, 11 but De.scartesescapes. He
point s out that God's gu ar anty is not required b y t he evidenc e . i.t i!:l re.c,uiretl only when one forge.ts why he had
tidrn:. t t cd t:hc trut h of certain propositions.
Now if i t is
po e:.sibl c f or one to know t hat he t hinl~s without remer.1bering ,
i.t i s :.ll s o possible to know tha t t here is a God ,;,d thout
r emcmbcrint. . Desc E1rtes states his prooi in t he form of .:i.
sy llogicm but it is real l y an i ntuitive: proof. Uh.en a person
con cei v es t h e idea of o. pe r fect bei ng , he i mracciia te.ly nsees ''
t h c.t i c is absolutely necessary f or this bein.i:,; t o e;rist.
Other entities
c.~dst, but thie being must exis t because

mix

existence is inc ud.ed i n the very conceptc:i'I:Deity . However
this i s 11an i l!l.mediate 3.pprehension" r at her thrin an ar gument •
.·'alebranc h e l ater descr ibed. it .:.:i.s a proof "fron rrtere vision."
[-JuotcdJ

Vi d e Levy- Bruh.l , op . cit ., pp . 17f .

73:.1., . g ., (a ) everything appears yellow when a person has
j aundice , ond (b ) all bodi e s appear to be smaller than t hey
act u a lly .:1.ru. when viewed f l~ora.

.:i

dist.;mcc.

74 £. ., the correct solution to a certain problem,
6
comme par mrern.ple qu •un g,orr~tre inventttt qu~lque nouvelle
demon stration, son sommeil ne l'cmp~che.ra it pas d 1 atre
vraie. • • • 11 Vide Descartes, " Discours De Ln r.1f thoc!e, 11
11

)uatri~m.~ Partie, 02, •

.£ll.,

I, 34.

75
Thus t he sense s deceive but fortuna tely this optical
illusion is corrected by Reason.

I
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imaginer dist.inctement une tate de lion entee sur le corps.
D8 une ch~vre, sans qu'il faille conclure pour cela qu 1 il y
ait au monde une chime.re . . . . . 07 6 Now reason reveals to

us the fact ~hat every idea contains a measure of truth;
otherwise it could not: proceed from a perfect Oeity.77
First mcditation78

A few years ago Descartes made an amazing d1scovery;
11amely ~ in his youth he had accepted numerous falsehoods by

faith .

He

writes:

An:1.Ul.adverti jam ante aliquot annos quam multa, ineunte

aet:ate:i falsa pro veris admi.serlm, & quam dubia sint
quaecunque istis postea sup!rextruxiiJ ac proinde

ft.mditu.s omnia semel in vita esse evertenda., atque a
primis. fw:1damentis denuo inchoandum, si quid aliquando
firmum & ma....-isurum cupiam in scientiis stabilire; sed
ingens opus esse videbatur, eamque aetatem expectabam 1
qua.e foret tam matura, ut capessendis disciplinis

aptior nulla sequeretur.79

Henee his deductions from these premises were enshrouded with

.aMI---··----. 76I bid., I, 35.
77God would not deceive us,
78oescartes wrote his

Miditations

in Latin and dedicated,

sapientis$i.~!s Clariss~misque Viris Sacrae Facultatis
Theologiae Parisiensis Decano & Doctoribus0 .. See "Epist-ola,"
1'1editatione§_ la Prima Phi.losoehjla,. in Oeunes 1!s. pesmtj!S,
~bli~e par Charies Adam ,& Paul Tannery ( 2 tomi; Pa s:
them

0

Leopold Cerfl) Imprimeur•Editeur·1i 1904), VlI .1 1. Dr. Salmon
asserts that the ~editations were distributed by Mersenne,
a friend of Oescarte,s •. (He was a free ... thinker, if not an
atheist.) This first ;~e9i~ati:2n is Descartes• defense of doubt.
791:tene Descartes, "Meditatio I," tteditationts De Prima

PhilosoJah2,§, ~bid.~ VII, 7.

97
doubt-.

From the very day he "woke up" he had been deter•

mined to purify his mind of all previous opinions and to
build upon an entirely new foundation.

He considered this

to be a stet"n necessity if he were going to be a true ecienti st .

However the undertaking appeared so formidable that

he decided to delay action until he was more mature.SO

But

s ince t his had all occurred so long ago he now feels the
pri ck of conscience telling him to begin.

Today he believes

to be an oppor tune time because he possesse.s sufficient

leisure and has no worries.

Therefore he will this day

a ttempt t o over-throw all of his previous beliefs.

It will

not be necessary to prove that every single tenet is false.
Hcmever he wlll be justified in rejecting the whole if he

can succeed in doubting something in each .area.

Instead of

exsmini..l'lg each article of fa!.th individually he will only

criticize the principles upon mich they rest, for he knows
that t..n1en the foundation is removed the entire ediface

collapses.81
The sun, of his certainty until now has been based upon

empirical data.
deceive!

But he noticed that sometimes the senses

Hence he doubted their testirri0ny.

But someone

might point out chat it is impossible to doubt the senses

BORene Descartes, "Meditation t.1>tt r~editations gn the
First Philoso,hz (New edition; Edinburgh: William Blackwood
and Sons, 187 ), p. 17.

8lc£. Psal m 11:3.
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all t he t i me, fo r example, that Descartes i.s now seated beside tho fire holding a piece of paper.

lf he were to deny

the existence of his body he would be classed with insane
person s who i magi ne they are gourds.
Now all this may be true; yet he cannot forget how he
has been deceived while dreaming.

Moreover 1.t ia impossible

to pr ove conclusively whether one is at this moment asleep
o r awake.82

He confesses,

it • • •

I almost persuade myself

t hat I a.m now dreaming.n83

Suppose f or example that Descartes is asleep and all

his voluntal'"Y actions are illusions.
t hat hi s hands are uon-existent.

Let us eve11 imagine

Yet we must admit that the

o bject s of our dreams are true reflections of concrete objects.

Therefore\) hands exist.

When artists paint fan•

t astic satyrs and sirens they represent these creatures by
various members of differ~..nt animals.

actually

0

If these artists

ereate81 something new one is compelled to admit

the reality of the colors.

Likewise, even though eyes, hands,

£t, ceter1a, are fictitious II yet we must admit the existence

of more universal objects which have caused the ideas in our
minds.
It appears that members of th1s class are corporeal

828 ow can a person ask questions if he never awakens?
83
ne,e cartes, ••Meditation I.," N9ditations on tht First
Philos9phl, anonymous translation, 22• cit., p.-Y9.
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bodies, figure~ quantity, number, place, and time.

Thus per•

haps ( a ) t he character of medicine, aetronomy, and physics
is doubtful~ and perhaps (b) geometry and arithmetic contain
a mcasu:re of certitude because the sum of

tl\~

and three is

fiv~, and a squa~e has only four sideSs•regardless of whether
a person is awake

01.~

dreaming.

Furthe?mOre it seems im-

possible to doubt such evident facta.84
Yet for some time now Descartes has believed that he
was created by an ornntpotent God.

But how can he be certain

that God has not arranged matters so that earth, sky, .£S_
cetcrg, arc non-exist.ent, and Descartes is deceived and only
imagines that t hese things exist as they appear to him?
Descartes has observed that sometimes people are wrong when
they are conviriced that they a re right..

Hence he wonders

whether he is d~ceivecd when he adds two and three, and when
he counts the sides of a square.85

They say God is perfect.

in goodness, so it is possible that God doee not will for
Oescaxtes to be deceived.

Yet Descartes recognizes ths.t

occasionally he is deceived.
to happen?

Now 11 why does God permit this

However one might explain the present existence

of. Descartes it is cer tain that the pTobability of constant
84oescartes never seriously questioned God's e~istence.

Vide Smith, Slll• cit., p. 240.

85
or. Salmon declares that the limit of Descartes• doubt
is reached at this point--if ho pays atta.~tion to this present
act.
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deception will increase proportionately aa the power possessed
by his t1ltima.te cause is decreased.

Descartes finds no

answer to this and is convinced that it is possible to doubt
the enti~e body of his for.mer beliefs.

So if he is going to

ar.rive at certi~ude in the future he should r eject 3.ny con•
cept ,-:hich could possibly be false .

lowever a person must do more than just observe-•one must
al.so remember86 because those old belief.a continually reappear.

In fctct he will continua to make reference to them

a s long as he believes they az-e weighted more heavily on the
side o f faith than on t he side of doubt.

Thus he t hinks it

~"Ould be permissible for hirn to deceive himself for awhile
by discarding all of his former beliefs.

This ·w ill help to

straighten out the unnatural warp of his intellect.

Certain-

ly this course of action · ·will not l ead h i@ astray.

So he i magines that (a) not God , but "some malignant
demonilu87 is attempting to deceive him~ (b} all empirical

de.ta is like

0

the illusions of dreams~u88 and (c) he is a

86oescartes does not doubt what would be given in a
simple act of thought, or in a simple problem. Rather his
doubt lies 1n the area of complex matters and where memory
is invQlved.
S7
Descartes, "Meditation I.," Neditatiops on th~ First
rhilis22h;x, anonymous trai1slation, 21?• cit.·, P•22. This is
an a temative to believing in God. Smith calls it Hatheism
in its weakest possible form." See 2-e• si!.•, pp. 296f.
08
Descartes:e "Meditation I.," Meditation§ 9.11 ~~e First
Philossmi}l, anonymous translation, !22• cit., PP• 2 •
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<lisembodied sp r it minus his five s enses.

wil l lead htm i11to the truth.

Perhaps this path

However it is a r.rcst diffi-

c ult attitude to sustain.

Second meditat ion89
The followin g day nesca rtee. di scovel!'ed that h1s f i.:-st

meditation ha d flooded h is mind with serious doubts which
refused to leave.

'!.'h e

situation even appeared hopeless.

Nevex-thelt.!SS be dec1.de d to make an effort by again rejecting

everything whh~h a ppea,:ed suspicious.

He believed that this

cou?"se would tead him either to something certai n, or to the

knowledge that nothing i s ccrtain.~O He found comfort in the
exan:ple of Archimedes for he believed t hat he could make real

progress if only he coul d be fortunate enough to rest his
inte llectual 'tfee t 0 upon one solid rock of c ertainty.
l\ccordingly he (a) refu sed to believe what he saw, (b)

r ejected the t estimony of his memory, (c) imagined his five
senses were. non-existent, and (d) believed t hat all corporeal
bodi es are f i gments of his imagination.

What remains?

Per•

haps only the certainty that all i s doubt ful .
But suppose there are objects in the universe which the
mi nd of tlescartes has never even eo11.c eived?

Is there not an

89His second deditation deals with the nature of mind.
It is

&1

90

analysis to show what the "I am" is.

Does he mean a certain knowledge of ignorance?

102
objecti ·,e cau.s e producing these very tho"Jghts?
God j but :'l.t might be Descaz:tC;?s hi.11self .

Dcacarte... is some thing.

existence of his body !

It could be

Thus certainly

But ile has already derd.e d the

Can he exist without i t ?

He had even

i-11:iag:l.ned that: the ent ire universe is non-existent .

i nclude Descartes?

Did this

No, because b,2 imagined all that.

Cer-

tainly s ome very powerful, elev.er, unlmo·wn being '' is cons tant ly employing all hie: irtge::11uityH91 t o deceive Descaztes. 92

i-:ot·:>, if neeca rtes were no11-existent he could not be deceived.

There.fo re , i t i s certain that Descartes exists.
But: ~+..at. is Oescartes'l

a man.

But wha t i s a mun?

ani nal0 ?

Certainly not.

Forrnerly he had thought h:e was

-

Can man be defined as

11

a rational

Descartes had thought he looked

like a human being, possessed of locomotion and cognition.
Thes e abiliti es ho had referred to his soul.

But he had not

paused t o define the term~, or if he did. he thought it
resemble d fire, or wind, or either.

At that time he had

ent ertaL,ecl no doubts conceming the nature of his body and
wottld ha.ve experienced no difficulty in descrtbir..g it.

But

now s ince he supposes a 0 tne.lignant be:1.ngti93 is bent on

-----·- --

9lnescartes, 1tHeditation II. , 11 ~~ditations_ on, the first
J!h!J.os.9.2t1I, anonymous translation. £1?• cit . i> P • ZS'.

921s

11

le malin genie" j ust "un mythe cosmiqua"?

Vide

Hena.! " GouhiGr, Essa~ ~.[ ,Qescs,;te.~ (Pa ris: Li.brairie Philosoph1.que J. Vrin~ 19 9 , P• 111 .
93
oescartes, uMeditation II.
1-:editati2n s 211 the Eirst

,n

J>bil_g,soer.:1, anonymous tJ:"anslation, 22• cit. 1 P• 27 •
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decetving him-...how ·w ould he now descr ibe his body?

After

due r ~flection ha decided that he now possesses no attri-

butes of a hu.11~n body.

Passing then to a consideration of

t he sou194 he decides that since h,:,, has no body he can

neither walk, easimila.t~ 'food,. nor perceive.
think.

'i'his alone is inseparable.

But he can

He is definitely certain

that he is, that he exists••but how fraquently?
e.s he t hinks?

is reel .

As often

'ile is not·: "only a thinking thing ,u 95 but he

Yet he wonders if this definition is exhaustive.

Coulc! he be au.ythi11g more?

He is certain he is neither a

corporeal body nor diffused air.

Yet he does

l'lOt

doubt his

own c..Kistence.
Descartes can render no judgment concerning things which
aro beyond his range of pe~cept1on~ but he i.s absolutely cer""
tain

~

at he exists indepenoently of things4

Furthermore he

is su -e his knowledg.e of self is di stinct from any knowledge

that he derives from his imagination.
He h.?.s al.ready deci .ced he is a being which thinks -but
0

what i~ that?

I t is a.l'l entity with the power of doubting,

undeTsta.~ding~ perception, imagination, r efusal, volition,

denial. 0 and affirmation. 96 This list is quite impressive,
but ,,>hich item :ts not identical with his intellect?

Certainly

94His dicotemy of soul and bo<ly is very pronounced.
95Ibicl.

96IW,•• p. 29.
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tt is Desca~tes who doubts, desiress

~

cete£,a.

Even though

he is dreaming one must admit that apparently he sees, hears,
and feels..

Thus it is certain that Descartes perceives.

He notices that sense clata appears more certain than self,
and since his mind is thus prone to wander he decides to give
it full leash.

Later he wi.11 bring it under proper control.

Next he ·will study empirical objects, fot' example 0 a
piece of wax.

It has s1ze 3 color, and figure.

However

definite physical changes occur when it is placed near an
open flame.

But is it still wax after it is changed?

Yes

indeed!) even though nothing now remains "but something

extended 0 flexible 0 and movable."97 This mass is still what
the mind declared it to be at the first.

Hence one really

perceives with the intellect alone rather than with the

senses.

However Descartes' mind is so feeble that he would think
just the opposite except for the people he sees on the street
below his window.

They c-o uld be automatons but their appear•

ance leads him to conclude that they are real human beings.
Thus the mind perceives what he suppo-sed he saw w1 th his eyes.

But is Oascartes' perception of this pieee of wax clearer
now than it was before his minute examination?
yes.

Definitely

In fact he would not even be conscious of its exi·s tence

91
I
Rene Descartes, "Second Meditation," Meditations,
translated from the Latin with an introduction by Laurence
J. Lafleur (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, c.1951), P• 27.
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e xcept for his mind.

But what is mi nd?98

Doesn't Descartes know himself

bet ter t han this piece of wax?

If the wax exists because

Descarte s sees i t, the same is certainly true of himself
be cause maybe t his is not wax at all.

no eyes!

Maybe Descartes has

This i s possible, but it is impossible for him

who thinks he sees to be non-existent.

Even though he should

j udge that the wax exists because he touches it, or because
he imagines it is there••even then it is undeniable that
I

Rene Descartes exists.

~1oreover the same is true concerning

every object in the world of appearances.
Hence he has proved that bodies are not perceived by
either the senses or the imagination.

Rather they are per-

ceived Oby the understanding alone.u99 Therefore, the entity

which is the easiest of all to apprehend is his own mind.
But inasmuch as i t is almost impossible for a person to
er ase an old opinion f r om his intellect, Descartes concludes
t ha t it would be wise for him to pause here

S'O

that (by the

very length of his meditation) he can impress his newly
acquired knowledge more deeply upon his memory.

The Proofs

98As yet he only admits that he is mind.
99

.!!?is!•, P• 30.
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His "causa l" proof 100

Descartes begins his far.ous third meditation with these
words~ °Claudam nunc oculos, aures abturabo, avocabo omnes
sensus 9

•••

ulOl

Thus he dogmatically rejects ev·e ry shred

of empirical evidencel02 for the express purpose of knowing
himself better.

He defines himself as "a thinking thing"

capable of perception and imag~ation.

Furthermore he is

cert ain these two "modes of consciousnessttl03 are wit hin him.
He admits this is a summary statement of all he was conscious of knowing at that particular time, but by means of
circumspection he will attempt t o discover additional innate
knowledge.

He entertains no doubt that he is really "a

thinking thing•• but the only assurance of truth afforded by

this first principle i s the transparent, sharp perception of
what he affirms .

(However this would be insufficient for

assurance if he should ever entertain a clear, definite idea
100 ~ Smith, 512• s,...s,., P• 299. 'l'his proof occurs in
his third Heditatiop. (This L>{editation ·is a whole analysis
of what he means by "idea.") His notions conceming truth

and ideas f!:Om an introduction to this proof.

lOlnes-cartes, " Neditatio III," De Deo, quod existat,.
Heditationes llit Prima Philosophia, 22• cit., VII, 34.
102Jacques Chevalier declares, n • • • 11 va rejecter
d'abord entierement le temoignage ~ ~ · •• •" ~ his
boo~ entitled Ptscarses (9th edition; Paris: Lihrairie Plon,
1921), p. 206.
'
103
Descartes, "Meditation III.," M
editationj ml the Fit:st
Philqsoph~, anonymous translation, 22• cit., P• 5.
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of falsehood.)

Therefore he accepts the folloWing rule:

Anything which the intellect conceives "clearly and distinctly" 104 is

t1."Ue.

In the past he had accepted numerous things as truel05
and then later discovered they were doubtful, namely, all
sense knowledge.

So what was it in these objectsl06 which

he had per ceived so clearly and distinctly?

Only that the

ideas of t hese entities were presented to his intellect!
But there was something else he had believed because he
imagined he perceived it clearly, namely, the objectivity
of external objects.

However he might have been mistaken

at this point .

Apparently the sum of two and three is five but if he
later doubted this, it was because he thought some God might
have endowed him with a nature which had deceived him.

(If

God wills it, he can easily cause the human mind to err.)

Yet at times Descartes was so certain of truth he was convinced that regardless of who should deceive him nobody could

ever cause him to slip into non-being, as long as he remained
conscious of his o,m existence, or make the sum of two and

three to be less than five, if he could discover in the

104tpid.~ P• 36.
105neception is possible only when a person considers
that: an idea yields knowledge. Vide Smith, SU?• cit.,. P• 297.
106E'•B•, earth, sky, stars, etc.
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answer an o bvious contradictio11.

Desca~tes could discover no basis for believing that
God is deceitful.

In fact any doubt at this point rests

wholly upon metaphysical ground.

In order to erradicate

this it will be necessary for him to find out whether there
i s e God.

If his conclusion is positive he will then be

compelled t o a scertain whether God can be a deceiver.

This

doubl e procedure is 11ecessary because he cannot be certain
of anyt hing until he definitely settles these two matters.
But in order t o ac~omplish this without interruption he

f inds it necessary~ first, to classify all his thoughts.
Wit hL'l'l his mind he discovered three groups of thoughts,
namely, (a) ideas, that is, images of objects,107 (b)
tion s, and (c) ·judgments.108

.Y.211·

Now. ideas alone, without

refer ence to anything else, are invariably true; for example,
one can imagine either a goat or a chimera 7 but the fact
remains that he has imagined one or the other.
hood resident in the affections or will.
for bidden fruit

or

non•existent objects,

true that he had the desire.

Nor is false-

A person can desire
but it is still

However one must be very

cautious lest he be deceived in the area of judgment .

The

principle error here (and the most co:nmon) is to suppose
that internal ideas correspond to external objects.
107

:e:.g., man, angel, sky, God.

108E.g., fear, affirmation, denial, willing.

However

109

a person would hardly ever err if he always considered the
idea alone, that is, without reference to anything in the
exterior world.
Now thet·e are three types of ideas~ namely, (a) innate, 109
(b) adventitiou§~llO and ( c ) fa£t1tio~s.111

However a per-

son is liable to believe that all of his ideas are of the
same class,1 12
Descartes then proceeded to examine the basis for believing that adventitious ideas resemble external objects.
The f.irst: groth'1.d for this belief is that man is so taught

by nature.

The second is that matt knows these ideas are in-

dependent of his will because at times they make their
appearance whe11 unwanted; f or example, when one sits beside

a fire he feels heat whether he so desires or not.
But are thes e reasons sufficient to convince?

When

Descartes speaks of natur e he does not mean an inward light.
Rather he has reference only to "a certain spontaneous impetus

109E.g. , t ruth, being~ ~hought. Cheval ier asserts,
ces ideas ou notions etant les formes de ces pen•
s'6es. 11 • .u ·v tge his book entitled Descarte~, 21?.• ill.• •
P• 222.

0 •••

llOThey enter the human intellect from without. They
are ttcreated" with the aid of the sensas. (Thus Descartes
anticipates the Kantian theory of knowledge.)

1~1I.e., fictitious, e.g., a dragon, a satyr, a fairy,
or a h1.ppogriff . Smith mentions a siren. See his book,
.2.2•

s!!·· ,

p. 298.

1121.e., one of these three .

110

t:hat impel s me to believe in a resemblance betweenttll3 L,...
ternal ideas and their external objects.

However there is

a vast: diff erence between these two types of reason.
tt

When

the light o f nature" lll;. makes a pronouncement concerning

trut h ther e can be no room for any degree of doubt, for

exampl e, when it declares that Descartes exists because he
doubts .,115

But the other type of reason is more convincing

t han the f ormer.

Natural impulses are sometimes discordant

wi th the will!> and perhaps many possess the ability to create
ideas independently of the objeetive ·world.
ble that they are generated during sleep.

It is even possiBut even though

these i deas should originate from the external world, it
does no t nec essarily follow that they resemble the empirical
object s.

Sometimes there is a wide gulf separating idea and

ob.1ect O for e:<ample, Descartes discovered within his mind

t wo entirely different concepts of the sun, namely, the tiny
di sc experienced by sense, and the astronomical conceptll6
113Descartes, " Heditation III.•" Meditatiop.s sm t~e
fi1.·s~ ? hilo~EhY:, anonymous translation, 22• cit., P• 9.
c'r. La fleur weaker version, "Third Neditation," 22.• ~ . t
Pt1 34.

a

114This natural light is the power found in all men to
judge well, to distinguish between the true and the false.
115on the other hand natural impulses frequently lead

1:>ne astray.
,

llh..
'''Harald 'Hoeffdlng points out that for Descartes an
~dea'..~ is an idea which can be developed rather than,
~ne wn1.cn ~s received in the beginning. See~ History; 2t
~19de77n ~hilosoQhY• 2 vols., translated from the German by
B. E. Heyer (Reprint; London: Macmillan, 1924), I, 221.

111

of a gigant i c sphere.

Now it is certain that these two

id~as r e sembl e t wo diverse suns; and yet reason teaches that
the f o rmer i s more tmlike its object.

Bence i>escartes con-

clude s that in t he past he has accepted some propositions
a s true "onl y fr.om a sort of blind impulse, 0 117 rather than
upon t he rati onal g~ounds of certa ir, judgment .
But there is another method of determining whether in•
ternal i deas co~r~spond t o external objects.
accGpted

Xf ideas are

a s just "certain. modes of consciousness,ull8 (a)

they all appea r t o be equal, an<l (b) they all seem to pro•
c eed f r o1" t ho intellect .

However if one co11siders them to

be i mages, then they are very diverse because an idea representing a substance contains more objective reality than one
which denotes acciden ts.119
sent i ng

ai.~

Furthermore the idea repre-

eternal God has more real objectivi ty than ideas

which symbolize finite substances.120
Now from natural light alone it is clear that the efficient cause must be at least as real as its effect.

Certain•

ly t he cause :ts the only source of r ·e ality for its effect.

117nescartes• "Meditation III," The t-!editation~, anony-

mous translation$ 2.2• cit.~ p. 40.
ll81bid.

119nescartes employs Scholastic terminology very freely
in his ~ditati21l.§.• Vidt; Levy-nruhl, SU?• cit,., P• 3.
120
nescartes, tfHeditation III.," Meditat~s 2Jl .tM
First f.hiiJl!o;ehx. anonymous translation, 22• · t., P• --z.r•.
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~·!oxeover it i s impossible for a cause to communicate that

which it <loes not possess.

Therefore, (a) being cannot be

produced by nonC'>be:l.ng, 121 and (b) the higher cam1ot be the

effect of the l ower.

A stone ~an be produced only by an

entit y which contai:ns the identical propert ies of the stone,
o r others which are superior.
infer i or to heat· itself.

The cause of heat cannot be

The idea which the intellect con-

tains of ~t?~ or heat wa s placed there by a cause which is

at l eas t a s real as these entities themselves.

If ·an iclea

s ·1ould conta in something which is absent in its cause, then

the cause o f this note t10uld of course be nothing.
an idea n ever arises from ~1011-being.

However

Cne idea ean be the

cause of another ideas but this regress cannot continue for•
eve r .

I n t he end we a.re ultimately driven back to a first

idea.122 wi:tich :ts ·he cause of all the reality in the series ..

I deas exis t in th~ i nt ~llect as pictures.

They may distort

t he ir causes, but they cannot be more perfect than their
causes.
Now to summarize:

(a) If the perfection of an idea

convinces one that this identical reality is absent from his

l21This reminds one of Pa-rmenides.
1 2
~ Etienne Gilson remarks, "La premiere surprise
eprouvee ,ar un lecteur scholastique etait de voir Descartes
,

ijrouvex l'existence de Dieu cotro1e cause d'une idee." See
]itu~U ~UI L! &2.1.e ~ &!! Pensee •iedie · a e Dans La Fyrmatiop
D1! ...,~st._ m~ Carees!'en, Vol. XIII in •tu es~ Ph~sophie
Hedi vale, Directeur: .Etienne Gilson Paris: Lirairie
Philosophique J. Vrin,. 1930) 1 p. 203.
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intellect both eminently and formally, and (b) the person
himself cannot be the efficient cause of this idea, it fol•
lows that(~) this person is not a solitary being.

Rather

(d) some other beL~g exists as the efficient causel23 of
this idea..124 On th~ other hand (e) if this idea is absent

from the intellect» then(£) one cannot be certain that he
is not alone in the world; "for I have diligently searched
fo'l' all such arguments and have been thus far unable to find
any other.ttl25

Among the various ideas in Descartes• mind he discovered
one whi ch represented Deity.126 Others signified corporeal
and inani mate objects, animals,. men., angels.

The ideas

denot ing the last three entities could have originated from
other ideas, whereas the ideas of corpo·r eal bodies might have
risen within the intellect itself.127

He could conceive

123smith asserts that the "self-caused1 can be no other
t han God." (Re is stating Descartes• view.J See 22• ill•,
P• 303.
124smi.th also states, "However imperfect the mode of
existence possessed by a representation, i.e. by an idea,
compared with the mode of existence for tohieh it stands, the
former mode of e.~stence, Descartes points out, is yet not
in itself nothing, and accordingly cannot o,-1e its origin to
nothing.~1 1!2!.g., p. 299.
125Descartes; HThird Meditation," Meditations, trans•
lated by LafleurD !m·• cit~, p. 38.

126we conceive of the infinite "through a true idea."
Vide Smith, 22.• ~ · - p. 301.
127
.
There is not much in this latter group which is per'!"
ceived sharply and transparently.
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certain e l ements clearly and distinctly, namely, magnitude 1.

figuxe , aitua tion, motion; number, duration, and substance.
Finall y there i s one group of ideas which is so obscure and

confused that one i.s unable to determine whether they repre•
sent r eal objects, namely, light, sounds, colors, odors,
heat, and cold.

Sometimes an idea will deceive by signifying

nothing as thQugh it

ti1er e

something; for example1 the ideas

of heat and col d are· so blurred and indistinct that he could
not determine Miether (a) cold is just the absence of heat,

or (b) heat is the absence of cold, or (o) these qualities
are fic titious ,

These ideas originate within the mind.

If

they are unreal their source is non-being and they proceed
from t he intell ect because of the imperfection of human

nature; if t hey are true they originate within the mind
itself . 128
Conce>.'ning clear ai.,d distinct ideas which represent

ce:rporeal bodies 1 it S(;}ems that some129 might be caused by
the i dea one has of himself.

Human beings and stones are

both ~ '.\bstances, but stones are unconscious and extended,

whereas people are conscious and non-extended.
t hat each represents a substance.

Yet it appears

The ideas of duration and

number arise trmen one reflects upon his past and present
12
8oescartes, "Meditation III. ,.n Meditatirs ml .tml
First Philo§gph,,. anonymous translation, 22• ct., P•""7ili.
129

0
£ •·o•,

nun-b er, d'uration; sub stance.

,
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existence, and reflects that he is conscious of different
thoughts.130

Thei.1 these ideas can be transferred to objects.

However motion, situation, figure, and extension are not in•
an1rnate.

Perhaps they reside in the mind "eminently.u

But does the idea of Deity arise from within?

God is

an eternal, immutable, omnipotent substance who has created
all things.

However these attributes are so wonderful that

it appears improbabl~ to suppose they could have originated

w·l thin tho human intellect.1 3 1

e,r.ists.

Thus· by necessity, God

Even though the internal idea of substance springs

from t he fact that man is a S·u bstance 9 yet this fact fails

t o explain the idea of infinite substance which is present
in man's intellect.

Han is a finite being and unable to

conceive of infinite being.

Hence the only possible source
of this lofty concept is infinite substance itself.1 3 2

It would be false to assume that the mind does not perceive infinite substance by a genuine idea because infinite
realityl33 is more real than the finite.

In fact one

13~he number of which 1s known.

l31Jacques Chevalier,"• •• 11 est manifeste que
1 1 id'6e de Di.eu., avec tous les attribut:s qu' elle 1.mplique,
ne peut tirer son origine de moi-m~me • • • • 0 ;lis)e 212.• ill•,
p,. 257.
132
Descartes could never say,"· •• l'idee de Dieu ~~est
qu•un concept de notre esprit; ce n•est pas Dieu qui a cree
l'honnne, c•est l'homme qui a cr~e Dieu.n lbiq., PP• 290£.
133
nr. Salmon observes that this idea is knowledge, not

2'.

some.thing necessarily I but about something.
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perceives the infinite before he conceives the finite, that
isn a person possesses the idea of Deity prior to the idea
of self.

One realizes his own doubts and desires and im•

perfections only when he compares himself with a being more
perfect than he.
Now it is impossible to assert (a) the possibility of
this idea being materially untrue, and (b) that it may have
ori ginated from non-being,134 as for e:rample, the idea of

cold, heat~~ cetera.

Rather this concept is clear, dis•

ti11ct, a nd more objectively real than all the rest.

Thus

its genuineness is above suspicion.

There can be no shadow of doubt concerning the truth
of an idea representing infinite, per·f ect Being.

It is possi-

ble to suppose the non-existence of such a Being,135 but it
is equally impossible to suppose that this idea corresponds

to nothingl36 which is objectively real.1 37

Furthern-~re

this idea is clear and distinct because whatever the intellect perceives to be true is contained whole within the idea

1341.e., human imperfection.
l35Descartes has been unjustly accused of atheism.
Vide Elizabeth s. Haldane, Descartes: His !tife ~ Times
~London: John durray, 1905), pp. 36l°f.-

136J.; -Segond declares, "La ph.ilosophie de Descartes

comp...,.rt..a •• " un agnosticisme religieux, '9.u moins relatif • 11
See I.& Sa<~essr Cartesienne Et I&, Doctrine De La Scienc§
(Paris": ttbra rie Philosophiciue J. Vrin, 1'9°!2;"; p. 217.

137As e.g., the idea of cold.

1
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itself.

This is a fact even though the human mind may never

be capable of comprehending the infinite.
forever impossible.

In fact this is

Moreover it: is sufficient for one to

know this and judge that ever ything he perceives transparent-

ly exists in Deity, so that his concept of God may become
the most definf.te of all his ideas.

But: could Descar tes have underestimated himself?

Is

it possible that all the attributes of Deity exist potential-

ly in man?

Descartes realized that his knot·1ledge was slowly

becoming more perfect and he could see no reason why this
increase should not exta.11.d indefinitely.

Moreover :lf this

should ever become a reality he might even become as perfect as God himself.

In a t«:>rd, if Descartes possesses the

ability to acquire these divine attributes, why \-JOuldn't he

be capAble of creating the ideas of these divine perfections?
However when he e:tam:Lned the matter more carefully he
discovered that this is an uupossibility1 38 because even

though his knowledge should become more perfect every day,
and although his nature possessed huge potentiality, yet
all of these wonderful qualities do not bea~ even the slightest resemblance to his innate idea of God.

Increasing

1381-•e-rhaps Descartes derived this notion from Montaigne.
Vide his essay entitled 11 Apology For Raimond De Sebonde," !he
~ssaXsS il liicl~l Eyguem S!, r~g-ntahcmg, translated by Charles
Cotton; editedby W~ Carew Hazlitt. This is an entire volume
in Grea~ ~ Qi. ~e Wes~erc Wqrld,, 54 vols., edited by
Robert ha ~ H.utc1ins ( hcago: Encyclopaedia Britannica,
l;tc•, c.1952), XXV, 208-94. Dr. Salmon says it is evident

taat Descartes has read Nontaigne, e.g., Descartes'arguments
for the errors of revelation are found in Montaigne.
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knowledge is a clefinite token of imperfection.

Noreover

e ven though his ~,owledge "grows" he realizes that it will

never r each per fect i on because it lrl.11 never get beyond the
point where there is no more to he l ea rned; whereas his

concept of Deit y is of One truly perfect.

In brief, a being

mus t exist actually before it can be the cause of its corres•
ponding idea . 139
Yet sometimes Descartes forgets why the concept of a
Being mo-re perfect t han man must necessarily proceed from
s uch a Bei ng.

Hence he wonde~s if he could exi st~ if God

were mon... existent!

existence?

From whom then could he derive his

Possi bil ities a~e. (a) hi msel f, (b) his parents.

or (c ) Hsome other causes less perfect than God; for we
could ( t h il:1k o f or) imagine nothing more pe1;~fe ct , nor even

equal t o hi m.ul40

But if Descartes were totally independent:

and the ef ficient cause of his own being~ he would also be
completel y f r ee from both doubts and desires.
be pe rfect; tha t is, he ~10uld be God.

Then he would

Now it is more diffi•

cult for a thinking being to orlginate in nothing than for
that s.ame bei.ng to a.c quire extensi.ve knowledge; and if

Descartes had created himself. he would not have denied
139aoc1 must exist as the tlnly efficient cau-s e of my
i.nt."•utte idea of Deity. Vige Collins, 22• cit. , p. 166-.

140oee;cartes, "Third 1'-"editation n r;-teditations s trans.-

lated by Lafleur, 2:2• s;it., pp . 42£.'
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hims elf' that great t reasure141 which he now lacks.

It would

be i mposoibl e f or him to refr ain from endowing himself with
all t he a ttr ibut e s of Deity.

nut even though he were to

imagine he had existed thus from all ete n1ity, it ~10uld not
mean that he had crea ted himself.

~·1an' s life on earth may

be d1.vided into an infil'ti te number of tota lly independent
por t i on s.142

Jut just because Descartes existed an hour

a go it does not foll ow that it is necessary for him to exist
now, tmless some ext ernal cause preserves him in this very

r.10ment .

I C r equires as much power to pre serve any substance

as it does t o create it.

Oesoa rtes exists at thi s very

moment, but doe s he possess the power to· prolong that existence for. even a single moment longer?

Cer tainly if any

s uch power were resident within hii·n, he would be consci ous
of its pr esence.

But he has no knowledge of any such ability_
Hence he f eels his dependency upon an eA"ternal Be ing.143
But suppose Descartes were produced by his par ents, or
SO'ffie

othe r f L~ite causes, instead of God?

However this is

i mpossible for the cause must be as ree.l as t he effect.
Descartes i s a thinking thL"'l.g.

Now,

Therefore , the Cause of his

existence must a lse be a thinking thing.

Ft.trthem ore it

1411. e . ~ vast knowledge.
142smith points out that this view of time is another
assumption upon which his arg~ent rests. See 9.R• ~ . , p. 303.

143
Dr. Salmon astutely observes noes<:artea needs God
a lot more than anybody else."
'
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must p?ssess perfections ~~1ieh correspond to the idea in
Descartes• mL"ld.

i3u t who rnade God?

If !1e ia self-existent,

he i s t he cause of his own being for self-existence i mplies

the abi l i ty to possess evezy perfection which D'escartes
c a11 conce,.ve as existing in Deity.
ef f e r.: t

9

But if God is only an

we sha1 1 p1:-oceed to discover whether the cause is

seJ.f ... existent.

Thu s we shall proceed backward step by step

until a t l ast we reach the ultimate Cause, that is, God.

An inf init e regress of causes is a.11 L«possibility at this
point becau s e the question at hand daals more with prese1.--ve.-

tlon t h an wi th creatf.on.

No"r is i t impossible t hat (a) Descartes was produced
by a dua lity of causes , &1d (b) his idea of a cer.tain divine

attribute i s derived f r om one of these causes, and (c) his
concept of another perfection is acquired from another

cause .144 Thi s is obvious for (a) the divine unity is one
of the pri me at tributes in Descartes' min.cl, and (b) the
cause of this idea is necessarily the same as the cause of
all his other ideas.
Finally ) eve11 though the efftcient cause of Descartes

was his paA7en ta ~ this does not necessarily ir11ply that (a)
he is preserved by them..

Nor does it f.ollow that (b) his

parents proth ,ced
.
anything more than his body••and the body

144
I.e., all these pP.rfections exist but they are not
concentrated tn Deity. Smith notes ttu"!t Descartes avoids
a detailed discussion of this point. See 22• cit., P• 303.
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is only the shell which encloses the genuine Rene Descartes,
namely, the mind.

Thus a person's physical birth does not

present any difficulty to the argume1'lt.

But how did Descartes receive this idea from God?
did not derive it empi.rica~ly.
he

c:&1

It is not a fiction because

neither increase nor decrease the concept.

must be innate.

There is no other alternative.

is not remarkable.

He

Hence it

But this

God implanted this i dea145 in Descartes·•

mind at the moment of creationl46 as a mark of His ~10rkman•
ship.1"1,7

Since God created Descartes 1.t i s very probable

that he fashioned Descartes in His own image, and this divine
likeness is now reflected in the idea which Descartes has
in his mind,
The whole argumentlli8 may be summarized as follows:

Descartes perceives that (a) it would be impossible for him
to be a thinkil1g thL~g and possess this idea

this very God were non-existent!l49

of God,

(b) if

(It is certain that God

145Thus we know God only in an indirect manner.
ib.id. !i p •. 304•.

See

1461.e., when God created Descartes.
147:rt is not necessary for the mark to be different
from the finished product.

148collins sees an additional argument 1n this t:ieditatiqp
but he admits, "There is no complete distinction between the
two proofs. • • ... See QB.• cit., p~ 166.
l49nescartes, 0 Heditation 1II. ," Heditation 213. the
Philos9pt1v, anonymous translation, SU?.• cit., p. 52~

First
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ca.."lnot decoive because Re a.son teaches that fraud is invari•

ably produced by itnperfection.)150
His ontological proof l51
Descartes rt.ow wishes to emerge f wm his dark 111ght of
doubt and 1.eam whe t her any certain lmowled ge is available

con~erning cor poreal bodies.

But bef o~e considering whether

or not the phenomenal ~10rld. is real, he must examine his own

internal i dea s and di scover which ones are in sharp focus
and \-mich are blurred.

His concept -o f qt;J8lltityl52 is so dist inct that he can
div:lde it ,..nto parts and assign to each diver -s f i gur~s,

sizes , l ocal mot i ons , and situations. He can even attribute
degr ees of duration t o each moti on.
ular · .:a ther than general.)

(His knowledge is partto-

Moreover ,men he percei ves

these individual particulars it is more l ike remembering

than discover ing somethi ng new.153 Host significant is the
fact that he f inds ·within his intellect an· infinite multitude of adventi·t tous ideas wh!cll cannot possi bly be classed

150Thie is not essential to his argument151From the fif·t h Meditation. Norman Kemp Smith affirms
tha;t the Ontological,. proof is a "simpler and more direct
demonstration of God•s existence." ~ s;m,. sit., p. 304~

1521.c-. , the ticontinuum,"

OX'

extension.

153cf. Plato, "Meno," lll.l Dil!:~' 2' fllM;a, 2 vols.,
translated from the Greek by
amJowett~ printing;
New Yor~1 Random House, c.1937); I, 349•80.
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as "pure nega t i on s. 0 154 These concepts possess unalterable
nat ures !) even though the objects which they r epresent are
non,;,,existent: out side of Descartes' mind.
imagines a triangle. 155

For example, he

Perha ps no such t riangle ever

e~i s ted in the entire \lni ver s e , yet one must a dmit t hat this

particular triangle possesses certain dimensi ons,
which are independent of 'Descartes.

£t 5r.ete; a,

This i s easily pro-ved

by considering tha t the three angles of t his triangle

equal to o.;o right angles ~

tt

cetera.

are

(These facts remain

whether Descartes trl.l ls it to be so or not.)

Furthermore

he cannot be c ha rged wi th hav·ilig invented them because he

did Dot even t hink of them until §fte; he had imagined the

triangle .

Nor did he conceive of this particular trlangle

because of othe·r triangles which he had seen.

He is certain

that thia is true because (a) he is able to i magine an
infinit e number of objects which nobody ever per ceived
empirically, and (b) he can prove various qual ities of their
nature the same as he can with this triangle.
exi sts bec.a use he perceives it clearly.

Each figure

Not one is a nega-

tion because (a) truth is identical with existence, and (b)

.

15

4oescarte.s, " Meditation v.• ," Meditati9ns

n

the

First

PhilogoJ?bx, anonymc;,us translation, ga. cit ... P•
•
155c£. Hicholas HaLebranche's concept of the circle in
his second Dialogue. Vidi "Ile Entret1en: De L1'Existence
De Dieu," Entretiens !l!£ a H4taphflitue st. sx 1! Jtetigio; •
suivi$ des Entretiens Sur La Hort ~:d tion Critique avec une
introduction et des notes par Armand Cuvillierl Paris:
Libre.:l.rle Philos<>phique J. Vrin, 1948), I, S3- 00.
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whatever is known cl.ea,:ly and distinctly is true.

This

last aseertion has not bee>.'1 demonstrated but the nature of
his mind compels assent.
Whenever Descartes s.e lects the idea of an object from
hts intellect it follows t'ha.t everything 'tmich he pe!'c.e ives

clearly snd distinctly concerning thi s object is true.
Thus perhaps he can base a theistic proof upon this premise.
Within his mi.nd he finds the idea.156 of a supremely pe>.i:ect

Being 9 just as he found the idea of the ~riangle.

Moreover

he perceives clearly and distinctly that eternality is an
attribute of this Being.

Therefore, the existence of God

is just as certain to him as any matheli'.atical truth.

"And

this i s true even though I oust admit that it does not at
first appear entirely obviou8, but seems to have some appearance of sophistry.n157 This is because the existence of Goel
can be separated from His essence1 and one may conceive of
God as being non-existent.

But as Descartes reflects mor.e

deeply he decides that the essence of Deity is inseparable
from His existence.158

In fact it is unthinkable to imagine

l56oescartes presupposes that eveey man possesses an
idea of God. Vid,a Gilson, gene Dess-an.es Oiscours ~ L!.
Methode., 22.• e.i t., p. 348.
4

157oescat:tfls, 1'Fifth Meditation," Heditat.ipnJ!J translated by Lafleur, 5m.. eit., PP• 58f.

15811 Preuve de Dieu par son essence" is Chevalier•s
definition of the Ontological argument. See 22• ill•, P• 272..
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othert-:r.i.se. 159 One can no more divorce the two than he can
.conceive of a mountain without thinking of a valley.

The

tl,o concepts cannot be separated.

Mow it is indeed impossible to think of a mo\l11tai11
without: also th:b.1king ·of a valley, but t his does not prove
t he e:id.stenc e of any mountain.

Likew·lse it is impo~.sible

for a person to conceive of God unless he conceives of God as

existings but apparently t his does n.ot prove that God exists.
One can imagine

t, a

·w inged horse," 160 even though no such

creature e2tists; l 61 11kewis·e one could attribute exis-tence
to Deity when Deity is really non•existe.nt.

ples are not gnalogous ..

But these exam-

It is true that one cannot 1-magine

a mountai11 without an adjacent valley, but this does not

prove that either eldsts; rather· it merely implies that

(whether real or fictitious) mo\Ultain and valley are in•
separable.

But on the o-ther hand it is impossible for any-

one to conceive of God as not existing.

Existence and God

159Emile Boutroux observes that 11 1 1 es,s ence et l' e1i..-iste"'.ace de Diou sont de telle sorte que, d 1 un part, el.lea sont
absolunent une et que, d"autre part, ·,11e, s2 rapportent
un moment du temps. • • ... See ~ Veijtts Ateti;elles ~
QS~i{s, traduite par M. cangulllieiµ Paris: Li5ral~~e
re x
can, 1927)) p. 104.

a

l 60oescartes, ffMeditati.Qn Y•., " t-{editationS· ··.s;m the f .i rst
Philo§R~, anonymous transl.a t.ion, 22• fil. , p... f>6.
·
161·we cannot force the lal-.--s of mind uwn the nou.aenal

world~ Human thinkiftg "imposes no necessity on things,"

V~fl:i ~mith~ 92• S,t,, p. 306.
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are inseparable.162 Therefore, God exists.

It is possible

to think of a hors e either with or without wings. but it is
i mpossib!e163 to conceive of a God without the attribute of
e2dste11.ce.164
Someone may ob.iect 9 HOf course the existence of God is

necessmr y g.f£.f#I. you attribute all perfectionG t@ Hirn, he..
cause thi s i ncludes existence.
is ...mnecessaryoi

But your basic supposition

Th is :1.s 1:tke affirming t hat one can circum-

scribe all qua<lTi latera l figures within a circle, whereas
the rhombus is excluded. 11

valid .

However this objectio11 is not

!1aybe i t is never necessary for Desca rtes to think

of God 0 yet every time the thought occurs he finds it

necessary t o C?Jndow God with all manner of perfections.

~iore-

ovet' a s soon as Descartes realizes t hat existence is a per•
fection he is compelled to attribute this perfection to
Deity also.

It is never a necessity for Desca~t~s to think

of a triangle either, but when he does it is necessary te
think of a geometrical figure whose three angles do not

162God's existence is inseparable from His essence.
See ibid.

l63Louis Liard points out that the idea of God "emporte
avec elle non pas seuleme,it la possibilite. mais la necessitett
of what he calls t'existe£e. Vide his book entit\ed
Descyites (Troisi me edition; Paris: Felix Alcan, tditeur,
l9lI, P• 184.
164
when Me.r senne suggested to Descartes that this .p roof

resembles Anselm's argument, Descartes replied, "Je verrai
s. Anselme a la premiere occasion." Quoted by Smith, SU!• s.1£.,
p. 304. ( ~ his footnote U4.)
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in~crihc.:.l within a circl e it doea not nt:cenrc:~r.:i.ly follo,r;,;,
~.....
-- h··,_
,e>.'1·.: ·t1....,,.."'
--:r ,. .,

._· o',_ t·.,,.,,1
...._ of· "'v"'"'"<:Ir:;" ..
... _;~_·
.... ,,...
.::."-"'..:.

1 , .....:--..

....
.1. ,

n . e 1.
.
di,£l:-er/;1 "
::..;r·
.· s a vc.:s1.
,f-

Now, the

enc e. be.l.,.reen £[il s~ l:i.~su.mpt:i.ons a nd innate

t h..."-.s i d.ea i s true b-2.cause ( a) he cann,0;: conc eive o f any

other being which is alnwlu.tely ue·ccssar y, (b ) it is i rr{r.ossi ble to i m~in~ m.o re tban one God 7 (c) if t he c::ristence of

and ( d ) Desc~trtes apprc.hen<ls nur:acr-ous othe:r chai...~cteristios

in lki t y t hat are immttte.ble.,

I f a trinngle contains one nin~ty-degree. anglep the
165
base will invariobly be opposite th.c largest angle.
Descartes i s certain of this.

In fact he is so certnin that

he finds it impossibl.e to beJ.ieve e·t hernise.

l!oreovcr he

166
. JUSt
.
. o f tne
'
~
l.s
as ce-r tain
exi.stence
m:,~ ~~ -d
· •

it so finnty that he is 1.m.able to dQUbt it.

r;~-

m;

b e 1 ieves
·

"J.am vcro

ituiumera,. tum de. ipso Deo a.lii.$qµe rebus intelle.ctualibus,.
tul1l etiam de. omni illJ

-n aturi corporel, quae est p1ll"G.e

1CS5 nescarte.s, 1 '1,. editation V. , i'I Madi:tAtion on tb.e. Firs.t
PhiloS:9l?hY., anonywrus transl.ation, s&~· cl.t .• , p.6 '8:0--

166aow.ever we should ,:-emember ·that; Descartes ' god i$
not the GQd of Christi.an t11eism. lioGffding asserts .tbat
for Descartes ''the ide..a. of God is .. • • the ides. of .a continuous, all-embracing, unity of existence, in which every-1
thing tbli.t possesses reality tttust be o.ble to find a place.'
see~~•• I, 222.
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Hatheseos objec tum.i mihi plane nota & c erta esse posstmt.11167
Conclusion

His f i rst: proof
This is De scartes' basic proof for the existence of God.
The principle of causality is e."nployed t o account for a
finite creature.168

Our i dea of the infini te must be explained

by something else. 169

Horeover this proof has t wo parts; l 70

namelyi>

a .. I with t hi s idea , I saw one i n finite i dea , and there
had to be a cause with as much formal r eality ~ itself as t his idea has objective real ity in me . 1
b . I, a creature with the infinite idea, I have an idea
of the

; ~a ,

for me. 1

ai1d

ther e mus t be· Something accounting

But i s t he second part of this proof a distinct argument? or
167Descartest " Meditatio V,tt Neditationes pg Prima
Phi Los9phiq, 22• .s!S•, VII, 71.

168oescar tes affirms that "la consideration de la cause
efficiente est le premier et principal moyen, R2!!£ ~ pas
~ ]& ,s eµl !S_ l' uni gue, qtte nous ayons pour prouve~
'fl'e'xistence de Dieu. 11 Quot$d s1c1 by Gilson in ~
Des car tes Discours ~ LA M~tho e, SU?.• Sl.S• &p. 3Sr.169This is an!. oosteriori theistic proof.
170or, t he secand part is a development of the first.

l71Her e Descartes stresses the idea in itself as having
more reality.

It is not the idea without t he

'iI",

because

the idea is in the ttt0 --but the "I" is not stressed.
172At this point Descartes accents the "I" as being
limited. Thus the "I" with the infinite idea needs a cause.
(The author is indebted to or. Salmon for calling his atten•
tion to this microscopic distinction.)
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is it j ust a tlevel.c,pme11t o f the fir st port i on?

If we take

the former positi on we will tt find 0 t:hxee pt:·oof s f o r God in

De scart es; i f ·we accept t he latter. we wtll "see" only t-wo .

Some authors es pouse t he f ormer view; f or example,
L~~oy a s serts th.at Descart es has "trois n:reuves de Di eu. i: 173
Collins is of the same op1nion . 17l~ !·:aritain mentions

11

l es

trois preuves cartesiennes
de l 'existence de dieu : par
'
l'existence en nous de l'id,e de lf infini; ou par l'exi stence de nousmemes en tant que nous pensons l 'Infini; ou par
lGesser1ce meme du Pa xfa.i t que nous pensons . ul75

Wright

stunmarizes "Desc a rte s' three principal arg,Jmen ts f or t he

existence of God."176
However Gilsonl77 and Norman I<emp Sm1.t:hl78 count only

t,·~ ,

and t his i s apparently mat Des cartes ha.d in mind be-

cause he il'i.fo~"mS us t hat " 11 n• y a que deux vo:t.ee par

l esquetles on puisse prouver qucil y a un D1eu , savo1r,

l 9 une parses effect s , l'autre par son e s sence • • •• n l79
173i-1axiir.e Leroy, Desca rtes , !! phil~~Jhe ~ masaue ,
2 tomes ( Paris : Les Edit ions Rieder• c. 1 ~, II, I9.
17l~Collins, £2• ,£!.t. , p . 164.
17 5Jacques t·tari t a.in~ lit§. Songe ~ pescaites suivi de
quel ques Essais (Paris: Edit i ons R.-A. Correa, ! 932), p. 153.

17 6william Kelly Wri ght , A ~ist ort gi Modern Philosophy
(New Yorks HacmillaJ:\i. 1941) , p'; 6. ~ his brfel summaries,
i b~d. , PP• 76•78.
17 7Gilson, Ren![ Descartes l}iscours P.2 I&. Mg'thode, 22•

£il•• P• 347.

178
Smi th, ill?• sit,., PP• 299, 304.
179"• • • ou sa nature mama" of course. Quoted by Roger
Vemeaux, Lu_ S0_urce1 Cartesi,ennes n K@DtJ..mm•• DA ~daa11,fll:
Fgncai@ (Parts; Ga rtei Beucliesne ff Sai ms; o;I'9 • P • ·
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But we uu.1.s t be caref\.tl le.st we. interpret t his first
proof i n the 'Thomistic sense.

GilGOl\ p.oints out th.at although

vecc artes: "refu:1e d 'abord de critiquer' 1160 the Angelic Doctor,
~...1:~t

·this ar gument from cau.s;tl.ity·

l a s c hol.:a.sti qt.te .

..

11

porte di2•ectement contre

.. ul,81

His second proof
Ti.tl.; is the proof which we .c ustomarily associate with
the 11.amo of Dc.sc .i;irt<?.t3 • 182

(Since K.:.:tnt it ha s· been known as

t he On.tologicl\l urgume:nt.) 183

This is the point at which

C:.-..r tc.si.:m analysis penctrt\te<l. most deeply into t'he meaning

of

:1"-..rr:klt'.

thou ~:·,t .184

It is an

i, priori HlS· p-roof

and may be

~t atcd as f.ol).. m1s:

..:. find in me an ider.i of being which resembles tL.e idel\
of: nur,lo~r . But there i.s .:~ profound diffe~ence be tween

181Ibid. Vide Heru::-i Gouhier•s disct1ssion concerninr
~sc ..:rt~
t la t:.-"adi'tion thomiste, 11 in I...:>. l:tc:ns-c.es ~~elirteus.e
De Desc~rt~?.s (};>aris: Librairie :i1lri.losophique J. Vrin, 19245.,
11

pp.

270,-80 ..
1 Br,

_, ~vr . .3.alr:1ori...

~-

183Gilson, Ren' De$cat"tes Discoux•s ~ ~ Nethocle; 2£•

c;i.t., p. 347. · 1 84

•
Collins,
18'7

22.•

m•,

p. 168.

-Duns Scotus reviewed the Ontol.ogice.l argument nnd

was convinc:ed that an a 121."iori o-coof is irnnossible. ~
Riclu.trd 'HcKeon, 'l'he l:"'ltil6$0Ihy
Spino~a (New York:

of

Longn:t£lna, Green &Company, 928T, p'. 99.
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the t-wo ideas, n.&nely, the attribute of eternal perfection belongs to S!l!.!. idea. I realize that it ~uld
be less perfect if it were non-existent. This essence
is immutable and unchangeable but to be perfect it
must exist. Therefore, God exists.186

A person "WOnders why Descartes fails to mention St. Anselml87
but perhaps he Hsemble n'·avoir connu l'argument de saint

Anselme que par saint Thomas."188

This second proof tends to assimilate the first; 189 yet
Gilson points out that Descartes did not regard the Onto•

logical a rgument as capable of standing alone.190 In Descartes'
sys t em the Idea of God is the point of departure for both
proof s.

Unl ess one has this Idea first he cannot demonstrate

uaucunement" 19l the existence of God.

Sometimes Descartes

admits t hat God's ~xistence can be proved 9.ll!z from the naked
Idea of God, that is• in the sense that God is efficient

Causel92 instead of final Cause~193

l86or. Salmon •.
187~ Ans.e lmo, ptos~pgion (Argentina: Institute Oe
Filosofia;-1950), Chapter!, P• 26.

188Gilson,

cit., P• 352.

&en4 Descartes

Discours

~ La M,thode, 22•

189Collins~ la£• cit.

!!&·· p. 304.
191Gtlson• &ms fei:cartgs nis~urs 12§. I&. MJthRde• ~.

190cited by Sm1thr 22•

r

cj.t. (This 18 impossb e 6ecause
you start wit (a)tinite,
you c·a nnot reach to (b) infinite.)
192
I.e., efficient cause of idea, not of existence.

193eo11ins, 22• s!l•, p. 168.
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Desca~tes ass\.Unes that existence is a perfeet1on but
"Gassendi a nie • • • en soutenant contre De~cartes que

l' existe11c:e n • est une per£ ection ni en Pieu ni en aucune
autre chose 11 mais la condition sine qua !lQn des per.fections.ul94
Obvi ously Gassen-di is in error at this point because exist-

ence is an att ribute of perf~ction.

In fact the entire

argument :res ts upon this pt-emise, even though Descartes
finds existence only 1n the idea.
I f one a dmits that existence is a perfection, then it
:ls impossi ble for him to think of the Supreme Being as none)dstcnt.

One is compelled to concede that God ~xists.

The

very struct ure of our concept cf Deity demands it.195 There
is no other conclusion possible.
However Descartes failed to realize that an!. priori
theistic proof i s an 1mpo-ss1bili.ty.

It is impossible be-

cause a person is forced to begin with something prior to
God in the ontologi.cal order.

We cannot deduce the essence

of God from his existence because his essence is to exist.
'£his argument involves an tmlawful leap from the ideal order,

into the order of reality.196
194Gilson, ~ .Q,escartes pi9cgurs
Sil•, P•· 349.

P.t. L! 1-1:ctthgde,

22•

l95coll1ns,. 22• s!,t.; p. 169.
196of course De.s cartes does not have these two orders
in h.is system. For him · the real becomes the reality of
Thought. Hence., fxom the standpoint of cartesianism, he
remained within the same order.

.

.. ..t,i • • ,
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Descartes ·very discretely avoided a clash with St.
Thor.1as.
of the

He regarded Anselm's proof as based upon the meaning
~

"God"; w'nereas he considered his own as founded

_,______

upon the 3!!!t'u.1;£ of God.197

CHAPTER IV
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA I S INNOVATION OF THE

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
I ntroduction
Be11edictl De Spinoza2 is remembered as a man who
11

ge.nui.nely shocked hi s contemporaries."3

During his life,

and for a century after his death, he was denounced as an
"amoral a theist. 11 4· Later the pendulum swung and people
were inclined to admire him as an "ascetic sa1nt.n5
The purpose of this chapter is to examine (in context)
his ontological proof for the existence of ml i;ealissimwn.
The discussion will be supplemented by pertinent biographi•
cal notes in an attempt to throw additional light upon the

la1s name was really Baruch but after his final ex•
commW1i.cation he adopted the name of Benedict, i.e. 0 the
Latin equivalent of the Hebrew Baruch. ~ George Stuart
Fullerton, translator from the Latin. The Phii,sophy S!f
Spino.z a (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892 , p. 6.
2aorn 24 N~vember, 1634; died 21 February, 1677.
3R. H. M. Elwes, 11 Introduction," ~ Chief Wqrks gf,
}?egedi,ct 12§. ~pinqza, 2 vols. , translated from the Latin by
R.H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, c.1951), I, vi.
4John Wild, "Introduction•" Spin9za Selections, edited
by John Wild (New York: Scribner's Sons, c.1930), p. xxi.
5

.

12.kl• (John Wild denies that Spinoza was either.)
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p~oblem we are considering.
Human Appraisals
Negative views
On 27 July, 1656, Spinoza was publicly excommun1cated6

from the Jewish synagogue in Amsterdam.

The fearful ban

l.'ead in part :

Cursed shall he be 1n the daytime, and cursed also by
night! Cursed shall he be when he lieth down, and
cursed when he riseth up! Cursed shal l he be ,men he
goeth out, and cursed when he cometh in! Nay the Lord
not forgive him his sins!7
Rudolf Kayser frowns upon this but he admits that 0 Spinoza's
idea of God& which was always the pivot of his philosophy,
no longer had anything 1n common with the old idea of
Jehovah."8 Lewis Browne declares that the Deity of Spinoza
is "not the God worshipped in churches

and

synagogues. 0 9

After Spinoza's death Johann Georg Graevius cried out,
11

Through- the centuries the world has never seen anything

more pernicious • • • oh ye gods, save the world from this

6Because he believed that nature and God are identical.
~ Samuel Max Mel&"Qed, Spino:!
B1¥1,a (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, c ,. 9
,. p. 33.
7Rudolf Kays.e r, Spg;se: Ptttrait gf !. Spiritual li.!m,

fl~

translated froni German

Y Amy A

en and N.axim Newmark

York: Philosophical Library, c.1946), p. 97.
8

l.W•,

-CN~ew

p. 105,

9
Lewis Browne,
Company, 1932), p. 1

itessed
Spino;a
•

(New York: The Macmillan
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pcstilence !"lO

Even the well•know.n deist. Francois Arouetll

ridiculed him:12
Alors un pet1t Juif~ au long nez, au teint bleme,
Pa.uvre, ma.is fatisfai tt pensif et retire.
Eapr\t subtil et creux, moins lu que cel'1b;e, .
Cache sous le manteau de Descartes, son maitre,
March&1t
pas comptes, s 1 approcha du grand atra:
HPardonnez• moi 0 dit-11, en lui parlant t out bas,
Hais je pense, entre nous, que vous n 1 existez pas. 91 13

a

O e theol ogi an, Christ:i ru.'l Kortholt, considered Spinoza• s
philosophy an insult to God , a..~d even wished that it might
be cast i nto hellcofi1·e. 14

Thus one is not surprised to

learn th:;,.t Tractatus l'heolosicp-P9liticus was placed on the
Ind~lt.15

·--™-·~--"-lOquoted by Kayser, !!£• s;;it •.,

P• 314.

llHe is better known as Voltaire.
12tbig., P• 315.
13chrenicon SJ2fii;Zapum (Tomi quinque; Hagae Comitis;
Curis Soc~tatis Sp
zanae, 1921, 1922 , 1923$ 1924, 1927),
Vol . I , p. VII \_Sic).
14
1<ayser, 12£. .s:ll.•
1 5 ~ Frank Seu1t1ll, "Introduction,." Philosqphy Sll.
Bene · ct~ S32inoza, translated from the Lat~n by R.R. H.
Ewes New Yor~: Tudor Publi shing Company, c.1936), P• vii.
Cf. Spinoza• s letter (!!XLIV) to rrr. Jarig Jelless written
17 February, 1671. ~ "Epistolae Docterum Quorundam
Virorum ::~ s.u.s. ~ Aucto;g§ Responsiones; Ad aliorum ejus
Operum elucidationem non pa m facientes," Spj.poza ~ ,
im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenscha~
herausgegeben von Carl Gebhardt (Tomi quattuor; Heidelberg:
Carl Winters, Un1versitaetsbuc~dlung 5 1926) 1 IV, 227.
However Elwes is not certain that I. I. is Jar1.g Jelles.
1.d Spinoza, "Correspondence ... translated by R.H. M. Elwes,
T
9hief ij__orkt 2£ Benedict J2!! SaiJ!2za, im• cit. ; II, 362,
oo note i i .
.
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Positive views
The fixst to accord Spinoza real recognition was Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing.• 1 6

He never accepted the entire system but

he found in Spinoza a solace and a strength which he failed
to f ind a:nywhex·e else.

One wri.tei:- asks,

11 But

because he did

not believe Moses or the Prophets, since, as he said, they
accomr..~dat:ed thernselves to· the gro·s sness of the peoplei.; is

that a r eason for condemning him?tt17 Leon Roth defends
Spirwza. in an article entitled, "David Nieto and the Ortho•
doxy of Spi11ozism •.t, 18

a good

ma:.1 • ., 19

Tol~d describe$ him as, "A great and

Among his admir.ers one may also number

Coleridge 9 20 Wordsworth, Shelley, George Eliot (Mary

Art..n

Evans),21 and Albert Einstein.22 The subtitle of one recent

work (1946) on Spinoza is• "Portrait of a Spiritual Hero."23
.
l6Elwes, _"Introduction,,, . ~ Chief Wqrks 2f. Benedict
D,! ~p,1noza, sm,. cit., I, p. v1r.-

17A. Wolf, editor. ·.r~e Otdest Bi,~r.a phy 21 Spinoza
{London: George Allen & Unwin LTD 7 ¢.l 7), P• 69.
18Cbronicon Spinozanum~ 21?•

1.

sit•, I,

278•82.

191big. • I, p. Vii [ sic
20
~

Elwes, "Introduction,h Th~ (;hief
22• c~i.t . t I, viii.
·

se1n9za,

2 1Jb1,d. t 1 •. ix.
22
.
Kayser, SU?• cit., pp.• ix-xi.
23Kayser• s book..; Wsl•

ti9rks Q!. !}ene.dict
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Frank Sewall affi rms that Spinoza "f.ound in his Eucl1d1.an
dernonst~ations a visi on of God as real as that accorded to

saints. • • . " 24 After
gl amorizing Spino~ 9 s "voluntary martyrdom in t he cause of
the e cstasy of the mediaeval

[s1c1

free theught" he adds ~
Nore s ingular than all is the distinction t-Jhich Spinoza
enjoys of being a Pantheiat whose rel igion is so devout,
humble, and f ul l of love as to be a.n inspiring example
to many sect s of orthodox believe rs; ani oE being a
Moni st t-~1.ose One is not natur.e but God. 5

Spil"loza was t he man "qui a w le plus profond

according to Ren.an.

One ·wrtt:er testifi.e s,

11

en Dieu,.n26

I have read most

of the philosophers, and I assert in good faith that the.re
i s nothL,g that gives such beautiful ideas of the Deity as

Novalis praises
Spino za as ttt.he man intoxicated with Deity.n 28 noer Spinozi s ..
do the writings of Nr •. de Spinosa.u27

mus i st eine Ubersattigung m1t Gottheit, Unglauben ein Hari.gel
an gottlichem Organ und an Gottheit.•1 29

Friedrlch Daniel

24sewall., ttzntroduction," J'hilos9ph;x Qi. Bel)edic~ 12.!.
SRino;a, SU?.• ej,t. , p. xii.
I

251.e.W•t P•

vi.

26qooted by AndrJI Cresson in Sa~y (Paris: Presses
Universitaires De France, 1943), p. ~

27wolf,

12.£.

s,!t.

281 .• e,-.• "der Gottvert~ene :,.ann." Quoted by Elwes,
"Introduct·i on," lb!! Chi.ef Works Qi. BeASdict !2§. Sp!nRza,
SU?• C\t•, I, viii.
·
'
29
chJroniqon §Rins!H:JlUm, 22• £!!•, Vol. I, p. XI sic}.

l
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Ernst Schleiermacher30 speaks of "des heiligen, verstobenen

Spi noza!u31

Elwes affirms, u • • • we may say of him th.at,

like Mos es returning from Sinai, he bears in his presence
the witness t hat he has held communion with the Most High." 3 2
Kays er ws biography of Spinoza ends with these sublime ~rds,
"That i s the legend of Baruch, the blessea.u33

Couchoud

declar es:
A son enterrement il y eut. six carrosses et presque
autant de gens de qualite qu•a 1•enterrement d•·un
professeur. Quelques gens du peuple s'·y trouvaient .
aussi qui disaient: 0 Surement celui•la est au ciet. 11 34
Browne writes:
His body has long since retumecl to t-he dust whence
it ca~es but his thoughts live on.

And because they

3g

l i ve on, he who was named Baruch, ''Blessed,tt by h
father , is called blessed by mankind to this day.

Heine declares:

Konstatie~t ist es, das der Lebensi'1alldel des Spinoza
frei von allem Tadel war, und rein tmd makellos wie
das Leben seines goettliehen Vetters~ Jesu Christi.

30The celebrated "father" of u.:,dern Protestant theology.
3llbi_q. 9 Vol. I, p. X [:sic]. (I.e., "the holy, the
rejected Spinoza.") Quoted by Elwes-, "Introduction,-" Ill!.
Chief Works gt, B.e nedict ~ Spin2za, ~ . cit.
·
32Ibid., 1. ix.

331<ayser, Sll?•

cit.,

p. 322.

3
,
4Paul•Lou1s Couchoud; llmit ~
editioni Paris& Felix Alctm, dteur,

35Browne, SU?•

sit•, P• 319.

S~fflza
(deuxieme
I~, p~ 308.
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Auch wie Dieser lit:t er fuer seine Lehre· wie Dieser
trug er die Dornenkrone. Ueberall, wo ein grosser
Geist seine Gedenken ausspr ich~, 1st Golgotha.Jo
Thus it is evident t hat Beriedict De Spinoza is a very controv,s rsial figure in the his·tory of thought.

Spinoza's Doctrine
His method

In 1660 Spinoza wrote a treatise enti tled Tractatus
" qua.... optime
' !n veram
ln.tellectus .?\Uendf!tione ~
g!, va,a'

~

n

rerum £9;',nit1on1'&U slirlgi~r. 3 7

His thesis is: llolZ the
intel1.ect "may best achieve truth • • • • " 38 Experience had

"

taught him that "omnia, quae in commun1 vita fre.q uenter
occur~1t.·:; vane., & futilia esse. .. • .n39

He wondered

whether " quod verum bonumu40 might exist which could give
him supreme happiness.

However he doubted (at first) the

wisdom of losing his grip on what was certain for that which
was then uncertain.

He observed other men seeking for the

36QUot·e d by Elwes, "Introduction,•• .Ih!i Qhief Wortt.,1 2t
B!fll:!sic.t 12!1 Spi:PP&!h..2Jl• s;;it., It v.
.
3 7This t«>l:'k waa never co~pleted. (Religua desiderantur.)
3 8w1ld,

39

11 Introduct1on,"

21!• cit., P• xx11.

spinoza~ "Tractatus De lntellectus Emendatiorte; Et
de via, qua optime 1n veram reTUm Cognitionen, dirigitur,"
§ping&,! Q.P1Wh 22• cit.; II, 5.
40l!ur.s!·
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highest good in 11 di vit ias. • • honoren1 1 atque lihidinem." 41
These things a re a t tra ctive bu t after r e f lecting, Spino·z a
c oncluded t hat they a re evils, and the sunr.!lum bonum for which
h e sought was "fiXUs."Jl • • • bonum.. . . . .n42

Human happiness

er human mi seey is entirely dependent: upon the quality of
t he object which a per son loves.,

"Tbe chief goodn43 i s to
,.
,.
arrive at 19 cognit1onem unionis, quam mens cum t ota Natura
ha bettt 44.....and i f possible-, to l ead other s into this know9

ledge .
The f 1r st s tep i s. to discover a method whereby the

understandL""lg may be improved and purified, so that it may
comprehe..'11.d cor rectly in t he be.s t possi ble manner. 45

This

is "sununam humanamtt46 and he will attempt to di rect all the
sciences to th.is goal.

·- -411bid., P• 6.
"'"

u

42lJwi.
t1-3 spinoza, "On the Improvement of the Under standing,''
The Qtief Wgrkz 2£.. 5epe.d1-ct P£ SJ?!n9za .• translated by Elwes,
22• s.J:.t•, II, . •

4l~Spinoza, "Tractatus De !ntellectus nmendatione,"
§pinoy Opera" 22• cit., 11, P• 8.

45Elizabeth G. Salmon defines Spinoza's method a8
"reflective knowledge." Dr. Salmon wa.s one of the author's
teachers- in the area of Modern I~uropean Philosophy at
Fordham University.
46

1.lus• •

P• 9.
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His presupposition
Although Sp1.no2a cazu.,ot be classified as a Cartesian, 47
yet h ie pos ition pres\1ppo'3es the philc.>-SQphy of Descartes~ l•B

Descart.es conceived of the universe as being essentially
irrational. 49

tt • • •

Je penserai que le cie.l, l'air, la

terre 9 les couleurs, les figures, lessons et toute.s les
autres choses extJrieures ne sont rien que des illusions et

reveries • • • • u50 One might even consider himself 0 comme
1.t~ayant point de mains; point d'yeux, Point de chair, point

de sang, comme n' ayant aucuns sens, mais croyant fausseu1ent
avoi:c tout:ee ces choses •• .~ .s.1 51 The divine will rules

supr eme over the human intellect.
WWW

In fact God could will

:wi::

47Harald Hoeff<ling, a_ Hist2£Y Q!. Modern PhilostphY,
2 vols.,, translated from the German by B. E. HeyerReprint;
Macrnilla.r, i, 1924.), I, 296.

43Y.1f!.! Etienne Gilson, ttSpinoza Interprete De Descartes,.,
&q£oni£9D Sping~anq~ , S!Jl• .£it., !II, 68-87.
49vide Ren~ Descartes, "Meditation I," !h!. Meditations
!nSJ. Se~~cti~n! from Sb.2. Pr1.nciplet g!, Rene ijescartes,

translated :rom--aie· Latln and col ated~ the French by
John Veitch (Chicago: Open Court, 1945), pp. 23, 27. It is
said that Descartes Stlim\ed up his physical principles in
this formula: "Give me matter and motion and 1 will make a
world." QUoted anonymously by Ralph H. Eaton, "Introduction,"
pescartes §.electiqns (New York: Scribner's Sons, c.1927),
p. vi.
~ORenJ Descartes, "Meditations Metaphysiques,'' Me'ditation
Premiere, Oeuvres £hoisies, deux tomes avec un avant•propos
et d.ea notes de Louis Dimler (Pai:iis: Librairie Gamier Freres,

n.d.), I, 85.
51.i.e.w.
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a square circle if he so desired.
0

Furthermor e there was an

ess ential discontinui tytt52 in entitie s so t hat a person

might think of an infinite number of things and of nothing
occurring at the same moment .
is unable to exist alone.

Thus t he universe of Descartes

Descartes real ized that if it

were to be maintained for ever i t required the creative power
o f .Q!ay.53 He sta tes 9
I

.. . . .

et ainsi, de ce qu• \m peu

I

auparavant j•ai ete, 11 ne s• ensuit pas que j e doive main•
I\

tenant etre 9 si ce n •est qu 8 en ce moment quel que cause me
produise et me crJe pour a insi dir e derechef 9 c 0 est~a-d1re
me conserve. "54 The Cart esian univer se i s not r a t iona l .

1.i! igees slaire§ .f!t. disti nctes must be justified by faith.
The se 1deas55 are not t hei r own guarantee .

We inignt be

dreaming at this very moment .56 Perhaps 0 un certain mauvais
genieu 57 is dece iving us.
52wi l d, " Introducti on:," 22• s!S• • P• xxii.

53Th1s point was emphasized later by the Occasionalists.
For a concise definition. of this movement vide Vernon J.
Bourke, "Occasionalism, 11 ,llict~nafi 2!,. Ph1losoph
edited
by Dagobert o. Runes (New4lor~ P losophicai:Li rary 1 c.1942) ,
P• 218.

6,

54Descartes 1 "Me°ditations N,taphysiques," HJditation
Troisieme, Oeuvres Cboisies, 22• s!!,., I, 116.
5 ~ Descartes, "Meditation III•·" The Mjditationi

gelecfiges

!mm

!11£

the Princip\es 21 Rene Descartes, tranaated

y Ve tc , 22.• cit., P•

27.

56~., "Meditation I," p. 24.
570eacartes, 0 M.lditations Mfltaphysiques,n Me'ditation
Premiere,. O~uvree Choisies, 22• cit., I, 85.
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His corrective
Spinoza noticed this weakness58 in the Cartesian system.
Moreover he saw that reason cannot be justified or condenmed
by anything except reason.

Spinoza believed that the

guarantee of reason must be reason itself.

Understanding

"certitudinem involvat • • • •u 59 Truth must carry its own
imprint. 60 The tmiverse is rational and it is the nature
of mind to perceive this order.61

All scientific investi•

gation 1s based upon this assumption.

It is the very founda-

tion of Spinoza's system.62
In his work entitled Tractatus Theologicg-Politicus
there is a chapter63 entitled "De Miraculis.u

In these pages

he shows that God is not the basis of reason••rather, reason

is the foundation of God.

He admits,"• •• hie praecipua

ex solis ~rincipiis lumine naturali notis e11cu1, quod etiam

58spinoza writes. ttError autem, • • • est vigilando
somniare; &, si sit admodum manifestus, delirium vocatur."
Vide "Tractatus De Intellectus Emendatione," S?Ja• ill.•, II,
~

59,llli., P• 38.
60c£. Spinoza, uon the Improvement of the Understanding,"
translated from the Latin by R.H. M. Elwes and Bohn, SJ.?\119Za
Selectigns, edited by John Wild, 22• ~ . , P• 13.
61
~ !J?~., P• 5.
62
Ws Wild, "Introduction, 11 Ibi~. 1 P• xxiii.
63chapter Six,

Spinoza Opep,

21?!1 ~ . , III, 81-96.
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consul.to feci • • • • u64

If human reason is untrustworthy,

then everything else is untrustworthy also.

In fact it is

vain to think.

The final court of appeal for Spinoza is the insight
of a rational intellect .
sunt clarae 0

&

He is convinced that ttidea, quae

distinctae 11 nunquam possunt esse falsae ••

The ultimate test fo~ truth is nothing more nor less than
the clear and distinct ideas 66 t.mich are perceived imne-

diately.

If these cannot be trusted, then nothing can be

trusted .
Spinoza's Skepticism

Rah. Jaedaj67
Spinoza f ound an ancient theistic proof68 in the writing

64sp1nozaJ "Tractatus Theologico•Politicus, 11 De Miraculis,
21?• c.i t.,. III_. 95 •.
65sp1noza, "Tractatus De !ntellectus F..mendatione," 22•

cit., II, 26.

66oescaJ;tes in·aists that anything · which is conceived
very clearly and distinctly is true. ~ "Meditation 111,"
translated by Veitch, 22.• cit., P• 43~ He, affirms,"• • •
et P.&rtant il me semble que dejA je puis etablir pow: r~gle
gtfuirale; que toutes les choses que nous concevons fort
clairement et fort distinctement sont toutes vra1es. 0 ~
"M~ditations z..1t(taphysiques•" M$dltation Troisi~e, Oeuvres

Gbeiteies, SU?• .\al·~

1, 101.

67aabbi Ghasdai (or Chasdai.).
68.rhis stat~ent occurs in Spinoza.• s letter to Ludovicua
Meyer. Wa 11.Epistolae," Epistola x1; 1 22• sit•, IV, 62.
(This letter was written 20 April, 16~.)
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of Rabbi Jacdaj69 and states it as follows:
Si datur progressus causarum in infinitum, erunt omnia,
quae su.nt, etiam causata~ Atqui nulli, quod causatum
est 0 competit , vi suae naturae necessari~ existere:
Ergo nihil est in naturi ad cujus essentiam pertinet
n~'<!essar!o e~ister e. Sed hoc est absurdurQ: ergo&.

1llud. 1 V

Spinoza thinks that peripatetic! have misunderstood this
argument "

Its strength does not lie in the idea t hat it is

impossible f or God to e,dst, or that a regression of causes

&! inf ipi,t._qm is i mpossible .

Rather its force is- embedded
,.. natura" non necessario'
in the concept that "res, quae sua

existunt: 11 non d.e termi.."lari ad existendum 'a re

,..
St.ta

natura"

neces sario existent1.u71
Biblical miracles

Moreover Spinoza considered it impossible to prove God's
existence from miracles.72

A miracle is not an event which

69one of Spinoza·• s own countrymen, i.e., a Jew.
70t1If there be an infinite series of causes, all things
which arei are caused. But nothing which is cau.sed can exist
necessari yin virtue of its own nature. Therefore there
is nothing in nature , to whose essence existence necessarily
belongs. B1.1.t this is absurd. Therefore the premise is
absurd also. 11 Vide Spinoza, "Correspondence," translated
by Elwes, 22.• cit.; II, 322£.
71V\dt Spinoza•s correspondence with Ludovicus Heyer,
Epistola XII, ~.. cit. But., as Dr. Salmon points out,
there is a difterence between (a) arguing that there must
be a president of the United States, and (b) knowing the
president personally.
72
spinoza, "Of Miracles," The Q,hief Works 2f B~dicS

ll!

Pau

fP~!'
translated by Elwes~. cif., I, 84~. ile
rwe A!1
Stew&: Rl! Spipozisme (Par s: Desclee De Brouwer,
l

1952), P• H6.
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is contrary to the established laws of nature.73

Rather it

is merely an occurrence which men fail. to understand. 74

It

appears "ut a.liquid novi " 75 only because of human ignorance.
I n Scripture "omnia, quae • • • vere na.rrantur contigisse, 0 76
has happened in accordance with natural law.
Nature 1.s bound by "immutabilem ordinem" 77 ~Jbich is

never intern.,pted.78
decretis • • • • u 79

11

I t invariably functions "ex Dei
Scriptur a de natura in geneZ"e quibustlam

in locis affirm.at~ earn fixum atque immutabilem ordinem

serve.re, ut in Psal. 148. vers. 6. & Jerem. cap. 31. vers.
35 . 36.u 80 fhilos9pht,s states that "there is nothing new
under the sun.1181
Any irregularity in nature ••nos de omnibus dubitare

--·- -----

73cf. Spinoza, "Of Miracles," traniila.ted by Elwes, sm•

cit., I, 81... 83.

74Ibig., P• 86.
2.2•

75spL"'10za 1 uTractatus Theologico•Politicus," De I•'tiraculis,

.£1.t.., III, 95.

76Ibid. , P• 91.
77,l21£i• I P• 82.

78spinoza "Of Miracles." translated by Elwes, 2.2•
'
'

It 87.

ill• ,

79 spinoza. "Tractatus Theolo,g ico.. Politieus, 0 De 1'!1raculis,
22• £it., III, 86.
80

~ . , P• 9S.

81 Ecclesiastes 1:9.

(The Revised Standard Version.)
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f acere tt & a d Atheismum ducer et, 0 82

thst nature

0

suum

ord1nem non

I f we were to admit

servet1)i1 83

then "nee de ulla

r e unquam poterimus esse cert1 . n84

Longe igitur ahesti ut miracula, quatenus per i d
intelligitu.r opus 1) quod ordini naturae repugnet 9 nobis
Dei existentiam ostendant, cum contra nos de eadern
dubita~e facerent , quando absque 11s absolute de i psa
pessemuts e sse certi t nempe quando s ci mus. omnia nat urae

certum atque i mmutabilem ordinem sequi.BJ

Thus um1::ra.cula res nat ur ales f u.1s.s e" 86 and fail to teach us

anything concerning t he exi stence of God.,
Saint Thomas

Strange a s it may seem Spinoza complete ignores the
f amous Qv!ngue

~

of St. Thomas Aquinas.

He writes as

though these classi c proof s had never been formulated.
Siwek a sks 9

'1

Paul

Pourquo1 Spinoza l,es passait• il syste'matiquement

82spinoza, HTractatus Theologico.. Politicus."

22•· £.it• 9. III, 87.
83~ . , p. 81.

De Miraculis,

8~ . , P• 84.
85~., P• 85. HTherefore miracles, in the sense of
events coritrary to the laws of nature, so far from demonstrati ng
to us the existence of God would, on the contrary., lead us
to doubt it! where, othe~s-e • we might have been absolutely
certain of t, as knowing that nature follows a f i xed and

imnutable e>rder." Vfdt Spinoza~ "Of Miracl es , .. ti:analated
by Elwes., 22• £it•·, , 85.. On the other hand Deseartes
accepts miracles. Vide A. Wolf, translator from the Latin
and editor. "Introduction•" !b§ Con:es ¥df;A ~ Spinoza
(London1. George Allen and Unwlir'LTD, e~
li, p.26..
86

19

Spinoaa, "Trac~tus Theologtco..Politicus," De Miraculis•
22• s.1£., III, 96.
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sous s ilence?tt 87
Spinoza's P~ofs88
Fir st p,;oof

!n t he f i r st part of .E,.thica89 we find Spinoza's eleventh
proposi tion 0 namelyl,) "Deus , !!..!!. substantia constans infinitis
f,f;tg;~,gut~§.:i 9\12l"Ull! ~umguodgpta aeternam, ~ infinitapt essentiam
fil.C..P.,.ti.mit l) ne<:e,,s satj....2, exist it. 1190 If a parson denies this

proposition he i s requested to think of God as non•existent
(if possible).

I n that case God's essen~e does not include

his existence.

"Quiequid 9 ut non exi stens 9 pot est concipi,

ejus essentia non involvit exist entiam.u91

But this is irn•

possible because ~xistence belongs to the very nat ure of
substa.'l:lce..
8 7s 1wek

"Ad naturam sub$tantiae pertinet existere.• u92

11

this question.

9.2.

ili•,

P·• 86.

Vide his discussion following

88The P-xistence· of God is not s.e lf.;evident: .,

Rather it

must be :tnfetted from true ideas~ Vide Spi noza, "A TheologicoPolitical Tr.eatise," translated by Elwes, SU?.• cit., I, 84£.
89 Spinoza 11 ·E thica Ordine Geometri co demonstrata, Et In
9
quinque Partes disttncta, in quibus agitur,» Sp~za ~
1
21?• 9it.,. II• 41•308. (Pa.rs Prima comprises pp~l-83~1~~-Dr.
salmon descrt.b.es Ethica as "syst.e matie development in a

geometric fashion."
.

90spinoza_, "Ethices," Pars Prima• De Deo, Proposit1o XI,

~••

II, 52.

For a translation of Proposition K I ~

Appendix at the end of this chapter.
91
Axtoma VII. lln.d., II., 47. For a translation of
Axiom VII ~Appen~at the end of this chapter.
92

Pro~sltlon VII • .lhid.. Vol. II 49. For a trans•
lation of Pt"opoa1t1on VII~,AppendJ.x'at the end of t:his
chapter.
..

.J
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Therefore, God exists by necessity.

(Q. E. o.) 93

In Spinoza's ~o~e V9rhandeling Y!n 22s. / J2!! Mensch
~ Des
fo:r.mse

Z~!K~ We1stand94

he easts this A nriori proof in two

1'he first: he states as follows: 95

1. Alles wat wy klaar en onderscheiden verstaan aan de
natuur v&-i een zaak te behooren, dat konnen wy ook

met waarhe:ld van die za.ak bevestigen:

Haar dat de wezentlykheid a.an de natuur GQds
toebehoort& ko:rm~g wy klaar en onderscheidentlyk
verstaan. Ergo.
The definite nature of an entity cannot be omitted without
destroying the· e11:tity it:self; for example, the es-sence of

mount.€Wl includes the concept of

y~llex.

This is eternally

and immutably true 11• even -though the mountain itself is non•·

existent.

If one removes the idea o-f vall~y he thereby

automatically destroys the c.o ncept 0.f mormtaip..

(Spinoza• s

dependei"lce upon Descartes is quite obvious at this point:.)97 ·
93Th1a i8. an ~ Ft:i9ri theistic· proof .•

94see Spj.noza

Ope;a, 22•

cit., I~ 1~121.

95spi:noza, "Korte verhand-e 1ing Van God / De Hensch En
Des Zelfs Welstand," Cap. 1 •. Dat God i .s , ~ . $ · I, 15.

96°whatever we clearly an.d distinctly know to belong
to the nature of a thing, we can also truly affirm of that
t hing.

Now w~ can know clearly and distinetly that exist-

ence belongs to the nature of God; Therefore •• •" Vide
Spinoza; ".Sh.o~ Treatise on God, Han, and His Well..Being,"
translated fll'Om the Latin by A. Wolf, SRH19za Selections,

22• cit•, P• 45.

97,.,.
""d- Descartes, "Meditation V,!' lb! ?· editations mg
~
6
Seteclioff! froll\ ,th§. PrinciJ?les Q£. Rene Oe.seares,
translated
by Ve tc, SU?• .£1.S.•, P• 78. Spinoii'i metno even resembles
that of Descartes. Xide Paul J. Glenn lbs
.2f
Pbilo§Pph¥ (11th impression; St. Louis; Herder,~ 5J; P• 304.

Histyff.
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The Short 'I'reatise also conta,.ns a second formulation

of this same proof, namely:98
2. De wezentheeden van de zaaken zy.n van alle eeuwigheid,
en zullen in alle eeuwigheid onveranderlyk blyven:
De wezentlykheid Gods is wezentheid.

Ergo.99

" The objecttve e,d.s t ence of God is involved in t:he very idea

of God . .. l OO

The roots of the Ontological argument go back

to Augustine and Anselm.101

Descartes presents "a modified

version11 102 of it in his fifth Meditation; namely, it is im•
pos s ible to conceive of an absolutely perfect Being who is
non ... e}tistent, because if this .Being lacks the attribute of

existence He i s not perfect,

Spinoea restates this proof

very simply; namely, God's existence is proved by merely a

eonside?ation of his nature,

_,______

Necessary existence is involved

in the very nature· of Deity.
9 8sp:tnoza, "'Ktrrte Verhandeling Van God / De Hensch En

Des Zelfs Welstand," Cap I,. oat God is, Spipeza
$!.t.• 9 I, 15.

Opera, 22•

99"The essence o.£ things from etemity, and unto all

eternity shall remain immutable;
The existence of God is essence;
Therefore • • • u Vide Spinoza, 11 Short Treatise on

God, Man, and His Well-Being•"
by John Wild, &m• cit. , p. 45 •

Spinoza

Selectio1'ls, edited

_ lOOJohn Caird~ S~inozt! (Philadelphiat J.B. Lippincott

Company, 1888), p.• 10 •

101John Caird asserts that Descartes' Ontological proof
i ·s just a modlf ication of the Ontological argument found in

Anselm and Aquinas.

-

See ibid.

102
Richard McKeon, Ill!. ih§tS?§9Phi Qi. Spingy (New York:
Longmans, Green & Company, 1 2 , p. 8.
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Both Descartes and Spinoza handle the Ontological proof
in such a maru1er that the movement of the argument is identi•

cal~ but their points of 9mU2hasis stand out in shar p contrast.
Descartes i s concerned with his innate idea of an infinite
Being who must exist in order to be perfect; Spi noza insists
t hat existence is part of God's very nature.103

Spinoza

recognized that the potency of this argumentl04 does not
rest upon the precision of our finite, fallible knowledge
of God, 9r of the divine perfection; but the strength of the
proof lies in the fact that human thinking (whether right
or wrong) u involves a being whose existence is therefore
necessary and who is the eminent cause of the perfection11105
both of ideas and ·things.

But a theistic proof should not

be based upon any of these results.

these con.sequences.

God, as cause, contains

Our idea of God is guaranty for his

existence , not because all ideas are dependent upon Deity,

but because the divine nature itself involves existence..
" • • • postquam novimus naturat"ll corporis; non possumus

fingere muscam infinitalll . . . . .,0106

10.Jvide Proposition VII in Appendix at t he '3nd of this
chapter.
1 0id
~ Spinoza's lette,: (IL) to Hr. Jartg Jelles,
written . June, 1674.· It is preserved in •~Epistolae,"
Spino~t Opera, 21!• sit,.,. IV, 238-241.

l05NcKeon, 2£• ci&., P• 99.
106Spinoza, "Tractatus De Intellectus Fmendatione,"

§p1!}oza Op:s ,a, u~· c\t., II, 22"
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Sp1noza 9s first proof r estR upon his basic assumption;
namely, the universe i s rational and it is the nature of
mind to know.

Let us imagine a

mai1

with blue eyes.. Now

obvio,,sly the color cannot exist alone.

Blueness must exist

in a substance~ which in this case is the human eye.

But

a bit of observation r eveals that the eye itself is not
self-sufficient.

The eye is dependent upon the entire body

for its existencP-.
dependent .

In fact the human organism is utterly

!1an depe11.ds upon other 11ving organisms, and

they in t urn depend upon earth '~ climatic conditions.

But

the climate on this planet is dependent upon the sun, and
the sun is dependent upon the motions of the stars,~ cetera,
until

encompass the entire universe!

Not until then do
we apparently arrive at a truly independent reality.10 7
l18

Regardless of where we stai-t the "series" leads bac:k to the
ultimate totality.

Now this WHOLEl08 must exist because it

ineludes all the r,arts.
depend upon.

existing.
ence.

There is nothing left for it to

Therefore, it must be its own r.eaRon109 for

In f.iact 'lts essence necessarily involves exist•

"M naturam

substantiae 1')8rtipet existere.ttllO

l07wild, "Introduction, .. 22• sit,., p. xxvii.
10
8.rrue knowledge is based upon the concept of the
. Vid9 Caird, W?.• .£ll.•, P• 135.

whole •

1091.e., cause.
Propositio VII. ~ Spinoza, ttEthices," Pars
Prima, De Deo, Spino&!~. II, 49. For a translation of
Proposition VII see Appeiic:Jii st the end of ehis chapter.

110
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Ti'n1s Spinoza argues for the oneness o f a l l reality. 111

Everythil1g we behold is a dependent part of a va st system,

and the syst em ~

exist because it is no t l imit ed by any•

t.hing on the out side.

This same conclusion may be r eached

by anycine 1.mo pauses t o inquire, " What i s completely self•

sufficient? 0

Regardless of where he b<!gins he will find it

impossi ble to s t.op until he has arrived a t the sum TOTAL of
everything.
However Spinoza has not yet proved t he existence of

this independent: substance.

He has only shown that!! there

is such a substance, i t s es-s ence necessA.r ily includes exist •

ence. 112

In this pr~of we are supposed to assume that God

is non- existent .

But t his i s cont radictory because Spinoza

has already shown t hat existence is identica l with the divine

essence. 113 Now either t his substance is non-existent or
God exist s .
Se cond proof
I n i_t hi.c4 Spin<'za offer s a second pr oof as demonstration

of his eleventh proposition.114 He sta tes that invariably
111 spinoza"s pantheism stems "from his false definition
of sub~tance. " lls!! Glenn, g.a. ci,t. , p. 306 .
112Vide Proposition ~I in Appendix at the end of this
chapter.
113or the Jglqle of reality.
11
~
Appe?\dix at the end of this chapter.
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there is a cause ·why something, eit:her e~ists or does not

exist, for example~ a triar1gle.

If it exists, there is a

reason; if it does not e:d.sti> it is because aomethi.ng either
· hi11ders or negates its , ·existence.

MQroove4 ·this c ause must be either intrinsic or extrinsic
to t:he nature of thQ thing in questton; for example,

t 1 circulus

quaclratushllS is non-existent because the concept involves
a contradiction.
entity itself.

The cause is found in the nature of the
Furthermore substance exists because its

nature incl udes existence.116 However the existence or the
non.,.existence of a trianglell7 flows ttex ordine universae
natu:rae corporeaeull8 and not from the nature of a triangle.
Therefoa-a a triangle either exists by necessity, or it ca..11•

not exist.

This is a self.evident truth.

Hence an entity

exists necessarily, unless there is some hindering cause.
The·r efo re, God necessarily exists, tmless there is some
cause which hinders or negates his e}.~Stence.

If such a cause exists it is either inside or outside
the nature of G~di that is, 11'\ a secontl substance with a
dive~se nature, because if the reason were to be found in

115spinoza, "Ethices," Pars Prima, De Deo, Spipoza

9pera, 21?• cit., II, 53.

ll~ide Proposition VII 111 the Appendix.
117o~ a circle,.
118
spinoza, "Ethices," s8 1,no*a 02era, lqc. fit.
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an i dentical substanc.G the imp1'.ca t.1on woul d be t hat God

exist.a..

But i f a substanc e do es not poss ess the di vine

att rlbute s 119 i.t has nothing 1n common with Go d .

n pW3.e

~antiae~ diversa a t tribµt a habentes , nih\!, i nter ~
.s.,q,mmune. habent . ul 20

Hence it could ne:U:he r nega t e God' s

exi.stence 0 nor confer ~xis tence upon hi m.

Since the cause

which cou ld nullify God ' s e xistence caruwt lie outside his

nat ure, i t must nece s sarily be within t he divine nature.
But t his involves e cont radict i on be cause we have already
e.ssumed that God i s non•existent; and t o affirm that t he
i nf ini te perfect Being does not exi s t i s absurd.

There is

no cause i n existenee capable of negatiag the divine exist•
e-nce 0 either 1.n.s i de or outsioe t he nature of God.
f ore ~ God ex1sta by necessit y. ( Q. E. n. ) 121

Thes:-e•

This sa.'lte proof appears in ~.orte Vel'handeling !{m God /

Qs

~

an

Des_.kelfs Wels~and.

Here Spinoza states that

t he exi stence of God may be pr oved A po~t e r i o r i in the
fallowing manner:122
...

=

......

119Thesa attributes are infinite i n number but we can

know only two of them, viz., (a) Extension, and (b) Thought.
.

120s p1noza "Ethices," Pars Prima
9

II, Spinoza o ~r a, 22•

1

De Deo, Propositio

sl!•, II~ 47. ~For a tr.a.nslation of

Proposition I ~ Appendix at the end of t hi s chapter.)
121This i s an~ ppst e rior.1 proof .
122

cap. I , '1 Dat Gorl i sr.'' Sp inoza o~era, ~ . , 1, 15f.
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Indien de mensch een Idea van God heeft, zoo moet God
zyn: maar de mensch heeft een Idea van God.

formel!~

Ergo.

The first may be proved in this way:124

Als' er een Idea van God is, zoo moet de oorzaak des
zelfs formelyk zyn, en in zig vervatten alles wat de
Idea voorwepielyk heeft: maar daar is een Idea van
God . Ergo, 2.5

However certain principles are necessary to prove the first
part of this argument, namely,

a. That the number of entities which we can know is
infiniee.
b. That a finite intellect cannot grasp the infinite.
c . That a finite mind is incapable of knowing anything,
unless it is determined by some external causee126

The major premise is proved thus:127

123u1f a man has an idea of God, then God must exist
f9rmaliter;
Now, man has an idea of God;
Therefore •• •" Vide Spinoza, "Short TTeatise,"
Spinoza Selections, 22• .£!.£., P• 46.
124spinoza, "Korte Verhandeling Van God/ Oe Mensch En
nes Zelfs Welstand," Cap. I, Dat God is, Spinoza Opera, 22•

£!S•,

I, 16.

l25"If there is an idea of God, then the cause thereof
must exist fgrmaliter, and contain in itself
all that the idea has objective;
Now there is an idea of God;
Therefore •• •" Y19!, Spinoza, 11 ShoTt Treatise,"
Spingza Selections, loc • .si!•
126This is not a quotation.
Verhandeling," 12£. cit.

127Ibid.

Vi~e Spinoza, "Korte
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Indien de verzieringe van de mensch alleen oorzaak was
van syn Idea, zoo zoude het onmogelyk zyn, dat hy iet
zoude konnen begrypen: maar hy kan iets begrypen.
Ergo. 1 28
The first is proved from the first principle enumerated
above!) namely 11 that the number, of things whi ch the j.ntellect
can know is i nfinite.

"Also, following the second prin-

ciple,ul29 namely, that nobody can know everything because

the human mind is finite; and unless a finite intellect is
determined by extrinsi c things "to know this sooner than
that, and that sooner than this 0 130 it could know nothing
at all.
It i s false t o suppose that this idea is fict i tio .1s
1

because it i s i mpossible to possess a non.. existent idea.
Moreover ·when we receive an idea from something and generalize
it !n abstr acto, then we may :J.magine diverse things about
it, and add numerous perfections which have been abstracted

from other entities.

But tt is impossible unless we first

know the entities from which the abstractions have been
drawn.

If one assumes that his idea of Deity is fictitious,

128n1£ the imagination of man were the sole cause of
his ideas, then it would be impossible that
he should be able to apprehend anything, but
he can appr.ehend something;
Therefore •• •'' Vide Spinoza, "Short Treatise,"
Spinoza Selections, 22.• sit•, Pe 46.
129Ibid.
130Ibid., P• 47.
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then he must classify all of his other ideas as fictitious
also.
But if this is true, why are these ideas so different?
I t is evident that some of our ideas are non-existent, for
examplei a monster possessing the dual nature of both horse
and bird,~ cetera.

creatures.

There is no place in Nature for such

Then there are other ideas which could (but do

not necessarily) exist.

However their essence must exist,

whether or not the ideas themselves exist, for example,
the idea of a triangle, or of love in one's soul distinct
from his body,~ cetera.
of my own imagination.

Nor are these ideas the products

At first I might have supposed I

was imagining them, but more mature reflection compells me
to acknowledge that they really exist--even though everybody were ignorant of their existence.131

Now, both of these ideas carry with them the concept
of possible existence.

But there is a third idea which

involves necessary existence.

In the case of the first two,

only their essence is necessary, not their existence.

But

in the third idea both essence and existence are necessary.

In fact without them this third idea is nothing.
Hence it is clear that essence, existence, or truth,
are never dependent upon the human intellect.
1311.!?..!s1.

They are what

160
they are regardless of whether or not anybody ever thin~s
about t hem.

This is true concerning the second type of

idea, but more so of the third.

If God were non-existent

I would be unable to make any statement about him.
this is not trtte of other entities.

However

God must be "the

sub jeeturn of all other things.u132
Now pre-supposing all this we can prove the second
point, namely, that one•s imagination does not give birth
to his ideas.

Rather, these ideas rise from an exterior

cause "Nhich compels

a person to perceive some particular

entity sooner than he perceives &1Qther.

Entities "whose

ess entia objec~iy~ is in his tmderstanding exist formalitert'

and are closer to him than anything else.

If a person has

t he idea of Deity it is not necessary for God to exist
eminenter, but "God mu.st exist formaliter • • • •'' 133 This
is true because nothing exists which is more excellent or

more real than God.
It is obvious that man has the idea of God because the
human mind knows the divine att·r ibutes.

These qualities

did not originate with man because man is imp.e rfect and
incapable of giving what he does not possess.

Furthermore

it is evident that man knows the divine attributes because

he knows he is impotent to

132John Wil,.d.

133Jbid, .

0

creatett the infinite by assembling

Vide the footnote., ' ibid., P• 48.
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a composite f r om va rious fini te porti ons , it is i mpossible
fo r two i.nf inites to exist simultaneously, and it is un- .

changeable and perfect .

This i s true because nothing seeks

to annihilate i tself , God cannot t r ansform h imself into a
more excellai.1t bei ng,134 and no exter ior cause can compel
God

to

act (be cause God i s omnipotent,~ ceter a).

Spinoza's second pr oof i s J! posteriori.
~Tith the i dea t hat men have of Dei ty.
that men possess a n idea of God.)

It starts

(It is tmdeniable

Moreover the objective

r.ealit!r of this cortcept cannot be explain ed by anything

except Deity.

0

A perfect idea i s a perfect rea l ity and i t

i s impossible without the existence of a perfect thing. 11 135
Spinoza is not comparing an idea to a thing.

He is not

making an illicit leap fn>m t he order of thought into the
order of reality.

Rather he is making a transition from

one essence to anot:her.

"The ·momentary existence of the

human mind is guarantee of the necessary existence of that
per fect essence."136 My idea of Deity is not a reflection
of infinite Being; my idea of God means that God is working
directly upon my mind.
I need.
him.

This idea is the only verification

Thus I prove God's existence by my own idea of

If anyone professes to lack this idea of God he is

134Because God is already perfect.
13 Sz1eKeon; 22• cit., p. 100.
13611?.!s.., pp. 100£.
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"no man but truly a fool and an an1ma1.11137

The person who

doubtsl38 the existence of God is insane.139
Spinoza's second proof is built upon his basic assump-

If there is no God there must be a reason for his

tion.

non-existence.

But since God is the sum of reality this

reason cannot be exterior to God.

Furthermore this cause

cannot possibly be in the d~vtne substance because God's
essence is his existe.n ce.140
Third p roof

In

Ktbic,

Spinoza presents a third proof as demonstra-

tion of his eleventh proposition.

''Posse non existere

impotentia est, & contra posse existere potentia est •• • • "141

Now if the range of necessary existence is confined to finite
entities, then an absurd conclusion follows; namely, finite
things are more pow~rful than infinite being.
self-evident.)

(This is

Therefore, either (a) infinite being exists,

1371h1d., p. 101.
138Doubt results from a lack of Hdue order" during an
investigation. Vif;! Spinoza, "On the Improvement of the
Unqerstanding," Sp oza Selections, edited by Wild, SU?• cit.,
p. 32.
.
·
139
McKeon, SU?• s!S•, p. 165.

140wild, "Introduction," 22• cit., p. xxviii. John
Wild observes that both of these proofs are invalid if one
assumes that "absolutely nothing exists."

141

See

i!2!Ji.,

p. xxix.

sp1noza• "Ethices,." Pars Prima, De Deo, §p2.P9za
Opera, 2J?• ~•• II; 53.
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or (b) nothing at all exists.

But we exist; either "in

nobisnl42 or in some other entity which exists by necessity.
"Omnia, qua.e sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt.n143
f o re, God exists necessarily.

There•

(Q. E. o.)144

The existence of God can be proved from the fact that
men exist who have this innate idea of God.

Spinoza insists

that a person cannot demonstrate this from the reasons given
by Descartes.

Descartes• proof has two axioms,145 namely,

(a) whatever is capable of performing that which is greater
or mor e difficult, can also perfo·rm that which is less, and
(b) to create or conserve substance is greater than to create

or conserve properties or attributes of substance.
To refute the fir,s t, Spinoza argues that a spider can
easily spin a web, whereas men would experience the greatest
difficulty if they were to weave one • .On the other hand
men accomplish many things very easily which the angels
would find to be impossible tasks.

But what is the meaning

142spinoza, "Ethices;" Pars Prima, De Deo, Spinoza
Opera, 212.• £!,S. , II; 53.

143Axioma I. Vide ibid., p. 46. (For a translation
of Axiom I vid9 Appendlx-;;r-the end of this chapter.)
144.rhis is also an!. posteriori proof. In fact Paul
.
Siwek finds three proofs of this type in Spino~a. Vide his
book, 212.• cit., p. 111.
145Spinoza, in a letter to Hr. Jarig Jelles, mentions
onlf .one axiom and thin.~ it should be recast as follows:
".QJ!h\'cpg1tandi pot;tia ad cqgitapdum nsm ~esf,

guam

potentia dsteiidum §:..Jrerandum." v d Epistolae,"
Epis.t o a XL, filiineu Opiggl 21?• c t., IV, 198. This letter
was written 25 Nartii,
4)

Mturai

I
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of "more difficult"?

Fundamentally Spinoza is pointing out

that Descartes is confusedl46 concerning "the hierarchy of
perfecti ons.« 147
In Descartes' second axiom it is impossible for us to
L~terpret just exactly what he means by the difficulty which
ia involved 1n the conservation of attributes and substance.

However from these axioms it is evident Descartes meant to
infer that no man has the power to conserve himself.

If one

possessed t his power he would endow himself with all the
attributes of Deity.

Therefore; the mere fact that a per•

son continues to exist is evidence for the existence of a
Being

,~10

is perfect.

But it is also clear that Descartes

failed to accomplish his purpose.

Hence Spinoza substitut~d

another proof which is based upon this ~~iom, namely, man
is unable to conserve his own existence; therefore he must

be conserved by another who also has the power to conserve
himself ..

But whatever being possesses that power must

necessarily exist, and he must be God.

The strength of this

argument lies in the fact that it begins with an existent
being

&1d

demonstrates the divine existence by inference--

an inference which demands nothing but "a c·o nception of •••
1461£ a person attempts to prove that the Cartesian
arguments (in the third and fifth Meditations) are false he
is f 'i ghting his own shadow, Vide Epistola XL, ibid., P• 197.
l47McI<eon, 21?• ~
"".. •• p. 101 •

165

powers of existenceul48 which are relative.

Thus it is

different from the second proof, even though both are classified a s J! pgst~riori.

The second argument commences with

the .innate idea of God and deals with nothing but concepts
and their inherent hierarchy of perfections; and from this
dat a alone it deduces the implication of all these ideas,
namely, the ultimate reality (or God).

Yet both A J?2Steriori proofs rest upon the same foundation.

The existence of finite entities (whether it be an

idea or a philosopher.) cannot be conceived as one unrelated
phenomenon.

An objective hierarchy is implied in the mere

existence of an idea, and the existence of God is implied
by the mere existence of any finite being--otherwise this

finite entity could neither be, nor continue to be.

There

can be no doubt concerning God•s existence, just as long as
there is a person who thinks and has an idea of Deity.

1<·1ni.t e

existence can be explained in no other way than by reference

to necessary existence.
The forml49 of this third proof protects it from the
destructive criticism which Kant hurled against the
Ontol.ogical argwnent.150

It is obvious that §Omethi}lg

148Ibid., P• 102.

149vtz•• !. posteriori.
150
Immanuel Kant, Critique .2t Pure Reason, translated
from the German by Norman Kemp Smitli"1tondon: Macmillan,
1929), pp. 500-07.

166
exists, namely, the finite s~lf.
thinking of Descartes.) 151
elciat.
it.

(Spinoza is probably

Spme.t h!Pg must necessarily

If I doubt or deny this plain fact I merely assert

For example, suppose I deny that I extst .

It is very obvious that I exist be-

proves my existence.

cause I am present denying my existence.
fil1i te self exists.

My denial

Therefore, the

But existence is a token of power.

Hence an infinite Being 1v0uld possess infinite power.

Therefore, God exists.
Fourth proof
Spinoza' s fourth theistic proof appears in the Schol1um152
which follows Proposition XI in Etbica .. 153 He explains
that his third proof is~ posteriori in form, not because
it is impossible to build an!; BJ;ior~ argument upon the same

foundation, but ao that people might comprehend it more
easily ..
The ability to exist is power.

Hence the amount of

151Frank Sewall asserts that Spinoz.a was na master of
Cartesianism• • • •" Vide "Introduction," Philgsophy gg_
B!!Jedict l2!il Spip9za, translated by Elwes, sm,.• £!!•, p·. viii.
152I •.e • , No t e.
153spinoza, ttThe Ethics•" Part I, Concemin.g God, Ib.t
~ ~ 2i B,enedict ~ Sphy>za, translated by Elwes, 22•
~ ~ 3 r . Bu~ Richard McKean can find only "three
actual proofs~" namely 1 (a) one A 12ri9r!, and (b) two!.

WasteriK;i!.• v14e

his book, 2.2• cit., P• 98. On the other
and Jo
Wild enumerates four arg'iiments. ~ "Introduction,"
Spinoza Selections, QJ?• cit., pp. xxvii•xxix.
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reality adhering to the nature of anything is proportionate
to the pot-1er for existence which it derives from itself-

Now an absolutely infinite being possesses an absolutely
infinite power of existence.

lutely.

Therefore, God exists abso-

However the force of this demonstration will pro-

bably elude many.

Spinoza states:

Many persons, nevertheless, will perhaps not be able
easily to see t he force of this demonstration, because
they have been accustomed to contemplate those things
alone which flow from extemal causes , and they see
also that those things which are quickly produced
f r om these causes, that is to say, which easily exist,
easily perish, whilst, on the other hand, they adjudge
those t hings to be more difficult to produce, that is
to say, not so easy to bring into exisisice, to which
they co11ceive more properties pertain.

Spinoza . desires to remove *'his praejudiciis" 155 but he does

not consider it necessary to show the manner in which the
following proverb is true, namely, nquod cito fit, cito
perit.,nl56 or to examine whether "omnia aequi facilia sint,n 157

as one observes in all of nature.

Rathe.r it will be enough

for him to notice that he is not ref·e ~g to entities
~mich are generated by exterior causes.

Spinoza speaks of nothing but substances , namely,

P•

!~4Spinoza, ttThe Ethics;" Spinoza Selecti9ns, 22• cit; • .,
10

155spinoza, "Ethices," Pars Prima, De Deo, Scholium,
Spinoza Opera. 22• ill.·, II, 54.
156
1!?!.d. Quoted anonymously by Spinoza.
1571W.
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entit:1.es which cannot be pr oduced by any external reason.

°'Y.~

substa11ti2

D.Q!!

pg test 12rgd~ci

!!!?. alig

substantia. •• 158

Regar<ll.ess of how much rea.1:tty or perfect1ol'l things possess
which are produced by e,::terior causes, 159 they are still

indebted entirely to the efficacy of an extrinsic reason.
Hence the existence of these thL.,gs flows solely from the
perfection of an external reason.1-60
I

But any perfection in

substance. is no t caused by an exterior reason.

Thus the

existence of this substance follows only from its nature.
Ther efore its existence is identical with its essence.

Con-

sequently perfection establishes the existence of an entity;
it does not prevent existence.

obstructs existence.)

(It is i mperfection that

'1~herefore, we can be more certain

of the existence of God than of any other existent thing.161
The divine essence includes absolute perfection and pre..
eludes all imperfection.

Therefore, all ground for doubt

concerning God's existence is removed, and the most superior

lgde For
Spinoza, Ethices," Pars Prima,
a translation vide Appendix

158Propositio VI.
De Deo~ ibid., Vol. II,
•
at the eruf'of this chapter.

11

159tolhether they have numerous parts,

01;·

just a few.

16°'rhey are wholly dependent upon this ext~rnal cause
for their existence.
161
Cf. Descartes• statement in the fifth Meditation:
"Cary a ... t-i~ rien de soi plus .clair et plus manifeste que
de penser qu'il ya Ul\ Oieui c•est~a-dire un etre souverain
c;t parfait, en l'id,e duque seul l'existence n4cessaire ou
eternelle est comprise, et pa~ consJquent que existe?" ~
"Meditation Cinqui~me•" QeUYif#S Choisies, 2J.?e cit., I 1 1 ~

169
degree of certainty 1s imparted "quod mediocriter attendenti
perspi ct.'U.l<il fore credo." 162
Thi s foui"th proof is just a re•statement of the third

pr oof~ but i n !. priorJ: dress.

If a single finite model63

exists:> t hen God necess~rily exists because he is omnipotent.

Conclusion

His proofs
I t is a pparent that the existence of God can be proved
both (a) !. RFJ9I!, and (b) !l pos.tegori.

However the divine

existence can be shown better by the former method.164 This
is because all~ posteriori proofs demand external causes-•

y

which :> of course, is an obvious flaw.

Whenever "things"

must be proved~ ;ppsterigri they lack the ability to wake
their presence known through themselves.
dependent upon these. ext.e rnal causes.

Instead they are

Now Go-d is the first

cause of everything, even of his own existence.
himself through himself•

He reveals.

"Weshalv-e u van niet veel. belang

162spuwza, "Ethices," Pars Prima; De Deo, Scholium,.
Spinoza Opera, ml• sit•,. 1I; 54.
,

l63ttPer modum intelligo substantiae a£fectiones, sive
idt quod 1n al:l.o est, per quod -etiam concipitur." Vide
Spinoza, "Ethic·e s ," Pars Prima, De Dea, Definitio v·, Spinoza

Qp,ra,

Ql?,•

.s!.t.. ,

I I-; 45.

·

1 6 ~ Spinoza, "Short Treatise,tt Wild, !m• ~ . ,

P• 49.

I
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is het zegge van Thomas Aqu1nal6S namentlyk dat God A priori
niet en zoude konnen bewezen worden, omdat hy kwansuys geen
oor zaak heeft .. "166
Spino2a probably believed that nothing is required
beyand t he 2 2r ior1 proofs, but 1n order to safeguard his
posi tion against later criticisms the §.. ~J!?Steriori proof is
necessary.

Hence his full proof is tlependent upon the e~lst-

ence of some finite thing.

If a person admits the exist-

ence of any dependent , finite entity, then he must necessarily
admit t he exi stence of God.

It is impossible for a person

to deny his own existence because his denial really amounts
to an assertion.

Hence, finite reality exists.

Therefo.re,

God exists.
His error
ln Spinoza's letter to Hr. Hugo Boxe1 167 he admits that
his mental image of God is less clear than his mental image
165The Angelic Doctor declares, "Deus autem non habet
causam, • • • "

~

Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, "Ut:rum Deus

sit onmino ~implex," Summa Theologiae, cura et studio sac.
Petri Caramello; cum textu ex recensione Leonina (Tomi tres;
Taurini-, Romae: Mariettj., 1952), Prima Pars, Quaestio 111,
Articulus 7, Respondeo, Tome I, 19~
166sp1noza . ''Korte Verhandeling;" Cap. I, Dat God is,
1
spwo;a Opera; 2:2• sit•, I, 18..
167
Epistola LVI n.d. ~ Spinoza, "Epistolae,••
1noza Opera, 2ll•
IV, ~-62. For a translation see
Ibi¢orrespondenc9
Spinoza, Sl.J?• s!i•, P• 289.

s6

i!t•,
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of a triangle. 168

"• •• Deum enim non imaginari; sed

quidem intelligere possumus. 11 169 This is not surprising
when one examines his definition of "God.•1 170 He employs
the term quite frequently. but

,mat

Spinoza the devil is a non-entity.

does he rnean?l71
I11

For

fa.ct "it is obviously

impossible that there can be any such being.ul72 Angels are
0 simple Phant6mes" 173 and belief in ghosts is laughable.174
But what does he mean when he speaks of "GodU?
Spi..~oza considered the entire universe to be "essentially
l68£idg Spinoza, Epistola LVI, "Epistolae, 0 Soing.z a
Qper~, 22• £!S., IV, 261.
-

169l.J21.ci. "For we cannot imagine God, but we can, indeed,
conceive Him." yide this same letter in "The Letters of
Certain Lea·m ed Men to B. D. s. and t:he Author's Replies,"
translated by A. Wolf, Spiliiza Selections, 22• cit., P• 456.
11 Correspondence " !he Chief
Cf. the Elwes translation
1
Wo,;ks if Benedict pe S,2ingza:; 22• cit_., II, J87.
17<>i.telamed even questions the· validity of his proofs.
¥id~ aelamed 1 s book, .2.e• cit., p. 199.
171Ethica would be more intelligible if Spinoza had
used another term to designate his deity.
172spinoza, "De Deo et Homine," in a chapter entitled
De Diabolis. Quoted by R. Willis Benedict 12!. Spinoza: His
~~ Corresr.ndencs, g Ethics tLondc>n: Truebner & Company,

I8'10J, P• ~O •

·

17 3vide A. Wolf, editor. ~ Olfest B~graJ?hY Sll.
Sping*f, 21?• ill• , P• 97. (The trans ation s ''mere phantoms"
on P• s.)

. 174,Life th~ last paragraph of Spinoza's letter to Hugo
Boxel, "Ep stolae," Epistola LIV, n.d., Sp!,poza QJ2era, m?•
cit., IV, 254.
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of one p1ece.ul75

The human mind perceives all things as

either Thoughtl76 or Extension,177 but basically everything

is a part of one vast vn!OLE.

Rocks, trees, men, and even

dreams are fu11daruentally just one reality, and this reality
is God.

Sometimes Spinoza calls it Nature.

I.,:r;:,,eftise he uses the term

11

In the Short

Naturett as a synonym for "God11 ,

and Alexander thinks the concepts are identical,178 that is,
Nature is God.
Ethics.)179

(Hampshire affirms that this is true in The

Hoeffding considers r1God,tt "Nature, 0 and

" Substance" to be identicai.180

Paul Siwek explains:

Tout ce qui est, est unique. Il est ce qu'il est. Il
represente en soi la 0 mesure" de sa propre nature.
Il coincide avec son type i~eal. Il est son archetype.
C'est la le corollaire de l'intuitionnisme rationaliste
professe par Spinoza. L' etre n•est 1'11 °parfait" ni
"imparfait.n Il est tout simplenre11t une ttrealite." 181

Spinoza regarded the traditional concept of "God the Creatorn182

175Browne, 22• cit.i P• 185.

_.,

176v1z

spirit.

177viz., Matter.
178s. Alexander, Spinoza (Manchester: Manchester University Press~ 1933), p. io.
179stuart Hampshire, Siinoza (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, c.1951), P• jQ. ~ also PP• 36, 39£., & 44.
(Dr. Salmon states that this is true only "in a. sense.")
180
Hoeffding, 22• !ill•, I, 308.
181
Siwek, 2.2• cit., p~ 97.
182Hampshire,
~•~
~·1
22•

~ ••

p.

"f •@. ,
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as an imaginary fictic,n. Pollock18 3 denies that Spinoza's
god is unconscious, 184 but this is certainly debatable. 185
Pollock explains that this god thinks,1 86 but Spinoza refuses
to describe his god as tta thinking beingttl87 either eminently
or exclusively.

However this is e1ctremely improbable be-

cause t his being lacks both intellectl88 and w111.189 Hence
one is not shocked when he reads the subtitle of Helamed's
book 9 l 90 namely 0 yisions

2i ~

~ QQ.g.

Spinoza's god is
not onl y unconscioust it is rigid and lifeless. 191
Spinoza's god is substance"' 192 It 0 is the elemental

--------

183Frederick Pollock, ipinoza (Second edition; London:
Duckworth; New York: I·iacmil an, 1849), PP• 328£.

184Melamed, SU?• ill•, P• 198..
185vide the arguments 12m and ssm in James Martineau,
A Studx el Spinoza (London: Macmillan, 1882), pp. 334-45.

i86Pollock, 22• cit., P• 329.
187Ibid., P• 330.
188tt~ •• sicuti & ego, ne Divinam Naturam cum humana
confundam, Deo humana attributa, nempe Voluntatem, Intellectum,
attentionem, auditum & c. non adfigno.tt ~ Spinoza's letter

to Hugoni Baxel, "Epistolae, 11 Epistola LIV, n.d., Spinoza
Qpera, 91?• .s!S.•, IV, 252.
l89t-1elamed, 1,...c. cit.

P• 192.

l90spinoz@

~ ---

Vide also Martineau, 22• ill•,

.!ris. !hlddqa.

19111elamed, 22• .s.U•, P• 198.
192
Fullerton, SU!.•

cit., p. 13.
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Substance~193 the stuff and essence of all that exists.ul94
But it is not "a. concrete thing.ul95

Nor is this god trans•

cende11t••a.."lc1 it could never become 1ncamate in a human

being. 196

This god is totally impersonal.

Hence it ~uld

he preposterous to refer to it as "Father," "Judge," or
~Ki11g of kings. 0

It is just as impertinent to praise this

being as to blame it, even though it may be defined as "an
immanent cause.u197

Oelbos writes:

• • • tout en soutenant que .D ieu est cau.,se immanente,
Spinoza marque tres fortement que ce n•est pas Oieu
qui est dany e monde~ ma.is le rnonde qui est en
Dieu •• • •

98

~ §.iV(2 Natural99 has no obligation to man.

utterly indifferent to human beings.

"He" is

"Hett ~id not create

193"Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, &
per se concipiturs hoc ·est id, cujus conceptus non indiget
conceptu alterius rei, a quo formarl debeat." V~e Spinoza,
"Ethices," Pars Prima, De Deo, Definitio III, SJ? 2za ·o pera,
22•
II, 45. For a translation of Definition III see
Append x at the end of this chapter.
194
Browne, 22• .£.iS.•, p. 185.

gif.,

195Friedrich Ueber1"1eg, History gf PbilosophY; 2 vols.,
translated from the fourth German edition by Geo. s. Morris
(New York: Scribner's Sons, 1892), II, 66.
196Browne, m?• .£!.S.. p. 186.
9

197Fullerton, loc.• cit. Vide also Hampshire,_ nn. cit.,
PP• 43£.
--&Ji.,
198Victor Delbos, L.f! Spinozisme (Deuxieme edition; Paris:
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,"l926), p. 75~
199Hampshire, 22• cit., p. 39.
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men, and

0

he" does not sustain them at this moment.

this god is not a personal being in any sense.

In fact

It is just

°a

logical category. • • •tt201
Spinoza's god is tithe Thought of thought," "the True Idea

"a logical concept, tt 200

of all true ideas~" "the Intelligibility of all intelligi•

bil:l.ties.n202

Browne observes,

0

It is the name for that

all-embracing, all-pervading Essence which inheres in all
t hat exist s. 0203 This god is "identical with the infinite
Universe • • • • n 204 There is a close resemblance between

Sp1j1oza's deity· ai~d the .§1.1 ~ai

Pan

of the ancient Greeks.205

Howeve1- the only "God-figure" ,-mich it resembles 1R Brahma. 206

Thus one does not marvel when he reads that Spinoza scorned

his fellow-Jews who gave God the credit for money they had
made in business transactions. 207 One writer asserts, "He
was entirely cured of those silly and ridiculous opinions
200srowne, lgc.

ill•

20lt·1slamed, 22•

ill.•;

P• 198.

202The author is indebted to Elizabeth G. Salmon for
these three definitions.
203

Browne, S!J2• cit., p .. 186.
204A. Wolf, translator and editor. ''Introduction,"
The Correspondence 2!. Spinop, g:e. ill•, p. 32.
205Melamed, gn. sit., P• 200.
206Ibid., p. 199.

207 Browne, loc. c:);t.
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which the Jews have of God.,,208
Technically Spinoza is a pantheist,209 but for all
pract ica l purposes he is an atheist.

"God, nature , or sub-

stanc~ is nothing in itself independent of the ~orld , but
me rely t he eternal order of the world. 0 210

ln fact Spinoza's
cleity is identica l with the laws of nature. 211 However
Pollock r efuses to classify Spinoza as an atheist,212 and

Hege l p r efe r s the term "acosmist. 1•213
t he terrn

~

Pollock affirms that

is one whtch "polite and intelU.gel'1t per-

son s have • • • shrunk from usingu214 recently.

Then he

continues:

This is just as well, as it is only an ugly name, but
has no intelli gible meaning. At least the nearest
approach to a definition that I can suggest is that
an atheist means anybody who disagrees with one on
any theological question of importance; the speaker
being, of course, the judge both of what questions
are theological and
they are important enough
to call names about. 5

!Y~ther

208A. Wolf, editor.

2.I?.•

SS•, p. 69.

~ Oldest Biography

2£. Spinoza,

209Hampshire, log. cit.
21 0Melamed, 22• ill• , P• 198.
211Ibid.
212vide Pollock, 2£•

£!!..,

p . 332.

213Frank Sewall, 11'Introduction, 11 Philosophy 2£. Benedict
I>.& Seino;a, translated by Elwes, 21?• sit,., p. xii.

214Pollock, lsls,. c!t,.
21512!.g.,
b
pp. 332£.
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But this is merely confusing the issue.216

It is even possible that Spinoza does not merit the title of "pantheist.u 217

Jacobi, 218 Bayle, and Malebranche.219 classify him as "un
athee.u220 Martineau writes:
• • • i t is no valid disclaimer to say, "I am not an
a t heis t , fo r I believe in a First Cause," if that first
cause should happen to be hydrogen, or other blind
e lement of t hings.221

And how true!

tvhat is pantheism but a refined atheism!

When

a man boldl y affirms, "This rock is god, " we understand that
he is denying the existence of God.

Thus all of Spinoza's

theistic proofs are void and meaningless.
Hi s death

The student of religion is always concerned with the
manner of an infidel ' s death, and Spinoza is no exception. 222
How did he die?

Kayser declares:

216u • • • dicentes enim se esse sapientes, stulti facti
sunt." (Romans 1:22)
217vide Martineau, 21?• sll•, P• 347.

2181!?.!s!·

219ch. Appuhn, S;eigoza (Paris: Andre Delpeuch, Editeur,
1927), P• 62.
220

llli•,

p .. 61.

22 1Martineau, sm,. ~., pp. 347£. Spinoza denies the
charge of atheism in his correspondence. ~ George L.
Kline, translator. sy1nez1 in Soviet Philoso;ehY (London:
Routledge & Kegan Pau LTD, c .1952), p. 35. .

222
Even more so because he rejected the doctrine of
personal immortality. ~ Kline, ibid.

I
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Gently and lightly, death bent over the narrow bed • • • •
The face of the dead man was no paler than it had been
when he was alive. His color merged with the color
of the pillow, into which his small head had sunk as
his soul had entered into God's love. 2 23
However this extravagent judgment is very subjective and open
to serious question.

After Spinoza had been excommunicated

at the synagogue224 he never again entered a church for the

remainder of his earthly life.225 Moreover it is reported
that during his last illn.e ss he gave orders to his land•
lady that no clergyman was to approach his bedside.226 Some
avowed that as he lay dying he groaned repeatedly, "Oh, God,
have mercy on a miserable sinner. 0 227

It is even said that

at the lost moment he swallowed some juice of mandrake in
order "to escape the pangs of death,u228 and that he passed
out into eternity while in an unconscious state.229

223Kayser, 21?.,

cit., P• 302,

224spinoza was absent that day.
225 Ibid., P• 105.
226Browne, Sll?•

s!S•,

-

See ibid., P• 97.

p. 319.

2271bid. ·, PP• 318£.
228Ibid., P• 318,

229w1111s, 22• SbS•, pp. 74£. Both Willis (ibid.,
p. 74) and Browne (92. cit., pp. 318£.) discount these reports.
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Appendix
A. Definitions230

I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which
the essence involves existence, or that of which the
nature is only conceivable as existent.
• • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • •

• •

III. By §}lbstanci, I mean that which is in itself,
and is conceived through itself: in other words that
of which a conception can be formed independently of
any other conception.
IV. By i!,ttiibut~, I mean that which the intellect
perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
v. By mode, l mean the modifications (affectiones~
of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
VI. By QQ.s!, I mean a being absolutely infinite••that
is a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
•

•

•

•

e

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

VIII. By eteffitY, I mean .e xistence itself; in so far
as it is con&!ved necessarily to follow solely from
the definition of that which is eternal.
B. Axioms 231

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or
in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything
else must be conceived through itself.
230spinoza, "The Ethics, 11 Part I, Conceming God, The
C91ef li2.t!s!. S!f. BCedict a Spinoza, translated by Elwes,

22• sit.;-r1. 4s.
2311.W•, P• 46.
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III. From a given definite cause a.~ effect necessar.ily
follows; and; on the other hand, if no definite cause
be granted 0 it is impossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves
the knowledge of a cause ..

v.

Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood~ the one by means of the other; the conception
of one does not involve the conception of the other.

VI . A true idea must correspond with its ideate or
object .

VII . If a thi11g can be conceived as non- existing, its
essence does not involve existence.

c.

Propositions232
I. Substance!§. kz nature prior se_ its modifications.

I I . ~ foUbstance~, whose attributes are different,

hav.§'.. n9tfiing

lu

cgmmon.

III. Ihin&f! which have ngthing

-IV.

-----

the cause of the other.

!n

common cannqt

~

one

I!:!Q. 2.£ more distinct things are distinfuished one

~liFiez,

from the·
gither b;y the diffirence g_ the at'E:r.\>,utes Q!. t e subst{Blces, 2£ §:£ the dif &erence g! their

modilicatdons.

V. There c~gt m!t, !n ~ universe S!s!. or more
subs~ances~ving ~ same nature 2.£ attribute.
VI• Qne .§Ubstance C8l!B.2t

.@.t@Pce.

·

ha

VII• Existsnce belongs Bl

prpduced

~

~

an2ther m!!?.-

nature 2,t substance.

VIII. Every substance!§. necessarilX infinite.
IX. Illit m2l:! riality St£. being!. thing h!!.
nuzqber Q1 ts attributes~ • • •

~

232
~ . , PP• 46-48, 50f- • passim-.

~

greater
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x.

gach particular attribute of th~ one substance must
through itself. - -

~ conceived

XI. God , or substance, consisting of infinite attri•
butes;-of'"'which each·errresses eternal !!!2. infinite
essentia!'itY, necessar y exists.

CHAPTER V

DAVID HUh E' S CONTROVERSIAL OOC'tRINE OP CAUSALITY

Introduction
His life!

David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, on 26 April,
1711. 2 His father died when he was an infant, leaving him
and two older children3 to be cared for by their mother,
"a 'ivOman of singular Merit, who, though young and handsome,
devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of
her Children.114
During David's youth British philosophers were engaged
in a lively discussion concerning the nature of morality and

religion.

Deism was in high esteem, affirming that (a) there

1Hume•s doctrinal position is so vital to our discussion
that the author herewith gives a rather "full" sketch of his
life.
2Henry David Aiken, editor. Hume's Horal and Polit.ical
Philos9phy (New York: Hafner Publishing Company-;-t'948).
~ the tttntroduction," p. x.
3Hurne had one older brother and one older sister. Vide
Thomas Henry Huxley, lb!m!.., one volume in English Men o.f Lett ts~ edited by John Morley (New York: Harper & Brothers,
l900, p. 2.

5

oavid Hume, "My own Life•" ~ Letters g!, David~'
2 vols., edited by J. Y. T. Greig-COxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1932). I, 1.
4
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is a religion which is 11atural t o mankind, and (b) it can
be discove red by unaided human reason.

The opponents of

the current of ra t tonalism were nur.,bered among the most
able men of l etters in the eighteenth century, namely, Bishop
Berke ley, t he Earl of Sha ftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, and

Bishop J o seph Butler .5
Since

11u met

s father had not been wealthy, David was

compelled t o selec t

ai1

occupation to earn his daily bread.

He began the s tudy of law but abandoned it in f avor of a
career as a merc hant .. · However this also proved to be unsuitahte6 ·to hi s n t astes and int:erests. 07

Re went to lr:.:!

France and while there decided to become a man of lettex·s. '3
His mother i s reported to have remarked that

11

our Davie's

___ _______ _

a f ine , good-r1atured cr ater, but uncommon wake-minded." 9
.,.

HP.ndel, Jr., "The Ph1losophy of Hume,u
t-J .. Hendel, Jr. (New
York: Scribner's Sons, c.1927), p. v.
6This last ed for only a fe~ months.
5 ~ Char les

1·.• •.

lli!!!l!! Selections, edited by Charles

7ALKen, loc. cit.
Bshor t l y befC're Hume died he confessed that nmy ruling
Passion11 had been "my Love of literary Fame, •• •" ~
0M
y Own Lifes" Greig, 2£• ill•, I, 7. In the celebrated
Treatise he ·writes, "I !eel an ambition to arise in me of
contributing to the instructi.on of mankind, and of acquiring
a name by my inventions ancl discoveries." Vide the conclu•
sion to Book I, "A Treatise of Human Nature," Hendel, sm•
.£!£., p. 99.
9Quoted by Aiken, 21?• c.i t., pp. xf.
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Yet within three yearslO after Hume arrived in France

--He was only twenty- s 1x,ll yet it stands today as

he had ·written his f amous work entitled A Treatise of Human

Ngt Ur €;.

his gr eatest philosophical production.12

He finally com-

pleted :1.t: at La Fleche , 13 after having labored on it for a
period o f ten year s.14

Perhaps he revised it laterl5 but
i t was pub l ished in Londonl6 dur ing 1739 and 1740 17. How-

ever the Treatise was 11ot well received.

was quite di sappointed.

Naturally Hume

He wrote in his autobiography:

10
.
A
Ho st of his time was spent at La Fleche, a school
maintai ned by the Jesuits. ~ HlL--<ley, .21!• .ill• 0 p. 8.

~ene Des car tes was also educated here. He refers to La
Fleche a s "l'une des plus c,lebres ecoles de l'Europe, OU
je pens a is qu' i l devait. y avoir de savants hommes, s'il y
en avait en aucun endroit de la terre. 11 Vide "Discours De
I...a :;6thodc," · Premiere Partie, Oeuvres Choisies, avec un
avant• propos et des notes de Louis Dirnier (Oeux tomes; Paris:
Li brairie Gamier Freres, n •.d.), I, 4.
11Accor ding to Aiken, 2.2• cit., p. xi. However this
conflicts with the figure givenby Hurne. Vide b.is letter
to Gilbert Elliot of riinto (written in 1751), J. 'l . T. Greig,
~ditor, Q.E• cit., I, 158. (The entire letter is reproduced
on this page:Y-

- Sons,12yfdi
William .I<night ,
9 O), p. 22.

~

Hum~ (London: William Black\~od

13vide ibid. Descartes had attended seminary here, yet
Hume fai s tomention him in the Treatise. In fact the name
of Descartes is absent from all of Humefs wr itings.
l~orman Kemp Smith! The Philosophy 21_ l)avi d ~

(London: Yiacmillan, 1941J, p.
15 In London~

336.

HistaH

16Friederich Ueberweg,
2!. Ph112sophx, 2 vols.,
translated from the 4th German e~tion by Geo. s. Morris (New
York: Scribner• s Sons, 1892), Il, 132.•

17The first two volu~es appeared in January, 1739; the
third in 1740. W!, Knight, 9.1?• .£!£.,. p. 26.
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Never literary Atter.1pt was more unforttmate than my
Treat ise of human Nature. I~ fell dead•@tn fro~11 the
Pres~; without reaching such distinction as event~
excite a 1·!urrnur among the Zealots . ll:.S
Norman Kemp Smit h thinks it "is a work of genius, and as
suc h takes its place among the philosophical classics.n19
But on t he other hand Prichard states, "The Treatise20 is

one of the most tedious of .books, and close examination of
it renders me not skeptical but ai:,gry.n 21

William Knight

admires Hurne 11 yet he admits:

The "Treatise" does not advance with systematic, order"!'
ly p3~ecision. There is a11 occasional want of conse"!'
cutiveness.. It is sornetL-nes diffuse, and here and
there repetit.ive. A want of precision in the use of

terms--that irritating feature of many a philosophy-must also be noted. Some of the most radical and
important words are used in more senses than one; and.
we are occasionally at a loss to understand the precise signification in which they ar e being employed.22
In 174523 Hume entertained some hopes that he would be
appointed 2 ' ~ to the chair of I·!oral Philosophy25 at the

l 8aume, n.\1y Own Life/' Greig,
19smith, £.E• sJJi.•, P• 537.

Q.E.•

ill• ; I, 2.

?Q

- The punctuation is uncertain here.
21quoted by J. A. Passmore, Humets Intentions (Cambridge:
Cambridge Un,i versi~y Press. 1952), p. 152.
22I<n1ght • .eJ!• cizt .• , P• 28 •
23Aiken,

22• ~-• p. xi.

1746, loc.gs.
24Aiken. loc
. .. cit.

~- -

Ueberweg gives the date as

25ueberweg, 21?• cit-, Il, 132 •.
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University of Edinburgh.

However the "popular clamouru26

against him27 was suah that he uapplied in vain. 1128

So

for a while l'te tutored the Harqui.s of Annandale, a. person

declared (legally) to be a lunatic. 29

Later Hu.i-ne became
secretary and judge-advocate to General St. Clair. 30
In 17 48

31

he published Ar:i Enguiry Concen1ing Human

U11derstandil13, a copy of which was sent to Butler. 32

It

is a re-writing of the Treat.ise, 33 yet this is the work

which exercised such a profound influence upon Immanuel
l'a'1.t.34

In fact Kant himself admits:

Ich gestehe frei: die Erinnertmg des David Hu.~e war
eben dasjenige, was mir vor vielen Yahren zuerst den
dogmatischen Schl9,1nmer unterbrach und meinen
26An anonymous quotation by Aiken, lo.c. c.i t.
27Hume attributes this to his own °heterodoxyt• and
11

scepticism".

23

Vid~ ~ - , pp. xif.

Ueberweg,

12.£. ill•

29Aiken, .Ql2• cit. ; p. xii.
JOThis latter position enabled him to travel in Italy
and France.
31 Ibid

-·

32This was before Josep~ Butler became Bishop of Bristol.
33The author is indebted to Balduin v. Schwarz for
this information. Dr·. Schwarz was one. of his teachers in
the area of Modern European Philosophy at Fordham University.
34or. Schwarz declares that Kant was not familiar with
the Treat;is§. He knew only the tmg;uiq.
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tJnt<arsuchungen ira Felde der ·spegulativen Phi.losophie
eine ganz andere Richtung gab.35
Hur..-,e declares:

the phiLosophical Principles are the same in both: But
I was carry' d away by the Heat of Youth 5: · Invention to

publish too prectpitately.

So vast an Undertaking,

plan' d before I was one arid twenty t f1. compos • d before
twenty five, must.necessarily be very defective. I
have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times. 36

In 1751 !m, Enguip: Con~ern:l,n..s,

~

Ppinciples gf lipra!§ appeared,

a book which Hume regarded as incomparably his best.37
(Aiken thinks u there is perhaps no finer philosophical prose
in E11glish1138 than portions of Enguirieq.)

0?,.ssertat1on 91J;

~

Hume also wrote

P~S§j.ons, a t--ork described as

11

his ?;"'.Ost

perfuncto~7 performance.u39
111

1752 Hume accepted the position of librarian in the

Advocate·s' Library at Edinburgh.

He held this job for five

years, during which time he began writing his J:Iistoa

2f

35Immanuel Kant, '' Prolegomena zu einer jeden kuenftigen
Metaphysik, die als Wis.senschaft wird auftreten koennen;"
Immanuel Kant•s
(Sorgfaeltig revidirte; gesammtausgabe
in zehn Baencien; Le pzig: Modes und Baumann., 1838), Dritter
Band, p. 170. I<ant• s £rolezgmena 12. Any Future !>~eta1>h7sics
~ l-lill 1i£ Able ss,. Come Forth as Science appeared'. in
17'83. It is Qro"bably tlle"be~t availa6l-e guide through -the
"thorny pathsi', of his more important l{:rit~ der reinm

Wsrre

Vernunft (1781).

.

36
Letter to Gilbert Ellio·tt of Ninto (written in 1751),

Greig, 22•

cit.,

I, 158.

37Aiken, !Qs,-. ci_t .
38

39

Ibid., p .. xi.

~ . , . p. xii.

.
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~ngland.

This particular work required about ten years to

complete a1:1d ,gas considered standard for a long while.
However i t is deficient.

As a historian Hume is "somewhat

conventional and superficial."lJ-0
By t he t ime Hume was fifty he was both wealthy and
independent.
at1d

11

His wish was to retire in his native Scotland

never more set foot out of it,tt41 but in 1763 he again

visited France; and in 1765 he became secretary to the
British Embassy in Paris.
i n t his city.

He was received very cordially

I n fact for a time. he was "the philosophical

idol of t he French capital."42

He had a wonderful time in

Paris but " determined to abandon the fine folks, before
they abandon me _.u 43

When Hume returned t:o E11gland he t.zas accompanied by a

f r i end , Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Rousseau had been exiled

f rom both France and Switzerland, and Hume graciously took
him to Engl~d in order to f ind "an asylum of rcfugen44 for
him.

However Rousseau proved quite ungrateful.

He repaid

401bid.•

41quoted by Aiken, j.bid., p. xi.ii.
421.lu&.·
43quoted by Aiken, ih;d.
44rtarald Ho·e ffding, ~ Histor,y 2i Moqem PhilpsophY,
2 vols·. ~ transla.ted f ~ the German oy B. E. Meyer {London:

~:.acmillan, 1924), I, 427.
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Hume's kindness "with the maddest suspicions.1145 He had
symptoms of a persecution mania and imagined ttthat Hume was
conspiring against h1m.u46 Actually Hmne•s motives were
totally benevolent and disinterested.
quar-.celled, 47 there was

0

Nevertheless they

a scandalous rupturen48. 1n their

friend ship 9 and Rousseau returned to France.

In 1769 Hume settled in Edinburgh for the last time.
Here he polished his famous pia\ps:tffiS gn Natural Religion,49
and enjoyed the company Qf friends. In 1775 he contracted
serious diarrhea, 50 the noisome malady which at last caused
his death the following year.

He wrote:

I n spring 1775 9 1 was struck with a Disorder in my
Bowels, which at first gave me no Alarm, but has since 8
as I appreh~d it, become mortal and incurable. I now
reckon upon a speedy Dissolution • • • I consider • • •
that a Man of sixty five, by dy!yg, cuts off only a
few Years of infirmities • • • •
45Ibid., I, 428.
46Aiken; 22• cit. 9 p. ·xiii. or. Schwarz affirms that
Rousseau was neurotic.
47For an extensive treatment of this subject vide John
Hill Burton, L!fg_ !!ls! Corres~ndence 2f. David Hume~volumes
(Edinburgh: WII!Iam Talt, l8 ), II, 319-81.
48
Hoeffding, l9c. cit.
49This work was published post-humously a duty which
1
fell to Adam Smith, Hume's literary executor. ~ Knight,
2.2• cit. 1 P• 95.
SO~ Adam Smith's letter [dated 9 November, 1776] to
Nr. Stranin in William Bell Robertson's t•tntroduction,"
~litical Discourses (London and Felling-on-Tyne; New Yor z
Te Walter Scott Publishing Company, LTD, n.d.) 1 p. xxiv.

Hrze• s

51
Hume, ttHy Own Life," Greig, 22•

ill•,

I, 7.
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Adam Smith asGerts:
Upon h1s rotum to Edinburgh , though he f ound himself
much weak~r 9 yet hi cheerfulness never abated, and he
continued to divert himnelf as uoual, with correcting
his otm t-."Orks for a runq odit1on , and reading books of

amuse~ nt 0 b~th the conve~s-ation of his friends, and,
sometimes in the evan1ng 0 with a party at his favourite
His c heerfulness r..r.aa so gt:eat: 9 h1o
conversation and amusements ran so mueh in thelr usual
str ain thut , notwithstanding all bad a~ptoms , ~any
people could not believe he was dying • .:.>2

g&mG o i: 'G:lhi st.

on 22 August 9 1776 0 Dr. Black noted:
He sits up, goos downet~irs once a day, and amuses
himsel f with reading, but seldom sees anybody. He

finds that oven the conversation of his mos,t intimate
f riends fatigues and oppres ses hi.rn; and it is ilappy
t hat he does not need it for he is quite free fl'Or.'l

anxiety, i mpatience, or
c,~m
During hi

iow

spirits , and passes his

very tiell with the assistance of amusing bookso53
last (lays Boswell lur ed hlm int o a rliscussion

cone m ing irn.:nor.telity and ·was uappalled to discover one

who could faca the prospect of his own imminent annihilation
with complete equanirnity. h54
Hu.--,:ie departed this life 25 August 1 1776 1 a t about four

o ' cloc k in the af.ternoono55 When his body was laid to rest

52Arlam Smith's lettc,: to Mr. Strahan cited above. Vid~
Robertson• s ••Introduction , " flume•~ I'2liti.cal pi.sc:oyrsefJt
9J!o s.!S• , P• xxiii.
53~ Robertson• s tttntroduct1on," ibid. , P• xxv .

54A1ken, 22• sJ:.S• , P• xiii.
55~
or. alack' s letter [ dated 26 August, 17761 in
Robertsons hlntroduction,tt Hume's P51litica.t Disco!:'.[ses,
Wl• s.11• , P o x:wi.
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n a great concourse of people9156 were pr esent ''~o s ee.m to

have anticipa ted for it the fate appr opri ate t o the r emains

of wizards and necr omancers • •• • 057

He left behi nd six

thousand pounds , most o f which wen t to relatives.

However

Adam Smith also received a sum of cash. 58
An appraiaal

Appraisals of David Hume diff er sha rply.

Huxley calls

him "an intellectual a thl ete , • • • who had an eminent share
of practical wisdom an.d tenacit y of purpose . " 59 Taylor
thinks that t1of all Scotti s h metaphysica l t hinkers'' Hume is

"the most famous, even i f not the greate st • • • • u 60

Mossner• s

book is entitled» Ill.!. Forgotten~. and i n t he Foreword
we read 9 "THE Hf RO of thi s book is David Hurne-- • • • ~
bQn na vid • ., 61 Adam Smith, i.11 his famous letter62 to Mr .

56ttuxley , SU?• .£1!. 9 P• 42 .
57 Ibid

- ·

58Knight, 2.J?• s!S,., P• 95.
59Huxley , 22• cit . , p. 2.
60A. E. Ta ylor , David Hume & the Miraculous ( Cambridge :
Cambridge University Pres s , ~ 7),-p; 1.
61Emest Campbell Mo s sner, " Forel\.'Or d,•• The For go tten
Hurne (New Yor k: Col umbia Un iversity Pr ess , l ~ )~" p. xi.
62written 9 Novembe r, 1776.
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Strahan,63 Gpe.t'l.ks of Hume as

0

our excellent friend," 64 and

declares :
Upon the whcle, ! have always co11sidered him, both in

his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as
nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous
man Sf perhaps the nature of human frailty will per-

mit. b.;1

Before Hume died he wrote a brief biographical sketch entitled
r.!:t Own &,if e . 6 6 !n this monograph he gives a 0 modest''
description of himself in the f ollowing ~.;ords:
• • • I am , or rather was (for thia is the Style, I
must now use in speaking of myself; • • • ) I was, I say,
a ma11. of mild Dispositions, of Comnand of Temper 11 of

an open , social, and cheerful Humour, capable of
Attachment , but little susceptible
Enmity, and of
great Moderation in all my Passions. 7

ot

A bit later he states, . . . . . I took a particular Pleasure

in the Company of modest women. • • • u68 "Hume was not a
recluse speculative philosopher, like Spinoza and Kant.« 69
Rather he was "a man of affairs,'' 70 11.ke Leibniz and Bacon.

63aume•s publisher.
64vide Robertson• s 0 Introduction,'' Hume's Political
Discoursei;"" SU!• s!.£•, P• xxii.

65lbid., P• xx.vii.
66 oated 18 April, 1776.
67Hume, "My Own Life," Greig, 9.ll•

Sl:.£•,

1, 7.

68 tbid. Yet Hume was apparently tta fat man ... Quoted
by l<night, 2.1?• cit., P• 95. In fact tradition tells us that
he was a glutton. ~ Aiken, ''Introduction," 21?• SlS•,
P• ix.
69Knight,

70l.!21li·

An•
~

it •• p. J •
s.,_
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Ht'Ine is

Robertson.

tt

this truly great man'' 71 in t he opinion of

"'Lech.artie r va m;me jusqu' a. soutenir ferinement

que Hume eta it un fidele chrJtien11 7 2 and Henderson .:hinks
,

ltl' horrme eta.i.t • • • u n croyant sincere;,

73

,..

••peut•etre.

However certain others have been less kind in t heir
evaluations ; for example , Thomas Jefferson ~Gfers

to

Hume

as '' the great apostle of toryism • • • this degenerate son
of science p this traitor to his fellow men. o 74.

Taylor admits:

•• ; I have t o own t o a haunting uncert ainty whether

Hume was really a great philosopher, or only a ••very
clevez snan. 0 75

Aiken thinks Hume was

11

more curious than de vout• 0 76 and

Passmor e a sserts,

0

philosophcrs ."77

Selby•Bigge complains:

Hume is one of the most exasperating of

He says so many different things in so many different
ways and different conne:tiono, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very

hard to say positively that he taught or did not teach
71 vide Robertson's "!ntroduction," Hume's Political
Discourses," !m• fil• • p. xiv.
·

72The ~10rde of Andri Leroy. Vide his book entitled
Id! ~rit:igue fili I&. R;ligion Chez oavid'H.ume (Librairie F~lb{
Alcan, n . d.) , p. 361.
73
Quoted by Leroy.

74Quoted by Aiken,
75

1.J2!d•
12£. sll•

Taylar, 2.J?• cit., p • .54.
76An anonymous quotation b:, Aiken, sm,.
77

Passmore, 21?.• cit., p. 1.

ill•,

P• ix.
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this or that particular doctrine • • • • This makes it
easy to f i nd all philosophies in Hume .or, by setting
up one statement against another, none at alt.78
''But Hume• s mL'"'ld 9 even at its best 11 was not of the most
disciplined sort ... 79 Apparently he "owed little to schools
or wiiversities.n 8 0 Furthermore much of his early education
was i n linguistics.

His knowledge of philosophy he had

acquired almost entirely by himself.Bl
I

Hume was a "deiste qui n 'a pas eu le temps de devenir
un atheen 82 a ccor ding to Compayre. But Hume was not a Deist.
Ra ther he was an adversa~y of Deism. 83 However it is sheer
fol ly to label him as a "chrJtien sincere et timide, 1184 and
affirm t hat his

0

timiditJ naturelle que nous avons reconnue

etre un des traits distinctifs de son caraterett85 is the
explanation of his skepticism.
,

I

It is significant that "sa
l

I

mere aurait declare: -'Notre David est d'un excellent nature ,

mais c•est une intelligence extraordinairement eveillee,

78quoted by Passmore, .!J2.!g.

791.e.!£., P• 152.
80Huxley, 22• s!t•, P• 3.
81Aiken, 22• cit., P• xi.
82
Quoted by Leroy, SU?.• cit., p. 360.
83
see ~ . , PP• 358w60.
84

.lJ2li., p. xiv.

85

l.l?!,d.., P• 361.

(This is the opinion of Lechartier.)
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passionnee pour les recherches dangerausee.'"86
It is undeniable that Hume was a kind, tolerant man.
He was gifted writer, a sharp thinker.87

»His relations

to the more eminent clergy of his time were most friendly.u88
However this does not preclude the possibility that he might
be in error.

o • • • to be a Humean, precisely, is to take

no system as final, nothing as ultimate except the spirit
of a1'\quiry. ri89

Hume's Position
Introductory

- he fa::ious philosophical system'S of the past have all

~een juilt upon a foundation of sand.90
see::i that p! ilosophy is disgraced.

In fact it woulc

Today there is :::::uch

cisagree::::e:it a::x>ng the sciences.
rc.ere is nothing -~ic'.:l is not the -5 '\iliject of ce:>ate,

a:::._c :...:-. "'hlcb =en o: learning are not o: contrary

O?i!iicns. -be :x>st triv..al questio!l esca;:,es not o~
cc=. tro t;e :''SY , and ~ t-ce :::o st =IO=ei to '.!S we a~e ~ t
able co give a:r.7 certain rlecisionJ ~LS?"~tes a.re =uti?l!.e-c, as ii every th.1n.g .as uncert.ai n; a.r.-rl t=ese
,H
t es are ::an.age_
..i, -~\...,
c.l ••
•J..
~ s ..
i ~
--57..l
...-~e
grea~e.. war= t"n, as ..:
e--r;er; t'~i'"16 ~s ce:--tain. ..~.=icst all this ~s:le I tis

E6IbLc., P• 3c0.
S7~

J.&.•

,

",.......... .,._

--~·'

G....i.'-•

88-,JCn:ignt, 22• cit., p. 94.

89pas8wl0re, 22• c1t., p. 159.
9

~ote the t-rue Cartesian spirit here.

.....
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not reason which cat'ries the prize, but eloquence;
and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes
to the most extravagent hypothesis, who has a:rt enough
to represent it in any favourable colours.91
Hence even scholars are prejudiced against metaphysics.
However people do not understand the meaning of the terms
and much labor has been lost in research.
be averse to the subject.

But we ought not

If truth is within the grasp of

reason, it Qertainly will require diligence to attain ic.92
Now it is obvious that every science is related to man's
nature.

Even natural religion, mathematic·s and natural

philosophy are somewhat dependent upon psychology.

It is

impossible to predict what improvements might be made 1n
these fields if we totally comprehended the range and power

of the intellect and could explain the essence of ideas, and
the various operationa of reasoning.

The area 1n which

these advaneemen·t s ttare the more to be hoped for09 3 is that

of natural religion.
And if natural religion, mathematics, and natural philo•
sophy are dependent to such a degree upon the science of
man~ what may we expect in other realms which are more closely
related to hunan natu~e?

There are four sciences which con-

tain just about everything which is conducive eithe·t ' to the
91Hume, ttA Treatise of Human Nature,•• Introduction;

tU!!!!! s1legtions, 22• ctt., p. 1.
921J21sl•t P• 2.

931J?!sl., P• 3•
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improvement or the adomment of the intellect, namely,

logic, crit1cism 9 morals, and politics.
Hence the only way to be successful "in our philosophi•
cal researches•• 94 is to adopt a new method..
the queen of the sciences.

Psychology is

If we master it first, we shall

easily conquer th€ others.
There is no question of importance, whose decision is
not compr1z'd in the science of man; and there is
none, which can be decided with any certainty, before
we become acquail1ted with that science. In pretending
therefore to explain the principles of human nature,
we in effect propose a compleat (sic1 system of the
sciences 9 built on a foundation almost entirely new,
and the o~ly one upon which they can stand with any
security. 5
The only firm basis upon which to erect the other sciences
is psychology; and "the only solid foundat1on" 96 for psycho•
logy is observation and experienc·e .

Other countries may

compete with us in poetry and even surpass us in some of
the arts, but our nation excels · in philosophy. 97
Since we are ignorant concerning the essence of mind98
it is impossible for us to formulate any conception of its
abilities and attributes, except through experience and

94tbid.

95~., P• 4.
9611?!.d·

g7This is an overstatement.
9 8,,he same as we are ignorant conceming the essence
of extemal bodies.
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observation.

After we have done our best, one thing is

certain , namely 0 we cannot go beyond experience.
is impassable.

The barrier

Neither polished philosophers nor the most

abject workman "can go beyond experience, or establish any

principles 'Which are not founded on that author1ty.u99

If

our experiments are conducted properly "we may hope to establish on them a science 9 which will not be inferior in
certa1nty 0 and will be much superior in utility to any other
of human comprehension.ulOO
The origin of our ideas

All perceptions may be classified as either Impressions
or ldeas.101

The difference between them is merely the

degree of power and vividness with which they smite the
intellect and penetrate our consciousness.

Those perceptions
'Which strike us most violently are Impressions; 102 whereas
an Idea is just a weak, faint replica of an impression. 103
99Ibid., P• 6.

100Ibid., P• 7.
p. 9.

lOlHurne, "Treatise," Book I, Part i, Section l, ibid.,
(Section l in the complete and original text.)

102This includes all sensations, emotions, and passions
when they first appear in the mind.
103All our ideas are derived from impressions. Knight
calls this a "clumsy en"Or.t1 (Vide l<night, sm,. 1t., P• 148-)
Hoeffdi.ng points out that for Hume ideas cannot ea p£1ori.
(ll.de Hoeffding, 22• S;it., I, 428.) Every idea is
copy
otaii impression,. and the idea of God is no exception. '11le
intellect acquires this idea "by magnifying the human attri•
butes of wisdom and goodness beyond all limits." (,Ueb~rweg,

6a
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llQwever it is not: alway$ e~sy to distinguish betwee11 them.•

Sometimes

001

idea is so violent that it resembles an impreDsion,

for c::{t:,rI~.plc., when a pcr:~on is dr<cnming, or when one has a

fcav<!r, or when a yorson 5.s insane ..

On the otoor hand there

are time.a ·w hen au i ~11pr ession is so feeble and oubdued that
1-~

confuse it wit h an idea.

But these ~.re the. eY.coptions.

1'1.,rthci"'r.1.ore ,?.11 perceptions are e.i ther simple or

compl~),:.

'.t'h ose whic h cun be neither distinguiehe;d nor

sepa r~~:ted ar"'?. simnlc p~rccpti.ons; •phereas those. uhich may
be differenti ate d a,:e ~on1Ele;x p~rce.ptione • f or e ::1:£'.Jnple, this

apple has a. definite color, odor, and taste. .

These three

qutli tics ar~ c on,bin.ed in this one .:!pplc, yet they a.re not

identic al.

i,e perceive t1-iem as being sepn:rete from one

a.."lothcr. lOl,.

Irn.presoions antl i aeas resembl~ one an.0t h.e r in every
way excep t i n t heir dtiv:-ees of \!igor and liv·cliness o

In

1:1

sense one reflects the other, so th.."'.t eversr perception has

its "double .:i

:-.,1,.en I close ey eyes a11.d think about rw,J r oom,.

my ideas arc e:-:act tl1..1plict1tes of my imp1..es~ions.

Apparent-

ly there iE. alw~.ys a correapondence bet:;,.roon the ide-a and
its impres oiot)..

212.• cit. , II 1 1.32.) Hence we are not surprised t1in.:t for Huce
ff is l.m.possible to deni.onstrat:e t he mcistence of God. ~
Paul J •. Glenn, ~ lli~tory 2f. ? hflos'Ophy (ll.th. i mpression;
St. Lou1.s & London: iferder t 19!;5), p . 327.
104Treatise, Bool,t I, l:1art i, Section 1, ]h.!me Select:Lons,

212.• ~ · , p. 10.

-
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Howeve:t" as I examine the ma t ter r!lore closely I di scover
that I have been unduly lJ\1pressed Hby the first appearance.

• • • ulOS

I t is false to assert

im:ere..~sio~~ are .t,e semb1,.!J:1.,g." 106

0~.

all ~ ideas ~

I notice that numerous com•

plex ideas never had a corresponding impression, and fre•
quently our ideas a re not exact copies of our i mpressions.
I can imagin.e to myself such a city as the New
Jhz¥salem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies,
to I never saw any such. I have seen Paris , but
shall I affirm I can form such an idea ~f that city,
as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses
in their real and just proportions?l07

I observe that usually there is a great similarity bet ween

somplex ideas and impressions, but they are not always precise duplicates of another.

But this is not true of simple

perceptions, because invariably there 1s a simple idea to
correspond with a simple impression, for example, "That

lOS!bicl., P• 11.
1061.g!g.

107lhig. Through imagination and errors of memory we
may form coraple:::. ideas which are not true, e.g., I have a
complex idea of the New Jerusalem with !ts streets paved
with gold. Here we cor:ibinc our idea of (a) a city, and
our idea of (b) gold, which we do not ~""tperience. We cannot combine what we do not experience. (The stage is now
set for the main teaching. All knowledge is declared to
be derived from impressions, and the way for determining
the truth of any idea is to trace it back to its origin,
i.e., to the impression. If you can show me the impression,
then the idea is true; but if there is no impression at the
source of the idea, then the idea itself is false and .must
be rejected. If you have the idea of ~ . you can produce
the impression of red.• ) Dl:. Schwarz, ll>October, 1957.
(The author's class notes.)
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idea o f r e d ~ \~,i ch we form i n the dar k , and that impre ssion,
which s t r.:t kes o\.1r e yes it1 S\ll.1shil1e, di ffer only in degree,

not in natur.e. u l08

This affii-mation is i rrefutabl e .

In t he px-e sent tz-eatise we shall be sati sfi ed t o e s tabli sh j ust one gene zal propo,sit im:1, n amely, '*Tha.£.
§Jimple .i-.deatt

in £.l'U!.i.1'..

f i r st. 1pnearance

simple imp:!!'easi2as , "v1h.ich

a

ill our

™ clerlv ' d

from

corres pondent; 1i£ them , !!!S

which t hey; §._Xact l y r epI:e§ent. tt l09
The association of ideas
The ~~agi natis>n i s capable of separating al l simple
ideas and then reuniting t hem in what ever forin it chooses.

Hence Hnot hing wou' d be more unaccountable than t he operation s of tha t faculty , were i t not guided by some universal
principl esol l O which make i t somewhat immut able wit h itself
at all time s and in all places .

If idea s were completely

vague and detached t hey would have nothing to u.~ite them
I t is impossible for the ident ical simple ideas
to drop habi t uall y 1.~to complex ideas 111 without some tie

by chance.

108ll?!.g., P?• 11£.
1091W•' P• 12.

1

1h14. ~~!Fi3:1 9tse~~~~n14 i~r~h;· c~:~i!~~ !i;dli:Jgfflic~;::s
lllAs they frequently do.
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between them, 112 whereby one idea normally int roduces
a nothe r.

But we should not regard this princi ple of unif ication
among ideas ri.s

mi

i n sepa r able a ssociation be c au s e it has

a lready b e en d e.b arred from the i ma3 ination; nor e.re we to
infer t h n t it mus t b e pn~sent b e fore the i ntellect is c apable
of linking two i deas , for n othine has more f r eedom than

t he mind; but we nr c only to consid er it as a modera t e power,
which g e ner~lly pr e v a ils , a nd ir. one o f the c a.uses why

l an3 u a 5 0 s are s o similar t o on e another, natt.1..re i n

,?.

way

indic nt i nt t o e ve ry man t he simpl e i de a s which are the most
nppro )r i ~tc to be c (,mbine d int o one conpl ex ideo. .

Now t here

ar c t hr C:!e nt tribut c s which give birth to thi s associ at i on,
an d \·:hi c h thns c · rry t h e i n tellect f r on one idea to another,
n nmel y , Resembl ance, Contigui t y in time or pl ace, ~nd Cause

and i.:ffect .113
I d e not thin < it ·wi ll be very nec essnry to show that

these n c -zes yie l d a conne ction amon g idea s , and ·when one
i dea a p pe.a rs i t norr!1ell y introduces another .

I t i s obvious

that a s we thi nk , t he i magina tion pusses with facility
betw~cn l: i mil a r ideas , c.nd this property ·-,lone i s a. sufficient tie o.nd conne ction f or the fancy .

i'..s t h e senses

change t heir object s, it is ne cessa r y for t h e m to c han~ e
them rnathodically , and t o a ccept them in their

1

-

12

113

.
.
;,; ome associating property.

Ibid.
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s.ontiguous position; likewise it is necessary for the

imagination to procure this idenC:l.cal method o f cogitation
b y frequent repetition over a long period o f time, ••and run

along the pa:1:ts of space &ncl time in conceiving its objects."114
At thi s point ,.re shall r2o t insist: upon the a ssociation

~n1ich is mace by t he kinship of cause~ effect because

later we shall have th<:; opportunity to examine it thoroughly.
At preseA1.t it ie enough to notice t>that there is no relation,
which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes

one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of
cause a.d effect betwixt their objec:ts. nll5

He.nee these are the principles of cohesion between
simple ideas , and in our imagination they provide the site
of that pe1-manently united association by which they are

j oined in the memory.

This is a sort of Attraction, and

the effects vrl.ll be discovered to be as rema rkable in the

mental i-rorld as in the natural; and it will n~nifest itself
in forms as numerous and a s diverse.

Its effects are promi•

nent everywhere ; but its causes are for the most part un•

known, " and must be resolv'd into original qualities of
human natut"el l6 which I do not preten<l to elucidate.0 The

t rue philosopher must restrain his inordinate inclination

114I bi d. , p. 14.
l l51bid.
116!l?!g,.
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of delving i nto causes; and wh~n he has verified a ciogma
by eno u gh e,cporinents, he shoul d be satisfied. when it is

clear that a fu1~ther search woul<l co:s:!<lucc him into , pecula-

tions which t.ire VB.gue and ambiguous .

I n Chis case he hacl

better spemd his ::lme ii-ivestigating ef fe,.!t s rathei· than

causes .
Among t.:he effects of this conr1ection o f ideas , nothing

is mer~ worthy o f comment ·t ha,, t hese complex i deas .

They

are the customary topics of. our. reflections and usual ly
issue from some principle of unification among the simple
ideas.

The ideas of space and time117
11

o discovery cou• d. have been made more happily for

deciding all controversies concerning ideas0118 than what

has been noticed briefl y above, namely, (a) An impression
is always superior to an i dea, and (b) every idea appears
first in an analogous iu1pression.

The itnpressions are so

transpa~ent and manifest that no disput e is possible; where•
as numerous ideas are ao indi.stinct that the intellect can
hardly discern t heir precise essence and elements.

Now

ll 7n1.s analysis of thesti two ideas is superficial.
ill•, p. 548.

Vide Smith, 22•

ll8Treatise, Book I, Part ii, Section l, ~ Se}ectious,
22• ctt• , P• 15. (Section Jin the complete and original
text.
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let us apply this law in order to investigate further the
ideas of space and time.

t'1hen l open my eyes and look about I perceive numerous
bodies; and when I shut my eyes and reflect upon the distance
separating these bodies, 1 gain the idea of extension.
Since every idea originates from an analogous impression,
the impressions which resemble this idea of extension are
necessarily either sensations acquired from sight or interior
impressions flowing from these sensations.
Man's internal impressions are emotions, aversions,
desires, and passions; and certainly nobody ~ulcl think that
one of these is the copy from which we derive our idea of
space.

Hence there is nothing which could possibly transmit

this idea of space to us, except our senses.

There is no

appeal from this conclusion.
The appearance of this table before me is all that I

need to acquire the idea of extension.

This idea corres-

ponds to an L~pression which I perceive by sense at this
moment.

But the senses impart nothing to me except an
impression o.f ttthe impression of colour'd pointsn 119 arranged

in a particular way.

If the eye sees anything else 1 hope

somebody will indicate it to me.

But if nothing further

can be proved we may infer with certitude that our idea of

extension is only a model of these colored points and of
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the way in which they appear.

Suppose that the points in this extended body are
purple; then every time this idea is repeated we would locate
the points in the same patten1 and confer upon them the
only color we know, namely, purple.

Later we become acquainted

with other colors120 and their various compositions.

Then

we discover a similarity in the character of colored points
which constitute them.

At last we try to omit the distinca

tive color traits and find an abstract idea only on that
manner of appearance wht.ch is the same in all of them.

Even

when we convey the similarity beyond the objects of just one
sense, and we discover that the impressions of touch resemble

those of sight in the arrangement of their parts, even then
the abstract idea is capable of symbolizing both because of
their similarity.

Every abstract idea is nothing but a

particular idea, thought of in a certain sense; but being
attached to universal terms, they are capable of representing
an immense diversity, and to embrace entities which are alike

1n some ways and vastly different in others.
Our idea of time is acquired fro~ the succession of
every kind of perceptions.

It is an abstract idea which

includes a greater diversity than the idea of space.

Yet

it is depicted in the imagination by some definite, individual

120v1z•• red, green, violet, black• and white.
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idea of a precise qual'ltity and quality.121
Now just as we derive the idea of space from the nature
of objects which we can see and touch, so we fashion the

idea of time from the sequence of ideas and impressions;
nor can time ever appear alone or be thus observed by the

intellect.

A

man who is sleeping soundly, ol" conce.i"'ltrating

strongly on one thought, is unaware of time; and he imagines
the same duration to be longer or shorter according to the

speed with which his perceptions follow one another. One
eminent ph1losopher 12 2 has noticed that human perceptions
have certain limits "in this particular'1 123 which are determined by the primary nature and temperament of the intellect,

and beyond this no ~xtraneous entity can eve~ accelerate
or delay our· thought.

If you whirl a burning coal about

rapidly it will appear as a fiery circle; nor will any time
intervene between its revolutions.

This i s because external

bodies can be moved faster than our perceptions can follow
one another.

An absence of "successive

perceptionsttl24 is

invariably accompanied by an absence of the conception of
time, even though the objects really succeed one another .
Hence we may infer that the intellect cannot discover time

12ll.W,., P• 17.
l22John Locke.
1231.2.W·

124.l!?.i£.' P• 18.
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except "by some aerceivabl~ succession of changeable objects." 125
The mind can ma''1er perceive time either alone or in company

with an object that is steady and immutable.

To corroborate this we may annex an argument which to
me appears perfectly indisputable and persuading, namely,
it is obvious that time is composed of various part$: other•

wise it ~10uld be impossible to think of time spans as longer
or shorter.

FUZ'thermore it is apparent that these portions

cannot co-exist: for that attribute called "the co-existence
of partstt126 is the property of extension and differentiates
extension from duration.

Now just as time is constituted

of non-oo•e:tistent parts; an immutable entity ( since it
yields only co-existent irnpressio11s). does not produce any

which is capable of imparting to us the idea of time; and
therefore that idea is necessarily procured from a sequence
of mutable bodie-s, and the initial appearance of time can
never be detached from such a succession.

But is it possible to copceive time without thinking
of a sequence of entities?

And can time by itself produce

a well•defined idea 1n the fancy?

We will nQt examine

these questions.
In order to be certain whether any entities which are
linked in impressio.n are distinguished in idea, it is only
125ll.is!·

1261w.

209

necessary to reflect whether they are diverse from each
other; if they are i t is evident that they may he grasped

separately.

Everything which is different can be dis-

tinguished; and ever ything t-1hich can be distinguished ntay
be detached, according to the precepts elucidated above.
But if they are all the same it is impossible to distinguish
them; and if one cannot distinguish them, he cannot separate
·them.

But this i s exactly the situation as regards time,

compared with out" consecut ive percept ions.

We do not infer

the idea of time fl'om an individual impression rningled
with others and obvi ously separated from them; rather it
originates en t irely from the ·way in ·which impressions become

visible t o the intellect uwithout making one of the number. u 127
It is possibl e to dez1ve the idea of time fr.om listening
to five not es played on a flute; even though time is not
a sixth impression displaying 1tsalf to the hearing of any
one of 'the senses.

Nor does reflection reveal a sixth impres•

sion within the mind.

When the.Se five notes appear like

this they fail to stir any emotion in the mind, nor generate
any type of affection, which (being noted by it) can give

birth to a new idea.

For tha~ is indispensable to effect

a new idea of deliberation, nor can the intellect, {a) by
tumlng over all its ideas of sensation a thousand times,

(b) by inferring any new primary idea from them-•unless

127l!wi•• P• 19.

210

nature has fashioned its faculties in such a way that ot1t
of such a contemplation it is conscious of the birth of
tt some

new original impression. • • • 11128

But this only

takes cognizance of the fil81Ulfl: in which the various vibrations become perceptible; "and that it may afterwards con-

sider without considering these particular sounds, but
may conjoin it with any other objects. 0 129

I t is necessary

to have the ideas of certain entities, nor can it ever
reach any notion of time 1n the absence of these ideas;

which, because it does not appear as any original, clearcut impression, can obviously be nothing but various ideas,
or impressions , or entities arranged in a particular way,
that is, successively.

Existence and eternal existence
Every impression or idea that we remember, or of which

we are conscious, is conceived as existing; and it is
obvious that we acqutre the most perfect concept and
assurance from this consciousness.130 Now from this source

a dilemma may arise, namely, since we assign the note of
existence to every impression or idea that we reme.nber, th~
128.iw.
129a.w.

130sume• "Treatise," Book I, Part ii, Section 2 1 !mm§.
P• 20. (Section 6 in the complete~

s:iemyns,text."T~
illi•t
o g
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concept of existence (a) must spring from either a clear•
cut impression~ associated wita every object or perception
of our thought, or (b) it is identical ttwtth the idea of
the perception or object."1 31
This awkwar d situation manifestly originates from the
principle that the sou-rce of each idea is a similar impressiono, so our decision be tween the tt«> ho.ms of the dilemma
is no longer questionable.

But as to whet her every impres-

sion and idea are accompanied by a distinct impression. I
do not thi nk you, wil l find two clear impressions which are
permanently united.

There are particular sensations which

may be jou1ed at a certain time, but we soon discover that
they can be separated and may be introdueed sepai:ately.
Hence the idea o f existence is not acquired from an

individual impression.
Our idea of e.x istence is identical with what we think

of as existing.

To ponder one entity alone is the same .a s ·

meditating on it as existing.

When that idea is joined to

the idea of e.ny entity 0 the later gains nothing new. 132
Everything which we conceive, we conceive as existing.

"Any

idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea
of a being is any idea we please to form . . . . . n 13 3
1311.l?lc1·

132oid Kant borrow this concept from Hume?

133l'J!l1t•, P• 21.
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Moreover the concept of external existence can be
explained in a similar way. It is "pretty obv1oustt 134
that nothing is present to the mind except perceptions, and
that our knowledge of external objects consists merely of
those perceptions which they cause.

If I think, feel, see,

hate, or love~ I am merely perceiving.
Nowa since (a) the mind knows only perceptions, and
(b) every idea originates in an entity present to the
intellect beforehand~ it follows that we cannot conceive
of anything as being precisely different from our perceptions.
Let us concentrate on extemal things as much as we can:
Let us chase our iir.agination to the heavens, or to
the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any
kind of existence 9 but those per gtions, which have
appear 1 d in that narrow compass.

13

"In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our
scepticism.

If we believe, that fire warms, or water re-

freshes,136 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to
think otherwise.u137
Probability; and the idea of cause and effect
Every kind of reasoning is no thing more than

1341b!d.
135~.

l36tfote the robust spectre of Bishop Berkeley here.

137Treatise. Conclusion to Book 1. Hume Selections,

~~. p.

99.

----
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,SOmpaiiscu1, 138 and a discovery of the re1ations139 between
two or more entitias.

It is possible to make this compari-

son when we perceive both objects, just one, or none at all.
When bot:h entities are parceived by the senses we call it
Accordingly neither our

perception, not reasoning.140

observations about identity nor temporal and spacial rela-

tions ought to be classified as reasonirlg; for the intellect
cannot reach beyond se11se data to dis·cover either the existence or t:he relations of entities.
produced only by causation..

This association is

It alone assures us that "from

the existence or action of one object, that •twas follow'd
or preceded by any other existence or action• • • • 0141

Moreover these other two relations are useless in a liu.e of
argument, except to the extent that they either UJfluence
it, or are influenced by it.

No object contains anything

to convince us that they are always either contiguous or

remote; and when we observe that

in this case their relation

never changes, we invariably infer that they are joined
or separated by "some secret cause.n142 This is also true

138Ib1d., Book I, Part iii, Section 1, p. 22,
2 in the complete and origi,nal text.)

(Section

139variable or invariable.
140There is no reasoning in this case; the senses merely
admit impressions.

1411!l!r4.
l42Ibid., P• 23.
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of .identity.

We are prompt to assume that an entity may

remain unchanged, even thou.gh it is not perceived s~veral
times by the senses , and to confer identity upon it 143 every

time we conclude that if we had only watched or felt i t
constantly, it t-1ould not h,.ve cha:11ged.

But: this infexence

extends beyond sense impres sions and can only be based upon
the association of £!use .€mil effect; nor can we be certain
this new er..tity has not b~en alte~ed, regazdless of how much
it resembles what ~e formerly perceived.

t-Jhm~ever we discover such a perfect resemblance , we
consider, t~1ether i t be common in that species of .
objects; ·w hether pcssibly or probably any cause cou' d
(sic) operate in producing the change and resemblance;
and accordi11g as we determine concen~ing these causes
8.nd effectS 9 We form 0Uf audgment concerning the
identity of the object.· 4
Apparently then

(amor1g

these three relat ionD which are

independe11t of nothing but ideas), there is only one which

transcends the senses and gives us information about entities
which we do not perceive, namely, caucatio11.
From whence does t he idea of causation originate?

We

cannot reason properly unless we comprehend perfectl7 the
idea befor e us;-and it is impossible to do this until we

discover the source of the idea, and ex.amine the original
impressio11 which gave it birtli.

The idea will appear in a

clear light when we examine the impression; and when we

143Even though the perception was interrupted.

144ills_.
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examine the i dea our thinking will be cc,me t r ansparent.
Therefor.e let us s ci-ut inize any two en tities ( t...-ilich we
label cause and effe ct ), so t hat we inay discover the i mpres-

sion which yields "an idea of such prodigi ous conaequence.11145
l see immediat ely that I dare not s ee c i t ir, any o f ~he

individual gualitie§ of t he entiti es; because r~gardlass

of t'lhich quali ty I sel ect , I f ind some obj ect in which it
is absent , and yet it is catalogued a s cause and e ffect.
In fact e eryth ing whi ch e::cist s i s ei t 1e:r a c ause o;:- a n

effect 0 even t hough it i s obvious t hat there is no parti•

cular quality in every ~e1ng whi ch entitles i t to be placed

in t his class ification.
Hence the i dea of cauaatio11 is necessar ily acqui red

from a if~J&t igp, among entiti es; and we must now t ry eo find
that rel ation .

First I discover that everythL,g whi ch i s

regarded as a cause or an effect is £9nt iguous; and t hat it
is impossibl e for anything to act in a place or time , which
has been removed just a little t1from t hose o,f its existence.ul46

Objects ~hich are far apart may occasionally appear to effect
one another, yet an examination generally reveals t lu:.t there
is a chain of ~uses between them

11 wl1ich

a r e contiguous

among themselves, and to the distant objects";147 &nd

1454bid., P• 24.
146Ibig.

147Ibid.
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whenever we fail to discover this connection, we presu:ne
that it exists.

Therefore contiguity is essential for

causation; or at least we may assume such to

be

the case

for now.
An.other essential relation is the "PRIORITY of time
in the cause before the effect."148

Some feign that it is

not an absolute necessity for an effect to follow its cause;
but that any entity or act (when it first comes into existence) may exerci,s e its fertile quality, and produce another

entity or act f co•temporaneous with itself.

But aside from

the fact that experience usually seems to contradict this
view, we may place the relation of priority on a permanent

basis by a type of inference.

One settled principle in

moral and natural philosophy is that an entity 11 which exists
for any time in its full perfection without producing
another, is not its sole cause";l49 but is helped by another
Principle, which shoves it from its inert condition and

forces it to expend that energy which it secretly posses.s ed.
Now if it is possible for any cause to be perfectly cotemporaneous with its effect, then it is evident 150 that
all of them must be so; for any cause which delays its
action for one single instant fails to exert itself at that

148;tbid., P• 2S.
149.ll!J.si.

lSOAccording to this principle.
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particular moment in which it could have acted; and there-

fore cannot qualify e.s a conventional cause. The result of
this ~uld be nothing less than the demolition of that

sequence of causes which we perceive about us, and in fact,
the complete destruction of time.

For if a cause were co•

temporaneous with its effect, and this were co•temporaneous
with its effect.~ cetera, it is evident that (a) succession
would be a fiction , and (b) all objects exist simultaneously.

If this argument appear satisfactory, •tis well. If
not, I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty,
which I have us 0 d [sic] in the preceding case, of
supposing it such. For he shall find, that the affair
is of no great importance.151
Now since we have d1scoveredlS2 that succession and contiguity
are indispensable to causes and effects, I find myself in
a dead-end street .

I can advance no further in examining

a single case of cause and effect.
Motion in one body is rega:rded upon impulse as th.e
cause of motion in another. When we consider these
objects with the utmost attention, we find only that
the one body approaches the other; and that the motion
of it precedes that of the other, but without any
sensible intervat.153

Further reflection upon this subject is hopeless.

We can

penetrate no deeper by considering this individual example.
If a person should attempt to define a cause as that
15ll!?J.g.

152or imagined.
153Ibid., p. 26.

Vide Appendix "A"•
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which produces another, it is obvious that his words w:>uld
have no meaning.

For what is the meaning of production?

Is it not identical with causation?
But shall we stop here?

Do

the relations of succession

and contiguity exhaust the concept of causation?
not.

Certainly

An entity may precede another and also be contiguous,

without being its cause.

There is another relation ~"hich

is more important than the too mentioned above, namely,

necessary cpnnectign.
Again I approa-ch the subject from all sides in 01:der
to ascertain the nature of this relation, and to discover
the 1mpressionl54 from which its idea may be obtained.
When I examine the knowi1 qualities of entities I find that

cause and effect are not dependent upon them at all.

When

I reflect upon their relations I discover only succession
and contiguity, both of which are faulty and unsatisfactory.
ttShall the despair of success"l55 compell me to affirm that
1 have an idea here which does not follow an analogous

impression?

No, because the opposite principle has already

been proved ••as to admit of no farther doubt; at least,
till we have more fully examin'd the present difficulty.hl56

154or impressions.
155l!ll.g., p. 27.
156W,Q.
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a cause is always necessary
It is a common principle in philosophy that ttwhatever

begins .ts!. exist, !!U:Y!.t. have !. cause

2f. exis.t ence.n157 This

is generally accepted as an ax1oml58 in all argumentation.
It is assumed to be based upon intuition, a principle which

may be denied with the lips but never doubted by the heart.

But 1£ we test this maxim by the concept of knowledge
elucidated above, we shall fail to discover 0 any such
intuitive certaintyn;159 rather we shall find that it is
quite alien to that kind of conviction.
All certainty is derived from comparing ideas, and
from discovering immutable relations••as long as the ideas
do not change.

Now these relations are (a)· contrariety,

(b) proportions in quantity and ntlillber, (c) resemblance,

and (d) degrees of any quality.

But not one of these is

present in the above proposition, namely, "Whatever has!.
beginning

D.!.i ~ !. cause

2!,. gt'4s.t enc1. 0160

this statement is not self-evident.

Therefore,

If a person asserts

the contrary he must deny that these are "the only infallible

Hde

157Hume, "Treatise,tt Book It Part iii, Section 2,
sgect,ns, ibtd•, P• 28. (Sect10n 3 in the complete an

o gina text.
158No proof required.
1S9llJJ1.
160.i!?W·
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relat1onsnl61 and must discover another relation of thia
type which is insinuated in it.

But this argument p~-oves immediately that the ante•
cedent ~axim is both intuitively and demonstrably uncertain.
It is impossible to demonstrate that every new being 162 must
have a cause, unless we simultai'leously prove that nothing

can come into existence without some principle of productivity;
and whenever it is impossible to prove the second proposition,
"we must despair ofnl63 the possibility of ever being able
to prove the first.

Now the second cannot be demonstrated

because, as all clear•cut ideas can be distinguished from
one another, and as the ideas of cause and effect are plain-

ly of this nature, it will not be difficult for us to con•
ceive of an entity which exists one moment and not the next,

without associating it with the well-defined idea of cause.
'1berefore, it is obviously possible for us to imagine the
idea of a cause as i solated from the idea of somethbtg that

comes into existence for the first time.

Hence it follows

that the disconnection of these entities is possible to the
extent that there is neither absurdity nor contradiction
implied; and therefore it cannot be refuted by reasoning

based upon ideas; in the absence of which we cannot pmve
l 6 lll?.1si.

162or new modification of being.

163.1!?!£., P• 29 •
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that a cause is necessary.
Consequent ly we shall discover that every demonstration
which attempts to s how t he necessi ty of a cause is deceptive
and specious.

Some phil osopher sl64 affirm t he.tall spacial

and tempor a l points , in which we are able t o assume any
entity comi.ng int o eJtistence , a xe equal il.1 themselves; and

except fo~ a cause which i s distinctive t o a cert ain place
and a cert ai n time (and which thezeby the ~xis t ei1ce is
necessitated and e st ablished), it must continue f orever in
suspense; and t he entity cannot possibl y begin to e::tist,

because t here i s not hi ng " to fix its beg1nning.n 165

But

is it any more difficult t o assume that t he place and time
are definitely settled without any cause?

There are two questions ,~1ich always confront us con•
cerning this suqject, namely, (a) whether or not the object

shall exist, and (b) whe,fg and 3:lhen it shall begin to exist.
If it is intuitively absurd to dismiss a cause in the one
instance, it i s necessarily so 1n the other: and if a proof

is necessary to make the absurdity clear in t he one case,
it will likewise be requisite in the other.

Hence the rldi•

culous character of the one presu.i~ption cannot possibly

prove the other; since they both rest upon the same foundation, and necessarily stand or fall by the same line of
16L
--E.g., Hobbes.
165l.l?J:.g.

222

argument.
A second argument166 is this: Every being must be
caused; for if any entity lacked a cause, it would follow
that it has produced itself, that is, it existed prior to

its coming into being, which is an impossibility.

However

this reasoning is obviously not conclusive; for it assumes
that when we deny a cause ue still admit: exactly what we
have denied, namely, that a cause is necessary; t~,ich con•

sequently is acc~pted aa the thing itself; and that, doubtless is manifestly inconsistent.

But to affirm that some•·

thing begins to exist: t-dthout a cause, is not the same as

asserting that it causes itself; rather, in rejecting every
extraneous cause, rejects~ fortiori167 the created antity

itself.168 A.~ything which is causeless, cannot be its own
cause; and when you boldly declare the one ensues from the
other, you assume Hthe very poh1t in question, 0 169 and pre•
surne that (a) nothing could possibly ever come i..l"lto exist•
ence without a cause, but (b) when we e.~clude one causitive

principle, we are compelled to resort to another .

The third argumentl70 for the necessity of a cause is
l66or. Clarke,~ !l•
167All the more.
l6Si1ume• s thought is a bit ambiguous here.

l69Wii• • P• 30.
170Jotu1 Locke.
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this: Anything which begir,s to exist without a cause, is
produced by nqthipg, that is, it "has nothing for its
cause.u l 71

But it is equally as impossible f o r 110thing

to be a cause as for it to be something, or to equal several
right angles.

A

real cause unde~lies the existence of

every object.
All of these arguments are based upon t he same mistaken
idea; all are obtained ttfrom the same turn of t hought.nl72
lt is enough to perceive that when we reject all causes we
really reject them all, and do not conjecture that either
nothing 9 or the entity itself, has caused the object to
exist; and therefore we ca11not draw an argume1,t from these

ridiculous presumptions t o prove this exclusion is absurd.
If it is necessary fo~ everything to have a cause, it means
that when we exclude all other ca.uses, we are compelled to
accept as causes either the entity i t self, or nothing.

But

the very point under discussion is whetheir o!" not ever.;

being must have a cause; and therefore, we ought never take
this for granted.

The advocates of this fourth argu.rnent "are still more
frivolous . . . . . . 173

They declare that every effect must

have an underlying reason because this is implied in the

17lllu:£.,. P• 31.

172~.

173Ib\d•
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very dafil'lition of the term ef fss;t. nEvery ef f ect necessarily
pre-supposes a cause • • • • « 174 gffect is the r el a tive term,

and caus e t he correlative .

But this fails to prt~ve that a

cause must pr ecede ever y being; for example , it is nece ssary
for every husband t o have a wife, but it i s not necessary
for every man to be mar ried.

The question before us i s

whe t her or not eve:i: y entity which begins to ue is indebted

t o a cause for its existence; and t his I declare t o be both
demonstrably and i ntuitively uncer tain , and hope tha t: I have

suffici en t ly pr oved t his by means of the preceding a r guments.
The inf erence from impression to idea
I t is not diff icult to perceive that the inference we
draw f r om the causal relation is not acqui red merely f r om

an eY.&nll'l..ation of these individual ent i t i e s , and f rom such
an insight into their natures as may revea l t he fact that
one depends upon t he other .

0

There is no object, which

implie s the exi s tence of any other if we consider these
objects in themselves, anc\ never look beyond the i deas which
we form of them. " 175 Such an infer ence woul d be equal t o
knowledge and would imply that it is absolutely i mpossible
to conceive of something di fferent.

But sbice there i s no

174I bid.
175"ume, "Treatise," Book Ip Part iii, Section 3, H3lllS
Selectigns, ibtd•, P• 32. (Secti.on 6 in the complete and
Oll'1ginal text.
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connection between distinct ideas, it is obvious that an
impossibility of this type cannot exist.

When we move from

an impression to the idea of an entity, it is possible to
separate the idea from its impression, and to substitute

another idea in its place.
Therefore II the only way \~e can infer the existence of
one entity from another is by experience.

The nature of

experience is as follows : We remember frequent examples of
one variety of entities, and that flthe 1ndividuals"176 of
another kind of objects have invariably accompanied them
and have been in a normal order of sequence and contiguity
as regards them.

So we remember having seen that kind of

entity called flame, and having felt that kind of sensation
called heat.

We likewise remember their invariable tmion

every time we observed them.

Without any further delibera-

tion we label the one gause and the other eff~ct. and infer
the existence of the latter from the former.

In every case

where we ascertain the union of individual causes and effects,
we perceive both by the senses and then remember: but every
time we reflect about them, we remember only one.

We

fumtsh the other in harmony with our experience in the
past.177
Thus we have im·p erceptibly discovered a new relation

176

lJ?!g.. ; P• 33-.

177.w.
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between cause and effect, namely, c;;gnstant conjupct1gn.
Succession and contiguity are insufficient to compel

us to

classify~ objects as cause and effect, unless we notice
that both of these relations are maintained in a few cases.
However it ~1ill not be helpful to leave the direct exami•
nation of this relation, so that we may find the nature of
this necessar y
element of it.

connection,

which is such an indispensable

HThere are hopesttl78 that in this way we

may finally reach our goal; however it seems this constant
conjunction is not of much help.

For it implies nothing

more than that similar entities have invariably been put 1n
the relations of succession and contiguity; and it appears

plain (at least when first perceived), that in this way we
cannot possibly fi11d an idea which is new, and can only
increase the number, but not expand the entities of our
intellect.

A

person may think that what he fails to team

from one thing, he can never ascertain from a hundred repli•
cas.

Through our senses we perceive two bodies, or qualities,

or motions, in the relationship of contiguity and succession;
then we remember numerous cases in which these re~ations
were invariably the same.

But

should a bygone impression

be repeated to infinity, it could never give birth to a
new, primary idea, for example, necessary connection; and

in this case a multitude of impressions is no more convincing
1781.2W.

227
than just one.

This seems logical, but since it would be

foolish u to despair too soon," 179 we shall resume the

thread of our argument.
The next question for consideration is: Whether experience employs the imagination or the understanding to produce this idea; whether we are necessitated to make the

change by reason, or by a positive relat ion and connection
of perceptions.

If the former, it would advance according

to the follo~rlng principle, namely, (a) cases ~mich we have
experienced must resemble those which are foreign to us,

and (b) the course of nature ever remains invariably the
same. 180 Now i~ order to make this matter plain let us

review every argument upon which a proposition like this
may supposedly be hased; and they must be obtained either
from probability, or from knowledge.
It will not be difficult to persuade ourselves, from
our former method of ratiocination, that there are no

denonstrative arguments

t.o

show those eases ,-mich we have

never experienced are similar to those which we have expert•
enced.

At least it is possible to imagine a variation in

the onward movement of nature, which is sufficient proof
that a change of this type is possible.

uTo form a clear

idea of any thing is an undeniable argument for its

179

'

lli2,., P• 34.

lSOThis would undercut miracles!
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possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended
demonstration against it."181

Probability lays bare only

the relations o f objects, not of ideas.

Hence 1n certain

particulars it must be based upon our ideas and the impres•
sions of our senses and memory.

If our probable reasonings

were free f t'"Om any taint of an impression, the result would
be totally delusive: And if all ideas we~e absent, the
operation of the intellect (i11 perceiving the relation),
would be sensation rather than reasoning.

Therefore in

every instance of probable reasoning, the intellect must
be conscious of aomething; 182 and from this we infer SOQe•
thing associated with it, ~mich is neither remembered nor
seen.
Cause and effect is t~e only relation of entities which
is capable of directing us further than immediate impres-sion
of sense and memory; for it is the only connection upon
which we can base a just inference from one entity to
another.

It is experience which produces the idea of cause

and effect.

From experience we learn that in the past such

individual objects have invariably been connected with one
another: "And as an object similar to one of these is
suppos'd to be inmediately present in its impression, we
thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual
1811.2M•t P• 35.
1821t ml.!St either see or remember.
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attendant . 0 183

Thus according to the foregoing version, 184

the foundation w.~derlying probability is the assu.mption
that those two entities are similar, which we have e:,rperi•
enced* and also those wti,.ch we have not experienced; there•

fore, probability could never give birth to this pre-

sumption.

It is impossible for the identical principle

to be both the cause and the effect of a second; this might

be the only proposition about this relation which is either
deinonstratively or intuitively positive.
If anybody should try to escape this a r gument, without
deciding whether our reasoning here is acquired from proba•

bility or demonstration, and feign that every conclusion
from causes and effects is sustained by firm ratiocination,
I can only wish that this reasoning be brought forward so

we can examine it.
We have already noticed particular relations which
compel· us to pass from one entity to anoth~r, even though
there is no reason behind it; and this we may fix firmly
as a general law, namely, whenever the intellect unifotmly

and constantly makes a change for no 1"eason at all, "it is
influenc'd by these relations." 185 Now this rule applies

183l.2.id.•' P• 36.

18"1-lhich Hume believes to be unquestionable at every

point.

185.l.!?W•, p. 38.

230

to this case .

Reason186 is impotent to show ( a ) .. that two

objeci;s a.re co1u1ected , and (h) the observat·ion of their

invariable association in all past cases.

Therefore when

the il1tellect makes the transition f:rom the impression of
one entity to the belief of another, it is determined by

individual pr:1.nciplesl87 ~"hich connect the ideas of these
entities and join them in fancy.
If ideas were not united in the imagination any better
than they seem to be joined in the unde!"standing, it would
be impossible for us to infer anything from causes to effects.
Hence the inference is entirely dependent upon the combination of ideas.

The genera l pr inciples which unite ideas

are three, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
But they are neither the only causes, nor the infallible
causes of union.
The nature of idea or belief

A belief or opinion is merely an idea•-an idea that
differs from a fiction in the

ceived.

manner

·in lvhich it is con-

But I find it very difficult to explain this mam;ier.

However there is a difference in the

feeting

of an idea

to Yhich we assent, and an idea that we just imagine.
"And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by

lS6Even though assisted
187Rather than reason.

by experience.
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calling it a superior fore@, or vivacitI, or §.PJ:.i diti, or
.firmness, or steadiness. u188 This is an unfortunate diver•
sity of tet'ms but I am just trying to express the action

of the intellect 9twhich r~nders realities more present to
us than fic tions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,
and gives them a superior influence on the passions and

imaginatton. 0 189 The imagination has ccrnplete control over
its ideas.

It can unite, mix, ancl alter them in every

possible way.

It can conceive of a non-existent entity

and present: it to us ju.s t as though it were an actuality.

However it is impossible for the imag:Lnat:ion ever to attain
the level of belief.

Belief is not composed of the order

and essence of ideas, "but in the manner of their conception,

and in their feeling to the mind.ul90 But language fails

us here.

The only adequate term to describe this manner

of conception or feeling i s b~lief.

This is a word which

everybody understands, and in philosophy we cannot go any
further.1 9 1
The causes of belief

l8 8t;xatise, Book I, Part iii, Sect~on 4, Hume Selecti}ns,
!ltl.d., p. 0. (Section 7 in the complete and orlgiriai text.
Tfiis lack of precision reminds one of Locke.
189Ibid.

190Jbig.
191Ibid., P• 41.

232
Henc e all l ikely reasoning is merely a. t :n>e of sensat ion.192

I t is necessary t o follow our tast e and emotional

j udgment i n philosophy a s well as in music and poetry.
When I am pereuadad concerning a principle, it i s merely
an idea vihich impinges upon me more .forceful l y .

When I

prefer one group o f arguments to ano ther , I merely make a
decision from feeling a bout the pre- emin2nce of their power.
I t is impossible to di scover a connection bet ween objects ;
and it is only cust om inf luencing the imagination which
enables us t o

11 draw

any inf e rence from t he a ppear ance of

one t:o t he existence of anothe r.. 11 193

However. the bygone experience that under l i es ever y
judgment about cause and effect, may influence our intellect

in m1 ~nper ~eptible miu,ner.

The traveler who s tops on the

hank of a r i ver looks ahead and sees the r e sults of proc eeding; and his knowl edge here about f ut ure cons equences
i s t r ansmi tted to him by his experience i n the past.

It is

experience which enlightens him about certain cor.nections
of causes and effects.

But he surely does not stand t here

and recall e~pl es t hat are t o tall y forei gn to him in order
to discover how wate r affects an animal body.

The re i s such

an inti mate connect ion between t he ideas o f sinking and
192
Ireatise Book I, Part iii, Section 5 , Hume Selections,
~ . (Secti on 8 in the complete and origina l text.)

193}lli.
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water, and suffocating and sinking, that the intellect

makes the transition without any help from memory.
acts before we have time to reflect.

Custom

The things seem so

permanently united that we move immediately from the one
to the other.

But since this transition emanates from

experience rather than any original association between
the ideas, we are compelled to admit that it is possible
for experience to yield a judgment and a belief of causes
and effects by means of a secret activity, and without once
crossing the threshold of consciousness.

This destroys

every excuse$) if one yet exi.s ts,. for declaring that the
intellect is persuaded by reasoning about the principle
"that instances 2f. which~ have

m. experience, must necessarily

Xfa§emble .tho§e, Qf W\lich ~ haye.ul94 For here

we discover

that fancy or intellect is capable of inferring from bygone
experience without reflection; much more without formulating
any principle about it 9 or reasoning from that principle.

Generally apeaking the intellect never recalls past
experience in the regular and most settled connections of
causes and effects, for example, gravity, solidity, impulse,

.!t cetei:a.

But when the conjunctions of objects are more

unusual, then experience may reflect and thus aid the habit
and passage of ideas.

:wa.•

194

p. 42.
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The probability of causes
This reasoning must seem quite abstruse to most readers
who are unaccustomed •1 to such profound reflectionsn 195
about the intellectual faculties.

These folk are liable

to reject as fantastic anything which disagrees with traditional notions and the principles of philosophy tJhich are

the most appar.ent and least difficult:.

However if men can

only be totally convinced concerning two principles they
will be liberated from all ordinary systems and be capable
of accepting the most extraordinary ones.

These principles

are:
a. No object contains anything, considered alone,
which can supply us with a reason for making an
inference beyond it.
b. Even after we have observed a frequent or invariable
connection between objects, we have no reason for
drawing any conclusion about any §gtity outside
the orbit of our own experience. 1
We have discovered that these principles are "sufficiently
convincing.nl97

But perhaps conjectural reasonings

0

acquire

a new degree of evidence.ttl98

195T eat se; Book I, Part iii, Sectio~ 6, Hume ~
Selpctiyns, b . • 11 P• 43. (Section 12 in the complete and
origtiui text.
·
196I.b i.d .

197ills!·

198llw!·

(These statements are not quotations. )
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First it is apparent that in ratiocinations of this
t11>e, it is not the entity introduced to us, which• con•
sidered alone 9 gives us any reason to make an inference
about any other entity or event.

For since it is supposed

that this latte r thing is unce:rtain and this uncertainty
is obtained from a hidden •• contrariety o f causes in the

.

former, tt

199

:lf any of the causes tve?e put in to t:he known

properties of that entity, they would then be visible and
our inference would be certain.

Second~ 1t is just as apparent in this type of reasoning
that if transferring the pa.at to the. future were based just

upon an inference of t he intellect, it could: ·never give
rise to any assw:ance or belief.

When we transport con•

flicting experiments into the future, we are only able to

repeat these same experiments with their indi,'1dual pro•
portions.

But t hese cannot yield assurance in a single

occurrence that we reason ab()ut,. unless the imagination
fused all those combined pic.t ures and drew out frotn them
just one idea which is proportionately ardent and active
tt to

the nu.-nber of experiments from which it is det"iv' d • and
their superiority above their antagonists. 11200 Our experi•

ence in the past introduces no necessary object; and since
our belief (no matter how weak). attaches itself to a

1991W•t p. 44.

2ool.lz.is.
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necessary entity, it is apparent that belief is not produced
just by transferring the past to the future, but from some

activity of the imagination connected with it:.

This rnay

direct us to think of the way in which the fancy penetrates

all our reasonings.
The idea of necessary connection
The question "concerning the pgwei: and efficacy szi.
sause1•• 201 is one of the most sublime in philosophy. First
I

•

l wish to point o·u t that certain terms are almost synonymous.

namely. agenq:z, ~f figac;y,

merr~.

necessity, force, power,

cormection, and groduetiv@ gualttY.

Hence it is foolish to

use orie in the definition of the remainder.

Thus we im:nedi•

ately reject all the comrnon definitions of efficacy and

power which philosophers have employed.

So instead of

seeking for the ide~. among their definitions we are com•
pelled to search for it in the original impression which
produced it.

If the idea is compound it has necessarily

arisen from impressions which are also compound; if the
idea is simple,. it has come from simple impressions.

I believe the most popular explanation202 is as follows:
Since there are a few new material objects, for example,
201

If1A~se, Book I• Part iii, Section 7 9 !.2!sl•, PP•· 44£.
( Section 7 · the complete and original text.)
2
0 ~ Locke's chapter on Power.

237

differences and motions in body, there must be a power
somewhere which is capable of giving them existence; and
by this method of r easoning we finally reach the idea of

efficacy a..nd power.

But to be persuaded that this eluci-

dation °is more popular than phU.osoph1ca1,u203 :Lt is only

necessary to ponder~ apparent principles:, namely, that

(a) unaided reason can never bring fort h a primary idea,
and (b) reason204 is unable

t:o

compel us to infer •• that

a cause or productive qualitytt205 is absolutely necessary

for anything to come into existence .

The idea of agency can never azise £rom reason.
the idea must be obtained from experie..'lee

ai1d

Hence

some individual

examples of this power; which enter the int~llect by the
ordinary routes of reflection and sensation.

Ideas in•

variably depict their. impressions or objects; and conversely
some entities are necessary to produce e.ach idea.

There•

fore if we feign to possess any idea of this productive
quality which is based on reasonable grounds, we must pre-

sent an example in which the efficacy can be clearly dis-

covered by the intellect, and its activities are apparent
to

our sensation or consciousness.

A refusal at this poi.nt

is an acknowledgement that the idea is fictitious and utterly
203.rreatis_e, i~id., P·• 46.

204As d!fferentiated from experience.
2051.e1.9..
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imp1:0bable; because the only principle capable of delivering
us from this awkward situation is that of innate ideas, and
this principle has already been proved false and is at
pres.e nt ttalmost universally rejected in th~ learned world. 11 206

Hence our immediate task must be to discover some normal
production lmere the power and activity of a cause can be
plainly understood and conceived by the intellect, without
any risk of ambiguity or error.

In this research we shall

encounter but scant encouragement from the 11otions of cer.,.

tain philosophers.
It has been settled as a definite principle that
generat 207 ideas are only particular ideas observed in a
certain way; and that in pondering any entity we cannot

eliminate from our thinking every individual degree of
quality and quantity any more than we can exclude it from

the genuine essence of things.

Hence if we have any general

idea of efficacy, we must also be able to think of individual
kinds of it; and since efficacy is unable to remain in
existence (but is invariably looked upon as a note of some

entity.), we must be able to put this efficacy in some
individual thing and think of that being as possessing a
genuine energy and force; by which a precise effei:t results

nece·s sarily frcm its activity.

-·

2061&1d

2o·1Or abstract.

We must definitely and
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distinctly conceive the association between the cause and
effect and be able to declare (from a simple survey of the
one)1 that the other necessarily precedes or follows.

This

is the p~oper way to conceive a precise efficacy in a

definite bodyg and a univer sal idea is impossible without

a particular; one ca.m.1ot exist without the other.

Nothing

is more obvious than that the intellect is incapable of
forming an idea like thi:3 about

t'tvO

entities, as to con•

ceive any association betwee11 them, or unde~stand clearly

the efficacy t,vhicb unites them.

Such a union would be a

demonstrationi, and the implication wsuld be that it i s
absolutely ;.1ecessaey for one object to follow, or to be

thought of as not succeeding the other: but this type of
association has previously been discarded in every instance.
Thus in general we ma y conclude that iJhen we speak of

a being possessh1g an eff1.ca~y "proportion 1 d to any effect," 208

or of a necessary association between entities and imag~ne
tha.t this l.mion 1s dependent upon a power which is. a note

of any of the·s e objects, our meaning is ambiguous.

We

employ just ot'dinary words which lack any ideas that are
determinate and trans-p arent.

Suppose tt«:> entities are introdu~ed to us: one is th-e

cause and the other is the effect.

It is evident that by

simple reflection upon one or both of these objects (a) we

208Ibi;d., P• 4S.
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will never grasp the bond which unites them, or (b) be
enabled to declare with certainty that there is an association between them.

Therefore we do not derive the idea

of a necessary union of energy, of cause and effect, from
a single in.stance..

If we never observed more than individual

unions of entities (completely dive.r se from one another) si
we could '.never conceive any ideas like this.
But suppose we notice several cases in which tne same

entities a,:e invariably tm.ited.

Instantly we conceive an

association between them and s~rt drawing a conclusion from
the one to the other.

ttThis multiplicity of resembU.ng

instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power
or connexion, and is the source; from which the idea of it

arisea.u209

So in order to understand the idea of efficacy,

it is necessary to ponder that multitude of examples; this

is all I ask to solve the difficulty which has bewildered
us for so long.
These similar exai..."l'll'les which yield the idea of efficacy

do not influence one another. and are incapable of producing
any new attribute in the entity which can be the pattern of
that idea; yet the perception of this similarity g1ves rise

to a new impression in the intellect, which is its genuine

model.

For after we have noticed the likeness in enough

examples, we are inwediately aware of a determination of
209l!?Ja•
b . • P• 49
.. •
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the mind to move from one thing to what usually accompanies

it, "and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account
of that re1ation.t1210 The only result of the similarity
is this determination.

Therefore the same is necessarily

tNe concerning pot,ie-r,. whose idea is obtained from the

likeness.

The seve~al examples of similar unions direct

us into the notion of necessity and efficacy.

These in•

stances in themselves are completely separate from one
another.

Thei~ only connection is within the intellect

which perceives them and gathers their ideas.

Thus necessity

results from this observation,. and is nothing more than an
intrinsic impression upon the mind, or "a determination to
carry_our thoughts fron1 one object to another. 0211 Unless

we look at the matter in this way we shall never be able
to attain flthe 1nost distant notion of it,u212 or assign it
either to extrinsic or intrinsic entities·, to effects or
causes, to body or spirit.•

The basis of our inference from eause to effect and
~

Ver'S@o is the necessary connection between them.

Our

inference is built upon the transition which arises from
this habitual union.

Hence they are identical.

The idea of neces·s it;y originates from an impression.

21olJ?.lc1.
211Jbj.d.•

21~~-
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But our senses do not transmit any impression from which
this idea could arise.

Therefore it necessarily comes from

either an intrinsic or reflective impression.

The only

inward impression which is related to the present dis•
cussion is that inclination which frequent repetition pro•
duces~ namely 9 to move from an entity to the idea of what
ordinarily accompanies it.
of necessity.

Hence this is the real character

GGnerally speaking necessity does not exist

in objects ; but in the intellect; nor can we conceive the
faintest idea of it as a property in bodies.

Either we do

not possess the idea of necessity, or it "is nothing but
that determination of the thought to pass from causes to
effects and from effects to causes, according to their
experienc• d ui,ton •• • •u213
I a.'1\ aware that this is the

l'ilOSt

violent paradox which

I have presented in this treatise, nor shall I employ another
as strong; and it is only by the force of stable proof and

ratiocination that I am able to anticipate its being admitted

by the human race and conquering their deep-rooted prejudices.
Before we are reconcil'd to this doctrine, how often
must we :repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of
any t~,o objects or actions, however related, can never
give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt
them: .tbi!S this idea arises from the repetition of
their union: .tha.t. the repetition neither discovers
nor causes anything in the objects, but has an in•
fluence only on the mind, by that customary transition
it produces: Jil.1it this customary transition is,
21JTh-4rl
~ · , P• 50 •
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therefore, the same with the power and necessity;
which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not
of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and
not per ceiv'd externally in bodies? 21~
Usually we are astonished every time we perceive something
extraordinary; and (according to our approval or disapproval)
this amazement i.s converted promptly into the most lofty
respect or scorn.

Now to me the foregoing reasoning seems

to be the briefest and the most final that one can imagine;
Yet I fear that mental biases will influence the majority
of people who read these pages and make them prejudiced

against this doctrine.215
An

Evaluation

Hume desired to capture the citadel of human nature by

violence••with the assistance of Newton·' s method. 216

He

concurred with preceding empiricists that the immediate
entities of the intellect are its own perceptions.

But he

annexed one restriction,217 namely, that scientific method
is impotent to venture to impart any information conceming
spiritual or physical substances, or any real inherent
reasons.

For an extreme phenomenalism, all the knowledge

214..L.o
- ~~•. , pp. 50£.

215.l.9J:.s.•, P• 51.

.

216James Collins, A HistorY gf

Modeff

(hilwau.kee: Bruce Publiihirig Company, c.
217which he borrowed from NewtQn.

tf,'2P81!
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we can anticipate is limited to our own perceptions and
their inter.nal associations .

Newton had reduced all physi-

cal phenomena to uniform laws; likewise Hume suggested the
habitual rules of association as governing all mentQl
phenomena.

diff erent1ated ttbettieen philosophical and
natural relationsu 218 because some comparisons among ideas
He

do not 1mpltcate an a osoelative principle 9 t-~hereas others

are supported by a uniting tie.

The philosophical relation of cause-and-effect has no
independent status; its constitutive ideas are perfectly loose and provide no basis for metaphysical
inferences beyond experience. Causal inferences are
based upon the natural relation of cause-and-effect,
in whi.cn the connecting bond must be traced back to
custom or the influence of the laws of association
on the imagination. Since the ideas of cause and
effect are joined together only on the subjective
basis of customary association, the inference has only
subject ive validity. Hume applied this conclusion
rigorously to our inferences about external bodies
and the personal self.219
In Hume• s day the empiristic thesis was: •1All knowledge eon•
sists of ideas.

All ideas can be traced back to experience.

All experience comes to us by way of the senses.n220 Hume

draws out the implications of ~hese, positions221 and brings
empiricism to its logical conclusion.
Hume• s

philosophy ttdeveloped tendencies, which were

218

l!'?!s!.•, P• 452.

2191b1d.

220or. Schwarz.
22 1Nore rigorously than Locke and Berkeley.

21{,5
latent in English Philosophy from t he fi rst • • • • u 222

His

investiga t ions in the f i eld o f Causa l ity transformed Locke !s
Empb.-ic:1.srn into Skeptic i s m. 223

In fact it may be a.o serte d

that Hume has proved with fina l ity " t hat a phil osophy
which ~akes its r ise in sen s e- expe rience leads nowhere;
that i ts issue mu st be specu l ative nihilism, and that its
pr actical ou t come is agnost1c . u224
He incl udes in the given elements of our experience
the s pa~ial and the t emporal contiguity of our expe riences.

One is alongside the other, and one is after. t he other .
This contiguity is only the most primi tive form o f an
associa tion o f ideas .

Things which occur together are

likely to be j,.nvok.ed in our memory t oge t her.

one another••only t his i s gi ven.

Events follow

Ther e i s no causalit y!

We assume that t he events are connected by cause and effect.
The necessa~y connec tion of f a c ts is usually concei ved
under t hts form .

Hume

e:q,lains this category of our intel-

lect by a ssert ing that i t is similar to our habit o f thinking
about substance .

We see a set of col ors t ogethe r and get

into t he habit of t hi nking that t hese color s a r e i nherent

in this thing; and t he same is true concem i ng the idea of
necessar y connection be tween events .

222Kni ght, 22• cit. , P• 1 • .
223
Ueberweg, 21?• cit. , II, 131 .
22la.._
'Kn i ght,~. s!S• , p. 3.

It does not belong

to the intuitively grasped relations that one ewmt is the

cause o.f clllothar.

We could ~£firm that fire does not burn.

We just aseociate the two ideas.

There is no idea in

metaphysics mor e obscure ancl uncertain than the necessary
connection of cause and effect .

We are never able to dis•

cover a neeassaey connection (any quality which binds the
effects to the cause)~ anrl renders the one a necessary consequence of the other.

We fl.nd only that the ef feet does,

i11 facti) follow the cause.225

ball f oll ows the othex-.

The impact of one bilU.ard

There is contiguity but there is

nothing to suggest necessa~y co11neetion.

Necessary connec•

tion between cause and effect is an illusion.
is non... existent.

I n fact it

uone eve11t follows another; but we never

can observe any t ye between them.•, 226

imagine a necessary connection?

Why then do we

Because the mind (after

it has observed s imilar instances ) is .csrried along by force

of habit.

We link cause and effect by imagination.

The

connec tion exists only in our thought» and there is nothing
further in the case.227

a. Aside fF:om experience we have no basis for a con•
jecture as to (a) what event, or (b) what kind of
event, we may expec t to follow a particular event.

225The author is deeply indebted to Dr. Schwarz for
some of the very technical information in this paragraph.
226EnguirY, Part ii, Section 7, ibid., II, 61.
227
All this was very impressive to Kant.
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b. Even after we have observed an example of cause and
effect, the nature of the tie between them remains
a total mystery. Nothing but (a) their relations
in time of succession and priority, and (b) their
relations in. space of contiguity (when space is
involved). But it is impossible for temporal and
spacial relations to be an inferential basis.
c. Even after we have observed that cgnjtmct~n is
constant there is no rational ground wherey we may
infer that it is immutable and necessary. Unless
necessary connection is revealed in one particular
caset it is not revealed in any number of cases
that resemble one another. It is explicitly the
similarity of the examples which (a) constitutes
the invariable forrn 9 and which (b) eliminates the
possibility of something further being uncovered
by more cases than just one. Now; since the uniformity or reiteration never lays bare anything new,
we cannot make it the bas-is for any J:p.ference concen1ing the future (neither probable nor demonstrative). We are searching for such an expansion
of experience as ~rill yield what cannot be produced
by either (a) the isolated -instance, or (b) the
mere repetition of cases which are similar.
d. Even if we could infer something it would not
relieve us, for example, if we could conclude that
since reiteration has been uniform in the past we
are justified for inferring that it will continue
1n the future. t~o inference can give birth to a
new idea, for example, power, agency, or necessity.
e. Nothing new is produced when similar entities are
repeated in similar conditions--neither 1n these
things nor in any extemal objeet. Every case is
completely isolated from the others and one case

does not affect the other.

f. However a number of similar instances do create a
new impression in the intellect; they affect the
perceiver in such a manner as to produce the impres•
sion of being necessitated, tha.t is, determined.
This is how the different examples of repeated
union direct us into the idea of necessity and

power.

g. Thus the concept of necessity is borne to us by an
intrinsic impression of deliberation, and not by
sensation. It is felt inwardly by the soul and not
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observed extrinsically 1n objects. Horeover it
conditions faith by (a) long habit of expectation,
and by (b) the active power of impressions.
h. But we do not experience this feeling in total
isolation, that is 9 as just a feeling. Nature has
guaranteed that the feeling would act in a necessi•
tated manner; in this specific case it conditions .
a definite method of belief objectively, namely,
that all entities operate causally upon one another.228
For Hume "la causal:lta est une relation,u229 and only the
causal relation ••can carry the mind beyond what is sensed
or felt.u 230
Hume 0 s central assertion concerning the causal problem
is that causes and effects can be discovered by experience,
not by reason,.

However the wording here is ambiguous.

This can mean causal relations are discovered by experience

instead cf reason 9 or reason is impotent to discover them
in the absence of experience.231

The latter view harmonizes

perfectly with the idea that reason must obtain its primary

information concerning causality232 from experience.

But

it is Hume's purpose to attribute causal belief to a kind
of experience from which reason is excluded.

He has refer•

ence to the activities of "abstract reason, derived from

228These eight points are not quotations. Vide Smith,
22• Sit., pp. 393-95.
2
29Andre-Lou1s Leroy,
(Paris: Presses
Universitairea ne France, 1
, p. 34.
23
0smith 9.2• s!S•, P• 368.

~Jtd Hurni

9

23lcollins, SU?• cit., p. 430.
232And the causal principle.
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inquiries ( ,!.

.eriori;).

• • •

u233

One i s compelled to admit that causal relations are
not d.iscovered b y t his no11-exper imental type of reason.

This was a plati t ude with Nicole Malebranche and other
adherents of the Car tesian philosophy.

They declared that

1£ physical substance is an extended, passive object, then
(regardless of how much we analyze this lifeless entity)
we cannot prove t hat genuine causation exists among created
beings.

But if one affi tms that a surmised independent

Cartesian r eason is unable to bring causal relations to

light, he still has not influenced the rational power, as
it really perfo ~ns its duty in our experience.

For in

experience the rational principle works together with the
Sentiment powers 9 in order to discover234 causal relations
supplied by the entities of human experience.

Hume is

methodically stopped from admitting this view since he
limits the sound f\mction of the understanding to abstract,

exact, reckoning.

In causal inference he is able to make

a place for reason only by diminishing it to the creative
faculty,235 as made firm by connective ties.
2 33oavid Hume, ••oialogues Concerning Natural Religion,••
Part IV, ~ssaxfn.arul treatises 211. Several Sub ects, 2 volumes
(Edinburg: Pr teaor T. Cadell,4f:ondon1 l 93) 9 II, 513.
[The complete Dialogues are in II, 472-591~

1

23
4wtth their assistance and yet in an unconfused
intellectual manner.
2351.e •• the imagination.
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Hume's general comparison between "existential belief''
and

'* ideal demonstrat1on''236 ensues from the doctrine that

(a) the imm~di.ate entity of experience is the intellectual
percept, and (b) a rigorous rational science is grounded
upon absolutely perfect associations.

Hume mer ely attempts

to work out the extz-eme inferences of this comnon inheritance

which has descended to him frem Locke and Descartes-•there

is no analytical correction.

Upon this rationalistic

foundation he declares that reason is lawful only as a non•
metaphysical, precise function, and (for the same reason)
deprives it of the power to produce any causal and e."tisten•
tial researches.

Hume is on solid ground when he differen•

tiates between causal and mathematical examinations, and
when he considers the latter as dealing with factual or
existential matters.

It is also correct to assert that

numerous difficult matters (about little things and individual
causal associations) cannot be established with more than
likely assurance. · It is quite different to teach that
(a) the causal principle itself is without a conclusive
ba·s is, and (b) causal inferences never yield more assurance

than is probable.
HU!lle 1 s eonception of

demonstration

is such that he

cannot make a conclusive causal inference.

Ther e are two

blemishes in the assertion that a demonstration is impossible
236lW•• P• 43 1.
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as long as one can conceive of the opposit~ of a factual
matter, namely, (a) historical, and (b) theoretical.

N-e wton237

was exposed to the struggle ·that ( since a person can cou-

ceive of the Cartesian whirlpools) they exhibit a grave
alternative interp~etation of the material universe and
detract from the certitude of his own inferences.

His rule

against employing abstract suppositions in the philosophy

of nature

t,;as

meant to weaken arguments grounded only on

that which one can conceive, in agreement with the imagination of a scie11tist.

Concerning literal matters, a demon•

stration cannot be upset just by signifying preferences
which are logically possible.

In the field of natural

philosophy the inferences are invariably tentative, not
because it is abstractly possible to think of given truths
as not existing, but solely because investigation is con-

tinually laying bare naw existential facts which are related
to the final result.

.

From the speculative point of view it is arduous to
decide whether Hume means (a) the opposite which is contra-

dictory, or (b) the one that is contrary.

In either instance

he reasons as if the dependent matter-of-fact -were the
inference instead of the starting point for eausal reasoili.ng,
"or as tbough it were a point of departure
237Hume adopted his method.

sm1z as

!. member
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2f. !. tempqr al .!$:?T.i~.•1238

Any contingent reality can

become non-existent, but pr esuming that it really exists,
it is impossible t o conoidar it as not existing at thi~

moment.

Its actual state of being must be elucidated as

a confsrred reality: but this is where the inference begins,
rather than where it ends.

The entity could either exist

or not exist, but t he fact is t hat it exists in a dependent
manner.

Moreover it is this specific literal fact which

demands an explanation by means of 0 a present, actual,
.1?!£ li cause of its being.11 23 9 From this viewpoint it is
possible to pn>duce a demonstration f rom a dependent matter•

of•fact to a cause which must accompany it, r agar dless of
what we may surmise oonceming that which went before and

foll.owed ~.n time.

Hume is diverted from the appropriate inquiry by bis

idea that causal reasoning invariably is related to a forecast about future results, or a second seizure of transitory
antecedents.

This transient opinion abnut causal inference

is influenced by Locke's classification of ideas and Newton's

reasoning, in which it is of prime significance to establish

an occurrence in a temporal sequence.

Now 9 inside this

f'ramework the power of the imagination to separate an inci•
dent from its transitory associations would make Locke's

238l.!?!£.

2391..2.t,g., P• 432.
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~tatement of the causal pxinciple without significance.
Furthermore it-: would obstruct the activity of the connective procer,s which Hume sets forth.

But a cause is still

necossa:ry to elucidate the real e,:istence of whatever
entity is given a t pr esent.

This latter emergency does

not depend upon t he problem of f oretelling a future event
and meditati ng upon things in the past.

There is onl7 one

conclusion which Hume mi ght lawfully infer from the isolating
ability of t he imagina tion; namely, it lays bare the defi•
ciency of Locke 0 s declaration of causality, and also the
inconsistency "between Hume's scientific relation of causeand-effect and t he ac tual causal inference about existent

things." 2l>O
Hume gr ant s that the power of imagination to think
of clear-cut entities (as coming to be diseon=iected from
one another, without asking the concept of a cause) is not
related to veritable circumstances.

It is nothing but the

surface of the incompetence of abstract reason to discover
interior causal associations among things of perception.
But for Hume, existence points back only as far as the

primary impressions and the idea of

el'lche

The imagination

is at liberty to think of something coming int:Q existence
without any reason, only because the new entity is nothing

~-

240~-1:..·• ..2 ..-.
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but "a percept-object. 11 241

In order to preserve our sound-

ness of mind (concerning faith in the actuality of such
beings)p Hume considers the normal, internal powers,
laboring consistently through the imagination.

But he fails

to do justice to the difficult matter introduced by an
existential decision conceming entities, to the extent
that they exert ua cpnting~nt act 2! be1ngu 242 in isolation
fn>m our observations.

Hume lacks any characteristic

existential judgment:, and therefore any rational basis in
personal practice for cause and effect is also absent, as
related to what is needed for an inflow of being in existing
entities.
Accordingly there are keenly divergent methods of
deciphering Hume's dogmatic assertion that causal reasoning
stretches "beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. 11 243
From the standpoint of Realism this would signify that
memory and sense communicate more facts than they thefillli
selves can distinguish precisely.

In this sense we would

assert that reason seizes the meaning of sentient releases

for the inquiry of the existence of entities, and in this
manner to acquire its own characteristic view of the thing,

2411.!wl·
242~.

24Jaume,

ttEnquiry," Part i, Section 2, H.Y!!!§.

SU?• c!t• • p~ 117.
text.

sg~gcti°f!:

(Sections 4-5 in the complete an orig

1
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ill and through the sensible data.

The intellect (co--

operating with the senses) would grasp the received,

dependent factual matter, exactly in deference to its contingency for existence.

This 'WOuld foi:m a basis for the

causal conclusion--a groundwork funiished by the empirically seized reality and distinguished by reason from the
characteristic viewpoint of the shared existence244 that
demands causal elucidation.

But according to Hume the

intellect is absolutely outstripping the objective ground
for belief~ instead of grasping given associations and
things which ar e implied.

Memory and sense inform us mere-

ly conceming perceptual entities that one can be made

vague and detached, to the extent that t•their objective
content is concerr1ed.u245

It is in defiance of the atom•

1stic diminishing of empirical attestation, that the intel•
lect in the humean sense can firmly fix causal associations
and draw conclusions from the notmal relation of cause and
The struggle in the mind of Hume '*between skeptical
analysis and causal bel1efn 246 appears in vivid contrast in
effect.

association with the principal kinds "of causal inference

in metaphysics.u247
244or act of being.

245collins 22•
1
2461bid.

247l!ll:!!·

sil•,

p.

433.

. . "'
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Conclusion
Hume• s theory of Causality His hie most celebrated
contrib1.tt:ion to philosophy." 248 Or in the words of Leroy,
"L'examen de 1 8 idee de cause et d'effet est sans doute la
piece la plus c ,lebre:-. de la philosophie de Hume." 24 9 Price
observes,

0

Hume's discussion of causality and Induction is

familiar to all students of ~hilosophy, some of whom seem

almost to think that he never wrote about anything else."250
It is deplorable that when Descartes renewed philosophy
so many previous di stinctions were '"'lostu, for examp1e 1 the
difference between (a) the prilicip-1e of Causality, and (b)

the one~ ,fact.9. causal link. 251

We have no immediate

perception of particular caus¢s having particular effects,
for what is given is not usually the necessary connection
(The conclusion is bas·e d upon the infer-

but a conclusion.
ence of Causality.)

Seouenf!e does not necessarily equal cau9lity.
because "A'' follows

ttBh

Just

we cannot conclude with absolute

certainty that usn is the cause of "A". 252 Yet we know that

.

248Leslie Stephen, ¥istor~ Qf ~tish Thgucht J:n the
2 VO s •• ( ndeit~on; Lon&:n: SmitFi;"

Ei5hteentb century)
El er.

&Company•

1881), I, 45.

249Andre-Louis Leroy, Qavid ~ . 22• cit.• P• 133.
5
2 0ii. H. Price, HW!!' s Ih!g.n 9.f. the Egternat World
( Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 19/iO~. 1.
251 nr. Schwarz.
252ttEvery time I put soda in my Vodka I gee drunkl
•
Therefore, the soda is the cause of my gettf.n8 drunk.
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"A'' is caused, and we may look for that cause.

We know

that a l>Jhole set of causal conditions may exist for just
one event.

In fact we can never isolate just one cause.

The princ:lple of Causality is this: "Every event must

have sufficient causes."

But this is not knowledge we

acquire by in<luction.253 We know this by immediate insight.
Nothing ever just happens.

and time t-rlthout causes.
0

No entity can exist in space
Causality is· inherent.

It is

woven° in the very fabric of our temporal existence.
Furthermore it is legitimate to search for causes in

the. u neighborhoodu where appropr:l.a te causes are to be found.

Why did the billiard ball fly straight up? Well, the hand
of the clock (that just moved to eight
No.

0 1·c1ock)

caused it.

It is possible to be mistaken eonceming the identity

of an appropriate cause, but our
is steadily srowing.

11 stockpile'1

of infoxmation

In former times the influence of

the stars was thought to be an appropriate cause forcertain h\:unan events.

This of course is sheer superstition.

There may be some influence from cosmic rays but we know
very little about it as yet.
probable knowledge·.

Invariably we possess a

We lq10w what the appropriate cause is

for lifting the pencil; and we are absolutely certain that
it works.

Muscle inner,.,ations cause certain movements of

the body as effects.

Or when we desire a particular

25 3so -many cases where there were causes and effects.
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linguistic sou.."ld, we know how to produce it (even though
we may act subconsciously); for example, we know how to say
"do".

We possess accumulative experience and appropriate

causes.

We continually observe causes

producing effects

ii1

i1'l

the extemal world

the physical universe.

Now we may

be inclined to th:L~k ~fall causes precisely as we think
of those which we dominate.

In natur al science many things

may be too an~hropomorphic.

Moreove1r the hu.,nan body is

marvellous.

But: there are enough examples of Causality

which we can observe ta the degree of highest probability
(and mor e that we can nev,~ r inco1"porate into an empirical

faith), but the principle of Causality itself is incapable
of empirical pr oof.

Consider the word "do•"

stubbornly refuses to produce itself.

appear.

The sound

It will not just

We know this by a principle more certain than that

particular muscular m,vements will cause the \'10rd.

We have

an intuitive insight conceming the principle of causality,
but we lack any definite knowledge concerning the tie which
binds them together.254

The Thomist distinguishes space,~. gpntiguitY,
causalitY'.••and never confuses them.

For example, let us

suppose that every morning somebody (a) steps from the Staten
254soth Hume and Kant were confused at this point.

Each coul.d have profited by taking cognizance of some of
the things which had occurred during those obscure and dark
ages, to which they felt so superior.
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Island Ferry at precisely 7:52 o'clock 9 and (b) invariably
meets another person.
in space and time.

These

t~~

events are always together

Yet we would not suppose that (a) the

stepping from the ferry, nor (b) the time indicated by t he
hands of the c:lock, are the appropriate cause of the other

person appearing.

These~ people may have entirely

different rnotives.255

Now 9 such a crossing in space and time (as described
above) is very different from what the Thomist means by

Causality.

In fact it is a caricature.
Appendix "Au

The first time a man saw the commtmicaticn of motion
by impul se , as, by the shock of two billiard-balls,
he could not pronounce that the one event Has connected;
but only t hat it was conjoined with the other. After
he has observed several instances of this nature. he
then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration
has happened, to give rise to this new idea of
connexion? Nothing, but that he now feels these
events to be connected in his imagination, and can
readily foretell the existence of one, from the appearance of the other. When tore say, therefore, that one
object is connected with another, we mean only, that
they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and
give rise to this inference, by which they become
proofs of each other•·s existence: A conclusion which
is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on
sufficient evidence.256
255or. Schwarz.

256oavid Hume. "An Inquiry Concerning Humru, Understanding h
9
Section VII, Part ii, Esr:zs !Y!g, Treatifs sm Severai S~iscts,
2 volumes (Edinburgh: Pr ted for T. ca ell Lonclon 17
•

II, 90f.
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Appendix "Bn
Can I be sure,. that in leaving all establish'd opinions
I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I

distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide
me on her foot•steps?257

• • • • • • • •

• • • • •

Where am I, or what?

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

From what causes do I derive my

existen ce ., and to what oonditio11 shall I return?

Whose

favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread?
What be i ~gs surt~und me? and on i'*>.om have I any
influence, or who have any influence on me? I am
confused wi th all these questions, and begin to fancy
myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable,
invixon °d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty.

fortunately it happens, that since reason is
incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself
suffices to that purpose. and cures me of this philosophi cal melancholy a.'11.d d.e lirium, either by relaxi11g
this bent of mind• or by some avocation, and lively
impression of my senses, \i~ich obliterate all these
chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I
converse, and am merry with my fl:iends; and when after
three or· four hours' amusement, I wou• d return to
these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'cl,
and ridiculous, that I canno~ ~ind in my heart to
entex into them any farthe):'. 5

Most:

yuman

257
6_ 'l.'reatise Qt
Nature, Conclusion to Book t,
l!»m& Selections, 21?• U·, P• 93.

258tbid.; p. 97.

CHAPTER VI
A BRI EF INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Hi s Life

St. Thomas was born of a noble familyl (in the castle
of Roccasecca) early in the year 12252 near Aquino, Italy.
When he was only five his devoted parents took him to the
celebrated Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino.

Here he

was carefully educated by the monks for the next nine years.
Frequently he would suwrise the preceptor by asking, "What
is God?u3

In 1239 he laid aside his Benedictine habit and

started for the new 1.m.iversity of Naples.

Five years later

(1244) he decided t o join the Dominicans.

His family was

rigidly opposed to the idea: in fact Thomas i.:,as kidnapped

1John Fletcher Hurst, HistorY 21 the Christian Church,
2 volumes ( New 'lork: Eaton & Mains, 1am, I, 8fi4.•
2Anton c. Pegis, ''Intrcduction," Basic Wr i tings 2!
Saint Th mas Aquinas, 2 vols., translated from the Latin
by Fr. s apcote; ed!ted and corrected by Anton c. Pegis
(Eighth printing; New York: Random House, c.1945), I,
xlviii. However James A. Corbett and Fulton J . Sheen both
express a doubt concerning the accuracy of this date. Vide
their article entitled "Aquinas Saint Thomas," The Worlf
~ En5icl0Redi§ (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educationa
Corporat on, c.l 61), I, 489. (P~rhaps t he best we can
affirm at present is that 1225 is his nrobable
birth date.)
•
3
o. J. Kennedy, "Thomas Aquinas," The catholic
Encyc~~edia (New York: Robert Appleton-aompany, c.1912),

6

XIV,

•
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by his brothe:rs ru,.d held a prison~r for eighteen months. 4

They even sent a lewd woman to t empt him, but the youth

snatched a fire brand from -:he hearth ancl d:cove her out of
(We are told that God rewarded him for this noble

the room.

act by removing all lustful desi~e, so that throughout the
remainder of his life he ne,ier sinned through concupiscence.)

He finally es.caped by being lowered in a basket to some
waiting Dominicans below, 5 and arrived safely in Paris daring
the summer of 124,5 .

(The time he had s pent in confinement

was not lost because so mueh of it: had bee11 consumed in

study. )

At Paris he stay~d in the DomL,icru.1 convent of St.

Jame s for three years and studied with the gifted Albertus
Magnus .
0~
..

nom~body rlubbed young '£homas wi t:h the nick-name

"dU!mb ox .,.. ., but hi s teac h e r predi
· c t.ed , 1•• • • •

:ls bellowing

it1 doc t rlne ·will one day resound throughout the wor ld. 06

In 1248 St. Albert was sent to Cologne and Thomas accom•
panied him.

Her.e

the pr-lesthood .

the youthful scholar was ordained to
In 1252 he returned to Paris

his teaching career.

ai1d

began

In 12577 he and his cherished friend,

Bonaventure, received the Doctor of Theology degree.

It

41btd., p. 664. James A. Corbett & Fulton J. Sheen
assert that he was imprisoned for twelve months. Vice their
article 12.£. c it;.
5cf. Acts 9:25.
6Kennedy, 12.£• .£.U.
7
This date is uncertain.
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is reported that both were made doctors on the same day,
and they engaged in a contest of humility to see who should
receive it first.

From this time forward the life of St.

Thomas may be epitomized in five words, namely, teaching,
preaching 11 writing, joumeying 11 and praying.

In 1261 he

was called to Rome and had the honor of lecturing in the
Eternal City.

The two thinkers who influenced him most were Aristotle
and Augustine.a
Philosopher.o)

(He frequently refers to Aristotle as "the
In the classi:oom at Naples and Paris his

lectures were quite scholarly and technical; yet hissermons were so plain that even the illiterate could understand.
His intellect was keen like a razor; for example, he was
able to dictate different subjects simultaneously.

In

order to be well-rounded he made it a practice to read some
edifying books daily.

It was his custom to pray before

lecturing or writing, and when an answer to some problem
eluded him it is said that he would fall upon his knees and
pray for illumination.

Louis IX of France was accustomed

to consult St. Thomas for advice; but once (while sitting
at table with the king) he became so lost itl thought that
he forgot his surroundings.
at last I have found itf tt

Suddenly he exclaimed, "Now
His prior reminded him that he

8

Leo R. Ward, "Aquinas, St. Thomas,o An ~ncxcgopedia

2f. Religi~• edited by Vergilius Ferm (New York: T e
Philosoph cal Library, c.1945), p. 34.

.
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was at the king's table, but the genial Louis permitted
his secretary to come and write down the thoughts of the
Saint. 9
Toward the end of his life St. Thomas had frequent
ecstatic experiences.

Once while in a trance at Naples

three of his brothers heard the crucifix on the altar say,
"Thou has written well of me, Thomas; what reward wilt thou

have?"

The Saint replied, ttNone other than Thyself,

Lord.tt 10

In 1274 Pope Gregory X SU1I1Doned both Thomas and
Bonaventure to appear at the Council of Lyons so they
might participate in the discussions.

The Saint started

on foot in January but his strength failed an ;gute and he

The kind Cistercian inonks (at Fossa

fell to the ground.

Nuova) very graciously cared for him••in fact they·:,w ere so
attentive that Thomas was alarmed.

He exclaL--ned, "Whence

this honour, that servants of God should carry wood for
my fire?tt

Moreover in spite of his illness (at the urgent

request of the monks), he dictated a brief commentary on
the Song of Songs.

As the shadows of his earthly life

steadily lengthened the rite of Extreme Unction was administered.
St. Thomas departed his life 7 Narch, 1274. 11 The gentle
9 Vide Hurst, 22•

s!S•, I, 884£.
10Kennedy, 22• c&t., p. 665.

11 Bonaventure, his bosom friend, died the same year
while attending the Cowicil of Lyons.
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monks at Fossa Nuova wished to retain his mortal remains,
but Pope Urban V ruled that they should be given to the
Dominicans.

St. Thomas was canonized in 1323.

Forty-six years

later (1369) his body was removed to the Dominican church
at Toulouse.

Today the body reposes 1n the church of St.

Sernin, enclosed in a gold and silver sarcophagus.

However

the main bone of his left hand is kept in a cathedral at
Naples; and tha entire right arm (which at one time was
preseu.ted to the Sorbonne) is now in Rome.

On 4 August,

1880, Pope Leo XII made Thomas the patron saint of every
Catholic school throughout the world.
It is reported that the features of the Saint corres·
ponded to his great soul. He was tall, straight,
heavy, 12

and well..,propc,rtioned.

His complexion resembled "the

colour of new wheat.ul3 His well-shaped head was large
and partially bald.
St. Thomas lived less than fifty years, yet he wrote
more than sixty books.14 Even today one is amazed at the
voluminous output of his pen, especially since most of it
was done in twenty years.15

His monumental work of course

12Apparently his most grievous sin was enjoying d.eli•
cious food.
131.\?iQ.

14!!?19.., p. 666.
lSiiurst, QR.• cit., P• 884.
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is the famous Summa Tb2Qlogica.

His commentaries on Peter

Lombard's Sentences supplied him with the content and much
of the fotmat f or these lengthy tomes.

Perhaps the chief

merit of the SY9!:!la is its excellent synthesis of previous
I t consists of a complet e exposition of theology

views.

arranged scientifically, plus a summary of Chr istian philo•
sophy.

Yet t he Saint himself thought of it as nothing more

than just a manual of Christian doctrine for the use of
students.

The §J!!!m!. consists of thi rty-eight Treatises,

containing 612 Questi ons.

The Questions in t urn are sub-

divided into 3, 120 Articles; and the Articles propose and
answer about 10 8 000 objections.16 Hence we are not surprised to l earn that St. Thomas spent eight years writing

it.17
The

Swnma

has endowed its author with literary immor-

tality; yet it wa s never finished.

In fact 18 the Sai>.,t

never wrote anything after 6 December, 1273.

On that day

we are told he exper ienced an unusually long ecstasy during
Mass.

One can only surmise what revelation he received,

but later whe11 Fr. Regµiald urged him to write again he

replied, uI can do no more.

Such secrets have been revealed

to me that all l have written now appears to he of little

16Kennedy, 22• .£!:1., P• 668.

171.e1g,., p. 667.
18with perhaps just one exception.
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value.nl 9

The SUt'llf9! had been written as far as Part III,

Question 90, but it was never completed.

After this vision

the Angelic Doctor began immediately t:o prepare for death.
St. Thomas died when he was only forty-nine, yet during
his sho-rt lifetime he perfected Scholastic philosophy. 20
He joined the Dominicans at the tender age of twenty21 and

spent his entire life in study and teaching.

He even refused

all ecclesiastical favors so that he might continue his
precious research.

For example• in 1265 Pope Clement IV

appointed him bishop of Naples, but the Saint was so devoted
to his task that \~1th tears he begged to be excused.

This

might appear fooli sh t o some, but if he had accepted this
high honox the Summa might never have been written.
St. Thomas is recognized as the foremost theologian
of the };ediaeva l Church.

He ranks second only to St.

Augustine as the father of Roman Catholic theology. 22

Pope

Leo XIII praised him as "the prince and master of all
Scholastic doctors.•,23 Lindsay very aptly called him "the

19ilisi•• p. 665.
20paul J. Glenn, lb! HistO{Y 2f Philosophy (11th
impression; st. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1945), p. 243.

21

ward, 12£~ £1£•

22Hurst, las,. s!.t,.
23
Kennedy, 22• £.!!•• p. 666.
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spirit of scholasticism incamate.u 24
His System
Introductory
In his brief

11

Prologus" to the Summa Theologiae, St.

Thomas enumerates the difficulties e,tperieneed by theological

students i n his day, 11amelyj (a) lack of scientific order,
(b) multiplication of superfluous articles~ questions, and
arguments 9 and (c) frequent repetitions which ttet fastidium
et confus!onem generabat i11 animis auditorum.tt25 Then he

comments, "Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi evitare studentes,
tentabimus, cum confidentia divini auxilii , ea quae ad

sacram doctrina.m pertinent, breviter ac dilucide prosequi,
secundum quod materia patietur.u26
St. ThoLr.as believed that the~e are two distinct sources

of truth, namely, reason and revelation.

The latter is
more important but neither contradicts the other. 27 In his

24Elias Benjamin Sanford editor. "Aquinas. Thomas,••
A Conci~ cxc1ii;edia 2f Relig!qus inowledfe (Hartford, r
Connecticut: T s. s. Scranton ComE_Sny, 914), p. 46. lThe
author of this article is anonymous.)
25

sancti Thomae Aquinatis 1 "Prologus," Summa Theologiae,
cura et studio Sac. Petri Caramello; cum textu ex recensione
Leonin~ (Tomi tres; Taurini, Romae: Narietti, 1952), Prima
Pars, Tome I, P• 1.
26lbid.
27sanford,

12£.

cit.
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introductory question28 he shows that knowledge derived
from reason nmst be supplemented by revP-lation, if man is

to achieve salvation.

This is true because without revela-

tion ma..'1. would be unable t o ascertain the di vi11e end toward
which he must strive volu..litarlly.

Furthermore in tho a bsence

of revelation only a few coulcl attain to a knowledge of God,

and then only 0 after a long time, and with the admixture
of many errors . u 29
Accor ding to St. Thomas there a re three types of
t heology ~ n&mely~ natural; dogmatic, and mystical.

Natul!!l

theology embr aces all that one can know about sacred doctrine
by m~ans of h:ls unaided intellect.

Moreover there are two

branches, l'lamely, the meta.physical and the moral.

In

metaphysic~ one discovers the existence of Ens Realissimum
by means of pure reason alone.

In moral theology a person

learns that every pl"Ohibition i s based upon one fact, namely,
the iml'l'anence of the Divine Mind in all of nature. 30
£ogmatic theology is given only to the Church (not to
the world),; for examp13, the mind of man may infer that God
28sancti ·rhomae Aqtd.113.tis, 11 De Sa c~a Doctrine, Qualia
Sit, Et Ad Quae Se Extendat, 0 in decem articulos divisa,
§JlQlma Theologiash 21?• sll•, Prima. Pars• Quaestio 1, Tome I,
pp. 2.g.
29Kennedy; 21?•

cit.,

p·!" 667.

30Perhaps this u ,trandh of the Thomistic •• f abric11 is
borrowed £ rom Stoicism.
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exists, 31 but it can never attain to the sublime truth of
the Trinity. 32 This bit of knowledge can be demonstrated
logically after it has been revealed, but the human intel•
lect is impotent to discover it.

Hence this doctrine must

be accepted by faith.
MYstical theology is the highest type.

In this hallowed

realm laborious reasoning and simple believing are alike
superfluous because here one may experience an immediate
vision of God.

However the Beatific Vision comes only

after death, except 1n the case of a few mystics who have
enjoyed this rare privilege while still 1n the body. 33
The Thomistic system is hierarchical, that is, the
higher o~e ascends in the scale of being, the more signi•
ficant is the knowledge communicated.

Furthermore this

system is harmonious, that is, knowledge received on a
higher level never contradicts knowledge received on a

I"-.
I ~

lower level.

The harmony is perfect.

eover according to

st. Thomas there are four kinds

of law, namely, (a) the ete.m al, (b) the natural, (c) the

human, and (d) the divine.

Etemal law is law as it exists

311£ a person uses his intellect properly.
32Nev'i because this dogma is a mystery, viz., a truth
which lies eyond the grasp of human reason. (Some truths
are above reason, but not contrary to it.,)
33
·Perhaps there is a slight trace of Idealism here •
. Plato thought that mind could get along very well without
body.
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at this moment in the mind of God.

This law is absolutely

perfect; it is the source and norm of all value.

Natural

law is that law which the Gentiles have inscribed upon the
fleshly table of their hearts.

Human

Thus they are without excuse.

law is law as it expresses itself in society and in

social institutions, for example, the laws of the state •.

Divin! law is that law which God has revealed to His Church.
It is a deposit of faith designed to help those people

whose i11tellects are deficient or whose society has not
clarified the Eternal law.
Now the astonishing (almost miraculous) factor is this:

all four laws are synonxm-ous!

They are not identical; but

neither are they contradictory.

It is almost as if God had
written his heavenly law with carbon copies. 34 The copy in
the mind of man is dhn, and the copy in human society is
perhaps even dimmer still.

Yet this Law (like a flickering

lamp) shines through the dark mists of human depravity in
every age and illuminates the consciences of men.

Some-

times the rays are rather feeble, but this light is bright
enough for every man to see the path of life as it stretche.s

before him. 35

34rhe author is indebted to Carl Michaelson for this
apt figure. Dr. Michaelson the former assistant of Edwin
Lewis, was the writer's philosophy professor at Drew University.
3 Scf. Pietro Parente, Antonio Piolanti, and Salvatore,
·
Garofalo, "law,u Dictionaff of Dogmatic TheologY, translated
from the second Italian ed tlon by Ennanuel Doxonzo (Third
printing; Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 19S7),

PP• 162£.
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Thomism (lik~ a mighty ocean) is fed by innumerable
tributaries, but the main current of thought flows directly
The Saint (with rare discrimination)

from Aristotle.

separated the t rue f rom the false in the teachings of the
Stagirite and i ncorporated them into his own great system.
St. Thomas did not "baptize" Ar istotle, yet his philosophy
is so permeated by Aristotelianism that it is almost unintelligible ( at certain points) unles.s one has a background
in this a rea.

Hence the author (by way of introduction)

will attempt to outline a few basic principles.
Scholas tic philosophy is subdivided into seven distinct
branches, name ly (a) Oialectics 36 (b) Criteriology, 37 (c)
9

Cosmology 0 ( d) Psychology,38 (e) Ontology, 39 (f) Theodicy,40
and (g) Ethics . 41

However ,o nly sections ttau,

are relevant for our study at present.

"b", and "eu

(Later we will

361.e., formal logic! ttthe science of valid argument. 11
John J. Toohey, An ementaxy Hand~ok 21. ~~jc (3rd
tion; New York: Appfeton•Century•Cro~s, c.l · , P• 1.

Yjie

E

371 .. e., material logic tta reasoned explanation of
knowledge... The author is indebted to w. Norris Clarke,
s. J., for this succinct definition. Fr. Clarke was his
Dialectics professor at Fordham University.

38Perhaps Anthro29logY would better describe this
discipline.
39

ontology is u the science of being. tt Vi~! Paul J.
Glenn, QnSPlofY (10th printing; St. Louis: Her er, 1955),
P• 1. Proper y Ontology is a department of Metaphysics.

4~atural Theology.
41Ethics should always be studied last in this series.
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concentrate upon o ftt.) 42
Criteriology43
The human intellect has three distinct ftmctions,
namely (a) apprehension, (b) judging, and (c) reasoning.
By appreh~nsion Aristotle means that the mind grasps ideas.
He also has reference to sense experience.44

Inanimate

entities are totally "ignorant" concerning each other ; for
example, two trees never ttget acquainted."

This is because

all knowledge involves a new presence of the thing in the
subject.

To he known by another it must be

!!!

the other.

Even though an entity exists with its own existence, yet
there can be no knowledge unless:·.1t is in the knower.

St. Thomas begins with experience.

We know things

only if the knower becomes the object.

A man, a brute

animal, et 5:ete·r a, are incommunicable.

Each is a distinct

unit.

Each entity is itself and. not the other.

Thus in

respect to the other each is incommunicable.
The reality of a stone cannot be in the knower as such.

The stone can only enter the mind in the sense that a likeness
42However we will not study them in this precise order.
43The author is indebted to his teacher, John

s. J • ., for much of the following information.

v.

Flynn,

Fr. Flynn was

formerly chairman of the Philosophy department in the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Fordham University.
44
Harold Bames Kuhn. (Dr. Kuhn was the author's
philosophy professor at Asbury Semina,:y.)

- - - - -.......
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of it as intelligible is present to the mind.

In the case

of knowledge concerning natural things this likeness is a ·
form, purified from all signate matter and determined45
from its reality outside the mind.

In virtue of this like•

ness of the reality in the mind the intellect comes to
know the object to the extent oi the simili.tude representing

the object.

Now since the similitude46 io not bound up with

signate matter47 the form must be purified from this impediment. 48
The hwnai'l intellect cai"l k110w an object only after it

has been dematerialized; and likewise the cause of intellec-

tuality in God's mb1d is immunity from matter.

However on

the divine l evel we are dealing with Pur e Act.

Here we

encounter an absence of both potency and matter; that is,

we are confronted by utter simplicity.

True knowledge is

1n God and ther e the l<nower, the knowledge, and the known

are all present without any plurality.
In all knowledge there is a union of the knowledge and
the know~r, but in a Being which can receive no determination
4 5 so t.o speak.

mm•

46or
47As such it is incommunicable.

48signate matter is the second stage in the moments

of actuation.
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whatever, the.re is no such union.'~9
identica l.

Rather both are

In fact the divine intellect, the act of knowing,

and t l Le forrnal pr i ncipl e o f kno"m a re one and the same with

t he divine sub3tanc e. .

In God the divine intelle ct is identi-

c a l wi th t h e d ivine e ssence, SO t he divine knmving is

i dentica l wi t h t he divine e ssen ce, 51 and t he formal prin-

ciple in knowing is identical with the divine essence. 52
c.v en s piritual beings like the angels are incornmuniCllble in the:i-r re ality .

The principle whereby each k'Tl.ows

the othe r is a simi litude of the other.
on~

HTI.[cl

'l'he only way

c an be ''in" th.e other is by a like nes s existing

in i ts i ntelle ct.

However t his similitude is n.ot abstracted

or i mpressed by another angel.

Nor i s it o.c quired.

Rather

t his sir .;litu<le i s divinely i mpressed in t he moment of
creati on by God himself.

Hence angelic knowledge springs

fr.om an innete l:;nowledgc i mpres sed on the .inr;elic i ntellect
'lt

the time. it is cre(;.ted.

of

. , __
l. t...,~

Thus the c}.ngelic mind hn s a ll

kno ,·l ede e already present.

But i n t he c~se of r ational nnim~ls there is a difference.

49vide S.1ncti 'l'homae .\Quina tis, "De 3cientia Dci ," in
sexdecim""a'rticulos divisa, ~. cit., Prima Pars, ()u nest io
:,.: rv, Tome I, 75-90 . Cf. ~i?J. ter Farrell, A Com c:mion !2_ the
~umma (l} ,rolurnes; New York: .Sheed & Ward, 1945 , I, 76-84.
50
1n rational animals it is a faculty.
511n hum.an beings it is an accident.

1

5 21n mc.n it is an intelligible s pecies.
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At birth the human ir,tellect is a ,:abula W!,,. that is, a
I

blank tablet on which nothing has yet been written, and all
knowledge is derived by means of the species.
The exception to this 1s the Beatific Vision.

Here

knowledge is not derived through a similitude by means of
a human substance.

Rather God is immediately present to

the soul thr ough the divine substan~e.

Thus the object is

known through the object i tself direct rather than by a
similitude.
The act of knowing53 implies (a) a subject-•one who

knows, (b) an object-•that which is known, and (c) a relation existing between them.
the known inside the knower.

l<nowledge is the presence of
But how?

Derr.ocritus supposed that all bodies transmit tiny

replicas of themselves directly into the intellect.

Plato

taught that all knowledge is a remembering of what we
experienced in another life. 54 Descartes believed that
all ideas are present in the intellect at birth.

Berkeley

was of the opinion that each intellect creates its own
ideas.

53The author is grateful to John c. Taylor, s. J.,
for much of the data which appears in the remaining pages
of this section. Fr. Taylor was one of his professors in
the area of Scholastic philosophy at Fordham University.

Sf+t

.

fti~o~t 2printing;
volumes,

'Meno ... 85, 86, The n1.a1eue1 Sll,
translated from Greek by Benja~ Jowett
New York: Random House, c.1937), I, 365£.
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However St . Thomas follows Aristotle in affirming
that there i s nothing in t he intellect which was not first
in the senses, and t his is true.

The i ntellact must have

the "raw material " of sense data ili or<ler to produce

knowledge; and it is the peculiar function of the senses
to supply this necessi ty.
Intellectual knowledge is superior to sense knowledge
by its very nature .

Sense knowledge is characterized by

(a) singula:ri.ty, (b) concr eteness, and (c) contingency.

Intellectual knowledge is characterized by (a) universality,
(b) abstractness 11 and (c) necessity.

Our ideas m&1.ifest

no quality wl1ich implicates time, space, or number .

In a

~rd, the immaterial is supe~tor ~to the material.
ltri0wing is a relation 1n which the,:e is a fusion of
subject and object.

However son,e positive element is

necessary "-1"ich does not affect knowers as a thL"'lg of nature;
for example, a person''s thoughts do not affect the color cf

his skin.

Now this positive element is intentional being.

It is primarily relative, that is, we can explain it only
in terms of something else.

by reference to a child.)
knower and known.

(We explain the term

11

father"

Furthermore it is common to both

T\«> circles coincide and form one.

Thus

the knowing relation is one of Identity.
However

l~

lect is passive.

ought to keep in mind that the human intel•
It must be roused to activity.

Further•

more the state of the knower at the initial stage is merely
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potential .

A per son

is capable of knowing an infinity of

entities but he is t o t ally ignorant at first.

Moreover knowledge has an imminent character.

It

begins and terminates in t he knower as an experience.

When

I know something t he subject and I have some kind of unity

ancl some kind of i dentity.
But how do we span the gulf between t he concrete and
the abstract:?
ki1owl edge.

Obvi ousl y we need some bridge or medium of

Arist:otl e defined it thus,

10

The Modification

or Change br ought about in the knower by the action of the
know.n.11
But we also need •1 the agent intellect."

By t his strange

expression St. Thomas means only t hat the mind has a native
activi t y \-mereby it is capable of t;:ar,s f ot,ling an image
into an idea .

'l'he intelle ct is a light whi¢h brings to an

intelligi ble s tatus the contents of images; t hat is, the

intellect &bstr acts t he intelligible content f rom the sen•
sible image.
In

&

se11se the species is a prolongati on of t he

mQterial object; for example> a stone c&n exist in thought

only by its form.
dematerialized.

Hence to exist mentally it must be
A

stone exists in the intellect as a seal

exists by its L~pression 1n the wax, that is, by its repre-

sentation or form or specie s.55

55tn this analogy (a) the seal is the object, (b) the
wax is the subject, and (c) the species is the impression.
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Thus la1owle<.lge i s t he t-Jay t hi ngs exist in knowers.

The knower is l ike what he knows; and thi s l ikenes s consists in both idei1tity and diversit y .

But t he cause of

intell e ctual knowledge 1s se1,sozy knowledge.
Hence it i s evident that ( a ) int:ell.:lgence i s dependent

upon sensory knowledge, (b) intel lectual knowledge is

to

superior

sensory knowledge, and ( c) j.ntellectual con-

cepti ons a r e caused by empi1'i.cal knowledge.

Now ther e is evi dence t o show tha t the Angelic Doctor
was seeking a theist:ic proof " which would defy a t t ack." 56
Yet he is not the dogmatist \~1ich some have pi ctured him
to be.

Hi s posit ion is closer to Agnosticism than it is

to Dogmati sm.

57 But devout souls need not be a larmed

because a fotmi da ble barrier prevents St . Thomas from

tumbling into this feax-ful abyss , namely, his unique

Epistemology .

In fact tha Thomi s tic theozy of knowl edge

unde rlie s each o f the Five {·la ys. 58

Ontology
By j ydg!Pg Aristotle means that t he intellect compares

c.

5 6t.1.
D'Arcy,.
Limited, c.1930), P•
57 Ibid., p.. 168.

ifomas
Agutnas (London: Emeet Bann
o.

5
8Etienne Gilson, ~ Phil~sophy 2f St. Tt}mas A'uinas,
translated from the Freiia1 by Eward
nd ed tion;
Cambridge, England: B. Herder Book Company. c.1929), p. 56.
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ideas and then pronounces a judgment concerning their relations.

Intellectual knowledge is experienced first on the

idea. Level, for example, my idea of ~ ' namely, a type of
plant possessing roots, a trunk, and protrusions called
branches.

My

idea is applicable to all trees.

Yet my idea

of tree is quite. different from the individual, concrete
tree outside my window.

The first has only an ideal exist•

ence within my intellect; but the second exists in reality.
Undoubtedly this is knowledge, but it is very inadequate.
I need more t han concepts by which to 11ve.
that this object in my yard is a tree.

I must know

Hence I find it

necessary to rise to the second level on which intellectual

knowledge is experienced, namely, judgments. A judgment is
an act of composition mentally executed, by which there
is attributed to the subject some predicate• for example•
"The tree is leafless.n
Primarily "is" asserts an identity, but
"leaflessn are not identical.

ever bear a leaf.

II

tree" and

If they were, no tree would

Rather the identity here is between (a)

that thing called a tree, and (b) that thing called leaf-

less.
We distinguish two operations of the intellect, namely
separation on the idea level and unification on the judg•

ment level.

My intellect now unites what it had previously

divided.
Judgments have only a mental existence but they are
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extremely important because ideas alone are impotent to
grasp real being.

An idea is an abstract grasp on some

aspect of the real, omitting both its individuality and its
existence; a judgment is a grasp on the real which retains

the entity in both its existence and its individuality.
Hence it is apparent that only yia judgments do we ever
arrive at a knowledge of things.

Now, one is free to assert either (a) "The tree is, 0
or (b) t'tthe t r ee is leafless.11

But each statement contains

an element i-Jhich is absent from the conceptual idea.

Each

contains an original contribution from the intellect.

In

the firs t example the contribution is existence; in the
second it is

i dentity.

Both qualities are in the ontologi•

cal order but something new has been added to the concept.
Hence the intellect is not just a mirror.

Rather it is

creative.59
Judging l?!I !!. is a highly skilled intellectual operation which employs five predioables,60 namely, (a) genus,
(b) specific difference, (c) species, (d) property, and (e)

accident. 61

However Fr. John J. Toohey62 has improved

59 The author is indebted to Fr. John c. Taylor for
much of the preceding information in this section.
60Aristotle calls them Categoremata.

61Predicables are attributes of a class which explain
the nature of a class.
62A contemporary Jesuit.
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Aris t otelianism by adding a sixt h pr edicable which he calls
an "insei>arable mark. " 63

These s ix predicabl es are as f o llows: Genus--this is
(a) an attribute which every ..member o f a c lass has in conmon
with o t her objects ; and (b) the qual~ty which best explains

the nature of a clas s; f or example , i n t:he class of

l'ien

the

gener ic attribute is animality.

Specific diffe~enc,64•• t his is (a) a note which is
found only in the member s of this particular class; 65 and
(b) it is the best attribute to explain the nature ef the
c lass ; for ex.ample, in the cla ss of Men the speci fic differ-

ence is ~ationalit y.
Speci~66•• this is a combi nation of (a) genus, and (b)

speci fic difference; for e>tample, 1n the class of Nen t he
speci es is animality plus rationality.
of Nen i s r a t ignal animal.

Therefor e the species

In fact this is the definition

-·

of man 67
frgpert y68•• this is (a) a characteristic which occurs

63Tcohey, 22• cit., P• 120. (In Fr. Toohey•s di scussion
inseparab\e mark is"'"iiurnber five, and accident is number six.)
6 4or differentia.
65tt is absent in all other members of this genus.

66or class characteristic.
67The species of a class is also called the
the claBs.
68or pecularity.

essence

of
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only in member s of this particular class; but (b) it is
not the best note to explain the nature of the class; for
example1> in the class of Hen risibilit}!69 is a property.
Insepa rabl~ mark--this i s (a) an attribute which is

found i n every member of a class as well as i n other
objects; but (b) i t is not the best quality to explain
the nature o f a class, for example, in the class of Men

------

an inseparable ma rk is warm-bloodedness.
Accident••this is (a) a note which is not present
permanently i n eve~-y member of a class, or (b) it occurs
only i n certai n members.

Moreover (c) it is a characteristic

which i s the least suited to explain the nature of a class;
for example , in t he class of Men either whitatless or

illness i s a.~ accident .

However when a Thomist affirms that animal is the
genus of Menp he means pF9ximate genus. 70 This is signi•

ficant because the class of Men also includes the supreme
genus, namely, substance.

In addition it contains tl«>

Jubaltern genera, namely (a) organism, and (b) body.

691.e., the ability to laugh.
70A proximate genus implies all the other genera in
the same order.
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SUBSTANCE~

Corporeal

. Incorporeal
BODY

Organic

~Inorganic
ORGANISM·

~

Sentient

Non-sentient

· ANIHAL-

Rational

~lrrational
MAN 71

These six predicables exhaust the methods of predication.
One can assert with confidence that there are no others.
It is noteworthy that all predicables exist inside the
human mind.

They a r e modes whereby the intellect predicates

one idea of another.

If one wishes to classify entities

which exist outside the mind he must employ the ten

catggories.72
Technically these ten categories consist of one master
category and nine accidents.

The master category is

71The famous Tree of Porphry.

72or predicamental§.
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S9bstance; 73 the nine accidents are: guantitx, quality,
J."ela,ticm,, a~ti9n» 2f!SS10D, plac~, ti.me 9 .aostHf£ 11 and habit. 74

All finite reality can be classified under one or more of
these ten Categortes.

§.Y~t:ance answer s the question, "What?H What is the
being75 which we are conside~ing? (An example would be a
ma11.)

9.U!.utitx answers the quest1on 0 °How much?" 76

(Let's

suppose that thts man is si.x feet tall and waighs 200
pounds.)

Q.y!.JJ.t:£ answers the question, "Whet sort?•1

(This man

is i~1ite; he is an American; he is a Derr~crat; he is a

catholic~ he is industrious.)
Relat!.,_<m, answers the question, "In ~-hat relatio11s?"

73nr. Kuhn.
74~qbst~nce is just the opposite of accident. (a)
Substance is tra being whose essence naturally requires it

!rf

to exist in itself;
~ se; ens !D. l l i a .being that
has existence in itse
&io by virtue of itself as an ulti•
mate distinct subject of being. Loosely it i.e equivalent
to essence and. nature.'' v de Bemard Wuellner, "substance,tt
]21ctionau 2t S£hglastic P
s h (Hill'-'B.ukee: The Bruce
Publishing Company, c. 1§5 , p.
• On- the other hand (b).
an accident is tt somethin.g whose essence requires naturally
that it exist in another being; a being of a being; a mere
modificatiQn or attribute of another being; being in a
qualified sense; being inhering in another being as in a
subject of existence; • • • ens eptis. In the plural,

accidents are often referred to as appearances, phenomena,
or species." l!Jss, "accident," .ieJ&.. 1 p. 2.
15
Or the reality.

76
1.e., Row big? or how little?
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( This man is an employee.)

A5;tJma

answers t he question. "What doing?"

(This man ·

is talking.)77
passi9.:u answers the question,

11 What

enduring?" 78

(r•faybe

this man is irritated• or fatigued, or ,-1ell satisfied.)

!!,lace answers the question, "Where?•179

(This man might

be on a street- comer; L~ school or in church.)

l..~ ai-1swers the questio11p •1 r.vhen?tt80 (It might be

ten

o 0 clock in the morning, during early spring. )
~.,sture answar.s the question 9 °In what attitude?"

(This man is sitting do~m.)
Ha!'2it answers the question, "In ·what e,cten1.al condition? 1181

(This man 1s wearings. long, black, close-fitting tunic with
a wide girdle. )

All ten of these categories may be -detected in t he
follotrl.ng sentence 9 "An old slave, six feet in height, and
clothed in scanty rags, stood singing in his doo~"B.Y at

evening, his body swayed by the melody." 82

77obviously he is a Jesuit.
78or undergoing?
79I.e., Where is the reality?
801.c •• When is the r~ality acting thus? or enduring
this? or so placed?
81
I.e., in what state? or dress? ~ cetera.

82Glenn 1 Thi Histq17 g! Philqsophy, 22• cit., P• 86.
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a • .§.u~~ta,nc~--a slave.83
b. Q._uant~~-•six feet in height.
c . ~i:..x~ ...old.

d. !~l,.tt..!;ig].l••.... slave. 84

e. ,Plas__~--i.n his doort~ay.

£. I,,i.m~--at evening.
g. E..~tu~n-stood.
h8 Habj_t•aclothed in rags.85
i.

6.££:i_on--singing.

j . f.J!tt:!ml••swayed. 86

These ten categories e):haust the possibilities for classi

0

fying finite being.

(There are no others.)

Hence it is

obvious that !<.a:nt' s attempt to "improve" Arlstotl e at this
point was aborttve.

Dialectics87

The third operation of the intricate human mind is
xeasonipg.88

Sometimes the intellect is unable to decide

83 I.e., am~, a human sub stance.

84.ritis implies relation to a master, viz., servitude.
85Habit of mind is gualitX··
86pa8,!.,i.on means submitting to; or affected by action.

87The author acknowledges his indebtedness tow. Norris
s. J., for much of the Nd1mentary information in this

Clarke,

section.

Fr. Clarke w,,is his Dialectics professor at Fordham

University~
88or inference.

the human intellect,)

(This is the most complex function of
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whether two propositions agree or disagree.

Hence it

employs a third idea in order to reach a conclusion.
Thie is the realm of dialectics, the science of valid
inference.
thought.

Dialectics is a kind of blind, empty form of
It always presupposes truth.

It can never tell

us how to attain truth directly; but granted that pro•
position "Au is true, Formal Logic will tell us how to
pass (in terms of pure logical form) to another truth which
follows automatically.

Logic is like a bologna machine: it

can do nothing until we "feed'' it sometM:ng.

If we tifeed"

it truth, we will receive truth in retum; if we "feed" it

falsehood, we will get only falsehood.
the connection between ideas.
nothing but pure form.

Logic merely gives

The valid or correct is

The theist and the atheist can both

(a) be consistent, and (b) employ precisely the same logic
because Dialectics is a neutral tooi. 89 It is just valid
reasoning.
Logic is a weaker form
only in our kind of minds.
he does not need it.

of intelligence which exists
There is no logic in God because

Logic is necessary for us because we

can see only one thing at a ttm.e .

(l f we were completely

intuitive spirits, logic would be unnecessary for us also.)
The very essence of Traditional Lo81c consists in
89This is true also in geometry, e.g., the atheist and
the theiQt both get the same answer when they count the
angles of a triangle.
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passing from one proposition to another. 90

This passage

can be in terms of three kinds of argument, namely (a)

Categorical, (b) Hypotheti.cal, or (c) Disjunctive.91

ln

the Categgxica! syllogism this operation is invariably a
matter of inclusion or exclusion.

The basic skema is:

Figure "A"

Figure uau

9 ~gic can do notMng with just one word or a single
proposition.

91The three types of syllogism.
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Figure "C"·

These are n the circles of Euler".

can be handled

by this

All valid inferences

simple skema. 92 No o·t her rule is

necessary.
However before we can affirm that a given concept is

infide or

outstde,

it is necessary to have a QU,antifier ..

ln order to set the machine of Logic 1n motion we need four
Operative Terms, namely1
a.

fill are• for example,

flll "S" are up«.

li2D!. !;U,, for example, No "S" are ''P" •.
c. §.Qm!. !li, for example, Some 1t51t are HpO•
d. ~ W !12£, for example, So.,ne usu are not ttpt1.

b .•

92But Tradition,il Log'ic cannot hal\dle relations;

whereas modem Logic can. Traditional Logic can qualify
.
only the subject; contemporary Logic can qualify both subject
and object, e.•
"All men are some mortals." In fact modern
Symbollic Logic has caught the movement of mind. (Yet there
ls no conflict between the old and the new.)

g.-.
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The geometrical skema i s as follows:

Figure

11 3 11

tt S"
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Figure

ucn

"P"

Figure unu

These a,:e the only forms; there ~re np others_. The first

is (a) the Universal Affitrnative; it is usually called an
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"A" Propos1.t i o111 , for example,

0

A11 93 men are mortal.tt94

The second i s (b) the Universal Negative; it is generally
known as an HE*' Proposition, for example, "No men are mortal."
The thir d i s (c) the Par ticular Affirmative; i t is usually
labelled an u1n Proposition, for example, "Some men are
mortal.,.

The fourth is (d) the Particular Negative; it is

generall y called an "O'• Proposition, for example, "Some men
are not mor t a1.u95

(All four can be placed on the Square

of Opposition.) 96
The se a~e the only four propositions which can be used
in Formal Logic.

Hence the very first step in the reasoning

process i s to reduce our given proposition to one of these
93This is an existential "all," i.e., a double "all, u
or t,..o 0 all a. tt It means (a) all that there are, and (b)
there are at least one. Thus in Traditional Logic we
invari ably presuppose the existential operative.
·94nindu l ogicians of the sixth century B. c. never con•
ceived of a universal conclusive term. Everything was
expressed in negative terminology. Thus in order t o say;
.,All men are mortal, .. they would affirm, "The essence of
non-rationality resides in the essence of non-humanity.n
The Hindus finally arrived at the same truth as Plato; but
they required about 400 years to accomplish wl'lclt Plato did
in about eighty. (On the other hand the Chinese never tit>rked
out any system of formal logic.)
95

It is significant that an 11 0 11 Propositioi'\ cannot be
reversed. It is valid. to affirm, ~ '*§." axe ~ H.f',
but invalid to• declare. ~
are nqt tl.§_lt.

ur

96the discovery of some anonymous genius.

(It is sig•

nificant that 1n this famous diagram both Univer~ls appear

on the top line, and both Particulars on the bottom.)
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four forms, 97 for exampleil "Only the brave deserve the
fair.u

This does not mean (a) all the brave deserve the

fair; nor that (b) this man deserves the fair because he
is brave.

Rather we are really saying, Al l U§." a:re

"E',

that is, " All those t-Jho deserve the fair are included among
the brave."

not mean

llll

Likewise, "All that glitters is not gold" does
"§." !om

"f",

but rather, Som@.

"!"

!;£!.

JlS21 "E'.

When Jesus said, "Blessed are the meek," he was stating an
"A0 proposition, that is, AlI. o~u are 01:u. 98 But if we

assert l> .HA man may be a scholar without bei1'g wise," we are
employing an

°ou

proposition, that is, ~ "~" are not

0

.e.•t.

The second step in the reasoning process is Mediate
Inference; t hat is, we combine t~ propositions and derive
a truth which i s more significant.
our knowledge 1n this way.

In fact

t~

increase

For example, years ago there

was a banque.t in ~land and the speaker arrived late.

But

fortunately there was a priest present and he was asked to
entertain the crowd for awhile.

He arose and said, " Hy life

is not very int-e resting: the first penitent who came to me

was a terrible murderer••yet he was a respected citizen.n
Then he spoke of crucial points in life.
speaker arrived.

Finally the

He began by saying he was glad Fr.

97
Every conceivable pi:oposition "fits" into one of
these foxms.
98
The well-known (but erroneous) statement! "Every
man has his price," is likewise an "A" pmposit on.

-
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had spoken fizst.

"I've knoltm him for years.

In fact I

was his first penitent."

Now, consider these two state\nents: (a) "tie was my
first penitent:,n &'ld (b) stI was his first peniten t.''

If

we examine t hem separately there is no deduction possible.

But if we put them together we arrive at a rather terrifying
conclus:tonll

('.l'his is how the murderer was apprehended.)

These sombre facts can be stated 1n an ttAtt propos1t1.on as

follows:

2

u 2tt is inside of "3° ,
"lO is inside of tt 2" ,
'Eherefore tt 1 tt is inside of n 3".

Or like this:

All ttA" are ttBtt,
All "B" are "C"

Ther.e fore all tt.{tt are

"C".

0
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This is the stanclard fot"m of the "A.'1 syllogism.

"A"

and

"B11 are brought togetherc through rq3t1. Thus hB 11 is the Middle
Term. 9 9 However the 11idclle TGrm never appears in the conclusion.

!t i s like t he cata lytic agent.100

It is obvious that one cauld study a11 night without
conc ludin39 All

nan

~~

UQ!f' because this truth can be

derived only by inference.
that is,

t t10

Aristotle declares 2:4

is to four as four is to eight.

••
••

4:8,

However this

formula is not as fruitful as the first geometrical figure
above.

'rhe negative form is:

No ttAtt are "B",

All ucn ax·e "A",

Therefore no "C" are ttau.101

99r.e., the bridge. or mediator.
lOOor like somebody introducing two strangers, and then
stepping out of the picture.
lOlThis :Ls an °E" syllogism.
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Or we c~u1 diagr s 1r, it like this:.

B

Double negations cause difficulty; for example, ffNo plants
are non•living,u that is, ti2

"i"

eg,uals 11.:.f.".

But

this

statement can be reversed thus: ttAll plants are living,
that is,

6!l. "§."

are Hg!•.

Or we can assert, 0No non•living

things are plants," that is, lie "2tt ! a Hfi• •
This--in very brief summary-•is the difficult
Categorical syllogism.

It is governed by the following

rules:

a. It may have only three102 ~erms.103
102''A" is the Major Term, t i ~ 1s the Middle Term, and
"C" is the. Minor term.
l03when debating one must beware tha1: hts opponent does
· not .c onceal his Major Premise,. .e .g., '*Uon' t trust that fellow.
He's one of thoAe immigrants who have given us so much txouble."
In this argument the hidden Major Premise is, hAll immigrant•
are untrustworthy...
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b. Only one te;."t,1 may be negati vc.

c. If onca premise i s n.ega ttve, the conclusion will
also be negative.
d. If one term is particular, then the conclusion will

likewise be pa.r.t lcular.

e . The Niddle Tez-m nius t a l ways be miiversal at least
once. Hence the following syllogism is not valid:

C

Some ,1Au are ''Bf',
Some "A" are "C",

Ther~f ore some "C" a re os11 •

B

£. No term may be universal in the conclusion, if it
is part i cular in the premise in which it occurs.
Thus neither of the following e~amples is valid:
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All tiAu are

1tB11 ,

All "Att are ttcu,
Therefore all "C" are

ua11.

All "A" are ''B",

Ho 0 cu are "A",
Therefore no "cu are 0 B0

•

g. One premise must always be affirmative.
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The second type of syllogism is the Hypothetical.

Its

basic structure is as follows:
If "Att then uatt •
But ttA0 ,
Therefore u

B".

This is the only valid form 1n the affirmative·; it cannot

be. rever sed.

1£ we are given "A", then "B" automatically

We are given ttA" ; therefore "B" follows.

follows.

(The

consequent follows because we have affirmed the antecedent.)
But suppase we assert:
If

0 Au

then uB" ,.

But u su
'
Therefore

11

A".

This is obviously not valid.
If "Att then
But 1t.,13tt ,·

"B",

Therefore u.A0 •

New York Ci-t y is in ·the state,
! am in the state,
Therefore I am- in New York City.

The negative form is:
If it rains the street is wet,

The street is not wet•

Therefore it is not raining.

This is the only valid form in the negative •. But suppase
we affi?:rn:

If it rains the street is wet,

If 11 At, then "B";
But "•A"

Therefore'

But it is not raining;
Therefore the stre-et is not wet.

""'B"•

This of course is not valid.

In the Hypothetical syllogism

"if" ii3 not equivalent to ''only if;" for example, when some~

one declares (a) "li. you do this it will work," he is
implying thei:-e are different ways to do it.

But when he

says (b) "QnlJl. !f you do this it will. -work-. " he means there
is only one way to do it.

The

Di@j;uncti~e

syllogism ls just a matter of Either/Or.

Moreovet' there are only two valid forms:
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a. Either

"Att

But "•A" 1

or

"B",

This is either a radish or a carrot,
It is not a radish,
Therefore it is a carrot.

HBtt,

This contains either oxygen or carbon,
It does not contain carbon,
·

Therefore "B" •

b. Either "A.. or
But "•B",

Therefore "Att.

Therefore it contains oxygen.

In the Disjuncti ve syllogism either/21: means (a) either "Att

or "Btt, and not both; 104 (b) either "A., or ttBtt, and perhaps

both.

105

The logician looks for the minimum be-cause it can

always be applied.
The syllogism is perhaps Aristotte•s greatest contri•
bution to Dialectics, but (like other things) it can be
abused by the unscrupulous.

Perhaps the most serious pit•

fall in this area is the Sophism, for example:
Epimenidesi> the Cretru.1, says that all ere.tans are liars,
If Epimenides• statement is not true, he is a liar; and
1£ it is true, he is a liar, for he is a Cretan,
But his statement is either true or not true.
Therefore he is a liar,
But since he is a liar, his statement is not true
that all Cretans are liars,
Therefore some Cretans are not liars,
But since some Cretans are not liars, Epimenides is not
necessarily a liar because he is a Cretan,
Therefore we may accept his statement that all Cretans
are liars.
And so on. 106
All this might appear abstruse but tttogic without tears is
hardly worth the paper iit•s witten on.ttl07

104rhe minnimum.

lOSThe maximum.
106-roohey, 22• s!S,., P• 109.

107rr. w. Norris Clarke, s. J.

- - - - -~-
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Now it is significant that St. Thomas very _ca~efully
'

avoids logical fallacies when he formulates the J<"ive Ways.
All dialectical errors are absent.

Each proof is perfect

from the standpoint of Formal Logic.
His Terminologyl08
The term '"'Existence"
St. Thomas e mploys the term ttexistence•1109 in its

first and most obvious meaning.

By ex1stentia he means

'' that by which an essence becomes actual, or is placed outside of its potential state in its causes. 0110 Now when
one enquires concerning the existence of an entity he seeks
to lea rn whether it is actual or 1?,2t§tial.

From the science

of ·-1 etaphysics we know that a being is a reality; and a
reality can be defined as anything which exists, or
103For a broader discussion of this technical subject
vide Josiah Royce, ttLatin and Scholastic Terminology,"
iSt'c'tionary Qi Philosophy !!1£ Psychology, 3 vols., edited by
James Hark Baldwin (New, corrected edition; New York: Peter
Smith, 1940), I, 628-39.
109For all the precise references of existinp, existimans,

existo, and existent in the Summa See Roy J. Deferrari and
Sister M. lnviolata Barry,~ Gpmplete Index 2f. ~ Sumna
Theologica 2!, §S. Thomas A u1nas {Baltimore: The John D.
Lucas Printing Company, c. 956), PP• 123f.

1

llOaoy Joseph Oeferrari and Sister M. !nviolata Barry
(with the technical collaboration of Ignatius HcGuiness,
ttexistentia,'1 ~ J..ezs con 21 2S• Thomas Aquinas based sm, ~
~ Theologica an... s~iect!U! pgssages st{ h!i other~
{Baltimore: John D. Lucas Printing Company, c.1949), P• 395.

3
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anything which may be conceived as existing actually, that
is, existable reality.111
Every reality is classified as either potential or
actual.

A potential reality can exist because (1) there is

no contradiction involved in the thought of its existence;
for exAmple, a chocolate motmtain can qualify as a potential
reality; whereas a square circle cannot because the very
concept~

§.2.

is self-contrad'f:ctory.

cancels its own existence.)

(It automatically

Moreover a potential reality

can exist because (2) a being already exists which is capable
of converting the potential into the actual, that is, this
being can cause it to exiat.
An .@f.tual reality may be defined as possibility trans•

formed into actualized being.
been begotten by its causes.

It exists because (a) it has
(Actual reality is caused

being, a1, effect, and also contingentll2 being.)

Cr 9 actual

reality exists because (b) it is so faultless and self•
sufficient that the perfection called existenc~ is inherent
in its very··nature.

It is necessary being.113

It must

exist and non-existence can.~ot be attributed to it.

&

It is

lllpaul J. Glenn, TheodicJ (14th impression; St. Louis
London: Herder, 1952). PP• 1 f.
112tt is dependent upon its causes.

113cf. Thomas N. Ralston. ~lsments 21. Divinity, edited
by T. o. Summers (Nashville: Pu=tishing House M. E. Church.
South, 1916), p. 15.
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not an effect; it is uncaused being.

Moreover since

,.t

contains no potentiality which already has-been or is•to•
be act'4ali zed by causes, we·~refer to it as pure actuality.
1'hus when St. Thomas refers to the existenc~ of
Godll4 he means ~ existence, not possible or potential
existence .. He means uncaused f!Xistance, not caused existence; n.@S_essa~llS existence, not contingent existence;

~ s,.~J;.ualitx, 116 not effected existence. Hen ce

it

follows

that when the Angelic Doctor employs the term God he is
referring to ne~essar.y, uncaused, actual exi stence.
The term "Causa1ityoll7
The five c lassic arguments of

se.

Thomas a r e all based

ll4In con trast William James considers the question of
God's existence to be irrelevant. Vide his famous Gifford
Lectures, The Varieties 2f Religious Experience (New York:

The Modern"Tibrary, c.1902), P• 491.

115nenry Nelson Wieman argues that belief in God is
not necessary tt in order to worship." Vide his chapter
entitled ''Private worship,u cyntemporary Reli~ious Thought,
compiled by Thomas s. Kepler New York:Abing on-Cokesbury
Press, c.1941), p. 291.
116only God is devoid of all potentiality because He
alone is absolutely unchangeable. Vide Jacques Maritain,
~n Introduction .t£ Philosophy, translated from the French
by ·E. I. Watkin (London: Sheed 5i Ward, c.1951?), p. 187.
117For a full dis~ussion of this subject vide R.oy
· Joseph Def errari and Sister M. Inviolate Barry1'with the
technical Cf::!llaboration of Ignatius McGuiness ), ''cause,"
A. LE;asJ,cqn P! il• Thpmas Agyipas based sm Ih!, Sunma Theologica
!llg selected .E.,.asaages e! h!_! other works (c.1948), SU?•£!!•,
pp. 1jg... 43.
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upon the principle of Causality.118

"Every eff.ect requires,

to expla111 its existence, the existence of an adequate cause
or sum of causes, and it ultimately r equires the existence
of an uncaused and necessarily existing First Cause which
is Subsistent Being Itoelf." 119 However all of the proofs
employed by ~he Saint are not expr essions of the same kind

of causality.
A ~aµ§~ may be defined as anything which pi"Oduces (or
helps to produce) an effect . 120 The constane relationship
between cause and ·e ffect may be considered from two different
points of view, namely from the position of t he cause and
from the position of the effect.

The former is known as

causalitX and the latter as c2ntingencx.121

An effect of

a particular cause may also be the cause of another specific
effect.

'rhe world consists of a complex of cause and effect

relationships.

ll8Jacques Maritain states that they are ba~ed on "the
ne~essity of a first cause which is pu~e Act or Being,
itself subsistent in its own right." See Approache§ .!:,2 God,
translated from the French by Peter O' Reilly (New 'iorki
Harper's, c.1954)• P• 23.

119Quoted anonymously by Hgr. Glenn, Theodic;:, sm,.

p. 53.

ill•,

120tn a general sense f8.US£ may be defined as , "That
which produces an effect; that which gives rise to any
action, phenomenon, or condit ion .u See The Oxford Dictionary
(Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1933), II, ffi.
121This term is synonymous with dewmdenc;r in Thomistic
usage.
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A Principle is not necessarily a cause.

A principle

is the som.-ce from which a thing emerges, its place of
origin. 12 2 Thus a cause can al~:Tays be defined as a principle because an effect invariably arises at this place.
However a point of origin i.s not always a produc:tng source;

for eY..ample, ( a ) the pr1nciplel23 of day is dawn, but dawn
is not the cause of day.

(b) Convictions are the princi•

ples of voluntary conduct, but convictions are not the
cause of voluntary conduct.124 Convictions are not causes;
they are principles.

Thus it is manifest that a cause is

always a principle; but a principle is not always a cause.
A
a

rea!Qn

is not necessarily a cause.

reason explains.

which elucidates.

A cause produces;

A reason may be defj.ned as anything
Every entity has reasons; but every

entity does not have causes; for example, we assign reasons
to God, but not causes.

God is the first Being, not an

effect produced by causes.

Every cause is a reason because

knowledge of a cause automatically explains the effect.
But not all reasons can qualify as causes; for example,
the Thomist demonstrates God's existence, but he never
attributes causes to God.

Thus a cause is always a reason;

but a reason is not always a cause.

122cf. Glenn, li.£. cit.
123

I.e., the starting-point.

124The cause is the will.

For example, fire is
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the cause oi heat; it is also the reason for heat .

Like-

wise heat is a reason for flre; 125 but it is not the cause

of fire-~ rather it is the effect of fire.
There is also a distinction bet~.;een cause and 9c9asion.
An occasion may be defined as an extraneous circu.~stance

which sets a cause in motion.

For example, the mere sight

of a clergyman might cause an atheist to use profanity; but
the clergyman is only the occasion (not the cause) of the
vile language .

As one writer observes, hThere is never an

essential and in.trinsic connection between

~

p_,..c...,c_.a....s-io..__n and

,the cause whi£h ~ en occ~sion, but there is frequently

a powerful 0 if e".?.tri.nsict influence exercised by occasion."

126

Thus one fb1ds these practical truisms:

a. He who wi.lls not to avoid occasions of sin, does
11ot will to avoid sin.

b. The person that l0ves danger shall perish in it.
c. Tell ~e the company you keep, and I will tell you
· what kind of person you arc.
·rherefore it is obvious that a cause is different from a

principle, a reason, and an occasion.
There are t-wo types of Causality, na.~ely intrinsic and
extrinsic.
the eff~ct.

An Y,1t;insis. cause is one which is inherent in

Moreover there are tl-.1> different kinds, nan1ely

1251.e., heat explains the presence of fire.
126Gl enn, 22• ~
~•~. , p. 55.
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material and formal.

A ID!~~tl,127 cause is the material

from vmi.ch somethi ng is fashioned; for example , the material

cause of a statue is marble, or. wood, or some other sub-

stance.

It is apparer.t that spiritual entities lack a

mater!.al cause for matter is not a proper.t:y of spirit.

The mater ial from which something is made can be classified
as a true cause 0 for without it the effect could not be pxoduced.
A ~-1. cause includes everythi11g which makes an
effect precisely what it is at this mome11t.
types, 11amely substanttal and accidental.

There are two

For example , ir.

a silver statue the substantial formal ca.use is the silver.;
whereas the shape ,128 size, color, !lS cetera constitute
the "accidental
...... formal cause.129
An extrlnsic cause is extraneous to the effect.
II!

130

.....

There are two different kinds, namely efficient and final.

An effisj,~-~.S cause produces an effect by means of its own
activity.

For example, the efficient cause of the V~nMs

S2

127Yide uphysica," translated from the Greek by R., P.
Hardie '" R. K. Gaye, Book II, Chapter 3, 'l'he Basic Works o{
AX:iktotle,. edited by Richard Ncl<eC'n ( 12th- printing; New
Yor<: Random House, c.1941), pp. 240~42.
128
Aristotle uses the term archetx~.

129The render will notice that (at this point) Thomism
is a definite refinement of Aristotelianism.
130An instrinsic cause is part of the effect, whereas
the ext~il1sic is DQt.

""
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~1110 131 is the unknown aeulptor who chiseled her "expressive
f ace
.
. l y mode 1 led eurf aces.. 0 132
and scft

Frequent1 y t h e e ffi •

cient catise is assisted by (a) instrumental causes, and (bJ
exemplar-causes.

For example, the tools employed by the

sculptor are the in§trwnentf! causes; and the pattern 1n
his hand (or in his mind) constitute the exemplar-cause.
A

final cause is the goal toward which the labours of

the efficient cause are directed in the production of the

effect.

A

final cause never exists in isolation; it is

invariably accompanied by an efficient cause; for example,
plants become fruitful, animals attain maturity.

Even the

inanimate forces of nature Hseek" a goal, for example,
erosion.

In the case of the statute, the final cause is the

reason which the sculptor had for carving it, for example,
maybe money, or a genuine love of art.

(Perhaps it was
just a pleasant way to pass the time.,)1 33 In men the final

cause may also be defined as motive, but this is not true
in God.

The final cause for God is never a motive because

God cannot be influenced 1n any degree.
always totally fJ.;"ee.

His choices are

To Goel we attribute pµrpose rather

lllAlSo known as the Aphrgdite 2f. Melo§.
132
the picture and \>fards quoted above in Lincoln
Rothschi . s article 1 "Sculpture, n ~ lli!x1..d ~ bCY~J.oJ>!dia,
XVI, 197. (Aristotle cites the hypa~eticar example o a
fathsr; he is the cause of his child.)

Iai'

133Aristotle uses health as an ex.ample, viz., the cause
for a person walking about.
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than motive. ·

In the ensuing pages (when we study the Five ways) it
will be apparent that St. Thomas demonstrates God to be (a)
the supreme ,1Efficien~~ and (b) the last
I

final

Cause of the

c~eated universe.
The term u proved11

St. Thomas introduces his five classic arguments with
the word m;ov~.

Yet he does not prove the existence of

God--rather he demonstrates it.134

Oemgnstratio~ is not a

134oenied by Louis Berkhof. Vide his large Systematic
l'heologx (4th revised edition; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, igi+§),
P• 28. Willia.m Evans thinks the existence of God is like
beauty, i.e., we can 'call attention to it, but we are
impotent to p~"Ove it. Vide his compact handbook, ~ Great
JQct,;:ines

2£.

~~ ~i~le taiicago:. Moody Press, c.1939) 11 P• f4.

Ref erring to ' t e t ei.stic argument," Olin Alfred Curtis
affirms~ •1A man of sanity 3 intelligence 9 and entire honesty
can follow the process step by step and yet not be convinced
that there is a personal God.·" ~ his anemic oork on
Systemat:ics entitled, ~ Christian Faith (New York: Eaton
& l"!Clins, c.1905) ~ p. 9r;- Borden Parker Bowne observe1; that
arguments do not demQnstrate. See his book, Kant and encer
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Con1pany, 1912), P• ~ Phil p
Melanchthon remarks, u. • • whether or not the fact that
God is can be deduced by ·human syllogism, is a matter more
for the curious than for the pious to dispute." See T~e
L.2.£!. Commdies 52.f. Philip Me anchthon, translated from t e
Latinby c arles Leander H ti (Boston: Meandor Publishing
Company, c.1944), p. 113.. George Christian Knapp declares,
"The person who hopes to attain to certainty in the way of
metaphysical speculation, will be disappointed; and will fall
into the depths of cheerless scepticism •.0 ~ his 1,eptures
2!l 5hrfsti!Jl Theplogy, translated from the German by Leonard
Woo s ,ndAmerican editiont Philadelphia: J. w. t·1oore 1
1854), p. 88. On the other hand no less a personage than
John Dick affirms that God's existence "has been proved by
metaphysical arguments • • • • u See Lectures sm jhfylogY,
2 voltSmes (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 15 , I,
159. Cf. Romans 1:20.
·

s1

1
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synonym for 2ro2i, in the Scholastic vocabulary.

A proof

may be persuading, convincing, or even compelling; but a
demonstration is never anything less than a compelling

proof.

Suppose a skeptical student refuses to believe that

the Battle of Hastings was fought A. D.• 1066.

This puts

the professor at a decided disadvantage because there is no
possible way whereby he can demonstrate t:his fact to the

complete satisfaction of his doubting student.

All evidence

(however copious) rests ultimately upon human testimony

and human documents.

The posstbility of error can never

be completely deleted.

A

simple proof (by its very nature)

is entirely different from an inevitable conclusion deduced
fr.om objective data, for example, the sum of two plus two,

or the sum total of the angles of a triangle.

No witnesses

are needed, and an appeal to reliable documentary evidence

is superfluous.

This is apparent be~ause eve.n the doubting

mind is forced to recognize that two plus two equals four,
and the angles of any triangle invariably total one hundred
and eighty degrees.
inescapable.

In either case tha conclusion is

There!! mother

possible

answer

because the

truth has been demonstrated.

Thus when the Angelic Doctor uses the tarm pE9ved we
are to understand that he means gemon§ttated.

For him a

proof is always tta compelling proof," namely, a demonstration.
In our present problen he even invest1gat$S the contradictory.
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The term

n demonstration"

A demonstration is always necessary in order to arrt,,e

at truth••unleos that truth ;.s ,self•evident.

There are

twol35 types which fall into his particular category and
require no demonstration, namely, (a) the kind of truth
involved in dating historical events accurately, and (b)
the kind one grasps intuitively and recognizes immediately.
For eY..&~ple it is impossible for anyone to demonstrate his
own existence, and thereby compel himself to recognize
(the undeniable fact) that he exists at a certain point in
space and ti.me.

Demonstration always involves analyois

and onc 1 8 existence is simple and elemental.
analysis is impossible.

Further

This is a truth which one ttsees"

directly and intuitively with the Heye" of the mind.

It

is so self-evident that he is forced to accept it, even
against his will.

If one denies it, he thereby affirms it.

For er.ample, suppose someone denies his existence by boldly
His denial really ~-nounts

asserting, "I do not exist. 0

to an affirmation: the use of the personal pronoun reduces
his statement to an absurdity.

The person who declares,

"I do not exist,o is really explaining, "I am here in order
to say that I am not here. 0

Msgr·. Glenn shrewdly observes,

135vide Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, nutrum Deum esse sit
per ee notum," QR• cit., Prima Pars, ciuaestio II, Art!cu1us
1, Respondeo., Tome I, 10..
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"If you l:eally doubt your own existence (or any selfevident t.zuth) you must lapse into complete and endless
silence, and, in t he dar.k despair of your non-existent
mind, you must fot·ever admit that even your doubts are non•
existent.~, 136

Some have thought that the existence of God is self•
evident.

Hence no proof is necessary 1n the strict sense

of the term.

If this assertion is true we are relieved

from the burden of demonstration.

John of La Rochelle 9

St. Bonaventure, and the Augustinian school believed that
137 Da.mascene
men possess an innate knowledge of God.
declared that ''omplbus eo&9itio existendi peum naturaliter
es,S inser!:f!.nl38

However St .. Thomas points out that this

natural knowledge is confused and genezal.

Man

has a natural

desire for happiness (a11d this implies natural knowledge)
but it does not give absolute kr~wledge of God's existence.
It is one thing to know that someone139 is approaching; it
is quite another to know that Peter is approaching. 140

136Glenn, SU?• ~it., P• 30.
13 7Gilson~ 22~ cit., P• 58.
138sancti Thomae Aquinatis, 22• cit., Prima Pars,
Quaestio II, Articulus l; Objectio i, Tome I, 10.
139The heathen (a) sense this, and (b) worship
me~ . Yet our divine Lord commanded His infant Chu~h.(Tia't'; 28: 19 ,20; Mk. 16: 15, 16) to evangelize these benighted
peoples.

140
Even though it is Peter!

Cf. Job 37:23.
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Many imagine that man's ultimate good consists in riches,
others suppose it is pleasures, and still others think it
is something different.

In other \«)rds~ man's i11X1ate

knowledge is in 11eed of clarificatione

Even if a theistic

proof could be built upon man's natural desire for happiness

"a proof is none the less required.t1141
Alexander of Hales also thought the ex!stence of God
is self-evident.

However he based his a,:gument upon an
"application of the principle of non•contradiction." 142 He
started ·with the idea of truth.143 The existence of truth
is self-evident~ fo~ he who denies its existence thereby
concedes its existence.

If tX'Uth is non-existent, th~, it

is at least true that truth does not exist.
true exists, truth necessarily exists.

But if anythil1g

God is truth itself

because Jesus affirmed:

~ )_ ~ -b- ~ ~

...

°' •

C

\

144

Therefore the existence of God is self-evident. 1"·5

a

141Frederick Coplestont
ijisto[I Qf. f.ll.iloa9_phy, 8 vols. :
(3rd printing; West minster •. Naryland: :Newman Pres·s , 1955) it

II, 337.

142
Gilson, SU?• c\t. P P• 59.

143v151e Sancti Thomae Aquinatis,

2:2•

cit., Prima Pars,

Quaestio II, Articulus 1, Objectio 111, Tome 1. 10.

l4li.John 14: 6.
~

l45Perhaps this proof originated with

Gilson,

l&£• ctt.

st.

Augustine.
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But St. Thomas has a r eady answer;146 namely, it is
self-evident th~t truth exists in a general way (like being).
But this fails to prove that this truth, and consequently
this beingl 47 i s identical with t he first Being wao is the
Cause of all being.

We must remain ignorant of this unless

reason proves it to our il'1tellect 9 or we accept it by
faith.

It 1 s r..ot self-evident in any way.

It is even

possible to concei ve of truth as being non- existent at one
ti.'ile.

Hence 1.t is obvious tha t ·~ his way does

i-10t

lead to

God.
Some have thought that truths ar e self-evident when
it is posoible to know them oimply by understanding their

·terms . 148

For ex.amplG , if a person understa..~ds the meaning

of "whole0 and ••part'' he simultaneously knows that the

whole i s invaz-iably gr.eater than any of its parts.
the e:ti.stence o f God is a truth of this natul:e.

H'ow,

The term

ttGt>d" means t:hae than which a greate,r cannot be conceived.

But that which exists both in the ideal ·world and in reality,

is greater t han that which exists in the mind only.

wnen

a person unders tands the te1."t'il ''God11 the- i dea is generated

in his intellect.

And since. God exists mentally U: follows

l 46vide Sanct1 Thomae Aquinat.is , 22• ill·~ Prima Pars,
Quaestio II, Ar t1culus 2, Ad tertium, To~e I, 11 .
147aecause b~ip_a is the basis of truth.
148yide Saneti Thomae Aquinatis 1 ibid., Prima Para,

Quaestio II, Articulus 1, Objectio ii, Tome I, 10.

111111111111111
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that He aluo exists extra-mentally.

Th9refore Hi t is self-

evident that God e xist_s . " ll•9

This is Che famous Ontological arg~ment.1 50

lt was

employecl by st. Anselm, 151 Alexnnde1:- of Hales , .nnd St .

Bonaventure .

(However for St. Bonaventure this is not so

much a theistic proof as it is ttthe final confirmation of

all proofs; it addo inner certitude to the logical conviction p11 ciuced by arg\.1ments." 1 52 ·
St. Thomes :relt.1ctant:ly rejects this argument.

answers153 by shotd.ng that this

0

He

proo£''' contains ti~ prir.•

ciple blemishes~ namely (a) t he supposition thet all men
necessarily conce1.ve of God as a being t han which no greater
can be conceived; for example, in ancient ti:nes many i dentified the unive rse with God.

Now to such a person God's

existence cannot be evident !. priori .

Furthei"rnore ( b) even

if every man 1Jnderstood God to be that being t han which it

is impossible to conceive a greater --even then it would not
necesearily follow that this being exists in reality.

If

149Gilson, !?.2• ci~., P• 6 O.
150
Technically it is not a theistic proof .
l5lAnselrn, 0 Proslogium,t: Chapters 2 5: 3, 21• AP;selm,
translated from the Latin by Sidney Norton Deane (Reprint;

La Salle , Illinois: Open Court, 1948), pp. 7-9 .
152Gilson, !ll?•

cit.,

P• 62.

153vide Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, 22• cit., Prima Pars,
Quaestio II, Articulus 1, Ad secundum, Tome I, 11.
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I comprehend the true meaning of the term "God" it is
undeniable that God exists at this moment in my intellect,
but only within my intellect!

Thus (a) it is only the

mental existence of God ~mich is necessary, and (b) only
after one has accepted the above definition.

It does not

follow that a being than which a greater cannot be con•
ceived exists in the real world.

Hence it is not a con-

tradiction t o affirm the non-existence of C-od.

Just as

long as a person (a) denies the real existence of a being
than which a greater is inconceivable. (b) he is capable
of conceiving a being 'Which is greater than any being
which exists either in the ideal world or in the world
of reality.

But inasmuch asl54 the atheist denies the

existence of God, it is impossible to force an admission
from his lips by means of this argument. 15 5
Some truths are so simple that the very moment a person comprehends· the terms in which they are couched, and

understands their necessary connection, 156 he immediately
grasps their significance.
is not157 in this category.

Obviously the existence of God
This fact is not a self-

1541! hXP9~hesi.
155Gilson• 22• cit., P• 61.
156E.g. 1 when we tmderstand the essence of both subject
and predicate.
1571.e!'·t not absolutely. God's existence is only relatively self•evident. l!!gg St. Thomas Aquinas, Q! ~
Hgs Creatures [The Summa Contra Gentiles], transfated rom

ld

e Latin by Joseph Ricl<atiy (Westminster, Maryland: The

Corroll Press, 1950), p. 9.
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evident truthl58 which obtrudes itself upon the intellect.
Nor is it innate, 159 except "1n aliquo conmlDli, sub quadarn
confus1one 0

•

.•

. u 160

This truth is not self .. revealing;

rather it must be leamed.161

Hen,ce the vital troth of

God's existence must be demonstrated.
Someone may object that since God's existence is
necessary, He is absolutely perfect and the attribute of

9xig·ten5;,e is inherent in His very nature.

Thus if a pe~son

thoroughly understands the meaning of the term God he will
perceive immediately that God exists.

For example, con•

sider the pt'oposi.tion, ttGod is an existent: being." 162

The

subject requires the predicate because the essence of the

subject obviously contains the predicate.

Hence if one•s

mind is capable of analyzing the subject, the predicate
l58Denied by Edgar P. Ellyson.

See hi s

Theological

~omffend (Chicago & Boston: '!'he Christian Witness Company,
gO), P• 7.

159Richard Watson denies that it is innate. See
Thnlorlcal lnstitut!s (2 volumes; New York: Carlton &
Ph llips 0 1855) 1 I, 74. John Calvin insists that the
knowledge of God's existence is. innate, universal, and
indelible. See Institutes Q.t. the ~ristf£° feligi§ll, 2
volumes, t ranslated from the Lillnby Jo · A len ( th
American edition, revised; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1949),
I, 54-56.
160sanctzi Thomae Aquinatis, Slll• g_~., Prima Pars,
Quaestio II, Articulus I, Ad Primumit· Tome I, p. 11 •.
l6la1.ann, 9.1?• ~•., p. 31. Watson concludes ~at it
was originally revealed, .lo.c_. c'"t Ralston affirms that no
philosopher has ever claimecl to
ve discovered God, QR• cit.,
P• 11.
l62or the one given by st.. Thomas, viz., "ham JI.!£

!J\Eial: • • •" See 22-• ci,t.., Prima Pars, . quaes~II,
Art cw.us 1, Respondeo, Tome I, p. 10.
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Will be self~evident.

I n ot her words, it is :not necessary

to demonstrate t he exis tence of God to such a mind.163

This i s true enough but one signif icant factor has
been over l ooked, namel y• the human mind i s not such a
mind.164

In Theodicy one l earns that his idea of God 1~

der i ved £1-om the di ffieult proceas of mental a bstr action.

It includes rea soning• analysi s,. synthesis. 165 One deduces
the concept from the empirical da ta.166 The proposition,
"God is an existent being,t1 is

™ ~ I!2li 99Rad .§.! but is

not ;eer i.11 n9,.ts,. guoad Dai• 167

(Thi s is evident because

the essence of God is unknown.)
St . Thoma.a r eject s a ll t hree of these "proof s 0 because

they are base d upon a f a lse postulate• namely, it would be

impossibl e for anyone t o possess an i,dea of God, of subsistent truth, of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, unless God himself had i.111planted these i deai:J in

l63or e.g. 9 Gt.!!.S tpc8mralia in l5!.s2 mm esse.'' This
is indeed self•evident 9 apud sapientes tantum• • • • u ~ .
164nPostquam ez.'1.iln in sap1entia Dei non cognovit mundus
per sapientiam Deurn• • • •" (I Corinthians 1:11)

165John Miley affirms that

tt the

idea of God" springs

spontaneously from our intuition. See his Systematic
2 volumes (New York~ Hunt & Eaton, 189·3), I, 62, 68.
166
According to

nans

Meyer•·s interpretation of

Theologyt

st.

Thomas, empirical knowledge is the only knowledge possible.
See I!!s Ph1lsU12~ r.!f. ll.• J ~ s ,t\g~as, translated from
the German by Fre<fer.[c Ee o ~ (St.l:..ou!s: Herder, 1948),
p. 237.
1671.e., self-evident to iself, but 112.£ self-evident

to us.

·
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our minds, or r a.ther unJ,.ess these idea s "'we re th£\t very
being and that v~ry truth."168 in ·which the human intellect

participate s in a f inite. manner.

If this hypothes is is

true, then the !. ::iri cr i proof:s 16 9 d o not inv olve an illicit
leap from idea to bei u,i itsel f .

( '1 :'hese proofs s ~&r t f rom

being; . )
The ..::.ngelic Doc t or works with an entirely different

postul Ht:e, n amely, a ll huro.~m knowled ge. has its or i gin in
''sensory intuit ions . 11170

'l 'h.is assumption under.lies his

C.,,.J..'
<I....._
·{c,_·,r:>.,f"n. 0:C
"' 't.- h"'
"."''rJ.'Qr_ J. proof~
,.
,.. -';\
.,.. 1
_ .
0

" 'T'h,...
::!Ppr~.... ...._. bninN
<---• .._, ..-.ihJ.·c:,-,,
n .• ,
._ "1•1e -l."'
,;;.

hend di rectly is t he i dee.. realised in matter ; it is theref ore a s ophi sm. to t r y and prove t hat the very be ing we
apprehend i s none other than God. 11171

'l'hus th2 celebrated

argume nt of St • . nselm is merely "the analysis cf a simple
abstract notion, 11172 and not the analysis of an essence .
But will our concept of God 173 permit us to discover
that link which unites essence and existence in t he divine
substance?

.:J t. '!'horn.as replies in the ne gative .

Such a

,..,,
1 00Gilson , 2.2.• cit .t p . 62.
169 •r echnically t he1--e. is only one ~ priori 11 proof 11 but
throughout t h e centuries it repe a tedly ~ppears in a new

"dress ."
1701bi d .
171 Ibid.

-

172Ibid.
173or of truth.

I

- - - - - -·-

321
knowledge of God is inaccessible to man in this world.

It

is true that essence and existence are identical in God
(and only in God) 174 bttt the human intellect can no more
apprehend it th.a11 the eye of the owl can gaze at the sun.
Man would have to be delivered from his morta1 body before

he could perceive that the existence of God is necessari?.y
implied i n his essence; but to those who contemplate the
divine ess ence in heaven, the existence of God is more

self-evident than the principle of Contradiction is to men

here below.!75
Thus it is obvious that the existence of God is not
a self-evident truth.

But does it follow that God's exist-

ence c&""m.ot be demonstrated?

The atheist, the agnostic,.
and the skepti~ alJ.. reply in the affi1-mative. 176 Moreover

there is a ce~tain type of religious mindl77 which adheres
to both of the above propositions and professes to accept
174vide R. P. Phillips~ ~tgdarn Thomistic Philoso hx,
2 volumes1t'ondo11: Bur.as Oates & washboume LTI>, 1941 ; II,
293.
.
175Gilson, 22• £!£,., PP• 62f.
1

5

176carl Michelson does not have much confidence in
theistic proofs. (Dr. Michelson was the author's philosophy

teacher at Drew University.) Lewis Sperry Chafer asserts
that "attempted proofs" are ttuncalled for,'' See £1,a1or B.iJu&
Themes (Wheaton: Van I<ampen Press, c.1926), p. 19. According
to Watson °it cannot be proved that human reason made a
shlgle discovery in either moral or religious truth •• • •"
See 22• cit• ~· I, 24.

l77Known already by Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 A. o. )
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God's existence by faith.

Perhaps this attitude is justified

because some arguments arG so feeble and unimpressive that
they beget doubt as to wheti~er any valid proofs can be
discovered.
Now it is txue that in God gu\qrl1tx178 and existence
are identical.

To know God's essence is to know his eAist-

ence-... but we do not: knm·1 the divine essence.

Hence we

cannot employ it as a principle. in a theistic proof.

And

sinc:e we cannot demonstrate God's existence (a) nropter
guid 0 the only possible method is (b) guia.179

The only r.oad which can lead us to a knowledge of the

Creator must be cut through the things of sense. The
itr.mcdiate ac::ces.s to the cause being barred to us, it
remains
us to divine it with the help of its

f~o

effects.-

But if all pr'lnciples of demonstration have their origin in
sense...perception, does it not follow that everything super•
sensible is beyond the realm of proof?

No,. because Holy

Scripture assures us that the contrary is true.

St. Paul

declat.es by divine inspiration, "Nam invisibilia ipsius a
e2reatura mundi, factis in.t ellecta eonspiciuntur, ipsaque
sempiten1.a eius vir.t:us et divinitas, ad esse eos

1781.e., essence.
179YMe. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, nutrum Oeum esse sit
demon:strabile," 2.2• £if•, Prima Pars, Quaestio II, Articulus

2, Respondeo, Tome I,

l.

l80c1lson, 22• c\t •• p. 64.
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inexcusabiles . u 181

I t !.s t.mdeni able tha t C-od i s greater

than our Denses or anything s ensible , but when we a ttempt

to p1·ove his e};:i stence we begin ·wi t h his e ffects , and these

are s ense- objects .

Henc e ou r k.nouledge or t he super•

s ensible origL.,ates in the sensible.
From t he forego ing co11siderat ions i t is a pparent
tha t the existence of Go d cam'l()i: be grasped intui tivel y, 182

and a der!k;nstration i s t her efor e necessary.

How a ~emon•

--

str a ti.on must be either di1:ec t , or indirect. A direct
demonstration occupies i t self with r ational moti ves (or
causes) which influence the e:.iti t y demonstra t ed.

An indirect

demons tration proves one po·s ition i s t 1.-ue because its

opposite (a) is without foundation , (b) false , ( c) self contradictory~ or that it (d) leads inevi t ably to reduct io
~ . :3,l;>,!u3;durn •.

When a logici an wishes t o prove that t he co1,t l:'a~
pc h , t of vi.ew i .s t.macceptable ha resarts to indirect denon•

s t ra.ti on .

F:n: exat'11ple; suppose the s keptic affir ras that

certitude l i e s beyond the r each of human intellects.

If

one count ers by showing the qul:llit y of the objective evi~
dence and its unavoidable influence upon the mind, he is
181 Romans 1:20.
182
o •Ar cy!. W?• ~ · ! p. 159. However 110 hUu...an intellect
is capable Qf compre
cl1ng God fully; if thi.s were possible,
God would not be God. Vid! John Francis Noll & Lester J.

Fallon, Fathsr Smith Instructs Jackson (51st edition;
Huntington, Indiana: Our Stmday Visitor Press, 1947). P• 18.

11111

32l..

arguing

dtres~~.

nut i i one accepts the majo~ premise of

his opPonentj 183 and then asks him just how he became cer•
tain of ~...... this is the iJ'lci,-ress method of araumentation.
;

Thus db:ect demonstration t3rov~s that a thing is right

in itself; whereas i11direct demonst?ation shows that some•
thing is right because its opposite is wrong.

The validity

of inc11rect demonst ration is app~rent because two opposite
PQi.i." lts of vicaw cannot possibly be both tr,-te anc false
simultaneously.

The

Ol'le

must necessarily be true, and the

other must r1ecessarily be false, becau se the possibilities

are always eltl'lausted when a person considers opposites.
Two contradictories are sufficie11t to <:over the entire field.

If the logician can succeed in proving that 11 f.tt is true,

he thereby automatically proves that "Btt is false, and

I t is highly significant that when St. Thomas demonstrates the existence of God he employs the d1&:ect method.

A direct demonstration is concerned with reasons and causes
and

invariably ranges either (a) from caus·e•to-effect, 184

or (b) i:rom effect•to-cauee.185

-

When one reasons from cause-to-effect it is called a
183viz.~ that true certitude is unattainable.
18

4.r.e.,

1851 • e •

:>

££apter ,auid.
guia.
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nrio;i. 186 demonstration.

This term means ttfrom beforehand''

and indicates the forward view from a cause to its effect.

No empiri.cal data. :ls needed.

One merely examines a cause

and then states the inevitable. result, for example:
Spherical bodies cast spherical shadows,
The moon is a spheri.cal body,
Therefore the moon will cast a spherical shadow.187
This is a siQri: reasoning. 188 In this instance one does
not begin with the shadow as a known effect; rather he
begins w'lth the cause of the sha.doti1 anct then anticipates

the unavoidable effect. This is called "spider philosophyol89
because

\~1en

one thus reasons inductively it is unnecessary

to gather data& either by detailed experiment or by observa-

tion.

A person just sits down in his armchair and "spins"

conclusions out of his own mind.

(This is the standard

procedure of Rationalism past and pt"esei,t.)

On the other hand when one reasons from effect-to-cause
it is called

!. pj?§terlogi demon.s tration.

This term means

186It is unfortunate that the erudite Adam Clarke's
discussion is unsatisfactory at this point. But we don't
expect biblical commentators to be apologists. See 6, Commeptan
aEd pr1.t2;,cal Notes, 6 volumes (New edition; Hew York:
ingdoh•Cokesbury Press, n.d.); VI, 770.
187
or~ ttThere are rabbits in the garden; my lettuce
will be eaten." Cf. A. G. Hebert, S£udies in ~- Ihomas
(Londont Society for Promoting Chrlstfu Knowledge, c.1§36),

P• 24.

.

188All data is derived from within the mind.

van Til who
or. van Til was his
philosophy professor at Westminster Seminary.
189tt was perhaps the venerable Cornelius

first point.e d this out to the author.
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"fn:,m afterward" and denotes the backward glance from an

effect to 1.ts cause.

The person who reaSons .!

;erlon

can

foretell the effect infallibly by simply studying the cause.
The person who reasons!. posterigri is never cognizant of
the effect beforehand.

He knows it only after it has

occurred~ but from his examination of the effect he is able
to make an

°ss ,cathedra"

judgment concerning the type of

cause which produced it, for example:
All bodies ·which cast spherical shadows are spherical
themselves.
The moon casts a spherical shadow.
Therefo~e the moon itself is a spherical body. 190
1'his is !.

oost,.eftori reasoning. One begins with the effect

(the shadow) and from it he infers its cause.

This is called

''ant philoeophyH because when a person thus reasons deductively

he invariably gathers information before he draws a conclusion.

He first accumulates factual data; then he makes a
Some of the biblical writers (anticipating

judgment.

modern science by almost tt«>· millennia) employ this empiri•
cal method.

However this kind of reasoning is impotent to

impart a perfect knowledge of the divine· essence.
When

st. Thomas deu-ionstrates the existence of God he

argues ·f rom effect•to-cause; namely, !!, J.?2Stetj.o~.

This is

logical (and proper) because no one can approach God 4 priori.
It is impossible to go back beycnd God because GQd is the
190or, "My lettuce has been eaten-..-those rabbits again."
Cf. Hebert, ~oc. cit.
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first Beil1g absolutely.

Nor can a person study the causes

of God, because they are non-existent.
attach itself to Deity.

Causality does not

God is the first and necessary

Being and is unavoidably eauseless.
In the area of 'l'heodicy the sum total of our knowledge

about God is the t'esult of!. P9Steriori reasoning, that is,
One (a) acknowledges God as the First Cause of all things,
visible and invisible;l91 (b) attributes to Hirn all perfections which ar.e recognized~ creatures;l92 (c) assumesl93

that the perfections of God. are eminently superior to those
found ir1 cre ated beings; 194 (d) deletes every imperfection
from his concept of God, ascrib.as

to Him all possible

perfections in an infinite degl'eG; and then identifies them
with the Divine Essence.195
Conclusion

The author realizes that this brief intxoduction to
Th()mism i.s by no

me&1$

exhaustive.

However he sincerely

hopes that these few remarks will render the Five Ways more
191This is known as "causalitytt in Scholastic termi-

nology.

192This is called "attributionu by the Thomists4\
193If ~ne knows that God exists he automatically knows
something about the divine nature. ~ Heyer, 19s. cit.
194This is designated "transcendence" in the Scholastic
vocabulary.

1951.e., denial of limitation.
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intelligible to the average reader.

These proofs are like

five tiny gems in a huge cn,wn or five little shrubs (with
long roo ts ) on top of P1ke•s Peak.

In a sense they

resemble icebez-gs~ because the major portion of each lies
subnerged beneath the surface ..

They may appear trivial and

insignificant in, the sµrnrnal96 but their h.idde11 presupposi•

tion·s are tremendous.

In fa.et t.o understand the Fi'tJe ways

is to under-stand the essence of Thomistic philosophy. 197

------·-...-----·
...

-·

l96Like fi.ve small isl.ands in the Pacific Ocean ..

197The author is deeply indebted to Felician A. Foy,
o. F. M.i for checking a portion of this chapter for accuracy.
Fr. Foy is a Franciscan monk at the monastery of St.
Bonaventu:re (Paterson, N. J.) and editor of
National
iathot;c ~lmanac. (The author lived near th · s monastery
or s
years and is happy to count Fr. Foy as a personal

Ihe

friend.)

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST WAY OF

s·r.

THOMAS: MOTION

Introductory
Christendom is deeply indebted to St. Thomas for his
classic formulation of the Five Classic Proofs for the
existence of God.

The universality of these arguments may

be noted from the fact that every finite being is:
a. Mobile•• • • • • • • • • • .and is dependent upon
the first immobile Hover •
b. Caused in causing • • • • • • and is dependent on the
fi~st uncaused Cause •
c. Conti ngent. . . . . . . . ,. • • and i.s dependent upon
the f i r s t necessary
Being.
d. Composite and imperfect • • • and is dependent upon
the me tilt per£ect and

most simple Being.

e. Ordained to something • • ,. .and is dependent ~n the

supreme Ordainer.

The Proof Stated

lTne author is indebted to Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange
for this outline. (It is ru>t an exact quotation.) Vide ·
his· booki, 1!il. Qn!l rod, translated from the French by Dom.
Bede Rose {St. Lou .s: B. Herder Book Company, 1943), p. 137.
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The first proof2 of the Angelic Doctor. is the argument
from ~J;.9.!l• 3

His lucid a nd profo.und sta-t ement is as

followsg
Raspondeo di cendum qttod Deum esse quinque vi.is probari
potes t .. Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae
sumit:ur ex parte rnotus. Certum est enim , e t sensu
conatat s aliqua mover i in hoc mundo.

move tur , ab a lio movetur.

Omne autem quod

Nihil eni.'TI mo,,e~"tll", nisi

s ecw1du.'1l quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod

moveturg rr.ovet autem aliquid secundum quod est act:u.
Movere ~nim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de
potent:ta in acturo : de potenti a autem non pot est ali•
quid reduci i n actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu:
s icut ca lidum i11 a c t1J, ut ignis, faci t lignum, quod

e s t calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc
move t et altexat ipsum. Non au tem est possibile ut
id~m sit s imul in actu e t potentia secundu.~ idem, sed
sol.un1 secundum d iver.sa: quod enim est calidum in actu,
non potes t simul esse calidum in potentia$ sed est
simul f:r:i gidun in potentia. L~possibil e est ergo quod,
secundt.tm idem e t eodem modoi a.liquid set movens et

motum 0 vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur,
oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur,
moveatur, opor tet et ipsum ab alio moveri; et illud ab
al io. Hie autem non est procedere in infinitum: quia
sic non esset aliquod primum mavens; et per consequens
ne·c aliquod a.liud movens$ quia moventia secunda non
move11t nisi per hoc quod sunt ntota a primo rnovente,

s i cut bacul.us non

movet

nisi per hoc quod est motus a

2Th1s f amous proof is also known as the ukinet:ic argume1.1t." Vide Charles R. Baschab, ! id!PAA.~ S?i,, ~--Scholasti!!
Phil9sopii.ft3rd revised edition; st. Loui s; B. Herder Book
Companyt> 929), p. 403.
3Apparently this proof is ignored by the majority of

Pn>testant theologians, Cf. (a) P. s. Fitzwater. Phitstian
Ih@WB:Z (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 194.8 ), P• 73;. also b)
GeorgeChristian Knapp, Lec~rei sm pbr is.ttan Theo\gcy;,
translated from the German by Leonard Woods (2nd American
Edition; Philadelphia: J. w. Moore, 1854), p. 86.
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manu.

Ergo necesse est devenize ad aliquod printun,

movens; quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Oeum. t} ·

The Proof Outlined
a. The DATUM- S_o met:hi:ng which moves.
0

It is certain$ and evident to our senses, that in
the world some ·t.:hings are in moticn.
b. l'he first PJ.U::NISE--

N'ow ·whate,1er is moved is movecl by ano t her• • • •
c . The ARGUMENT for the fi1:·st premise-

0

• • • for nothL~e can be moved except it i s in
potentiali t y to that towards which i t is moved;
where.as a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothtng else than the reduct ion of
something from potentiality to act:uaU.ty.

But

nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality,
e~cep~ by somethtne L~ a state of actuality. Thus
t hat which is actually hot, as fire, makes \1,'0od,
which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and
the reby moves and changes it. Now it is not possi•
ble that the same thing should be at once in
actuality and potentiality in the same respect,
but only in di.fferent: respects. For what is
actually hot caimot simultaneously be potentially
hot ; but it: i s simulf:R.•,..- ·'""··" ;- potentially cold.
It is therefore impossible that in the same respect

4s. Thomae Aquinatis• "Utrum Deus sit,'* sui;gma Theologiae,
cura et studio Sac. Petri Caramella (tres tomi; cum taxtu
ex recensione Leoniua; Marietti, Taurini: Romae, 1952), Prima
Pars, Quaestio II, Art1culus 3, Tomus I, 12. This proof
also appears in !he Summa Conti;:a Gentiles. Vife St. Thomas
Aquinas, Qi .QQ.d. a..11d His Creatures, translated rom the Latin
by Joseph R1ckaby°1'Westminster, Maryland: The Carroll Press,
1950), P• 11. The argument is substantially the same but
in The Swef! Tbeotofisa it is stated in "simplified form."
Thisis not surprs~ng because the latter work is intended
for beginn~rs. Vide Etienne Gilson, Ibs Philosophy i2f. st.
fho~s Agu~nas, translated from the French by Edward Bullough
Cam ridge:

w.

Heffer and Sons, LTD, 1929), p. 66.

·
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an.d in the same way a thing should be both mover

and ~ovecl , i. e ., that it should move itself.
d. Th e second PREHISE••tv'i.0ved movements cannot extend

u1to infinity.

Eternal regress is an impossibility.

If that by whieh it is moved be itself moved, then
t his a l so must needs be moved by another, and that
by anot her ag.ain. But thi s camiot go on to
i nfini ty• • • •

e . 1'he ARGUMENT f or the second premisG••
• • • beco.use t hen there would be r.o first mover~
and, consequeutly, no other mover, seeing that
m.iliseque.ut ntov exs move only inasmuch a s t hey are
moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only
b~causG it i s moved by the hand.

f. The CCNCt.UnION-"."
Therefore i t :ts :necessary to a?rive at a fizst.
ciover • • • •
g. The COROLLARX of the conc~usion~-The firs t mover
i s irrmovable o.: unmovL,g. :-.>
• • • moved by no other. • • • 6

The Proof Explained
The Ba~kgi:ound

5God is the "MQIQR MJmDl JMl•~OIUS." ~ Baschab, 22•
to~
.
C i t. t P• -~ :> ..
6 The author is indebted to William Bryar for this outline.

See St. !hoiuas and the Existence of God (Chicago:

Henry Reg11eey Company, -rg.;rr; pp. l33'f'; T he English q\.mtations from Tlli ~,}J'mX?a Th!:Jf&!.ru are taken f r om ~~ W£it;:1!)8S
Q£_ Sa1t5t ~10mas Aquinas,
VO umes, trauslated f rom th~

Latin Y • shapcote and corrected by Anton c. Pegis (New
York: Random House, c.1945), 1 9 22.
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St. Thomas did not "invent" any of these proofs; 7 for
example 0 the argument based \tpOn local. motion is a relic
of "psychical astronoroyn8 which Plato9 probably borrowed
from the Pythagoreans.

Plato passed 1 t a.long to AristotlejO

and the Stagirite bequeathed it to the Neo•Platonists.
They gave it to the Arabs and the Arabs passed it along
to the mediaeval Schoolmen.

Thus, the proof was lost to

Europe until the cwelfth cei.1tury of the Christian Era.II
It was finally

01

cast out" by Newton. 12

The metaphysical difference between St. Thomas and
Aristotle is profound at this point.13

In fact the Angelic

Doctor has purified the Stagirite to such an extent that
7John v. Flynn.11 s. J. Fr. Flynn was formerly Chairman
of the Philosophy Department in the Graduate School of Arts
and Sciences at Fordham University. He was one of the
author's professors in the area of Natural Theology.
8

Joseph Rickaby 9 ;itud1,e-s 9.!! Go~ and

~ts

Creaf.res

(London; Longmans, Green and Company,~2~, P• 3~

9ur.awsl)" Book x, 894, lll!! Q1al~s 2.f. Peato, 2 vols.,
translated ·f rom the Greek b1 Benjam ~owet:t New York:
Random Rouse 9 c.1937) 9 II 9 636.
lOsee ;~Physies,ft translated from the Greek by R. P.

Hardie and R. K. Gayel) Books VII, VIII, Ib.2Jasic Works gt
A

s.t t e, edited by Richard McKean (New Yo

: Random House,

; pp. 340°94i also 11 Netaphysiea," translated from the
Greek y W. D. Ross, Book XII,~., PP• 872-88.
c.

11Gilson 9 ls&• cit,,

l2Ricl<.aby$ 22• s.!:.t.•1 PP• 38£.
13
Vj.de Etienne Gilson, IW1 §p\rit 2!, Megiaeyal Ph!12!9PhY,
translated from the French by A. H. c. Downes (New York:
scribner~s, 1940), pp. 45, 74f.
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the Fi~st Way may properly be designated as Thomistic
rather than Aristotelian.. 14
The first three proofs of st. Thomas are founded upon
the principle of efficient causality.15 The third is undergirded by three axioms,16 namely:
a. Omne quod movet:ur ab alio movetur.17
b. Nihil movetur, nisi seC\mdum _quod est 1n potentia
ad illud ad quod movetur.18
c. Nihil potest reduci in actum, nisi per ali quad ens
qiwd est in actu.19

Nothing is more obvious than motion in the physical world
about us.

Every material entity is in a state of constant

change.20

Astronomy teaches us that the heavenly bodies

are in motion.

planet.

Geology records the development of our

Biology is concerned with the mysterious phenomena

lli,;ide Jacques Maritain, .&1 ntroduct on ,t2 Phi~sophY,
translated-from the French by E. I. Wat~in ·London a~ New
York: Sheed and ward, c.19.51?), P• 74.

and L~!:;::~

ii;~~l9~ d ~6i!4th impression;

St. Louis

16Fr. Flynn.
171.e.~ 0 Everything moved is moved by another.!' Aristotle's
Quidquid movetur, ab alio moveturtt has reference to what
Baschab calls "ontological evolution.rt See 22• cit., P• 403.

0

18r.e•• "Nothing is moved except it is in potency to

which it is moved.u

191 .. e •• ttNothing can be reduced to act but by some being
in a.c t. 11
·
20All changeable substance is finite. Vide Francis
Varvello• Metffi?hYsles, translated from the French by Arthur
D. Fearon tsan Francisco: University of san Francisco Press.

c.1933) 1 P• 266.
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of growth.

Chemistry21 ~nd physics deal with the movements

of atoms:; numerous "'combinations of inorganic elements" and
"caloric vibrations.1122

Now it :ts th1$ fundamental fact of change which has
inspired St. Thomas to ao11struct his lu.-ninous proof.

In

fa~t the Abbe Dubois has attempted to show that all the
argume11ts for the existence of God are only phases of th.is

first Way .. 23
The principle

The: phenomenon of motion is fundamental and universal.
\~1en the Angelic Doctor built his first theistic proof upon
this fouudat~on he built

Err~ .,,-/Tro.v

.24

He appealed

not only to Qbvious truth but to a metaphysical truth as
well.

There can be no reasonable doubt concerning the fact

of change.

This is indisputable but the.re is a serious

problem in ~elation to the nature of this fact.

In ancient

times Aristotle disagreed with the principal schools of
Greek thought.

However the same problem appears in modern

21Anything composite is subject to corruption.
22John T. Dri.scoll~ Christian Pbilosopb~ (New Yo-r k:
Benziger Brothers, 1900), p.• 129.
23~
footnote #1, ibid.

24Hat. 7:24.
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tirnes.25
By the term motiQ!l St. 'Thomas means "any change,"26

development,, 27 progress, becorning,28 Qr evolution2'9 from
one state of bei..Tlg into anothett".30

In general we can define

motion as change.
Movement means t he actualization of potentiality; for

example, a tiny grain of wheat possesses the potentiality
to ,Q.,W~ something other than it is at present. 3l

Every

block of marble is a potential s,tatue._ 32 But one is prone
to forget that only the actual can actualize the potential;

for example, fire is act ually hot, whereas wood is only
potentially hot.
it into heat ..

Hence ,«>od requires fire to act-ualize

A blazing log is hot bec.a use it came in con.,.

tact with an.other blazing log.33 Potenti ality is never
25E.g.• , Hegelianism.

26Edwir1 A. B1.1rtt~ IXPEi:it ..of Rel1-gio~s Philo§PphY (revised

edition; New York: Harpers, c:1'951), p.

74. .

27~·1alter Farrell, A Com:inign SQ the sumna& 4 volumes
{Mew York~ Sheed and ward, c. ~lii~; I, 30.
28
l.l?!sl•, P• 29.

29Fulton J. Sheen .. Phi~e~Yhy of Religion (Neu York;

Appleton-Centu1..7•Crofts, c.C
p:-1~'.S. Cf. Amos Binney
and Daniel Steele; a·~e1f• s Thgoio,ical Com,enq Improved
(New York: Phillips an '.Funt~ c.18 5), p. 7 •

30Gl.enn 1 9.E• .sit.• t PP• 5 9f.
31Jacques Maritain, tDJ?'ta.ches !.Q.. ~ , tt"anslated from
the French by Peter O'Reil.y New York: Harper's, c.1954),
pp. 26f.
32cf. Farrell, SU!• cit., I, 29.
33A. G. Hebert, Stu~§ !n .et• T~mas (London: Society
for Promoting Christian 1 wledge, c • . jg), p. 18.

I .

To deny this is to infer that being

self-actualizing.

emerges from nothingness.34 Nor can anything he both actual
and potential simultaneously.

Thus the mover and the thing

moved are never identical.35
Whe11. an entity chai1gee we assert that it is in motion.

Now cha.nge effects (a) }.)0Sition 1n place, or (b) quality,
or (c) quantity.

As one observc.s the external world he

per.ceivea that the raw material of sense experience consists of multitudinous changes·.

But motion is not constant;

that is, everybody does not move all the time.

However

motion is constant in the sense t hat some bodies are moving
at all times.

Renee it is correct to asser t that bo-dies

are either. !11 motion or at rest36 in the sensible world.
On the other hand whe1., we delve into the sub-mit;:roscopic

world we discover that motion is literally constant.
electrons and protons are ever in motion.

t, • • •

The

requiem

non ha.bent die ac noet¢ • • • • u37 Their action is ceaseless.
·rhe prop1:rt:ies of physical bodies are studied in th~

science of physics.

'fhe very essenc.e of material entities

are i-nertia and force.

Inertia causes bodies to be

34sheen, Q!!.• cit., p. 126.

35Gl~nn, 22• S.'=1•• P• 63.
36The Athenian observes that 11 s0me things are in motion
and others at rest." Pla.to 9 11 La.ws," Book X, 893, Jowett,
2.2• .s!t,., II, 635.

37Apocal ypsis 4:8-.
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0

111different" to either repose38 or movement.

is u content 0 to ~emain in either state saecula

Everybody

saeculorum.

The presupposition underlying this law is that a body can
be either a t rest or in motion.
The physicist a lso deals with ene~gy.

noreover there

are two kincls 9 namely 9 potential .and kinetic.
enexgy :ts Hloc ked.. up" energy,

Oi;"

Potenti§l

nene!!gy at rest:," 39 that

is, the ability to exert pot-1er when the opportunity arrives,

for exaraple 9 a suspended stone.

but i t ~ fall .

It is in a state of rest,

It has the potency to exert action just

as soorl as t he impediment is renoved. 40

I t possesses

Tb.is is potential energy. 41

energy which i s not being used.

On the other hand when energy is released it is called
kinetic energy .

This term may be defined as 0 active force." 42

It i s tt enexgy in action.1143

The power of kinetic energy is

• ,a ..-..

38Aristot1.e defines rest as !tthe privation of motion."
See flPhysica,n Book VIII, Chapter 1, :,o..""V, l"icKeon, 21?• sit•,
p. 356.

39celestine N. Bittle,~ and ~is Creatures (Milwaukee:
The Bruce f'.1blish1ng Company, c.
P• 70 •.

m3 ;

40cf. II Thessalonians 2:7.
41There is no potentiality in Gad. He is 11 actus
J?J.!rua." Vi.de Haur1ce De Wulf ., ,Scho~asti,cism Qld and Newa
trat1slat;:adfmm the French by P. Co fey {London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1910), p. 1.12.

42nr iscoll~ 22• cit., p. 131.
43 Bittle, ~q_,c. cit•
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expre s sed by the f ormula: 4.4

~
.. .
Thi s same di s tinction is t rue in the supermundane realm
of metaphysics. 45 Her e the pr oper ties of being are studied
and the real nat ure of pot ency and act are considered.

Pote11e y i a changed i nto act46 by an exterior power.

mover convert s a body at r est into a state of motion.

1'his

The

impulse l"'ecei ved from this extrinsic mover changes the poten•·
ti.al e..11ergy into kinetic energy.

Now this change from rest

to act i vi t y i s t he very foundation of the definition . for
mot ion employed by Schola st.ic philosophers.

fines mo tion thus:

.!n

.§2

.~fl?:. U

ll

Aristotle de•

tt!ht fulf\,l.men,.S g! what .t_xists potentially,

e;liists

potent;i~llY • • • • u47 He also

def 1nes motio11 a s " t he fulfilment of the movable in so far
as i t is movable, u48 for exam1,le.t ••sronze i s potential ly a

44-on scol!, l oc:. ~it.
45~.3tsi,t~:n 2f Cprlstic!,n ~ctr~e, ttBy A Seminary
Professor' {St~edition; Philadephia: John Joseph He Vey,
1921), p. 29.
46
Motion may be defined as t h e tra.."lsit i on f rom potency
to act.
4 70 Physlca,'' Book III, Chapter 1, x; McKeon, SU?.• cit.,
P. 254. •
l+Sibid., Book VIII,, Chapter 1,

V•X•

NcI<eon,. ibig., P• 355.

3l:.O

statue.u 49

St. !'horn.as agrees with this definit:J.on.50

Thus in Scholt:tst::l.c philooo phy the funda.-nental concept is
based upo11 a t wo... fold o bse rvat.io!1. , rdlmely I the ordinary and

the s cientific ..

Anci ent er rors
In ancient tir11es Parmeuides de n i ed the fac t -o f motion.

He s tarted with two pr inciples, namely, i.dentit y and contradiction. Sl

ttBeing is being; non-being is non•being; both

ca n never be i dentica1. n52

?-':oreover Parmenides drew a con•

clu s1on from these two pr i nciples, namely,
Whatever is~ i s; 't"mateve r is 1'l0t , is no t hing; from
110th1ng no thiI1g c an become, because nothing has

n.ot h:L~g to give; what already is, cannot become,
because 1~ a lready is wg't it is: hence , all becoming
(change) LB imposs iblP..

Thus every being is unchangeable.

!t remains just what it

I t can 11,ever change into anything else. Nothing
eve r comes into existence54 and nothing -which exists

is fo r e ver.
i-1ew

-------

49,l bid., Book III t Chapt $r 1,. x, Hcl<eon, ibid. I! P• 254.

50see I!ul ~ Th~logica, Part I, Question xc, Article
2, Pegis , 21?.• ~ . , I, ~6; also~ §l:!!!!ID.! Contra Gentiles,
trar1slata d f rom the Lat in by r:·r. Snapeote,. Par t III, Chapter
82, Pegis, !2.2• .si:.t•~ II , P• 154.
5 laittle, 21?• ci~•• P• 59.
52Quoted by Bittle, ibid.
53quoted thus by Bittle,

JJ21s!.

54A denial of creation by implication.
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ever peri she s.

Betng i s indivisible and changeless.

Being is an etet-nals, i mmovable whole.
nut ·what a bou t t he obvi,1u$ fac t of change in the

empirical ~'IQr l d?

Parmeni des expla il1s all this as illusions

of our senses. 55 Rea son asserts that change is impossible.
'rherefot'e a l l things are perma11e..,,t.
0

Mo~t on is an illusion;

change i s only apparene.1156

In modern times Herbart has followed in the footstaps
of Parmenides .

He t oo denied the reality of change.

On the other hand Ue~aclitup d~~i~d t he fact of rest.

He ma:lnt:ained that motion i s perpet ual ..
"All things flowv not h ing abides .u57

Change ts constant .

There is nothing to,

which we can poi rit 1.n the world of sense and affirm that
it is pertrianent because everything change s.

There is only

one real enti ty, namely, process , change~ p(arpetual flux.
uNature l o ves to hidG." 58

•10ne cannot step twice into the

same rivez-. n59 Heraclitus defined the essence of being a.s
beeoming.

The first pr i nci ple is fire.

11

All things ar e

S5t.1aza. Cf. John B. Noss , r·f.an' s iel~jons ( New York:
Macmillan, 1953), PP• . 119 , 240££. ,. 278 & , , •
56
Quot~d by Bittle, !2£• sll•
57
charl~s ;1. Bakewell~ Source .~ ~ok in An~~ent Phi\9~~hy:
(New Yo:rk, Cnicago, Bost on; Scl:'ibner' s sons, c •.1907), P• ~~.
This is a quotation from Heraclitus.
58This fragment; ( ~6123) from Heraclitus is quotad by

Bakewell• i9Ld., P• 35.

59Fragment /}-91, quoted by Bakewell, !!?!g., p. 33.
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ei:changed for tire and fire for all things, just as wares

are exchanged for gold and gold for wares.n60 Everything
is some form of fire and fire changes constantly.

Non•

belng rises~ the level of being$ and being recedes to the
le,,e 1 of non°being..

cal.

Therefore nothing and being are identi•

"The way up and the Hay down is one and tl1e sa.mc.tt61

OnG and the same thing a.re the living and the dead,
the waking and the sleeping, the young and th.?. old;
the fot.•·mes: change and are the latt~r, t he latter
change in tui."ll and are the former. 02

The only reality is change or becoming.
One moden1 disciple of Heraclitus is Georg Wilhelm

Friedrich Hegel .

The doctrine of Heraclitus is totally

materialistic because ha was concem.ed onl7 with the motion
of materia l entities.
everythi.ng.

Hegel e11larged the concept to include

He taught t:hat all things are becoming. 63

Every existing thing is just a manifestation.

Evolution is

apparent. on three levels, 11cL~ely (a) logic$ (b) nature, and
(c) hunan thought.
0

There is no rest.

There is only

constanf.:: movement ctnd evolution.u64

60 FT.agraent {i90.., quoted, j.Jlj.,g.

61Fragment tH50, quoted, ibi<t., P• 31.
62Fragment i~88,. quoted,
63v,i,a William Wallace!

Clarendon Press, 1874), p~

6b;.,g.,

p. 33.

~ Lggic gl,

3~

64
.
Driscoll, £1?• ,S!S., p. 132.

He,&el (O-xford:
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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz also belongs to the school
of Heraclitus.

He regarded potency as a third entity,

that is, a kind of intermediary standing between act and

repose.65
The argument
Plato distinguishes ten different kinds of motion ..
However according to one divtsion there are only eight,
1uuaely:
a. Motion of a body moving on its axis.

b. Transitory motion,. namely, motion from place to .
place~ up and down, ~t cetera.
c. A combination of the first tl«> types, namely, a body

rotating upon its axis and also moving from place
to place.

d. Divi·s ion.

e. Composition.
f. Growth.

g. Decay through division.
h. Generation and destruction.66

But according to another division there are only two kinds
of motion, namely (a) a moved-mover, and (b) an unmoved-mover.
65l2!5!•

. Cf. Leibn·i;, translated fl:'otn the German by
George R. Montgomery tReprint; Chicago: Open Court, 1931),
.

pp. 164-66-.

66nLaW$;_" Book X; 893f~,· Jowett., !m• £1-t•, II, P• 635.
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Thus there a r e ~ gact2 ten types of motion but the last
11

is ten thou sa nd times superior to all the others."

Spontaneous mot ion is ttthe mightiest and most efficientu 67
and ought r eally t o be number gne in this hierarchy.

This

is evident because all the other motions are dependent

upon such a mover.

Then number~ would be second in

the scale.
Aristotle teaches that time is et~ntal because if we
admit that time began; then there must necessarily be a
bef2Ie time .

Now eit her time and motion are identical• or
time is 0 an attribute of movement. 1168 Therefore motion is

also e t e rnal..

If we admit that there ever was a time when

everything was 1n a state of rest., motion would never have

begun and all would be at rest now.69
Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of motion, namely
(a) local . (b) qualitative, and (c) quantitative.70 More-

over he discerns four· different types of locomotion, namely
(a) pulling 9 (b) pushing, (c) carrying, and (d) twir11ng.7l
Plato affirms that this first-mover

0

1s the true

67"Laws, 11 Book X 1 894, W,g. o II, 636.

68nMetaphysica," Book XII, Chapter 6,
cit. 19 p. 877.

x,

HcKeon, 9J2·•

6 9 ~ "Physica,tt Book V1II, Chapter 1, ibid., P• 355.

7o"Physica," Book VII, Chapter l, ibid., p. 342.
71
"Physica, 0 Book VII, Chapter 2, Ws•i p. 343.
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principle of change and motion in all that is."72 The

prime!irlnover73 is self-moved; that is, he moves himself.
On the other hand Aristotle infers an unmoved-mover. 74 "an

eternal, unmovable substance.u7.5
At first one might suppose that these concepts are
contTadictory 1 but not so.

When Plato speaks of spontaneous

motion he is guarding against the inference that this first

mover is passive and inert.

Likewise Aristotle attempts

to show t hat t his prime-mover is at rest in the sense that
he is unchangeable; that is, he is not subjact to either
qualitative or quantitative motion.76
Fulton J. Sheen77 distinguishes six different kinds
of motioni, namely (a) local, (b) cosmic; (c) substantial;
(d) accidental ., (e) qualitat1ve and ( f) quantitative. 78
1

This table is un.d oubtedly superior to the ones given _by

Plato and Aristotl~ ,13upra..
7 2 tttaws," Book

x,

However in this chapter the

894; Jowett, 92•. cit.; Ve>l. II, 636.

731.e.; the soui/souls.

741n t he end he has fifty~five movers, but Fr. Flynn
observes that one seems t.o be supreme over the others.
75.,Hetaphysica .. n Book XII,. Chapter 6~ HcReon, on. cit.,

P• 877.

~

•

-

76st. Thontas ~econciles these O..'O concepts and shows
that there is no contradiction. See T h e ~ Contra
Gentiles, Part I, Chapter 13.
·
77A personal friend of the author.
78sheen, 22•

ctt.,

p. 124.

I
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author Will distinguish only two types, namely (a) local,
and (b) mutation.

By l9gal motion is meant locomotion,79

that is, movement: from one place to anothe.r ; for example,.

(a) Peter walks to school; (b) a jet airplane soars from
New York to Parts.11 (c) the planets glide in their orbits

around the sun.

or

(d) the heaving ocean, (e) :rustling

leaves, (£) creeping cloudst .(g) flowing brooks, (h) beating
hearts 9 (1.) sunrise and sunset.
On the othe'lt hand motion may be eitl1er quantitative

or qualitative.

QH5&,1ti~4eiv,.s change occurs whenever the

size of. an object increases or dim'-.J1ishes; for example,
(a) inanimate bodies increase or decrease through friction ·
or attraction; (b) living entities experience the phenomenon

of growth.

The final type of change is the gualitative;

for example, (a) a cold object may become hot, (b) a sweet
liquid bittex-, (c) a white surface black, (d) a pleasant
odor nauseous 9 or (e) the harmonious discordant.so

Some-

times (f) the ignorant force their way into the paradise
of knowledge,81 and occasionally (g) a sinner becomes a

saint.
79Fr. Flynn expresses a doubt as to whe·ther this p~of
dare begin with local motion. In The SUntna Contra Genttles
St. Thomas does -not use this type o"r'motion as a'.n examp e.
(Qualitative only.)
.soAristotle refers tQ the "musicatn as changing into

'*non~mus:Lcal.'*
21?•

sl£•,

Slcf •
Pegis' 212•

See 11 Physica, 0 Book I, Chapter 5, v, HcKeon,
P• 227.

~tt S.vw;a ~!R.~~~ica
•85.
I

C

.• '

Ol11

'

Part I I Questions cv-cv1.•
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Now both quantitative and qualitative motion may be
designated by t he t erm myt§tiQ,!!.82

Thus the argu:nent from

motion "t·rill follow in two channels, namely, locomotion,

and mut ati on .

The f irst is confined to the realm of the

physical sci ences ; t he second deals more with metaphysics.
Aristotle was really the firs t to ·propose the argument
whi ch is based upon loca l m,otion. 83 St. Thomas later
develop s it in t he Aristo telian sense hut Suarez r.ejoets it.

He ?'egarcis it ae weak and nar rou .

His conc lusion is, Higitur

ex sol~ mot'.l coeli nulla est sufficiens via ad hujus-modi
demonstrat:tom~m oo:nfictendarn." 84

Suare z changed this proof

so drasti.cally t hat he deprived it of i ts "demonstrative

valieity. 11 85 He argues from a s trange type of locomotion
and ref lects the immat ure physics of his day.

However the

argument ha s been revived86 and recast in a new mould which
takes i nt o consideration more recent a dvance s in the physi•
cal s ciences.

Acco:rding to physical science the phenomena of motion

-------

82or1scoll, SU?• cit., p. 134.

83"Physica," Book VII, McKeon, 22• cit., PP• 340ff.

B~uoted

by

Driscol l, 12£• .£!!•

( ~ f ootnote 110.)

85Garrigou•Lagrange, 22• £it., p. 136.
86By Abbi Farges, Father Pesch and Cardinal Satolli.
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may be e:itpla:lned t,1pon the basis of gravitation. 87

attract each oth~r.

Bodies

There i s an invisible, myoterious power

in natu~e which tends to imite things.

lie are indebted to

Newtcm fo!" formula ting the law which govems their ttmutual

action and reaction.ts

One body attra.cta another "in the

direct ratio of the squares of the masses and the inverse
square of the distances • • • • u88

A

= rn

An example is:

2

2

d

This law reigns supreme in all parts of the physical uni~
verse. 89 Thus the heavenly bodies whirl through stellar
space in blind obedience to this sovereign law.

The

astronomer is confident they idll never swing out of their
orbits because of their unquestioned allegiance to this
august law.

Chemistry and physics have even discovered

that this ~igor6us law holds sway over invisible molecules

87 Even if there were only two bodies in the universe
they could start motion by gravitation, and there would be
no necessity for God or at'ly external cause whatever. Joseph
Rickaby quotes Sir George Stokes as declaring th&t if "a
mass • • • were at rest, motion would be produced as a result
of gravitation• • • •" See S,tudtes gn Q.gd ~d ~ Crea~uie§,
.22• cit., p. 37.
88priscoll, SU?•.£!.£., p. 135.
89Nucle.ar physics might be able to ~ite sorne exceptions

in the sub-microscopic realm.

·

3l~9
1n bodtes .

Chemi.cal aff inity l aws have a l ready been stated.

Hodem s~:tenc e recogx1izes the uni versal l aw of gravit:at ,.on but the~e i s disagre ement concerning its nature. The
.tcchani sta90 aff i rm that matt e? is completely passi ve. The

power of a ttzacti.on i s not i nherent in the 1naterj~al subst ance.
Rathe r t h is pecul:i.ar power aris e s f rom s ome ext rinsic source.

I n suppor t: of their posit i on t hey appeal t o certain· physical

laws anc1 princi pl es :> for example, the l aw of inertia.
lacks trl.ll.

HattE:r

Hence it " cares" not whether it is in a state

of mo tton or r epose.

If a body i s at r est it will remain

at r e s t unti l some external cause ~et s it in motion; i f a
body i s i n mo t ion it

ve l oci~y

u1

will continue to rr.ove at t he same

the same direction until some ext r aneous impedi-

ment comp~1s · 1t to stop. 91 Nor i s ther e any exception to
thi s rule in t he empirica l worl d.

This law con trols the

movemEmt s of t he most colossal star s a s ivel l as t he most
minute particles of mat t er.

In fact the science of mechanics

is based upon t his very pr inciple.
They also appeal to t he law of the con servati on of
energy.

This law is a l so W1ive?'sal .

It affirms t hat t he

sum total of pot ent ial and kinet tc ener gy r emains constant.
90oescart e s, §Ji..!!!•

91 Newton•s first law of motion is, "Corpus omne

persever a re in sta tu suo quiescendi vel movendi unifQ~witer
in directum ni si quatenus. A viribus :t.mpressis cogitur
statum i 1-lud mut.are." (If Newton is correct the proofs
from motion employed by Aristotle and st. Thomas collapse.)
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No energy is ever lost ar,d none is ever created; for
example,
P

+ A = C.

The amount s of potential and actual en.a rgy may vary but
tha sum i e i nvariably the sai"Ile-; for -example,
(A

~

I)

4

(P •

I)

= C.

(A

~

I)

+

(P

+

I)

=

Or

c.

The i,o:rni o f energy change s, but the amormt never changes.
On t he o t her hm1d the Dyna.-nists92 maintain that matter

is pa r tit:i l l y active .

There is an element within matter

which is not completely passive.

This hidden factor explains

the strange phenomenon of attraction.

Of course there is

a:n element of truth in the law of inertia, namely, matter
ts not a self - mover .

This school distinguishes clearly

between animate and inanimate bodies.

Yet they insist that

there is a myste.r ious power resident in matter which cat~ses

bodies to attract one another.

However this peculiar power

is conditioned or limited by two factors, namely, (a) the
size of the bodie.s concetT1ed, and (b) the distance between

them.

Hence the law of. gravitation can be expressed by the

following formula:
A

=

2
m

2
d

92Leibniz is the founder of this school.
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One conclusion which follows in the wake of bo·th

theories is atheism; that is, we have a universe in which
we have action and interaction, but no one is compelled to
admit the existence of a prime mover.

The fact of motion

is obvious but an initial cause is unnecessary.
But this conclusion

is

false.

motion does not reside in matter.
from some external source.

According to Nechanism

Rather it originates

All atoms have the satne nature.

Therefore if these physical elements were not acted upon
by some outside force they t«>uld remain motionless forever.

All matter would be inert and motion would be an imposaibility.93 But these elements are in motion.

movement.

There is

Therefore we a~e compelled to admit the exist•

ence of a Prime Mover94 who is the source of all motion 9

namely, God.
.

.

But it is objected that motion is eternal. Aristotle
states that Hthere never was a time when there was not
motion, and never will be a time when there will not be

motion.u95 :Nor does the Angelic Doctor 0 deny the absolute

possibil1ty.u96 But even if motion were etemal, this

93cf. Aristotle• "Hetaphy$1ca,u Book XII, Chapter 6,
McKeon, 22• cit~, P• 877.
·g4only an unchangeable Cause can account adequately for

all the multitudinous changes in the world about us.
Bittle, 2.2• cit., P• 74.
9 5tt Physica," Book VII I , Chapter 1, McKeon, 22•

p. 359.

96ortscoll, 22• .c izt. • p. 138.

~

cit. ,
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argument would still be applicable.
not alter the nature of matter.97

The time factor does
Matter is indifferent

to motion or rest, regardless of whether 1t is tempora198
or eternat.99

So even though a person were to suppose

the eternality of matter, he would still be compelled to
admit the existence of an eternal Mover.
But the law of inertia showA that sensible movements
had a beginning.

It is apparent that a series of' movements

have been communicated.

If we endow this series with in°

fini t y we must inevitably admit that the series itself had
no beginning.

This is an evident absurdity.

Even Aristotle

observed that ttthe series cannot go on to w.finity • • • • ,.lOO

Nor is atheism the correct inference from Dynamism.
According t o this theory all matter possesses an inherent
power.

Now we have observed that this invisible force

changes from potency to act.

Hence at times this power

is in a latent state of rest.

Since we continually see

bodies passing from a state of rest to a state of motion

97Neither time nor multitude can change the

an entity.

natfe

An infinite series of dogs will not equa

of

the

sum of one rational dog; nor will an infinite line of zeros

add up to anything except zero. Now the same is true· ·con•
ceming the nature of change itself. Change can proceed
ultimately only from "the Prime Changf'! who is both
ttyPc,banged ang Upchangeabl9." Vide B ttle, 19.s.. cit.

98Genesis 1:1.
99The Stagirite.

lOO"Physica,tt Book VII, Chapter 1; xx. NcKeon, 21?• ..£&.£•,
P• 340.
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(and ~.ce ysrsa), it is very evident that change occurs
constm"ltly.

" • • • the universe as a whole is •• . • subject

to ceaseless change • • • •

Activity is found everywhere.ulOl

Hovement is abmys beginning.

Theref<lre we must admit a

first beginning to explain the present movement.

Kant: obj ects by asserting that the premises do not
warrant this conclusion.

He thinks all motion can be accounted

for upon the basis of universal attraction.

But this posi•

tion has been xejected by outstanding scientists.
weak s pot in l<.a.nt 1 s 11ebular hypothesis.

It is the

The law of grav1°

tation is dependent upon two factors• namely, (a) the quan•
tity of the maas 11 and (b) the amount of space separating

the bodie s.

Hence attraction is possible only if these

immutable conditions are met.

It is a difficult task for

anyone to explain the genesis of universal attraction.
Quantity and space are merely conditions.

Gravitation is

a fact but: it: refuses to be self•explanator-y.

If there is

not another source somewhere we are left without an explana-

tion.
The at01ns comprising the origilial nebula were either

distributed equally. or they were not.
attribute homogeneity to them~

If they \-,ere we can

Then forces of different

or unequal strength ~uld be an impossibility.

lhe equili•

brium would be pe;<"fect and a state of perfect rest would
101

Bittle, QI?• sit•, PP• 70f.
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persist to the present moment.
existent and impossible.

this is false.

All movement ~uld be non•

However we can be certa~.::1 that

J3ut on t!he other hand if the distributicn

of atoms were ui1equal, then we are embarrassed by "a
gra:tuitous supposition, 11102 which of course is a sufficient
reason for rejecting it.

or

if we allow this second alter•

native (for the sake of argument), then we are at liberty
to seek for the underlying cause of this inequality.
Therefore the fin&l conclusion is inevltable.

The

unive:i:se ner ll is impotent to explain these problems and
we ar0 forced to admit the existence of a Prii~e Mover.103
Next we shall cor1s·ider motion

111

the sense of mutation.

Here t.he field of enquiry is much broader because it in.,
cludea

fil change

in the na·tural w.orld.

0

It passes beyond

the limits of the external world, enters into our inner
l1fe 0 and takes as data, the secret thoughts and desires
and emotions of 'the sou1.u104
This a~gument is based upon two primary principles .
First: Every moving entity moves because of some extenial

l0 2Driscoll 0 22• cit., P• 139.
lOJJoseph Rickaby describes the unmoved Nover as "motionless." .See Studies gn 22S! and His Creatq1:es, 22• cit. , p . 33.

104oriscoll, S!Ja• cit. , p. 140.
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cause. 10 5 Or in the words of St. Thomas, "Omne autem quad
raovetur l) ab alio movetur . nl06

Aristotle declaresg

Everything that is in mo~ion must he moved by some•
thing. For if it has not the source of its wDtion
1.n itself it is evident that it is moved by something
other than itself, for there must be something else
that moves it. !07
· The law of inertia prov~s the truth of this statement 1n
respect to physical bodies because matter is indiffe~ant to

rest or mot:ion.

Moreover i t is apparent that every physical

entity is not 1.n motion, otherwise Umotion would be of the

essence of mattez-nl08 and rest would be impossible .

But the

undeniable empirical evidence proves this t~ be contrary
to fact .

Miattez- cannot choose its state of being.

bodiee are in motion~

':et some

Therefore the only possible explana-

tion f.or their movement is that they have been acted upon
by some e xternal fox-ce .109

Furthermore motion implies imperfectio11.

A being

moves in order to obtain some perfection which it lacks. 110

l05The cause of motion is 11 a motive principle."
Expositi9..q 9,! Christian pqct(1ne, 22• cit., P• 29.

See

106nutrum Deus sit 1 " Summa Theologia~, Prima Pars,

Quaestio ii , Articulus J, 22•
P•

3

£!!., l, 12.

7
~~ " Physica, 0 Book VII, Chapter 1 , L·!cKeon, 2.2• .sll,.,

108oriscoll, 4op • .£1t.•
10 91£ there is no unmoved Mover there are no secondary
causes of motion. See IDsP9sition a!, Christiap poctrine,
19.s.. S.1&•
ll01n this sense "motion" means operat1,on or

action.
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Hence if one affinns that a finite entity is self-moved,
he is tmpl.ying the.!: it hot:h possesses and lacks t:h '. desired

perfe~tion simultaneously.

pf!§ n2$ because

lt

it noves; it

already has hec.au~e it is capable of spontaneous motion.
Thi s of course is absurd.
St . Thomas proposes another reason by way of induction.
He distinguishes between viol ent and natuzal movement.
Sometimes a body is set in motion suddenly by a terrific,

violent 0 external influence.

Natural motion occu~s arnong

both animate a.nd ir,ani mate entities.

The law of inertia

provee that r.o physical body is capable of self-movement.
Its complete it'ldif ferenee t~les out t he slightest possi-

bility . 111
The organic woxld consists of plants, animals ~ and
men.

Now groi-1th i3 a certain type of motion.112

phei.1.omenon is z-elative and dependent.

But

this

It is not absolute.

Plants, for em:imple, require soil, moisture, wa rmth~ and

sunlight: to develop properly.

Whenever. these vital factors

are withclxat-m, plants invariably wilt and clie because tha
cont1nuatiou of life is an impossibility .

One basic law

lllvtde St. Augustine , "The Confessions ," Book ~!,
Chapter ~asic Wr tins of Saint A~ustine, edited by
Whitney J. Oates

n

printf.ng;

House, c.1948), I, 185£.

112

2

vol1tnes; New York: Random

·

Vide Henri Bergson, Cr!J!tivt :r;volutign, translated.

from the French by Arthur MitchellNew York: Henry Holt
and Company, c.1911), P• 109. (This book is on the Index.)

357

of biology is that life can never be derived from non-life.
Hence vital motionl13 is always derivative.
spontaneous.

It is not

Therefore the very existence of a living

thing proves that its motionll4 was imparted by another
antecedent i1ve being.
Psychology deals with intellectual and sentient life.
In this area one discusses "the rnotions of the sou1. 11115
Through the senses we are in continual contact with external
objects.

Moreover these empirical bodies exercise an

influence upon the soui.116 ·sometimes this power is so
compelling that our actions are involuntary.
wisely after mature reflection.

Again we act

Now the power of '1011tion

resides in the will, but the will invariably cooperates
with the intellect • .The intellect presents powerful motives.
These motives influence the will, and the result is action.
Thus the principle is verified by induction.

Motion

1s the result of an extraneous impulse.

This is true in
physical nature, in the organic wrld, in animals, 117 and
llJI.e. 9 life.

1141.e., its life.

11Soriscoll, 22• c\t., p. 142.
116when a person understands something "the intellect
has reached a state of rest and come to a standstill 1 • • ,"
Vide Aris.t Qtl.e, "Physica,tt Book VII, Chapter 3,. x-xv~ McKeon,
22• si£., p~ 348.
117when a motionless animal begins to walk one is liable
to suppose that this motion is spontaneous and Pelf-caused.
However this is false because the entire o;rganism was not: in 360
a state of rest. Y!,!!! !!?.!2.•, Book VIII, Chapter 2, x-xv, P•
•

3.58

in men.

No being is sufficient unto itself.

Everywhere

about us we obser,1e that one body influences another and
the result 1s motion.

ttQu;ldgu1d moYetur

!9. aJJ.o moyetur.n 118

By classical definition a living being must be capable
of moving itself.
principle.

Yet even this does not destroy the

uThe contradiction is merely apparent.,ttll9

Living bodi es are incapable of self-movement in the true
sense.

They neither move themselves into existence nor

confer life upon themselves.

Their motion is dependent

upon an inner principle, namely, the entelechy.120

Part

always moves part$ but the intricate pieces did not "assemble"
themselves.

Their present motion can be traced to a vital

unity for which they are in no way responsible.
But what about the electrons which revolve aro\.llld the
nucleus of an atom?

Isn't their motion 1.mcaused?

Not

ult1mately 9 because both matter and energy are contingent,
othenrl.se they could be equated with God. 121
The second principle undergirding the argument from

ll8Glenn 9 2.2• cit., p. 62. Behold how modern Scholasti•
cism has improved t~Angelic Doctor.
119Jacques Maritain A Preface .tg, Meta;eh;ysics (New
1

York, Sheed and ward, 19J9J, P•

i36.

1201.e., (a) Hsubstantial form," or (b) ••a vital prin..
ciple. 14 Vide Bemaro J. Wuellner, 11 entelechy," ~cti~r,ap

2f Seb9law.i Phil9s2£h;y (Milwaukee: The Bruce Pul1sing
Company, c. 5g), P• I.
121~1aritain, Approache§ .ssa. Q2.s!, 22• S!S•, pp. 26f.
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mutation is that a series of movements and moving entities
cannot ext end back into infinity; or in the words of the
0 122
• • • there cannot be an infinite regress •• • •
In a sense this vital principle is a corollary of the first.

Stagirite,

u

When one body sets another body 1n motion it is ob"\Pious
that the latter is dependent upon the former for its movement.

For example, if "A" is moved by «sn it is evident

that ttAn is totally dependent upon "BH.

But a bit of obser-

vation :reveals that "B" is moved by ttC" • and "C" is moved
by

"D11 , !_t;._ C§!tex~·

Now this series cannot continue for•

Infinite regress is unimaginable. 123 At the end of
this uchain" t here must be a first mover. 124 Otherwise we

ever.

are compelled either to deny the principle of Causality•
or to admit that all motion is impossible.125

Wheneve~ a series transcends the realm of bodily
reality126 !.t fades from view but it does not ce~se to exist.
For example, imagine a lengthy chain suspended from the top

122ttHetaphysica,c1 Book XII, Chapter 8, xxx, McKean;
22• cit., P• 884.

123vati.•ellot 21?•

stt.,

p. 266.

124.rhe L~difference of matter plus the fact of motion
equals a cause. See i!EQsition 2f Christian P9ctrine, l.2£•

.E1S.·

.

125oriscoll, 22•

s~.,

P• 143.

12~The proof from motion is independent of time.

Walter Farrell, 21?• si.S.•, I~ 34.

~
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of a &!ru.1t Redwood in califofflia.127 only a 6mnll pa~t of
the chain !s '1'"isl.b1e 1,ecause th4il gtbez- end ls concealed
by the fo1iuge.

One can per~etve 011ly a few links, tet he

lQ'IOWQ thii ~&118iuing links

l;\lt"ei

fbW•

In faet a person is

e.v~n coA1fi-dent ~hat (a) one of those links ~P there ie
secured to a aolid ''peg,*' and (b) the npegt, is aupportin.g
the enti.rei ·~hah'l., 123 If one deli.es the existence of the

invtsi.blia links ll· he thereby removea hi:a only reason for

beli.cavi.ng in the G'dstence· of those which be can aoe.129
Of. (!OU~Ge eom$bcdy may objce~ by 1fiaistti1g tb.at it

1s not 11.0@e.Sooey to sup1>0se UJO-v ement in a straight line.
Hight: not this

fuOV9'«ent

be eircula,:1130

cules at the eireU!i'lfet:e~ce reac~

Upo11

Suppose the mole-

one another and tbus

form o PQrfcot ei~le?

....

u. 1b& Il\ple
chain e - t hll!tg upon IIQ~hiti• ~

1~7er;~ w1111am Evans lbi. ~..Ps!P&inDSI
(Cbtcago, ~~~QOdy Pr~ss~ e.193'9} .--p;-I6.
12Soln,1o\'lely a

James~"'" lba,. P~\atite .~
at G8i .!W:t ~
o.r and napldss i.:.er .men.a ., 197t7I• p. . •
129cf• ·G lenn• U • sit• , P• 64.

Oi ::

(Reprlnt;

130cf 11 Fla.to. ttt.aws, 11 Iloc>l( X• 893& Jowett, Slll• S.,.•,

It, 635.
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The111 an impulse from t1A" wilt influence "B''; "B'' in tum

will act upon

ncn,

and

"C"

of "BH is derived frcm

0

from 1dcu » and

uon.

turn moves

tiAH

usu .

from

will move nott.

Thus the t:10tion

Au, the motion of ucn from "B", non

H~-ice nnu moves "An and ttAtt in

Now either this motion (a) had a beginning,

or (b) it ia etemal.

If it had a begimling there is by

necessity a Prime Hover and our argument is valid.

If the

motion is eternal we are compelled to admit that there was
a moment of time uhen •1A" w2.s in both (a) a state of rest,
and (b) a state of motion.

"Au

ii

in motion because it

moves usu; '*An is E2Q! in motion because it is moved by

11 D11 •

This is an obvious contradiction. "• •• whatever is moved
is moved by another• • • • n 13 1 '!'herefore we are forced to
acknowledge the existence of a first Mover.
However this arg\!ment can be stated in simplified

forme

In this chapter the author has distinguished three

types of motion but scientific e?{perimentation shows that
every movement can be reduced to the first, namely 9 local
motion.132 Aristotle emphasizes the fact that in local
motion there. mus.t be contact between the mover and the moved.
13 1.I.b!. summa 'Ehoologica, Part !, Question ii, Article

3, Pegie •· SJ?•

fil.,

I, p.

22 •

. 132Aristotle admits that "locomotion is the prima1."Y
motion.u See ' 1Physic~,." Book VIII, Chapter 7, xxv-xxx.
Mcl<.eon, 212.• Sit•, p, .:,79 .•
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There can be "nothing intei'mediat:e.u 133

In fact u1t is

impossible to move anything • • • without being 1n contact
w1th it.ttl34

For example, •'the flavour is adjacent tQ the

sense of taste.ul3S

As the chemist observes the action of

one molecule upon another he notices that they come closer
and close~ together until they meet.

l1oleculat> vibrations

can be t z-ansmitted from one body to m1other only by local
motion .136
mena.

This p1:-inciple underlies all empirical pher.o-

! t i i even employed to explain the motion of quality

and quantity.

"The laws of physics and chemistz-Ya of gravity,

electricity and arfinltiea are alls ox appear to be,
reducible to the laws of 1notion. 0 137

Now 6\ll motion is a form of local motion.

Fu~the-rmore

a minute analysis of Locomotion shows that all movement
can be t raced hack ultimately to a Prime r--1o·v er.

Therefore

the proof baeed upon local motion is applicable to mutation.
Hen.ce the cc:n1clusion is obvious~ even though indirect.
This argument does not rest upon metaphor but upon
principle., namely (a) a.c tuality always precedes potentiality,

133tbid.• , Book VII, Chapter 2, 245b, p. 345.

134Ibid., 24li.a, x•xv, P• 344.
135lbig., 245a; v.;x, p. 345.
l36st. Thomas observes that 11 no body acts except by
touching ox- moving; •• •" See The Sqnma Theolggica, Part
I, Question xxxv, Article 5, Pegis, 22• cit., I, 44o.
137orisco11, 22• cit., p. 145.

(Vide footnote 123.)
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or Cb) the less invariably a.rises 4:rorn .:he greater.138
To the mind of St:. Thomas this proof'
u 139
most convin~i.ng Qf all. "

..

ttw:i.s

the cleare3t artd

Conclusion

Recapitulation
The universe consists of innumerable objects, all of

which a.re subject to change.

However whenever anything

changes it is always due to the action of some other being,
for example~ ttA'' becomes "Au because of the action of "B1' .
But ~1he11 HBu acts it a1so changes because of the action of
11

en

t

li. r...._
cetera
I

•

But

this process cannot continue forever.

If infinite regress were possible there muld be no adequate
explanation of change.

In fact change would be an illusion.

We are con'Vinced that this is false because the reality
of the phenomenon of change is one c;,f the most apparent
itens in the entire empirical world.

Furthermore any pro..

cess of change must have an origin.

All movement ultimately

proceeds from ttan initial 1mpetus.ttl40 But an absolute
beginning is impossible unless we presuppose the existence
138sbeen, ·.2,2. ·. s!S•, . p,. 64.

139B~rtt, ~, ~ . , ,. 101.

Yet this proof is "the

least conclusive to modern minds, • • •"
140z,1aur1ce Oe Wulf,

Harvard University Press,

~.

t1effti}vn,l
l?~Slosoph;x
t~2 , p. •

(Cambridge:
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of a neing '*who is beyo11d all change,ul41 namely, One in

w1'..om all VJbecerningn is an in1poss'i.bilityt One

t<Jt10

i s i1~1mU.t•

able, w.1changcaable.I f the slightest modificat iol'l were· pos.s ibl e in God it
·woi.1ld imply the existence of a higher Being.

The process

would be endless ui1less God is himself unmoved. Il1-2

Summa.r y
One may epitomiz·e this a r gument as follows : There

must be a mo·ver t~ account for the mot§.on that we observe
in the ,~1·],d a bout us.

Ultimately there must be a Fixst

Nover143 v:rho 1$ hims elf un100ved.

Thie First Mover is God.

Thil!~efore~ God e~!sts.144

-

14lrhid.

l4,2IJ?j.J!. • P• 91.,

143Richard Watson evei1 deduces i11telligence from motion.
See Thfitogica~ ~stitytes 1 2 volumes (New York: carlton
and Ph ips~ 8 ), !; 291.
144Glenn 2.ll• cit.; p .. 65. Farrell believes that this
9
argument alone· is suflicient to demonstrate the existence
of God. See 82• pit., I, 36. Gerald Vann affirms that
the proofs of St. Thomas are intended merely to establish
the existence ,o f the F·t rs-t Unmoved Hover Ci . e., pure actuality)
~nd nothing more. See ~int Thomas Aguine! (New York:
Bene:tger Press, e.19l~7) 3 p~

127.

·

CHAPTER VIII
THE SECOND WAY. OF ST. THOMAS: EFFICIENT CAUSATION

.Introductory
The purpose of this brief chapter is to examine the
second theistic proof 0£ St. Thomas.

This argument was

suggested by Aristotle,! developed by Ibn Sina (Avicenna), 2
and transferred into Latin Scholasticism3 by Alanus ab
Insulis (Alan de Lille).4 It was used by Albertus Magnus,5
the celebrated teacher of St. Thomas.

Efficient causation.

It is based upoti

David Hume made a serious attempt

to emasculate this virile principle, but in vain. This
cosmic law is written rather deeply into the very structure
of the universe$ as both nature and reason abtmdantly
testify.

All human endeavors to effect it have been attended

by dismal failure.

Causality will remain when heaven and

"Metaphys1cs1 " translated fi:om the Greak by w. D.
It, Chapter 4!• 1b.@.
W9rks 9!, Aristotle,
edited by Richard Hc:Keon (llih p
ting; New York: Randoin
House.• c.1941) • PP• 713-15.

lv1d,

Ross~ Boo

Bam

2An Arabian ·philosopher (980°1037).
·
3aans Meyer, Ihe Philo~t>hX Qf {trk ~ Afuinas,
transla~ed from the German~ Freder c Ec1tlio!fst. Louis:
Herder 1 1948), P• 237.

4:Docte, un~yersalis (died c.1203)~
5Also known as Doctor un1versalis (1193-1280).
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earth have "passed away."

The Proof Stated
Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis.
Invenimus enim in 1st1s sensibilibus esse ordinem
causarum efficientium: nee tamen invenitur, nee est
possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens ··s ui

ipsii.,s; quia. sic esset prius seipso, quod est imposS1.toi
bile. Non aute.~ est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infini.tum.

Qui.a in omnibus

causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii;
et medium est causa ult1mi, sive media sint plura
s i ve unum tsntum: remota aute1u causa; removetur
effectus: e-r go,. si non fuertt primum in causis effic:l.entibus., x,..on erit ultimum nee medium. Sed si
pt'Ocedatur in infinitum 1n causis efficientibus, non
erit prima causa effioiens: et sic non erit nee
effectus ultimus, nee causae efficientes mediae: quod
patet esae falsum. E~go est necesse ponere aliquam
causa.m effie:tentem primam: quam omnes Deum nom1nant. 6·

The Proof outlilied
a. The DATut,1-.,.The illmlutable law of efficient causality.

In the tvarld of sensible things we find there is
an order of efficient causes.
b. The first PREMISE••Nothing

cause of itself.

can b~ the efficient

The1:e is no case known (neither is it 1 indeed, possi•
ble) in whieh a thing is found to be the ef fici.e nt

cause of itself • • • •

6s. Thomae Aquinat1s., "Utrum Deus ,1t ... summa :th§logiae,

cura et studio sac. Petri caramello (tre.s tomi; cum textu
ex recensione Leonina; Marietti, Tauri~i: Romae, 1952),
Prima Pa:r:s, Quaestio l!) _Articulus 3, Tomus I, 12f. Th
·. is
proof also appears in Jll!. Summa Cont;a Gentile@• ~ St.
Thomas Aquinas_, _Qf G~d !m.d ttfs C;ea~Yies, translatecftrom
the Lat.in by Jos~ icKili'y westm .ster. Maryland: The
Carroll Press, ·19.:.>0); P• 9.
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c. The ARGUMENT for the first premise••
• • • fer so it would be prior to itself, which is
impossible.
d. Tlie Second PREMISE••Effieient causes cannot extend
backward!!! infil}itum.
Now it, efficient causes it is not possible to go
on t o infinity. . . . .
e . The ARGUMENT for the second premise.....
• • • because in all eff1Ci$1t causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intennediate
~ause ~ and the intermediate is the cause of the
ul tirnate cause, whether the intermediate caus·e be
s everal, or one only. Now to take away the cause
i s to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be
no first cause among efficient causes, there will
be no ultimate,. nor any intermediate, cause. But
if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to
infinity, there will be no first efficient cause,
neither will thel;'e be an ultimate effect, nor any
intermediate efficient causes • • • •

£. The CONCLUSION-m
Therefore it 1s necessary to admit a first efficient
cause • • •. • 7
·T he PX'oof Explained

An efficient cause8 is one which is capable of producing
an effect.

It is metaphysical (rather than phenomenal)

7These English quo·t ations from Ill!. Summa Theologica
are taken from Baste rlrit~s Q! S\in_t Th21s Aquinas, 2
volumes, translated from te Latin ·Y Fr.s.a pcote and
corrected by Anton c. Pegis (8th printing; New York: Random
House~ c.1945), I, 22.
8~ ratigJl! causae ~ff!cien$ia• See Etienne Gilson,
I!li!, Phi ·o~Bbx 9! il• Thomas Aquinas, translated from the
French 6°yE<!ward Bulloughl edited by G. A. Elrington (Cambridge:

w.

Heffer a."ld Sons,. LT)),

929), p. 80.
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reality.9 We note sequences of cause and effect in the
world around us daily.

Frequently an efficient cause

"createstt an effect which in tum becomes the efficient
cause of another effeet,

~

cate,a, for example, the old•

fashioned flour mill where every revolving wheel and
traveling belt derives its power from one huge water wheel.lo
This same 0 order" may be observed in nature.

For example,

the sun i s an efficient cause to which one can trace "first
the blade ~ then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the
ear~ 1111 Mar itain declares:
Carnivo~ous animals live on flesh because there are
other animals that live on plmtts--because plants
produce carbohydrates-~and because chlorophyll fixy~
t he carbo11 f:xom the air under the action of light. ·

Someti.'Iles the eattses are very complex.

For example, we

cannot believe that a brigand was slain merely because he
had eaten

b-10

salt viands.13

There were a multitude of

9P'ul ton J. Sheen, Philo~~hy
Appleton•Century'!'"CX-0£ts·1 c. l~ ) ,

2!. ~eligion
p.33.

(New York:

lOnowever the water-wheel is by no means the ultimate.
end of the se,;ies.
llMark 4:28 (Douay-Rheims Version),
l2Jacques Maritain, Arproacbes SQ. God, translated from
the French by Peter o·• Reil~y (New York; Harper's• c.1954),
pp. 34£.
13Aristotle, "Metaphysica," Book VI, Chapter 3, l·!cKeon,

21?•

.s.iS.•, PP• 78lf.
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causes involved 1n his untimely death. 14 In order to receive
a doct0r ate one must ec, more than extend his hand·· to receive
the degr ee"

1'he causes (both visible and invisibl~) are

1

legion; they even antedate the candidate•s birth.

(Examples

could be multiplied.• ) 15

Now just a s no object can be its own mover, no effect
can be i t s own eff i c i ent cause.16

To deny this is to assert

tha t the effect exi s ted prior to itself, which is an obvious
impossi bil ity.

(If

&

man we~e the efficient cause of him•

self p he would of neces sity have had to precede his o~n
exi s tence. ) 17 Tharefore 9 whenever one discovers an effect

he mu2t seek elscawhezca in order to .,uncover" the efficient
cause.

ufill}il ,t:ur2i~ ppilosoph£

guicgUfm P!ss.t.!•ul8

™

fieri sine causa

Th~ cause is never inherent in the

effect.

Furthermore no chain of cause and effect can be a
14vid~ Jacques ~·Iar1tain 1 s lucid diagram in a_ Pfeface
,t2 l'.··1e t llph;yeic~ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939) • P• 143.

15paul J . Glenn mentions 0 thc golfer.u See Theodicx
(14th impression; St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book
Company, 1952), p. 66.
·
16cf. Aw~ s Binney &nd Daniel Steele, Binnex•s Theological

C~rJm.~ Improved (New York: Phillips and Huu t ; Cfnclnnati:

1-h.tchcock and Waldan, c.1875), p. 76.

17Vide ·1aritain, App;oaches .t2, Gog, 211• £!.t.•, P• 35.

· 18quoted anonymously by ichard ~atson, Theol~sical
~nstitut es $ 2 volumes (New York: Carlton and Phillps,
111~5), Vol. I, 276. (Italics mine.)
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progres§_!Y.91 Sll,.Y.sarn,m

i:!! inf ir11tum. l 9 For

example, suppose

a child sets up a long line of dominoes 20 and the:n tips the
one at the far end.

By this single act he succeeds in

knocking dow-1.1 t.he whole row.

Now even though a person

should see those dominoes emex·ging from a tunnel (knocking

each other ever as they ucome") 11 he would still be compelled
to infer that somebody (or something) had tipped the first
one .

Some cause (even though un.kncn·m o:t \h"'lkno·wablG) was

necessary to set the series in motion.

Somethina was respon-

sible f or s t a ~ting the chain reaction.

This is evident

becaus e i nvar iably there is a cause lying behind every
e ff ect .

No~hi.ng ever just happens; this much is certai n. 21

But caus~-effect, cause-effect, cause-effect, cannot
extend backward §.S!· infinitµm.22

Somewhere there must of

necessi ty be a first cause.
However thi.s principle is true only when a series is

essentiallx subordinated, that is,. when the series of causes
and effects ar e petero-gen@Ous.

If the series is hoW9geneous

19George Christian Knapp, Lecturf!s on phristian Theology,
translated from the German by Leonard Woods (2nd American
edition; Philadelphia: J . w. Haore, 1854), p. 86. (Italics
mine.)

·2ocf . Gilson, 21?• s!S• , p. 71.
2lour law enforcement agencies always operate with
this assumption, e . g. , i( a .person is founa dead in an alley
the police invariably assume that there is a cause.
22~ M. c. D'Arcy 11 :rhomas Aquinas (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1930), p. l6I.
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it may be conceived of as eternal; 23 for example, it is

not contrsdictory to speak of time as wlthout beginning or
end.24

(The causes of St. Thomas are heterogeneous causes

t-."111ch occur on different levels.)

The first i.e "hor1°20nta1.•1

whereas the !.a.ttet' i & 0 vertica l.u

Therefore th1;s principle

is applicable only to a series which i~ accidentally subordinated. 25

l<'or example• day and night follow in uniform

succession 8 but day is not the cause of night o~ vice versa. 26
But on the other hand » what drives the wheels of a huge
locomoci.ve?

Piston!) steam, f:l.ze» coal, coal forests~ solar

energy~ electrons--but electrons are not a solution. 27

Rather they atl'e only anoth€'l' pr.oblem be~ause now we must
account for their exist2nce. Whence the etectrons? 28
Visitors to the Lincoln birthplace in Kentucky always

23!£ they occu~ on the same level.
24Naritain 9 Approaches ~ God, 2.1?•

.£!!•,

pp. 36£.

25sheen , 21?• cit.$ p. 135.
26vi,d!!, ~-1 ine:r Raymond , ststematic Theology (3 volumes;
Cincinnati; Hitchcock and wa den; New 'lork~ Nelson m.'ld
Phillips 9 cel877) 9 ! 9 273. However the horizontal conception

of infinite time is no t identical with eternity because in
eternity there is no change or succession, i.e., it is tota
simul. ¥side Maritain, asm."'oaeh», Se, Ggd, 22• cit., P• ~
27A. G. Hebert, Stud~~s in~!•
(London; Society
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, c.
p. 19.

I~~Jg)
C

~

{New

,

28one never solves a problem by denying its existence.
Walter Far.rell, ! Companign t o ~ Summa, 4 volumes
York: Sheed and ward, c.l 41}; I , 4~.
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see a stately oak.

Th!s tree was produced by a tiny acorn,

which was in tum produced by c!ru)ther. tree, which of course

was produced by another tiny acom , !£. cetes:-a.

Tree-acom,

tree-acorn•-but this sequence canno t continue forever.
Somewhere it must stop.

The human mind is unable to rest 29

until it arrive s at a final tenuinus .

One is at last driven

back t:o a first tree (or a first aeom) 1 JO and in order to

explain its existence he must poait an Ultimate First Cause,

namely~ a Cause which is g~eater than t he eff~ct31 and
capable of a ecount:tng f or its origin.
Carl Fex-Bin~nd Wilhel m Walther, 32 celebrated founae~
of the Hissour! Synod 9 wes brought iuto existence by his

parents, who in tum were bl.:!gotten by their parents, §!.

cetera.

Child-parents, child-parents, child-parents 33--but

again the series is not etemal.

Worlg

29vide James Orr$

Tbf

It must terminate

Ch~istian View of God and~

(Reprl.nt; Grand Rap ds: Eerdmans;-1"94') • P•~ .

30cf . John i~ick, I4ect3ares 2!l theylogx~ 2 volumes (New
York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 85 ), I, 163.

3lteander s. Keyser calla attention to the fact that
water cannot rise higher than its source. See A System 2!
Chrtsti!Q Evidm1ce (8th edition revised; Burlington, Iowa:
L~thera~ L!terary Board, 1942) 9 p. 194.
32
B.:,m 25 October. 1811; died 7 May, 1887.
33or ttfathez--son, fathex--son.°
pp. 82£.

Cf. Gilson, 22• cit••
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somewhei:e.

The human intellect pushes farther and farther

back t hrough the mists of time until it comes to a first
man and a firs: woman.

Bnt the q\.1est does not end here

because. now vJe a't'e conf r.onted wtth a new p1." 0blem, namely,
\Jho confetted existence upon ou:i:- Fi~st Parents?

What great

Cause is adequate to explain this marvellous effcct?34
No reover. t his logic is applicable to every effect3.5
which one percei ves in t he univerae round about, that is,
eve,,_-y ef fac t which l s essentially s ubordinated. 36

Each can

be GXplai.ned by t~acing i t back to that Fir.st Efficient
Cause.37

This Firs t Cause is itself unca used.

lutely causeless becau se it is fir st.

It is abso-

There can be no

3 4nescartes obsei-ved , u. • • I must have been brought
into existence by a being at least as perfect as I am, for
the fountain canrdot rise highe~ than its source.tt QUoted
by Benjamin F,.elds, The Student• s l!.!Pdbook of Christian
Theo~¥o edited by John c. Symons (new edition; New York,
Cine
ati 1 Chicago: The Methodist Book Concern, n.d.),
P• 11. The present tn:1ter has been t1Dable to find the pre•
cise refer ence in Descartes.
35oFo~ every house is builded by some man; but he that
built all t hings is God." Hebrews 3; 4 (Icing James Version).
36to illustrate the opposite, Fulton J. Sheen employs
the striking hypo thetical e,campl e of fifty hammer.s used in

the prouueti.cn of one brass bowt.

See~·

.£!:t.., p. 135.

Cf. St. Thomas, ~ Summa I.b.f'&>.lo.81~.D Pa.rt I, question xx.xvi,
Arti;l e 2, Reply co Objectloit"T; Pegis, 2.1?.• Sl.S•, Vol. I,
p. 4;;5.

37cz. Edwin A. Barte , 'l'Ype$ of R~igi.ous &hilos§ h~
(Revised edition; New York: Rarperan I3rotners, c. I 1,
p. 103.

3

37li
cau.se l·1hi.ch antedates . i t 0 38 for then it would be not a

caucc hut en effect. 39

Conclusion
One may ~umma:rize thi s· s<:cori1d ps:-ocf as follows: Since

the~e is an oxder of cauoe end effect in t he ~,orld therG
must: be a First Caus~40 which is itself causeless .41
Uncausea42 First Cause 1.a Gocl.

This

Therefore »- God e:~ists. 43

38cf ., Thomas N. Ralstou E!emente of Divini t ;t~ edited
9
by T. o. Summers (Nashville• oa las, andRichmond: Publishing

House : I., E. Church 11 South, 1916), p . 15.
39
Those who deny cl1e pidnciple of Causality are Hin
sn impasse. 0 Vip,! Ma ritain,
Preface .t;Q. Metaphysics, !im•
.s:J.;£. s p . 133 .

a

40
All five of these proof$ lead to a First Cause in
being 9 but not necessarily to a First Cause in time. Y.19!
Maritain 9 Approach.es £2 God, 52.2• cit ., p. 36.

41Ther e is a sense in which the first cause of science
and the God of t:he Bible are identical.
S,.it., p. 22.
42
0

334.

Watson uses the term

v.nderb1ed.''

Vide Fielcl 1 eJ?•

See 22•

£.!S., I,

43Fa-rrell thi1-iks that t his argument alone is s ufficient
ta de monst?"at.e God 8 s existence. See ~ · ill•, I, P• 36.

CHAPTER IX
'l'HE THIRU WAY OF ST. THOMAS: CONTINGENT BEING

Introductory
There is a sense in which the Five Ways constitute but
a single proof because they all employ the same method of
ar gumenta tion to reach infinite Being; hut on the other
hand t hey are a ll different because (by penetrating insights)
they proceed progressively into the very nature of \B'lcreated
Bei ng.

Foxmally these proofs are different; materially

they a re ident ical.

"Together they form a cord with five

str ands, which is not easily broken."l
The Third Way of st. Thomas is his famous argument
from contingent being.

He places it in the very center of
his proof s, and indeed; it is "central .among them." 2 In it
is expressed the main theme of 9µ\pgue !!!.!, 3 and since it
begins with being

~

JU! it deals with the very essence of

lR. P. Phillips, Modern Tbgmistic Philosophy, 2 volumes
(7th printing; Westminster. Maryland: The Newman Press,
1957), II 9 P• 287.
21.!?J:s!• ., Vol. I l • 286.

3vide the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

376

metaphysics.4
The First Way starts from being in the process of
beeoming 9 the Second from the permanent aspect of being,
and the Third from the nature of finite being as it exists
in itself.

Essence and existence are not identical in

finite being.s
These

t t-'10

Essence does not even imply existence.

notes are separate and distinct.6

I n this brief chapter the author will strive to show
that ( a) the wor ld is contingent, and (b) that only adequate
explanation of this undeniable fact is to be fot.md in
neces sary Being, namely, 1n God.
The Proof Stated
Ter tia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario:
qu.ae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae
sunt possibilia esse et non esse: cum quaedam in•
veniantur generari et corrumpi 1 et per consequens
possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem
omnia quae sunt talia, Semper esse: quia qUt>d possibile
est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia
sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in
rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset:
quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid
quad est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit

4A. o. Sertillanges calls st. Thomas na metaphysical
poet, • • • a prophet of being••• •• • 0 See Fgundations
2f Thomi§J:ic Philos~phx, translated from the F'rencli 6y
Godfrey AnstrutherGateshead on Tynes Northumberland Press,
n.d.), p. 9.
5Paul J. Glenn, Onto~§!J (10th printing; st. Louis:
B. Herder Book Oompany, I
, p. 99.
6
However we ought to re,nemher that essence and exist•
ence are identical in infinite aeing.
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quod aliquid inciperet esse. et sic modo nih11 esset:
quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt
possibilia: sed oportet al1quid esse necessariurn in
rebus. Omne autem necessarlum vel habet causam suae
necessitat is aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem
possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis,
quae habent causam suae necessitatis sicut nee in
causis eff icientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse
est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non
habens causam necessitat1s aliunde, sed quod est causa
ne ces sitatis aliis: quod otnnes dicunt Oeum.7
The Proof Out lined
a . The DA'IUM--Contingent being.a
The t hi rd way is taken from possibility and
necessity• • • •
b. The f i r st PREMISE••Finite beings are not etemal.

He f ind i n natur e t hings tha t ar e possible to be and
not to be, since they are fotmd to be generated,
and to be · corrupted,. and consequently, it is possible for them to be and not to be.· But it is
i mpcssibl ~ for these always to exi st • • • •

c. The ARGtn•tENT for the first premise-• • • • for that which can not-be at some time is
not. Ther efore, if everything can not-be, then at
one time t he re was nothing in existence. Now if
t his were true, even now there would be nothing in
existence, because that which does ~ t exist begins
to exist only through something already existing.
Therefor e, if at one time nothing was in existence,
i t would have been impossible for anything to have
begun t o exist; and thus ~ven now nothing would be
in existence • • • •

.
7s. Thomae Aquinatis, uutrum Deus sit," . Summa Theologiae,
cura et studio Sac. Petri Caramell a (tres tomi; cum textu
ex recensione Leonina; Mari.etti• Taurini: Romael 1952),
Prima Pars, Quaestio II, Articulus 3, Tomus 1 1 3.
8
Every being which (a) begins to exist, (b) is composed,
(c) is finite, or (d) ·c hanges is contingent.
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d. The second PREHISE••Necessary Being must exist.
Therefore, not all beings are me,r ely possible, but
there must exist something the existence of which
is neces·sary.

e. The ARGUMENT for the second premise-But every necessary thing either bas its necessity
caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible
to go o:n to infinity in necessary things which have
t heir necessity caused by another • • • •

f. The CONCLUSION••
'l'her efore we cannot but admit the existence of
some being having of itself its otvn necessity. • • •

g. The COROLLARY of the conclusion••This Being is not
cont i ngent •

• • • and not receiving it from ~ther, but rather
cattsing in others their necessity.
The Proof Explained
Con tinge11.cy

Scho last ic philosophers repeatedly mention 1'contingentl0
being. 1l

The t erm may be defined as follows;

a. That which can be or ~ be or 12!. othe3: tpan
that which happens to-oe actual~

!S !!;

9These English quotations from~ ~uuo,a Th~ogica
0
are taken from Basic Writings S?!
:r omas
as, 2
volumes: translated from the Latin y Fr. Shapcote and
eorrected by Anton C. Peg1B (8th printing; New York: Random
House, c.1945), I, 22£.

sarvt

Agu

lOThe term contingent is applicable only to finite
being.
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b. That which is perishable or changeable in operation,
disposition or being.

c. That. which is an unnecessary or indifferent means.
Hence the object of a free judgmGnt.
d. That ,ihich can fail in its proper or intended effect.
e. That which is not true essentially or necessarily;
that which is r eal and true only historically. I
A continge1,t being is that \omich has no absolute necessity

within itself for existing.

Rather it is dependent upon

the various causes which have produced it and are sustaining
it at this moment.

New all conceivable reality is either
It either~ or must !lQ! exist.

necessary or unnecessary.

If its existence is necessary because of its o,m essence
and nature it is a necessary Being; if its existence is
unnecessary it i.s a contingent being.12

A necessary Being is totally self-sufficien- ; it con-

tains within itself the reason for its existence; it is
tmcause<l. It i a immaterial, eternal, ~irnple, 13 and infinite.
Now that ~i'n ich is infinite cannot be plural.

Hence it is

evident that there cru, be only one i nfinite Being.
......

WWW.PC t

w.,:s:;;:;

llThis is not a quotation.
Bernard Wuellner,
contingent ,.ti ~~ctionarx gi_ ...,c---i~,...i:. Philosophy (Milwaukee:
The Bruce PublishEig Company~ c.
, P• '29.
11

12Paul J. Glenn, S,,osmolog)! (9th printing; St. Louis:

Herder, 1955), P• 43.

·

131.e., (a) undivided and indivisible; that which lacks
parts; that .which is not extended. (The opposite of sqmposlte.)
(b) That in which potency or imperfection of any kind is
absent; pure. (The opposite of mtxed.) Vide Wuellner,
"simple," 21?•

.£1S..,

P• 115.

-
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Thus it follows that the only reality besides infinite
Being is contingent being.

posites.

All contingent beings are com-

Horeover thcey a?:e caused.

"• •• contingency

accompanies causality as a shadot'i accompanies a man walking
1n sunlight. 014 'l'his is obvious for every effect is dependent

upon its cause.

Even those who deny Causality live daily

as though this law were operative; for ex;imple, one can
imagine that even David Hume put his tea-kettle over the
fire ·when he wanted hot water.

The natu~e of a contingent being is such that it does

not demand existence.

It has the potential for existence

but it never moves from potency to actuality without the
agency of a cause.

Hence contingent being is called 2ns

!,2 tlio ~ that is, reality which depe...,ds upon something ex-

traneous to itself.
Generation and corruption15 are apparent everywhere.
Substances ~ontinually appear and disappear.

Hence it

would be foolish to maintain that physical substances are

independent.

Their contingency is a universal fact.

material reality has been produced.

Every

Thus all are dependent.

Everything which our eyes behold is unnecessaey because if
it wer~ necessary we could not conceive of it as non-

existent.

(It is not difficult to think of natural ·bodies

14Glenn, Cosmglggy, SW• s1£., p. 44.
151.e., substantial change.
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in this manner .) All that we perce1ve16 (a) i s here, but

(b) i t migh.£ not be pr esent.

Now any be i ng \vhich could

possibly be ne n"".ex1stent is cont ingent; t hat is, its very
ex-lstence must be explaine d in t erms of something else
besides i t self.

Anything vli~ich might !l2! be p~eeent, ~~uld

P<lt. be present except f or t he fact that exist ence has been
conferred upon it Hby something other than itself.1117
Therefore 1~ is evident that all phys ical bodies. bear the
unmi s takable mark of contil,gency.

Tho mat eri a l uni verse i s not sel f-suf ficient .

The

tell- t a ke mark of contingency is indelibly inscribed upon
her time-~JOtn f eatures.

Nor t s the voice of Revelation the

only witnes s t o t hi s fact.

Even the physical sciences have

added t heir impres sive testimony, for example, chemistry.

Chemist;x

i s concerned with the composition and change

of subst ances (or elements). 18 Their total number i s
probabl y un1"..nown but at px-esent 102 or 103 can be enumerated. 19
Per haps some day we shall discover t hat all matter is merely
a modi f ication of one basic element, and t hus prove the

161. ~. ~ empi r i cal l y.

1712.1.Q• , p. 45.
18.Y'.i.~ Horace G. Ueming, I9t~uct9!:l7 Cgllege Chemistry
1~), p. 8.
19
~
the list in ~ .Nostr!1Jd's iSientific Encyc~lydia
(3rd edition; Princeton:
e o. Van Nostrand Company, 1
,
P• 325.
(Ne:w Y.or lc: ·J ohn Wiley and Sons,
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Pre-Soc~atics correct in their basic contention.20

But

regardless of their exact number the fact remains that the
§Xistenti.f,!, of these elements is limited. 21 They cannot
speak t~ ue.

They do not contain within t hemselves a

suffici~t reas~n for their existence.
All elem~nts above lead, atomic number 82, are unstable
and are radioactive. Thus, in some bi!li.ons of years
there will be no element heavier than lead. Since
such elements now exist, this indicates fin1te
lifetime for the universe as we know it. 2

!

Only t~-o suppositions are possible concerning the aggr.egate
of the atoms which comprise the elements, namely, their
number is either finite or infin.ite.

If the former hypo-

thesis is correct t:he _a.torns are dependent~ whereas the
latter conjecture ts a contradiction in terms.

This is

evident because it is impossible for an infinite number
of atoms to exist.
for contingency.

Even the contour of an atom is evidence
An atom can change its shape, 23 but it

cannot possess infinite modes of existence simultaneously.
It must necessa~ily be one definite shape at any particular
moment.

Het1ce it is limited.

20~~ Frederick Copleston, ~ Histgr,x ~ Philosophx,
8 volumes<:New revised edition; Westminster, Haryland: The
Newman P~eSS9 1955). I, 22-28.
.

21John T. OTiscoll, Christian Phil2§0Rht ·(New York,
Cincinnati, and Chicag~: Benziger Brothers,900), P• 98.
22George t .• Clark, editor. ~ Encyclopedia 2!
Che.mi§ta {New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation; London:

Chapman and Hall; c.1957), p. 356.
231.e ., in obedience to natural law.

-------~--------------..
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Every chemical compow-ui is e vidence for dependency.

This is apparent because the elements never unite at will.
Their union i s invar i a bl y governed by irlliiutable laws• for

exampla , the exact proportions of hydroge11 and oxygen in
ever y drop of wate r .
very na ture.

All e l eme,.~ts ara continge~t by their

Thus chemistry is a witness for the contin•

gency of the uni verse.
Phvsi ca
...... i s the s cience which d~ls tvith matter and
energy. 24. It studi es Che general attributes of bodies and
the r easons underlying change ir, these p~·oper ties.

According

t o the law of inertia25 matter is indifferent to either
r est or motion.

A body at rest tends to r emain at rest

until it recei ves

3n

impulse from some external cause.

A

body in motion tends to continue moving in t he same straight
line u..~ til i t i s act ed upon by an external power~

Now

matter mus t necessarily be either (a) at rest, or (b) in
motion, yet it is absolutely powerless to

0

o r t he o ther.- It: cannot determine itself.

dependent upon something other than itself .

choose11 one state
Rather it is

Hence matter

is contingent .
Thermo- Dynamics investigates the rel ations existing
_ ___. ,

·w

1 duct1gnv. l9. Physics (New York:

24vide Harley Howe, Jnt

HcGraw-rrrri' Book Company,. 194 ) , p .

25This principle is valid. ~ R. Garrigou-Lagrange,
QQ.g, translated from the French by Dom Bede Rose (St.
Louis: The B. Herder Book Company, 1936), II, 447 .
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between heat and mechanical action. 26 This scienc~ leads
us to believe that some d~y the imiverse will come to an
e11d.

I £ thiv is t rue!t we can infer that t:he universe also

had a beginning.

At:. least tt is not eternal; rather it is

limited.

On e prlrnaey law il'l nature is the conservat1-on of matter.

It is impossible t o annihilate the smallest particle of
matteT, for example~ combustion.

When a log burns the

matter is changed but not destroyed .

In fact the weight

of the i-o10od is identical before and aft.er combustion,

that is, the ash " smoke~ and gas weigh exactly the same a s
the orlginal log lying in the forest. 27

In 1842 Dr. Jules28 pxopounded the law of the conservation of ener gy.

Apparently it is valid .

Force can be

co11ve:rted into ano ther form but it seems that the total

amount in thca universe remains constant.

£1--ugal.

Nature is very

Evidently l oss or gain is only an illusion.

But a third law has been obser.ved in operation, namely,
the la.w of the dissi.pation of energy: as different kinds
of energy are transformed there is one type which slowly
absorb~ c.:h.e others.
at 11 .

Z

. ....

J

a;w

..........

Electricity can be changed into

j

26-william Dodgo Lewis

DictionaEf

Company,

tt !!l. , editors. The li.,inston
(College edition; cfiicagoi The John c. Winston

942)b p. 1032.

27oriscoll , 22• si.t•, p. 101 .
28Ger.nany.

- - - - - -·-
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heat 29 but alJ. of this heat cannot be converted into aMther
form of energy.

A residue always remains.

No energy is lost

but the total amount of heat is gradually increasing.30

Thus

1n time all energy will be transformed into heat.
Now heat tends toward a 1.miforrn temperature.

Hence

the 1.111iverse is slowly approaching a mean temperature.
When this finally happens all motion will cease and life

will be impossible.

Silence will reign supreme.

is the death of the universe.

this

No mortal eye shall behold

it but the end thereof is certain.

Hence the universe is

contingent.
·
31
~st:;ono1&, is concerned with the heavenly bodies.
Hen have patie..lltly observed their mysterious movements from

earliest times.

However it is impossible to be dogmatic

concerning the precise manner in which these bodies
originated. 32

But

if our

solai: system was formed by the

contraction of a primordial nebula tihich threw off rings
as the central portion revolved33••1f this is true-•it is

29aeat is a form of energy. See 2!Jl ~ostrand's Scien•
tific Encx~lopedi.g, SU?• cit., p. 1678.
30oriscol1, 22• cit., P• 102.
Jlt3tde Edward Arthur Fatht The §lementr Q.f. AstronoffiY
(3rd ed tion; New York and London: N<:Graw-H llBook Company,

1934), P• 4.

32 Even Revelation is silent concexning the .b.2lf of
creation.
·
33The famous Nebular Hypothesis suggested by Swedenborg
and Kant. (Laplace developed it.)
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a solid confession by brilliant intellects that the universe
had a beginning.

This view is a frank admission that the

universe is not eternal.

Thus astronomy is also a witness

for contingency.
Geology eKBroines the "bony" structure of our planet.34
As a science it 1s quite yauthful but (after the lapse of
just a few generations) it confidently asserts that by
deciphering the ro~ks it has been able to reconstruct the
histocy of the formation of our earth.

Fire and water were

the principle agencies which consolidated the earth's crust

from its ortginal gaseous state.

Each

11

chapter" of the

long process is clearly indicated in natu~e•s great ''rock
book," namely, the Azoic, Archaean., Algonld.an, Paleozoic,

Mesozoic, and Cenozoic.
At times it is a bit difficult to separate fact from

fiction in the story of the geologist. 35 but one tenet is
in perfect agreement with Revelation; namely, there was an
epoch long ago in which "no life in any form whatsoever
existed" on this globe. ~"• •• not even a blade of grass

could be found • • • • u 36 Terrestrial life had a beginning.
It is not et&rnal.

Thus geology testifies to contingency.

w. A. Tarr, lptro~tion ~
Geologx New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19, p. 2~
3 4vfde E. B. Branson and

35W,!. George HcCready PTice, Common•SEffii8 Gr;logY
(Mountain View, California: Paeific Press, e. 46~ P• 9.
36orlscoll,, 21?• cit._1 p. 106.

387

J3iolggx studies living organisms, both plant and
an1ma1.37

One fundamental law of biology .is that the in•

animate cannot produce the animate.

from life.

He.nee

Life can originate only

the law of biogenesis which insists that

in order for life to be produced on this earth it was
necessary for an extraneous power to intervene.
On the other hand the materialistic advocate abio•
genesis, namely, the theory of spontaneous generation.

They

contend that the action of chemical or physical forces are
sufficient to account for the origin of life.

The roots

of this pen1icious heresy lie .deep in human history.

The

ancients e11tertained no doubts concerning the reality of
spontaneous generation.

Aristotle thought that "a number

Of insectstt originate Hfrom putrefying earth or vegetable
matter. • • . er 38

nvirgil descrlbes the spontaneous genera-

tion of bees," and "Origen cites the production of woi:ms
as a fact admitted without question• ., • •039

Evidently

this is what St. Augustine means when he states that frogs

37ili.! Arthur w. Haupt, Fundam~Sfls 2f Biolog:y; {3rd
edition; New Yorks McGraw-Hill, 194 1 P• T.
·
38;,Historia Animalium," tTanslated from the Greek by
D' Arey Wentworth Thompson, Book V, Chapter 1 1 ~S ~
Works .2f Aristotle, edited by Richard McKean ( thl)nnting;

New Yorl<: Random House 1. c, 1941), P• 633.

39oriscoll 521?.• ctt., p. 107.
1
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hare produced • • • from the earth. • •
Even during
the Middle Ages this view was accepted; for example, st.
Thomas believed that certain animals are "generated from
putrefact:l.on • • • •1141

As late:;as 1644 Kircher and Van
Belmont gave fo1·mulae for producing snakes and mice. 4 2

But more r ecent investigation ancl experiment:a.tion have
rendered this view untenable.

In the last centu1:y Pasteur

sh.owed that putrefaction is caused by germ·s .

Even the

fermentation of gr ape juice ean be traced to this source.
Spontaneous generation is a ttmyth." 43

life can produce life.

Nothing less than

Hence the origin of l i fe on this

planet must be sought in a cause beyond itself.

Thus

biology a dds its reliable testimony to the fact of conein•

gency •

.f!l.YS.bQ!9sx44 examines hUll".an nature. 45 Now it is
4o"The City of God,u Book XVI, Chapter 7, Basic Hrlt~gs
of ,S..t'a!nt ~ugustine, 2 volumes, translated from the Latin~
H. Dode, a ssisted by G. Wilson and J. J. Smith; edited by
Whi~ey J. Oates (2nd printing; New York: Random House,
c.1948), II, 325.
41ttthe Summa Theologica," Part I, Question lxxi,
Article 1, Reply to Objection 1, Pegis, 9Jl• s!S•, 1, 663.

42oriscoll p !2.2• .£!S., P• 108.
'•3oar.winism affirms more than it can prove. Vide Haurice
Ronayne 8 ~ (New . Yorkl Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger
Brothers , _888), P• 38.

441.e., Philosophical Psychology.

4 ~ Wuellner, ••philosophy of man,tt 21?• .£!.£•, p. 91.
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unde11iable that men possess animal bodies.

Furthermore it

is generally :recognized that the phenomerAOn of sensation
is common to both man and bea$t.

Yet we dare not classify

man as an ani.mal because he is endowed with intelligence

and w!.1.l.

These t~ qualities elevate man into a class by

himself.

Man i s unique and distinct from all other created

beings.•

But psychology shows that the lower forms of 11fe46
cannot produce sensation.

It also proves that sensation is

impotent to beget intelligence.

nence both sense and intel•

ligence had a beginning, and thi=it beginning cannot be dis-·
covered on a lower. level.
external plane.

It must be sought on a higher,

Thus psychology is also a witness for

contingency.
Mathematics is the science which deals with magnitudes
~-------~
7

and quant1.ties. 4

!t sets forth laws and principles which

reign supreme in the realm of nat~re.

Essentially it

treats of quantity in the abstract, but its inferences and
data are logically applicable in the concrete.

(Hence the

distinction between ~pplied and pure mathematies.)

There-

fore we can apply mathematical principles to the entire
46E.g., plant life.

47yl£dt Martin E. Jansson. Hand~k 2f. App~ied Mathematics

(New Yor · : D. Van Nostrand Company, · 37}, P•

•
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unive-rse48 fo,; the same reason that

we

apply them to

architecture, navigation, and astronomy.
Now this science prioclaims specific principles which

prove that the physical universe is limited in space and
time.

Hence the universe is neither infinite nor eternal.

Rather it is ftnite and dependent.
The double question of the infinite in space and time
can be resolveo into the problem of the infi.nite number.
Ho·wever this i s not an easy problem.

It has challenged

philosophi.c il., tellects for cent~tes.

the concept itself is contradictory.
acceptable.

Some allege that

But this view is un-

St. Augustine declares, "The infinity of number,

though thez-e be no nun1bering of infinite nu.'1lbers; is yet

not incomprehensible by Him whose understanding is infinite. 1149
Pascal admits the existence of an infin;.te number "but in
the same breath adds that he knows not what it is. u50 The
idea itself is not absurd; for example, a line consists of
geon1etrical points.

If we enquire

that the number i.s infinit,!.

~

many, we are told

This is also true when we

attempt to calculate how many integers there are in an
algebraic root~

48Because of its magnitude or quantity.

.£1:.t•,

49"The City of God," Book XII, Chapter 18, Oates, 2.2•
II .Ji 199.

50oriseoll, SU?• cit., p. 112.
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Other s try to solve the enigma by distinguishing
beb1een a ct and potency.

They insist that an infinite

number is possible but non•ex1stent.

consider t he concepts of tim~,
vals 1n time are real.

But on the other hand

spase, and line. The inter-

They exist objectively.

The same

is true concerning distances 1n space and the points in a

line.

Yet we can argue that they are infinite without fearing

the above dis t incti3n will be used to invalidate our cor.•
clusion.

An infLnite number is neither contradictory nor absurd.
But in o:rde~ to r emove the ambig,.Jity we must affirm that

infini te number (by its very nature) is undetermined.

It

is conceivable but unde tennined essentially. The proof is
obvio1..1s; namelyi. it is indisputable, that, given two ttinfi•
n1te0 numbers• one is greater.

such an assertion.

Uut it is impossible

to make

11he very concept of the plurality of

infinite numbers 1s contradictory.

There ean be only one.

This is true even if we compare an arithmetical progressive
series tdth a geoinetrical one. for example,

l, Z., l,

and

Z., !, ~. Only one aa..~ be infinite.
The distance separating two determined points 1n spacg
cannot be infinite..

is undeterm:1..ned.)
nal.,

(This is possible only when one point

Renee the material universe is not eter•

It had a beginning.

Any past event whatever is an

i.'llpossibiU.ty unless we presuppose its existence at some

precise moment of time.

Two determined moments are invariably
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separatad by a finite distance .

Therefore, mat t er is not

eternal, and t he series of phenomena which conet:l.t ut es the
physical universe nad a beginning.

'rhus i t i s clear that the univer se is l imited in time.
It i s also limit ed in space.

The number of ths stars is

not infi..~it e .

Each s tar i n the heavens is determined by
t he founds of its own e.xister.ce. 51 Hence the total number

i s determi ned, and a s such i t cannot be infinite .

If the

univers~ wer e not l imi ted in spaca~ real entities would be
s~pa~ated by infinite distances.

But this is impossible.

Theref or e~ the unive~se is limited in every direct ion.
Necessity
'rhe r.rhird Way i s not original .with St. Thomas; 5 2

Moses Mairnonides53 developed it parti ally. 54 Furthermore
this a r gument i s more gener al than the tt~ which precede it.
I t i s based upon Hthe metaphysical principle of causality
L"l its most general f orm, 0 55 namely, anything which l acks

5!The same is true concerning concret e atoms.
52vi de George Ch~istian Knapp, Lecturss sm Christt2ii
Theology, t ranslated from the Germanliy Leonard Woods
d
Amerlcan edi tion; Philadelphia; J. W. Moore, 1854) 1 P• 86.
53A. D. 1135- 1204.
54Yid...~ Hans Meyer,

l'.h2 Philgsop~x; 2t g. ~ ~~nas,

translateTfxom t he German by Fre2ler ck Ecl«iof~uss

Herder, 1948), P• 237.
55Gar rigou-Lagrange, a,e. cit., I, 293.
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a suffic ient r eason in itself for existence must possess
that reason i n something else.

The fundamental presupposition underlying this proof
is that God i s being.56 All r eality can be classified as

either contingent or necessary.57 CpntiD8ency is synonymous
with dependency.

It is "the converse of causality.n58 An

effect i s al ways contingent upon the efficient cause which
produce d it. 59

(All finite reality is contingent.)60 When•

ever an entity i s uncaused we describe it as qeceSS§£!•61
It i s not contingent because it is independent of any cause.

Since it: exists by itself, it cannot be non-existent.

But

ther e is only one example, :namely., God.

56~
t!:'anslat:e

Etienne Gilson, I!l2 Spirit ~ Mediaeval Ph~losoph,.x,
from the French by A. H. c. Downes (New Yor:

Scr ibner' s& 1940), P• 84.

57cf. Eti eime Gilson , The Philosoph,t 21 ll• ih9mas
~guaeas, translated from t he Frencllby Edward Bul~ough

ridge:

Cam

Heffer & Sons, 1929), P• 83.

58paul J . Glenna Tht9di9Y (14th impression; St. Louis:

Herder, 1952), p. 68.

·

59vide R. P. Thomas Pegues , Catechism

2£. Ihs. t t ~

Tl}~log'ui" ( West1uinster, Maryland: The Newman Press,-I950),
p•

•

60cf. st. Thomas Aquinas, "The Sum:na Contra Gentiles,"

Book III , Chapter 72, Basi.c ,;ziit:ings 2t saint Thomas A!1inas,
2 volumes .( 8th printing; N'et.z ~:ot'k: Random House, c.19l ,

II , 133£.

61The term nfcessa;y is applicable to that which is
unpreventable. I prevention is possible• then it is proper
to employ the term contingent. llS!. Jacques Haritaint
ttRef lections on l'tecessity and Contingency," Essays in
edited by Robert E. Brennan (New York: Sheed and t-larcf,

I¥ffiy;'

p. 27.

2 ,
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This conclusion may seem unwarranted at first but
sober reflection will show that it is true.

For example,

your Shiny new automobile is a great convenience but it is
not ·absolutely necesBary; yau could .walk or ride a mule.
Your precision wrist-watch makes life much easier but it
is only ~elatively necessary; yau could use a sun dial or
some other device.

(Countless men have lived and died with•

out ever seeing a mechanical time-piece.)

That spreading

elm 1n the ya.rd adds to your comfort but it is not absc,lutely necessary; you could exist without it. 62 'lour
beautiful home is only ·relatively necessary because you
could live in a tent or a cave.

(In the event of a nuclear

war multitudes will have no other alternative.)

Nothing

which the senses perceive is absolutely necessary.63

In

fact--humiliat1ng as it may be--man himself is only relatively necessary.64 God could govern his world very well
without our assistance.

If we should die today the sun

would still rise tomorrow morning; and the seasons w.,uld

retum in their natural sequence.

Our friends might shed

a few tears at the cemetery but the life of the community
would continue in its routine pattem.

Other hands would

62cf. A.G. Heberti §tu~s !n St. Thomas (London:
Society for Promoting Christ
Knowledge, c.1936), p. 5.
63
Harold Bames Kuhn, Asbury Theological Seminary. (Dr.
Kuhn was the author's philosophy teacher at the B. D. level.)

6 ~ Hebert, SU?• ca.t., p. 20.
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do our work and we would soon be forgott en.
not absol utel y necessa17.

relati vel y necessary.

Hence we are

Even this huge globe i:s only

In comparison to vast reaches of

the stellar uni ver se this planet is like a tiny grain of
sand f loating th1:0ugh t r ackless space;65 and if a hydrogen
explosiori should disentegrate it tomorrow the stars t«>uld

whirl on unpert ur bed 1n their couzses and the universe
woul d cont:lnue to function normally as bef.ore.

This earth

i s not a bsolutely necessary-•nor is the mm, or the moon,
or t he stars. 66

In all the "infinite" expanse of space

ther e i s only one absolutely necessary Being; namely, God.
Everything which our eyes behold67 is passing away:
i t i s dying~ it i s contingent.68

Plants push their way up

through the soi l and then decay.

Flowers soon fade and

decompose.

mortal.

Animals a.r e bom only to die. 69 All men .are

Even chemi cal compounds endure but: for a time arid

65A t thi s point the author is indebted to Wilder W.
Reynol ds. (Dr. Reynolds tau~ht him History of Doctrine at
Asbury Theological Seminary.,
66one should remember that Ha multitude of contingent
things do not make a necessary thing any more than a multi•
tuoe of idiots make one intelligent man." Quoted anony•
mously by Walter Farrell, a commion St .s!'lil Summa, 4 volumes
(New York: Shes.d and Ward•

c.19

• I, ·37.

67No object which one perceives has alwa ys existed.
Vide Hebert, 9.1?• £!.t., p. 18.
68cont1ngency is implied by change. Vide Jacques
Maritain, Attroiches .!;2 Qs.s!, translated from the French by
Pe·t er O'Rei y New York: Harper's, c.1954), p. 44.
69 1n fact the icthyosaurus is extinct. See .Qgg, edited
by c. Latt ey (London: Sheed and Ward, 1931), p. 4 ~
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then retun,. to their respective elements.

All things "are

subject to the universal rhyt hm of destruction and production; all t he f orms our eyes perceive are perishable; they
can c eas e t o be . •1 70

But for anyt hing to exist, something

must e:c.ist: from n e cess ity. 71

If a necessary being does not exist, no conti:igent
beings e,i:ist.

But conting~nt beings exist.

Ther efore a necessary Being exists. 72
Thud one account s for contingent bei11g with necessary exist-

ence.

Now that necessar y Being which makes possible con-

t i..~gent beil1g, is God.
That which is contingent either may or may not exist. 13

If i t does exist it owes its existence to pr ior causes which
gave it Hbirth."

I t does not exist of necessity, and th~

expla.t1at:ion of its e:tistence is not self-con tained. 74

The

ubnost ,-mich one can assert of any contingent reality is
that it i s possibl e.

It is obvious that contingent beings

70Mari t a1n , 4\pproa ches tg, ~ . 9.12•

71c£. Thomas N. Ralston,

P• 44.

ESemenf;gszf

by T. o. Summers (Nashville: · Pirlish

South, 1916), P• 14.

ill• ,

Divinity, edited
House t-t. E. Church,

72Vide Lattey, 22• .£!:.£.,. p. 46.
73
Edwin A. Burtt, Types g!, Religj.pus Philosophy
(Revised edit i.on; New York: Harper's, c.1951), p. l06.

74c£. James Orr, The ch75stian ~iew 2f God and the
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1§4 , p. 9.

world
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san exist 0 but it is equally apparent that they might lJQS.
have come into existcn1ce.

Now, if everything is contingent75

there must have been some remote moment of time when abso-

lutely nothing existed; 76 ancl if t:his had occurred it 1"0uld
mea.'l the.t absolutely nothlng exists at the present moment, 77

because existence can be attributed only to that which is

al,:eady actual.

A blank vacuum of absolute nothingness

,v0uld have contained absolutely nothing capable of actuali•

ztng the possible into existence.78 ~ nihito nihi& fit.79
But s ince it is indisputable that finite beings do exist,
one i s compellC;1d to assume that evecything is not contin"
Something must exist from necessity, otherwise nothing

ge1'lt.

could exist at all.so

-----

75The hypothesis is self•destructt~i7e.
Apprszaches J:S. ~ t 2.P• s!S•, P• 45.

~ 11aritain,

70soth Jetrlsh and Christian philosophers admit that

"if the noJ.'l•existence of all things were possible, a moment
would necessarily have occurred when nothing'' at all was in
existence. Vide. Gilson, J:he Philosophy~ §J:. Thomas
l',gul.pasi> 81?.• -s_JJ_. tt p. 85.; If nothing should exist for just
one moment there would be nothing in existence for all
eternity. ~i.filt Maritain, AJll>IRaches ,S2 Gog, 12£• cj.t.

77 Glenn, Theod~cy, 22• .£it•, P• 68.

L~ii·,voJPP•
68f. Cf. Hiner Raymond, s;zstematic
..umes . (Cin~innati: Hitchcock & Walden, c.1877)

78

Tbwi,sx,
I, 28.

'

1

79
From nothing comes nothing. yide John Miley, sxstematic
Ihs>logY, 2 volumes (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1893), I, 77.
80Except for God nothing ~"uld exist.
SU?.• s!S• • P• 3.

~ Pegues,
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NoP, if t here was a time when nothi:1g at all was in
existence, nothing at all would exist to•day.

But it is a fact that things exist.
Hence not

!ll

things are contingent.

Therefore, a necessary self•existeo·t Being exists.
This necessar y Being we call God.Bl

And since a necessary Being exists; i t fol l ows that He must
be fi3:st; that is~ He must be prior in time to every finite
er1t!ty whi ch i s dependent upon H:!.m for ,r;xistence.

This

fir s t and necessary Being is God.
Summary

These first three arguments of the A.~gelic Doctor are

based upon the principle .of efficient Causality.82 He
applies tt to (a) motion, (b) the order of causes, and (c)
to contir!ga~cy.

He Ehows that pure rea~on requires the

existence of a Prime Mover who is causeless, first, and
l1ece ssa1ey.

This Nover is God.

The ~rhirc1 way begins by observing that everything in

the tr10rld about is contingent; that is, the nature of these
things is such t hat their existence is not necessary.

"Thus

the first way considers these beings as changing, or subjec't
to change, the second as they. are actually existing, and

8lvidg Lattey, 22• cit., p. 47.
82vide Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals 21 cathT11c RRS!P!,
translated fJ:tlm the GeZ'maitby Patrick LynchSt. Louis: The

n. Herder Book Company, 1957), p. 11+.
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the third as they are capable of ceasing to exist." 83
We are cer tain that contingent beings exist because
we daily behold entities which have not always existed.
The roses which we enjoy today were not here last summer.
The strawberries 1n our garden were non-existent during the
winter .

We ourselves were not here a generation ago.

Every day

we obseJ:Ve the gene.r ation and corruption of

dependent beings on every hand.
Now, granted that this is true, we can prove the existence of a necessary Being.

Every being which is capable of

non- existence i s not self-sufficient and must therefore
have exis tence conferred upon it by another.

This 11 othertt

must be ·capable of self•existen.c e, for a series of finite
1

beings canz."'1.o t extend into infinity.

No matter how many

contingent beings we l ink together, they all owe their
existence to the necessary Being.

If we presuppo.se that

the seri es i s eternal the fact r emains that "it is eternally

insuffic1ent.tt84 If only contingent beinga exist, then
at some remot e moment of the past nothing at all existed.
Hence the question: How does anything exist now?

If for

just one moment nothing existed, then nothing would exist
at the present.

So how can we explain the existence of

83Phi llips, 91?• .£!t.., II, 285.
84Phillips, 22• ~.it. II, 286. This identical expres•
1
eion occurs in Garrigou•Lagrange,. SU?• cit.• I, 293.
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contingent beings?

The answer is not to be found within

their natures; if it were, they ~,:,uld not be contingent.
Therefore 9 t he only possible solution is that they wera
creat ed by a nece ssary Being.

They were produced by One

whose veey r,a t ur e demands that He exist.

This being is

God.

Or we may epi tomize the Third Ws.y more briefly as

follows: The existence of: contingent being demands the
exi s tenc~ of a f i rst and necessary Being. 85 This being is
God.

Ther efore, God exists.
Conclusion
Any proof f or God's e,c.istence starts with the in•

suf ficiency of t he creature •. The Five ways contain one
basi c a rgument, namely, Anything which does not exist

essent i al ly or necessarily calls for a reason outside itself.
John v. Flynn, s. J., 86 has given one proo£ 87 which
contains t he root of the whole matter.

This argument starts

S5This proof adds a significant factor to hwnan kn.ow•
namely, His necessity. Vide Gilson, The
~~1i2sophy af !t.• Il}omas Aguifaa, 22• cit., P• 86.

ledge about God,

86Fr. Flynn was the author's teacher in the area of

Theodicy at Fordham University.

871n his course entitled, "Philosophy of Uncreated
Being." (At that time Fr. !<"l;ynn was Chairman of the Philo•

sophy Depart·m ent in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.)
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with the exi stence of finite being.
physi cal argument.

Hence it is a meta•

It is not a scientific argument based

upon t he sacond law of Ther.mo•Dynamics or Aristotle's

physics.

Rather we direct our attention always and through•

out t o the fact of existence.

This is the act or perfection

which we know to be in. varying degr ees in the different
finite realit ies which we know.

However each such finite

r eal ity ( because it is finite as such) is indifferent to
exist ence.

Ther e is no intrinsic principle in such a

being which would e'Kclude the possibility of its nonexistence..

Of itself it might or might not exist.

There..

fore, i t is l egitimate to ask; "Why does such a being••
whi ch might not exist, which is of itself indifferent to
enstence- ....why does such a being exist?tt

The only answer

pos sible i.s t hat ,t he existence of such a finite being has

a real ground (or cause) in a being

being.

other .tb.!D. finite

This i s obvious because a ground whi.ch is nothing

more t han another finite being i-JOuld be useless.

The

ground (or explanation in reality) of the existence of a
finite bei ng could be none other than a being which is
non•fini te 9 t hat is, infinite Being.

Onl y such a being,

1n the last analysis, could be the truly originatlve and

adequate source of finite being.
8~

This infinite Being is God. 88

the Appendix for a variation of this· convincing
Essentially it is a refinement of the Third way of
St. Thomas.

pn,of.
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Appendix
Granted the e,dstence of a finite being; a being that
has existence. Then suppose it has no cause. Consiclering it! we could say that one houl:' from now it

might be, or it might not be• for there is nothing
either within itself or outside itself that is a
ca.use (or a ground) of being by the supposition just
made. As it stands now it is indifferent to any
future being OJ:" non-being. If this is all there were
to the situation, then we would have to say that it

could, an hour from now, either be or not be. Or,
if nothing intervened as cause the indifference could
not be removed. In other words, since the indifference
to heb1g or non-being is necessary and intrinsic to
a given situation (and if thet"e is no cause given).
t hen the t hing is equally indifferent to two terms-neither one of which could be reached. But certainly
in an hour, one or the other term~ be reached.
In an hour from now the thing tdll -e{ther be in existence, or not be in existence. Hence every finite
being has a cause sustaining it in existence: and
since no finite being could adequate as cause••since
everyone is equally dependent••then the onl:, adequate
cause ~~uld be a being that is not finite (or is an
infinite Being), which is God.
The same would be true of any finite existing thing.
F'or this finite existing thing, bei>:1g in existence,

and yet considered in its essence able not to be (the
presence at the alternative of existei1ce rather than
that of non-existence), points to some intervention

on the part of infinite Being; so as to remove that
equal orientation toward existing and not-existing,
whicR every finite being considered in its essence
has. 9
89oictated by John v. Flynn, s.

J.,

in his graduate

course entitled, "Philosophy of Uncreated Being, .. Fordham

University, 28 trlovember, 1956.
for punctuation.)

(The .author is responsible

CHAPTER X

TH.Yi FOURTH WA'l OF ST. THOMAS: GRAMTIONS OF BEING
Introductory
The Angelic Doctor's fourth theistic proof is from
Gradations of Being (or "Grades of Perfection") .1 This
argument is perhaps the most difficult to criticize today. 2
It is bas·e d upon the obvious fact of "more or less, 0 that

is, different entities possess degrees of perfection or
value .. 3 St. Thomas derived this concept from chapter four
of St. Anselm's M_opologiufn, but he is also indebted to both

Plato and St. Augustine.4 (The material form of this proof
reflects the peculiar structure of Medieval society.) 5
lpaul J. Glenn, Ibeodict (14th impression; St. Louise
The B. Herder Book Company, 952), P• 71.
2Ha:rold Barnes Kuhn, Asbury Theological Seminary. (Dr.
Kuhn was the author's philosophy teacher on the B. D. level.)
3

Jacqu es Maritain, Afjr9aches S2 God, translated from
th~ Fr ench by Peter O'Rei y (New 'lork: Harper's, c.1954),
p. 49.

a.

4ttans Meyer, J.'he Phi,lgs;phy of
Thomas Argina.s •
t ranslated fr.om the German~ Frederick Eekhoff ~t. Louis:
Herder, 1948), pp. 237f.
51n fact a person wonders whether this proof would
have been formulated if St. Thomas had lived in another age.
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The Proof Stated

Quar t s vi.a sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inven1W'ltur.
Inveni.tur eni.'11 Ll'l zebus al:tquid magis et minus honum 9
et verum , et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed

m.~ru&

et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod

appropiuquant diversimode ad aliqutd quod maxime est:
secut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime
ca.lido .

Est igitur aliq11id quod est verissi.mun, et

opt in1urn 1 et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens:
nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur
II ~eta;e..hls• Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo
ge:nere , est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis:
s i cut 1gnis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omniua
calidorum , ut 1n eodem libro dicitur.

Ergo est aliquid

quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitstis, et
cuiuDlibet perfectionis: et hoc d1cimus Deum.6

a.

The D.!\1'UM- Gradations of being.
0

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be
f ow'l<l in things.

b. The fir st PREHI3E••More and l,ess imply the existence
of an ex ternal standard for measur ement.
Among bei 11gs there are some more and some less good,
t ro..ie, noble, and the like. But J!!Q.I! and less are
predicated of different things according as they
resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum. • • •
c . The ARGUMENT f or the first p?emise-- .

• • • a s a thing is said to be hotter according as

it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so

that there is something which is truest, something
best, something noblest, and, consequently, some•
t hing which is most being, for those things that
a~e gzeatest in truth are greatest i n being • • • •

6s. Thomae Aquinatis, 11 Utrwn Deus sit," Summa Theologiae,
cura et studio sac. Petri caramello (tres tome; cum textu
ex recensione Leonina; Marietti, Taurtni: Romae, 1952),
Prima Psrs, Quaestio II, ArticuluE 3, Tomus I, 13.
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d . The second PRE -'iISE-•Degrees of perfection imply a

maximum.

Now the maximum 1n any genus is the cause of all
in that genus • • • •
e . The ARGUHENT for the second premise••

• • • as fire , which is the maximum of heat, is the
cause of all hot things • • • •
f . The CONCLUSION••
Therefore there must also be something which is to

all beings t:he cause of their being; goodness, and
every other perfection • • • • 7

The Proof Explained
The term peffection is derived from two Latin words 8
which may be translated "made through and through.''

When

a reality is all that 1t should be, that is, when no item
is lacking 9 we describe it as Hperfect."

We can speak of

de&:™ of: perfection because "perfecttt is an absolute term
only when it is applied to a single entity; for example,
if a circle is perfectly round it cannot possibly become
any

11 rounder.91

ce:>tnp~d.son .

imperfect.
•

A:ny

Round is a positive which will admit no
part'-cular reality is either perfect or

There are no alteniatives.

c•AJ4S!$iaN . .

71ihese English quotations from The Summe. Theologica
are taken f:rom Basic Writings gf Saint"9Thomas Aguinas, 2

volumes, translated from the Latin by Fr. Shapcote and
corrected bf Anton c. Pegis (8th printing; New York; Random
House, c.1945), I, 23.
8v1z., 21!£ and factum.
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However this distinction does not apply to realities
which a~e eaoe..~ tially different.
terms mot,e and l ess .

To them one may apply the

For example, it is obvious that a

precious stone is worth more the.i1 a lump of coal.

Likewise

iron i s more valuable than clay, br a ss t ~an iron, silver
t han brass t and gold than eilver.9
of b e ing

&1d

In the or der of fulness

activity an amoeba is more perfect than a

stone 9 a frog i s bet t er developed than an amoeba, a bird

is higher in the scal e of being than a frog, an ape is more
a dvanced than a bird , and a man is superior to an ape.

No~i t his hiera r chy of value pervades all of nature. 10
It also applies t o a bstract qualities,11 for example, wisdom,1 2

vir t ue , 13 goodnes s , 14 justice,15 temperance,16 beauty,17
9cf. Daniel 2:32,33. (This passage occurs in the
Aramaic section o f this book.)
lOvi de Etienne Gilson, l'lu! Philosophz 2f ~. Thomas
Aguinas-;-Er'anslat ed from the French by Edward Bullough,
editedby G. A. Elrington (Cambridge: w. Heffer and Sons,
LTD, ·1929) , P• 92.
11Not j 1.1s t to degrees of be ing.

121,l a.to , "Pha edo, .. 69 9 Jll! piafiigue s 2£,
translated from t he Greek by Benjam
Jowett
New York: Random House, c.1937), I, 452.

13y1g!i " r·!eno, rt 71-100, ibid. 1 I, · 349-80.
329-31, i i_g., I, 99-101.
-----

f}2tt 6,printing;
2 volumes,
Cf. "Protagoras• tt

14vtde the categories or elasses of the goods, "PhUebus,"
66,. ibid., I I , 402.
l5ttGorgi as," 447-527, ~ . • I• 505-87.

16y;!,d! ucharmides, 0 159..66, ibid., I, 8-16.
1 7 ~ "Lysis," 216, !J2!g., I, 45.
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love. 18 Even truthl9 is present in this analogical ecale, 20
for example (a) physical truth21 is lower than (b) ma~hematical truth,22 and (c) metaphysical truth23 is superior
to both.

If t~10 statements are false "one is always less

false than the other.u24
John Wesley's celebrated doctrine of Christian
Perfection25 is based upon this principle of ••more and less.u
The orthodox Wesleyan theologian distinguishes four types
of perfect ion,26 namely (a) absolute, (b) angelic, (c)
adamic 0 and (d) Christian.

Absolute perfection belongs to

God a lone.. Only He is absolutely perfect.

God is the only
being 1n whom ail imperfection and deficiency are absent. 27
18vide UThe Republic," Book III, 402, ~•• I, 666.
1 9 ~ u Phaedrus, u 248, I , 252£.

2~ar ita1n, ill?• cit., P• 56.
21E.g., This flower is red.
22E.g., Four plus three equals seven.
23E.g., God is eternal.
24Gi1son, 2.ll• cit., p. 86.

25vide the definitions in George Peck's book,~
Scrihtg;e'i)octr.!Be 2.f. Christian Perfection Stated !I!.!! Defijded
~lot edition, revised; New York; Carlton and Porter, l84 ,
pp. 25£.

.

26vide Benjamin Field.

The Student's "rodbook 2!. curistian

Theolo~ edited by John c. Symons (new edit on; New Yor :
The Met .dist Book Concem, n. d.), pp. 22l•f.

27E.g., Job 37:16.
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Angelic p<2rfection pertains to the angels 111 hea·'l/en.

are pure spirits, unencumbered with matter.

Angels

They are only

slightly superior to mortal men,28 but ill no way equal to

~aw.!£ perfection describes the perfection of our

God.

first parents in Eden .
sical

:1

Before the Fall man possessed phy-

intellectual, 29 and spiritual powexs which :iave

pract i cally disappea red t v:>day.

Luther, referring to Adam

in Pars.dise, 'l!:'emarks :
Both his in.n e r and outer sensations were all of the

purest kin~.

His intellect was the clearest, his

memory was the bes t , and hi.s will was the most straight-

fort-,arcl--all in the most beautiful tranquility of mind,

withoi,t. any feax of death and without any anxiety.

these inner qualities came also those moat beautiful
and supe~b qualities of body and of all the limbs,
qualities in which he surpassed all the remaining
liv:1..ng cree.tu,:ee. I am fully convinced t hat before

To

Adam's sin his eyes were so sharp and clear that they
surpassed t ho se of the lymc and eagle. He ,·ms stronger
than t he lions and the bears,. whose ~trength is very
great; a11d he handled them the way we: .handle puppies.JO

Chris~!!n perfection is the lotgest in this seale. 31

It

d enote s the new man in Ch:id.st32 who has been sanctified

---·-"
--2

....,_._,

8Psalm 8:5.
29r_~de Genesis 2:19.

3~fartin Luther, ·0 tectures on Genesis," translated from
the German by George v. Schick, Luthe;•s Workd, 55 volumes.
edited by Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concor ia Publishing

House, c.1958); I, 62.
31vide the different theological positions stated briefly
in H. Orton Wiley, A1ristia1.1 :rheylogY, 3 volumes (6th printing
Kansas City, Missouri~ Beacon Hi rPress• 1958), II, 441.
32.John 14; 17.
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wholly.33 ar1d f illed wit;h the ·1oly Spirit.34

The " perfect

mai1.• 1 35 ( ir1 the We s leyan sense) impli es more than t he

restoration of ~mago

J2!1. It designates a higher spi ritual

pl a ne i n which the heart is filled ~Jith pure love for God
and :nei ghbor.

\.Jealey defines Christian Perfection as follows:

"The loving Go d wit h a l l our heart. mind, soul:, and strength.
l'hi s implies, t hat no wroug temper, nonG contrary to love,
rernain.s in the soul ; and tt"1at all the thoughts, wo1:ds,
&1d

I

actions , ar.e govemed by pure lova.u36

Every finite thing is more or less perfect because of
the existence of au objec t i ve, abso l ute standard by which
all are measu,:ed. 37

A.n e11tity is judged to be better only

upon the bazis of i t s relationship to the best.38 If the
best -;· rcre noi1•existe11t it ·would be impossible to refer te
e ither t h e ~ or the be t t er. Degrees imply a maximum. 39

Every s taircase C'IUSt of necessity have a top step.

A person

331 Thes. 5:23.
?.4
Acts 2: 4..-

.:1

JSps~lm 37 : 37.
36John ·1esley, ttA Plain Account of Christian Perfection,"
,we-ale¥, 10 volumes (first American

Ihg Works 2!, ~ Rev. il2lm.
eal't!on; New York: J. & J.

Harper, 1827), VIII, 27.

3 7cf. Thor:tas Aquj.nas~ the SU1115l8. Th eologica, Fart I,

Question iv, Article 1 1 Pegs, 22•

£1t•,

I, 37.

38Edwi.n A. Burtt, Ixpes ~ Religious Phit,sophY (Revised
edition, New York: Harper and Brothers, c.19~ , p. 107.
39·

Maritain, £?.e•

c1~.,

p. 52.

410
need only obsei'Ve Achilles among Greek heroes40 to be convinced that there are degr~es of valour . 41

Any series com-

posed of a ~ ar1d a be~ter implies a best.
Now t here must be a supreme crlte1"ion42 which cannot

be comp,ared wlth any other.

For example, we can easily

determine whether this piece of linen is more or less than
a yard by com?:)arlng it with an .. approved yard-stick; but we
cannot conceivably measure the yard-stick.
the U.."1:l.verse i s

rnQ~

or

le~

Eve1."Ything in

nobl.'3 or good when compared

wi.th t~e a bsol ute Standard~-but t hat Stnndard ca~4,ot be

compared wi.th another.
These m~a$UrS.ble , finite· realities merely participate
more or l ess in t he peZ"fection of the ultimate Model.

,Ynive,Fsiilta ( n )

rn rem,

(b) egst rem, £t. (e) iD, li• 43

Everything good or beautiful is only thus by vi:r.tue of participation.

Hhen an a'rt:1.st describes

M9na

IJ:.§.! as

11

beautiful11

he is :i.•mplyi:ng4L:,. the e~istence of absolute Beauty"""!"the under"!'

lying ca:1.1se e>f all c r eated beauty.

All fb1ite entities

which possess degrees of (a) good and better, (b) less noble,
-•w
___w_...._
______.._.._.,.,,.._..,_ __

4001: Olivid among the imcier1t Hebrews.

41
-A.

.
Hebert ,tStudies in St. 't~~j (London: Society
for Promoting Christ,.an khot-11.e<!ge, c.
. ,. p. 21.

9,.

42v1z., an absolute stai1da.rd.
43universals befor e the r eality, after the reality, and
in the reality.
4/+.M
i 1ayoe ina.d vert en tly.
1

•
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more noble~~ f!Ot~;r;a,--all these dem~d the axistence of
that which i s Truest, Noblest, Best, Mosti.

~

cet~ra as the

supr.em~ source and ext te1·icm of these qualities which they
share ill a limi.ted amount.

absolute Perfection.

Relative perfection t.mpl1es

There must be one Being45 1n whose

essence th.er<a exi sts the superlative of ever--J kind of
pezfection, 46 :namely, an Ultimate whose vel"Y neture is
perf ectio11.ism. l:.7

Conclusion

He me.y summarize thi.a fourth argument as f ollows: The
degree3 of m.pr.e and ]-ess requb:e the existence of a Greates·t:

in an absolute sense.48 This Maximum ts Cod.
God exists . 49

Therefore,

:'5~f. st. 'rhomas 1 -~ Sµmie Theol f1.ca, Part I, Question
vi, A-tt:i.cles l•l;. 8 Pagi.s.,
QI?• SJ:S•, l~
•55.
46 Burtt,~· cit., p. 108.

3

47cf. Fulton J. Sheen,. J?hii2~~hr g! R!ligi2,n (New
York: Appleton-Century-C~ofts 9 c.~ ~. p.6?.. This proof
is concerned with perfection in a s.enus,.
48 Part of God's ;.nfinite goodness is seen 1n the fact
that He permits the existen.ce of svil, and from it produc.e s
sood. i1d st. '£homas, Th;e Summa Theol9&i£a, Part t,
Questio~ i . Article 3 1 Peg!s, QP.• cit •• vol. I, 23.

1

49cf. Glenn, s;m. cit., P• 74.

CHAPTER XI

THE FIFTH WAY OF ST. THOMAS: GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD
Introductory
'lite J)ltrpose of this chapter is to acquire a better

understanding of the Angelic Doctor's fifth proof for the
existence of God.

This argument is a favorite with older

Protestant divines.

In fact some of the Biblical writers

adopt the same napproach." 1

This proof is "se f onde sur la

consideration du gouvemment des choses" 2 but it is not
origw.al w:i.th St. Thomas.

Anaxagoras had an insight into

it, Socrates developed it, Plato appropriated it, Aristotle

improved it, and

st. Augustine

matured it.3

Apparently

St. Thomas bon.-owed his outline from St. John Damascene. 4

~!de Job 37:3~24; 4lcl•33; Psalms 3:3-9;

1

19:1-6•

lOli:2- . .- i I s &iah 40:21•26; Wi.tthew 6:25-34; Acts 14:15-17;

17:24-28; Romans 1:19-20.

2'
'
'
Et:iemtc Gilton, Ls Thomism@ (einquieme
edition;
Parisi
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947), p. 111.
3Francesco Olgiati, The Key ~ th~ prdy S!!. ~. Thqnas,
translated from the Italian by John s. Z.y ura (St. Louiss
The B. Herder Bcok Company, 192 5) , p. 77.

transi!:!~~~o~i~~:nrr:~~h~t;~~ae~~aUid.e
-u-~1t~:igi™c~
!~~!;
I~P

Cambridge; Herder, ~.1929), p. 92.
22• £!.t.•, P• 112~

~lso

~hoe1~,
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The Proof Stated5
Qt.,ir.ita via sumit:..ir e~ gube'i..1natione re1."'Um.

Videmus

enim quad aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet

corpora naturalia., operantur propter finem: quod apparet
ex hoc quoct s.e mper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur,
ut consequ.a1.1tur id quod est optimum; uncle patet quod

non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem.
Ea a.utem quae ncm habent cogni.tionem, non tendunt in
finem nis1 directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelli•
gente, s :1.cut sagitta a sagiti:ante. Ergo est aliquid
intelligens, a quo omnes reg··naturales ordinantur ad

finem~ et hoc dicimua Deum.

The Proof Oittlined

a. The DATt,n.!... ""Teleology in nature.
The fifth way !s taken from the gove;..'"!lance of the

world.

b .. The fir st PREM!SE••Natural objects manifest "purpose.n
We see that things ,m.ich lack knowledge, such as
?l.J:lt4Ut-al bodies,, act for an end. • • •

c . The ARGUMENT for the first premiae-...
5st. ·rhomas restates this proof in Ihe Summa Contra
G~fil!l!s 4 volumes (London: BUXllB Oates & Wasbboume LTD,
'fi 4) 3 ,,lz., "It is i mpossible for co11trary and discordant
things '°tc)accord in one ot'der always or frequently except
by someone 9 s govemance, whereby each and all are made to
tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the ~rld things
of differe.1tt natureo accord in one order, not seldom and
fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore
it follows that t here · is sgm~52ue

mrl<l ii gove1.-ned.
6

s.

l2z

whoSJ1 12rovide11ce the

A.nd this we call God.u

Vt.de 1, 33.

Thomae Aquinatis,. "Utrum Deus sit,11 Summa Th!.9l9giae,

cura et studio sac. Petri caramello (tree tomi; cum textu

ex recensione Leonina; Marietti, Taur1ni: Romae, 1952),
Prima Pars, Quaeatio II, Articulus 3, Tomus I, 13.
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• • • and thi s is evident from their acting always,
or nearly always, in the same way so as to obtain
the best r~su.lt . Hence it is plaln t hat they
achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly.
d. The second PREMISE··- Natural objects
the abil i ty to "se ek" a goal.

.12!.[

!!. lack

Now what ever. lack s knowl edge ca:nnot move towards
an end, unless i .t be directed by some being endowed
·with knowledge and intell:1.gence • • • •

e . The ARGUMEWl' f or. t.h0 second p·r efitise••

. . . . as t he axrow i s directed by the archer.
f . The CONCLUSION••

The1:ef:ot'e some il1t elligen t being exists. • • •
g ,. The CORO:t.I.•ARY o f the concl1lsio11:••
: • . • by t~hom a 1

7natural tt:ings

t heir end• • • • ·

are directed to

Tl13 Proof Explained

The Fi f th Way ,.s from the governance8 of the world.

Gilson label s i t "la pr.euve par la finalit~.u 9 Sometimes
it is called t he Teleological a,:gument. 10 The term

ih2

7These English quotations from
StL-nma Theol~gica are
taken f r o m ~ Writ!nfii gg_ ~.in_t T omaa AIDjinas,
volumes,
translate d Irom.theLat
by Fr. Shapcote an corrected by
Anton C, Pegis (8th printing; New York: Random Hottse, c.1945),
I, 23.

tran.
s
~;~;d
J~
=m
c:.~~i~tHi·§t;t~!~
li1~~i
(~~~;itc~1~5i~tn
revised; 2 volume8; Grand Rapids: Eerdmansi 1949), Vol. I, 218.
91=9 Thomisme, 9.2• cit. , p. lll~.

lO~fdS R. P. Phillips, ~1g~e~ Ih~istic fhily~ hx, 2

volumes

Londoni Burns Oates and Wash

urne LTD,),
7

.I I, 293,
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~ct91-..s>..s.x

is derived from

-.t\o t

11 'Which means w.12

lt')\o/ is used here in the sense of mirpgse, or aim, or
a~_\.13 This proof is also knotm as the a r gument f r.om des1gn14
because i.t is apparent that realities in ou r t~rld were
planned anc designed to achieve certain goals.15

(Hot·1ever

we should remember that design is employed her e in a

differ ent sense f rom that which one freque.1tly associat es
with t he 11ame of Pa ley .) 16

Hhen a person affirms that

entities pos sess a teleological tendency, or notes the
structural desi gn of particular objects, he ie referri113
to the gove rnance o f being ru.1d how t hey are directed to

t heir a ppointed ends.

Thi s proof "proceeds fror.1 the ordered multiplicity of
w... ;a ...

J

~....

llAnd '>. £~ o s • Y.ide John Hiley, s sterr.atic Theologx,
2 volumes (New York: Htu1.t & Eaton, 1893 , I, 86.
12Joseph Henry Thayer, A, ~reel~•Enfli?.h J..e:tiS.QJl tl the .
~ :i est ent (Gr inm' s Wtlke ' s (s{e 1 ~;!lvJ.s No v t I e_stament1.),

1

trans'ated rom the Latin (Revised and enl&rgea; corrected
edition; New York: American Book Company, c.1889), P• 619.

13paul J. Gl enn , Thecdic~ ( 14th i mpr ess i on; St. Louis:

Herdex, 1952) , p. 74.
14J a.tnG!s Or r , I he

.

g__hp st;au

Vi ew .21 9.9..g_ a!ld

th.£

World

(Repri ~t ; Grand . Rapids: Eer dmans-;-!947), p. fI'T:
15James M1 Cosh considers t hi s a rgument t o be the most
fo xc ef ul of a l l " t o t he unsophisticate d mir,daJ• See (?,,n
t=xami net;.l2.'.9 at k1£• l • s. ;;1111' s Philosophy; ,!\eibg ~ T>ef ence
2i Fim,damen tal Trut h (incl edi tion; New York: no ert carter

~~

Brotfiers, ! 869},

p.

l6P.hi l l ips, SU?.•

424.

at•,

II, 290.
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the world to an ordering intelligence." 17 tt ia undergirded
by a principle, namely, that purpose necessitates intellect.18

Since natural causes are inadequate to explain "the processes
of nature.••19 we must assume the existence of an underlying
intelligence.

This principle does not demand that one psy..

choanalyze a mosquito for motives.

It merely asks that we

recognize the "constant order of cause to effect.N20

The Fifth Way is based upon final causality.

This argu•

ment points to the fact that realities exist for the purpose
of atta.i ning a goal.

It calls attention to the final cause,

Frequently natural bodies act in an identical manner but
this does not imply that the world is a machine.

Rather

it shows that entities are "oriented toward an end.u21
Now at times it is quite difficult to ascertain the
purpose of a disease germ or a poisonous vipe1:: 22 "For we

17.lW.·

18aans Meyer, Ib2 Phil~sophy 2f st. T~mas Aquinas,
·translated from the German y Frederick Echoff (st. Louis:
Herder, 1948), p. 238.
19Friedrich Ueberweg, Hi&$9U gf Philosophy, 2 volumes,
translated from the fourth German edition by Geo. s. Morris
with additions b7 Noah r.c,rter (Revised edition; New 'loTkt
Scribner's, 1892), I, 447.
20
walter Farrell, A,. Coynnion SQ.~ Summa, 4 volumes
(New York: Sheed & Ward, c.
1), I• 4~
21Jacques Maritain, tfo'laches l2, S!2!!, translated from
the French by Peter 0 1 Rei ~ New YorK: Harper's, c.1954),
p. 62.
22
This is external finality.
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know that every creature gl'Oanetb and trava1leth in pain,
even till now.1123 But. the Angelic Doctor is not thinking
in this vein.

Rather he appeals to irl~erngl finality, that

is, the finality which we observe in individual things

which lack intelligence;24 for example» the purpose of the
ear is , hearing, and the function of the eye is seelng.!i.

Wings are obviously meant for flight and the stomach for
digestion.
The world is a cosmos,25 not a chaos. Astonishing26
order, symmetry, de~ign, and beauty27 are apparent everywhere.

Motionless torrents! silent cataracts!
Who made you glorious as the gates of heaven
Beneath the keen full moon? Who bade the SW\
Clothe you with rainbows? Who with living flowers,
Of lovelier hue, spread farlands at your feet?
God! let the torrents, ike a shout of nations
Answer, and let the ice•plains echo, God!
23Romans 8:22 (Oouay•Rhelms Version).

24Phillips, ~· sit., II, 291.
25Jier bert w. Morris aptly defines nature as "a pie•
torial revelation" of God. See Sciftnc and the Bible
(Philadelphia: Ziegler & Mccurdy, l 71 • p. 'J:'"'"°

1

26vl9f! George Christian Knapp, t,Sctuxes 211 ihristi£
!eologv, transla.t ed from the German y Leonarcl oods ( d
merican edition; Philadelphia, J. W. Moore. 1854), P• 86.
2 7Leander

s. Keyser

s.e es· a dis.t inct proof here. See
A Svatem 2!. Chris~ian Ev1d·en5s (8th edition revised; Burlington,

Iowa: Lutheran Literary Boar t 1942). PP• 195£. The breath•
taking beauty of sunsets and waterfalls l«>Uld be meaningless
~£ man lacked the capacity to appreciate them.
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God! sing, ye meadow•streams, with gladsome voice;
Ye .pine•gt"oves, with your soft and soul•like sound!

!:~ :~e~hei: pe~i:u! £!tie~h!11 t~!::e~! ~118
0

Every leaf,29 every blade of grass, every violet, every

snowflake, every microscopic grain of pollen-.- all bear unanimous testimony to the existence of the1r great Creator.30
They affirm31 triumphantly, "The hand that made us is
divine. 0 32

Moreover, "There is no speech nor language,

where their voice is nQt heard.n33
All change in nature tends towai;d an end.34 COnsld;r
the simplest pl~nt35 th~t grows.

Ies very structure and

activities evince balance, order, govermnent.

Surely it was

28Quoted anonymously by Thomas N. Ralston, ftrsents ~
edited by T. o. Surmners (Nashville; Pu ~bing
· House M: E. Church, South1 1916), PP• 16£. (Some of .the pW'lctuation is uncertain.J
' ·

D1v1nit~,

29vtde William J. Tinkle & Walter E. Laamerts, flBiology
and Creation,"
.in!! Christian
(A
symposium by memers o ·
Ametican Sc:ie11ti C Affiliation;
3rd printing; Wheaton, Illinois: Van Kampen PNas, 1950), P• 58.

!dsm ,s&~ce
Te

ititJ:l

30vide John Fletcher, "A Rational Vindication of The

Catholic Faith," . IM. Work§ .Qf ~ sever!Jld J.2bn. ftetch1,
4 volumes (New Yori: B. ·waugli & T. Mason, l835J--. II,
8.

31Nature has 10,000 voices.

~ Psalm 19:1-3.

32Quoted by Ralston, 22• ~., p. 16. (Is this a
portion of Addison's paiaphraae on the 19th Psalm?)
33Psalm 19:_3 (The King James Version).
34Mai;i.tain~ ·22· ll.S.•, p. 26.
35
tt is significant that the predominent color in nature
ia gresn, the most restful color to the human eye. (Suppose
the grass were bright red!)
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made for a definite purpose,36 and this goal is realized
when it attains maturity and reproduces its kind.

(Even

a tiny pebble on the beach is obedient to the laws of gravi•
tation and inertia.

It maintains elemental unity by being

in subjection to the law of cohesion. )37 Observe the
instinctive habits of the brute creation; for example, (a)
the myste·r ious "intelligenceH exhiQited by bees as they

patiently gather nectar and manufacture honey, (b) the·
unerrh-ig southwar,d flight of wild geese, .!S,

cetera. 3 8

Where

did the beaver acquire hie remarkable engineering skill?
Who taught the robin to build her nest?

weave such symmetrical webs?

Why do spiders

What mortal man can under-

stand "the way of an eagle b1 the ait:U or that ••of a serpent

upon a rock.1'?39
the ant, .o slugga11d; consider her ways, and be
wise.
Without;maving any c~1ef • officer or ruler; she prepares
Go to

-----.~-

,,_...._
36suppose all fru,i ts and vegetables were perfectly
tasteless. Their delicious flavors (plus the corresponding
ability of man to enjoy thell) is powerful evi.dence for
teleology. The same is, true concerning the fragrant scents
and vivid colors of flowers.
37
,
Glenn, 22• cit., P• 76.
38Bernard Ramm· attributes "the hidden intellilence of
Naturett to the activity of the Holy Spirit. See
e Christian
~ et. Science Md. Scriet).!Ie (Grand Rapids: Eerdtrians, .
I9"S'4), P• 112. vlae aiso lJls, Summa Theo\ogica, Part I,
Question cv. Pagrr;-~. cit.;

i, ·970-Bl.

39Proverbs 30i 19 (The King Jame.s Version).
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her food in summer, and gathers her sustenance in
harvest. 40
There be four things which are little upon the earth,
hut they are exc·e eding. wtse:
The ants are a people not stn>ng, yet they prepare
their meat ln the summer;

The conies are but a feeble folk, yet make they their
houses in the t'Ocks;
The locuats have no king, yet go they forth all of them
by bands;

The spider taketh hold with her hands, and is in
king's palaces.41
.
Note the uncanny protective ·col0ra.tion in an1mals42 and
birds.43 Try to explain the puzzling growth of wings on a

fledgling.

Men can foresee the goal of flight before they

invent an airplane, but thi.8 is impossible for birds.

In

the f1+st stages of development,. wings are a superfluous

burden••even a handicap-•in the struggle for existence.44
40Proverbs 6:6•8 (The Revised Standard Version).
41Proverbs 30:24-28 ('111e King James Version).

42Y'.i.mi A. G. Heb~rt, SS95!iep J,n ~. :;rhomas (Lonaoni
Sec.iety--roi: Promoting Christian Knowledge, c.1936), P• 22.
Sometimes in the fall a hun~er will amost step on a rabbit
be.f ore be '* sees" it. This is because the brown fur t>n the
rabbit·• s h!&ls so nearly reeem})les the dead leaves, dri.ed
grass, ~ cete;:a.

43Frequently we fail to notice birds j.n the branches
overhead because their b_reasts blend so well with the foliage
or the s~y.
·
44.Edwin A. Burtt, IX~ea 2t ~t~g!ous Phllgfipph;y (Revised
edition; New Yorke Harper!s, c.l
, P• lb§ • .
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Ponder how marvellously thie birds45 a·n d f1sh46 are ea.ch

adapted to their respective environ.'lle?lts.47

48

it

131 n \:1,.

t T\ ~

Gaze up into the vast expanse49 of the starrySO firmament
and notice the orderly procession of the heavenly bodies
as they pass in review on scJteduled time .. 51

In the first

chapter of Genesis it stands written:
And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of
the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let
them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and
years:
And let them be for lights in the firmament of the
heaven to give light upon the earth: and it ~s so.

45Hhy are their bones so light? Notice their peculiar
shapes! (The designers of modem airplanes have learned
much from studying birds.)

Moreo~~o~~e~i~m!i~~

:h:i~s!ar:i ~~~::t~~~~~t!e;•

minimum, thus enabling them to glide through Hthe paths Of
the sea."
47c£. Tirtkle and tanunerts 2.2• cit • ., P• 96.
1

48Psalm 104:24.
49Astronomers can now measure the distance of about 600
million light years. Vi~ Peter w. Stoner; "Astroncmy and
the First Chaptar of Genesis,.tt Modem Scimce !llli Christian

Faith, £1?• cit., P• 9.

SOcf. Immanuel Velikovsky,

w~rlds !!l Collision

York: Ha.cmillan, 1950), PP• 3, 5~.

(Hew

51Thei1· movements are so regular and precise that

ast'{Onomers can predict an eclipse of the sun (with minute
accuracy) many years before it occurs.

422

And God ~de t~ great lights; ~e greater light t'l
rule the d$y, a~d the lesser lig~t to rule the night:
he . made the stars al-so. • .:>~ ·
David prays in .· the , e~ghth · ~salnu
3. When . I cot?.sider thy.-heavens·, the work. of thy fingers,
the moon a*1a· the st·a r.s , which thou ha.s t -or~ained;

.
.
.
4. What is man, that thou an mindful of ht~?

In the nineteenth Psalm he wrote:

1. The heavens declare ·the glory of God; and the firma•
ment sbeweth his ;hand,work.
2. Day unto day uttereth Sp8$.c h• a11d. night unto night
sheweth kn.Qwledg~.·
'

3. There is no· speech nor language, where their voice
is not heard.

4. Their line is gone ou·t through all the eal".th, and
their words to the end of the world •. In . them hath
he Set a tabemac;le ".for the SU:tlt
..
5. Which is as a J;,rid~gmom combig out of his chamber,
and rejoiceth as a· strong man to ~ :m a ra~e·.
'

.

'

6. His going farth ts from the -~d-of, the heaven, and
his · circuit. unto ·the· ·ends of it.:· «nd -there is
nothing hid from · the heat thereof...
·

tn the fortieth chapter of i.saiah we · read:
26. LiJt up

·your

eyes

on hi:,g\l,· and

~e~ld who ha_tb

creat~d these thing$ 1 ·tb~i ~ringeth out their host

qy .riumbeli's

·h e caJ,.leth ·t~~ all. by p.ames by the
greatness of bie m.1 ght·, for that he ts -s trong in

power;

not one faiteth • 5. 3

S2Gene~ls. li 14.16 (Tile Ki~g Jame$ :Version).
53.rhe .p receding quotati~ns. are from the King James

Version~

I
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Delve de~ply into the secrets of mathematics, chemistry,
phystcs••and you will discover a litany of laws, all of
"*1ich exhibit harmony, oi-der, purpose, and direction. ·

>J:!

~ ~ :?l .

V n~

1

,n~.

54:
11 i
D
Study the d~licate mechanism of your wonderful eye,55 the
intricate chemistry ot 10ur amaz~ng digestive system,56 and
the baffling operations of your wondrous bra1n.S7

ss t .Y

1 J.

X>1 n i ~ 1)

t1

if.i .Y

Ever, member of the astonishing human body ex~ites wonder59
and admiration.. Can there be any reasonable doubt conceming
their appointed purpos.e ? Certainly each organ was designed
for a specific function.

Hence it is not surprising -that

one inspired \n"iter prayed, "I wil1 praise thee; for 1 am

fearfully and wonderfully made: marvellous are thy works;
and that my soul knoweth right we11.n60
Now design implies a goal; and a goal implies direction;

54Job 37; 14.

55vJ,ftt Fulton J. Sheen, Gl~;HhX 2.f. ~tigi~ (New
Yorki App eton•Century•C.ro~ts, c.
) • p . ~ ~ also
Rtcha~d Watson,
In&ti5rtss, 2 vo1umes--cNew· ¥orkt
Carlton & Phillipa,
· , It. 313•1'.

,i,eot§~~}al

56cf. Keyser., ml• ci,t., P• 193.
5 7c£. Miley •. tm•· sll•, I .,. 102 ..
58Job 37,s.
59cf. Wat80n, Ill•

c&t.,

I, 301•03.

60Psalm 139:14 (The King James Version).
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and direction implies government..

Thus it 1s apparent

govemment 18 Opera tiVe ln the WOrlde 61
C

\

-..u"fo-1

rJ1"'r11<tv.

J

!

••

God

ff O

~ I(

l:hat

itf

Tl.Ir~

'I

tt62

Ye~ Thomas Henry Huxley once described the universe
as a mud pie made

by

two blind children-~mat~er and force. 63

But either (a) the universe is "a tale told by an idiot•"
or (b) it expJte.sses purpose! The only altema~ive to design
is "blindff 64 cbance, 65 that ie •. an unpredictable state of

affairs occurring in an effect.

Chance may also be defined

as "a. fortuitous event•tt66 or aa ttevents resultingT.from the
meeting of independent causal .s eries • • • • n67 The ancients
defined chance as an accidental cause.68

Chance is never synonymou& with cause. The greater

6la1enn, 21?.• ~•• P• 76.
62Acts 14:17.
63The author is indebted to Wilder w. ReYJ'.IOlds for this
bit of infotination. (Dr. Repl,Olds war;i his professor at ,
A~bury Theological Seminaey.)

64Y'1lapp,

Q.2.•

cit., P• 87.

65
Cf. Orr, .2Jl.• q,it., PP·• 99f •

66Jacques Mantain, A Preface ,t2
.

Sheed & ward, 1939), P• flir~ .
6 7Marltain,. A?B\l1ache;s ,m
When

929.,

Meta.physics

!m•

1

·

(New Yot"k:

'

cit.,

P• 43.

:~~;~t:!£fe~s~!a!!sf;~lffln~R~fsfifl~~f~!;·tt~·n!!~:

Maritain classifles the otc~rrence as a fortuitous event.
~ his chapter entitled "Reflections· on Necessity and Con•
edited by Robert E. Brennan
3, ,¥i Xhqm!tly.t~42),
p. 29.

tliiiency, 11 Es:sa

(New York: Shee ana Ward,
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the degree of complexity and harmony which one observes in
an effectt· the more reason he has for believing that it was
fore•e$n and planned69 by its ultimate cause; for example,
the mere existence of a watch implies the existence of an
intelligent watch-maker.70

Yet the most fragile, "sensitive"

watch is crude71 ln compa:r1$0n to the simplest flower that
grows.

Once Lord Kel1.1in and Justus von Liebig were walking

together in the country.

As they Eitmlled along Kelvin

asked Baron Liebig whether ·he believed that the grass and
flowers around them were growing by mere chemical forces. 72
Liebig replies, "No 1 no more than I could believe that a
book of botany describing them could grow by mere chemical
forces.•• 73
ttBlind mechanism" 74 fails to explain teleology.

For

example, there are thirteen conditions necessary for sight,
69namm draws a striking analogy between (a) nature,
and (b) a 100dern factoey.

See 22•

~1~·,

p .. 34.

l!aff\21•·

70-see Pal~! ~tural
2 volumes· annotated
by H. ~. B r o ~ l Vries Be an A. Potter lNew .York:
Harper•·s, e .. 1839?}~ II, 118.
.
7 1Ti.nkle and T.Jl?mnerta declare,_ "When magnified, the

edge of a sharp razor blade looks llke a jagged and very

irregula.r saw, as. if a nervous man had cut out saw teeth

with his eyes ·sh~t."

See

QR;

.£1t. 1 p. _59.

72william Ev~s, ~ ~ pocjr!;.nes

(Chicago: Moody ttese, c.1939"T-; p..

73Sidney . Collett, All Abo)lt

Toxonto, London

&

6.

2f. the

~ ~

Bible

(New York, Chicago•

Edinburgh: Reven; n.c:r.T, P• 211_

74Burtt; 1m, c&z.t ., P• 109.
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yet the ratio. for a st.multaneous fortuitous occurrence is
9,999,935 to fifteen.75

It has been estimated that there

is only one chance in 100160 that a protein molecule could
have r~sulted foEtuitously.76

We are told that there is

only one chance in 620 sextillions that the twenty•a1x

letters of the alphabet 't«>uld "happen"
order. 77

t:o

fall into logical

Some scholars are f imly convinced that the

teleology apparent in the ~rld could no more be the result
of "a fortuitous concourse of Atomsu 78 than an accidental

explosion in a print shop could produce Webster's

Distionary;.
. 79
.

Mere mechanical forces80 are as impotent to achieve this

effect as they are to "wield the pencil of Raphael or the
chisel of Angelo.tt81

?:ortuity is PQi1erless to perform the

7·5Fan:ell., 22• •..Qi_t., I, 42 •
.· 76~m; Q.2·• ci,t., pp. 258£. Vtde his leamed discussion
of "the universal solvent" on P• 1 ~

· 77 Sheen, · • 91t., _p. 146. .c f. ~enJamin
·
Field, IM
S£ufpt•.s Hand . k Q!. Cbtist1an lb't;,2ffnaedited by Jonii

c.. ymons New e tfon; New York, C c .
Methodist Book Concern., n.d.), P• 15.

ti, Chicago: The

78qucted anon)l1i0US1y by Field, !bid., P·· 13.

79c£. ibid., p •. 12.

This is true, even though the

mathematicians'may argue that the Iliad could be composed
by chance.. ~ }fa~tain, A P.t ,faee -~ ~eta~sic;s, 22• 1t.,
p~ 150. But th.e
~ul.a n~t rcsu.t ~rt tous.iy. WI,
Maritain. h:BProas; r~ !$! §mi, P,• sll.~ 1 P• 63.

3

t;l.~Q

80chance is· not a sufficient

SlMileyl 22•

sll•, It 95.

raison d'.etre. ~-,

P• 58.
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wo-r k of mind. 82

Cert.a .i nly He who made the ear can hear,

and He who made the eye can see.83
~lan, design, 84 direction• government..•these are fa~ta.85
Now a pla11 implies a l)l&mer, a · design implies a designer, 86

direction emplies a director, and government implies a
governor. 87

O! lives there; heaven, beneath thy d~ead expanse,
One hopeless, dark idolater of chance?8~
This argument may be epitomized as followst Since we

observe undeniable teleology 1n the univer·s e it is necessary

to posit an intelligent being who is capable 6£ explaining

82~

orr 1

91?• c.it. ,·. p. 100 •.

83w.t Psal~ 94;9.
84yet the Humanist f41ls to ~ecognize it.

Vid~ Be.m ard
Eu ene 'Meland, HAt .Rome ,in .the Un\ve1:se," . Qpbt§!!fflt•D'
· 1 i .. a T~hit cQmpiLed by Thomas s.. Kepler New York &
Nas:i · · ei ~Aiiig :n ..cokesbury P~e·s s, c.1941)- P• 284.

85tllu$tt"ations of teleolegy ean be found in all

branches of natural science, .Y:i9.!l Miner Raymond, Systemat~c
Ibeolo.gY, 3 volumes (Cinci.J.1.rtatulfitchcock & Walden, c.187 ) ,

1 •. 276.

samuel. Wakefield observes, "The subject is • • •
inexhaustibl.e• • • •" v~ bis boo.k, 6, CQmolete systf?D
at. ~ti.stian Igeol.Qgf (C · (:innati: Curts & Jennings, c.1869) ,.

p~

. 9.

'

86vi~e Watson. tm• piM•t t, 330.
87wtlliam James is quit·e tmiropressed with this prc,of.

He e-ven. calls attention t<; ev:i.dei,ce of disorder in nature.
See Ill! Vatietie§ o:f Religious ~ri.enq~ (Re.prlnt; New
Yorks The Modem Library~ ~ .. 1~6~ ~ pp. 4 8£.
1

88quoted anonymously by aalston; SIR.•~·• p. 16.
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the-s e orderly effects.

This being is God.

Therefore• God

e~ists.89

Gani,gou~Lagrange has redticed thi.s proof to a syllogism•

namely, ••A means

(:alm()t

intelligent cause.

be directed to an end except by an

Now we find 1n nature, in the things

which lack intelligence,. means directed to ends •. Therefore,
nature is the ~e~ult of an intelligent cause." 90
Concluslon
Summary
M. c. n·• Atey bas oondensed the. Five ways of St. Thoma·s

into one brief statement91 a$ f<>llowst

All knowledge has. for its object eometbing o~ some·
being. According to St.. Thomas our first. awarenes$
of this something, which is not ourselves., is in sensible experience-. On¢e 1nttoduce~ to being we can be
certain that wh~tever is not t10thing must obey its
laws on pain of ·being nothing or falling into contra..

diction. N.ow change belongs to the world of our
experience; and change impli;.e~ that a thing is not yet

what it can be.

Suth a C(?tidition again implie$ con•

tingenee, l>ecause to be a-ble to 1Qse what one baa and

to a.c quite what one has no:t de.notes an incompleteness

in oneself., or in othe~ words the absence of full

being.

We ha-ve, th~-- existent beings wh1¢h are

S9~ Glenni, $22.e

Sil•,

P• 79 •

90~. Garrigou•Lagrange,, ggj1 2 volumes,. translated
from the French by Dom Bede Rose (St. Louiss Herder, 1934),

l ,j

346.
91

A. D. Sextillanges considers them 1n ~ .

See

Fqp~~tij11J of X~f.t k Ph1l~fa1lhv, tftniraiecrlrom the
.
FrenciF
GoMre~st.r uther~ateshead on Tyne: Northumberland
Press. n.d'.. ), PP• 68•76.

J
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contingent and .as such do not contain a sufficient
lteason $nd explanation in themselves' for what they
a~e.

There· must.,. therefore, be ~tttent a being whi.ch.

caxplains them, and at the same ti~ is its own suffi•
eient reaSQ~ and explana~1on; that is to say, a being
who~ as bei,ng, ts JtOt contingent or d~pendent ·o r ill
any way lacking ln completen;!s of being. .This for
the

moment

we· define as God. ·

Beneath these five clas-s ic p~fs "an entire meta..
phys1co 9 3 lies hi.dd.e n.. -A ll ~ef3t u~n the same foundatlon,.
namely., "the idea of betng.. " 9 4

of Causality.
a.
b.
e.
d.
e.

All employ the prin91ple

ii _n ~hilo ·a&h11 '1.t.·, 95 therefo.,.-e:
.

~' · .. . . I . .

. . .. .#.. .

Al,l mot~on presupPQses· a movet-.

Every effect tmp'l ies. a cause.
Every contingent being preS\ilpposes. a being 1?!£ !!•
Every s.~ries P!esuppoee$ a ftr:s t &gtm•
·
Al~ order p~esupposes .an orderer.

All are undergi.rded by Fm.pit:tcd.s.m.; J.l4mety:

a. There is tnQti,o.n in the -.i-ld.
T:>. Reclp~eal actiol1$ exis~.
c. se·t ngs cQtne into exi$tence and ~hen die,

d. Things e~st ~hi.ch 4re more or les3 per·f ect.
e .. We pe2;ee:i-ve·· order in i;he -universe. 7

It is evident that

st.

Thc;mas n·ttaJ"t(I from a - . . applies

92M. c. l)·•·A1:ey, Ihoma,s Ag)d.nae (London: Btt1est Benn
Lim-i ted., c .. 1930) , . PP• l64f;.· .
..
93
olgiati·t 5m•
. . . · ej.t
. . .. . •• P:• 80:i~

941~-:l~. •· P• 73·., .
95Ft"Om notb1..ng comes nothi,ng.

96
_G ilson; -~ .
~ .U!
-s A5N1Jlas, QI!•
si;.'4•t p-. 94... (Tlu:s: ts not a <1uotat1.o~

P.'.h~~qssn,~

.

971bid..

I b 2
•
m !
.
· § . .

(This is no~· .a quotatlon •.)
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a prj.nclp];e, and reaches .a

Ways.

estDSJ.u~ioa"98

1n his famous Five

The facts ate:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Things ai-e in the prQceEJs of becoming.
Beings ai"e 'caused.
Contingence.
L1~1te§gperfeetion.

e. Order.

The principles are:
a. Whatever moves 1$ moved by another.

b. The effect preaupposes a cause.
c. Contingent being implies n~cessary being ..
d. The lower and the higher demand the existence of
the highest.
. .
e. Order points to ai;i· ordainer.100

The concluS.ion iss God exists.
?,'he Qu!;;p.gue Via.e a~e all inductive but the first four
are co11ce2med with features exhibited tn rul,ities.

The ·

fifth deal$ w!th their relationships. Furthe~re this
last argument supplements the others by showing that God
is intelligent,101 or personal.~02
98ot1gati,

la.£•

991~19., p. 79.

c~tt.

(This is not a quotation.)

l00Ibfd·• (Thi.s is not a qUQtat~n.) Each of thes.e
fi'Ve princ ples i.s a supreme law of being.

lOlMiley, 22•.

~!~•, I',

88,95.

Cf. Orr• Q• ciJ;., P• 98.

£ti•,

~02surtt._ 2.B.• ~ . • p.~ 109·. a~. Raymond,. 22•
1,
274. Theodore Gra~pni:r( ev·e n deduces &9Gdn9sa from
s argu•
ment. See _yg_g .~
.tbg CQ·,mqf· (3rd edit · nj Grand Rapids:
Eer~ns ~ 1'9lio) ,: p. ""'SV. ··n oontrast; Edward Scribner Ames
asserts that his "idea" of God 1 ·8 · comparable to his concept
of Uncle Sam.~ H~ty Conception of God," Contem29r"'rY
l\Slis~e;a~ ;\be~~' s.R• .~1~ •• P• 1a1. .

f
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Goal
The famous Five Ways lead to a transcendent Deity who

is distinct from matter.103 God stands at the place where
the Five Ways meet.104 More~·the Five Ways lead to five of
the divine a-ttribut;es, namely,

a.

P§t=
· ,

b-. Pr

vens.
, C·

c. Pi:imum · ece

s•

s . um.
·
_t,;ll;gendo. 105

!: JI~ iib.e~an~
-

OU,4,ngue VU!,@•
Revela-tur enim ira Dei de eaelo

g:;atif!s for .t he

8.Uper omnem imptetatem>
et iniustitiam homi:num e<>'tltm 1 qui ve,;ttatem De1 in
iniustitia detinen.t: q~la quod notum est Dei 1 manifestum

est in ilU.s. Deus enim 11lis matiifestavit. Invi.sibilia
eu.im ipsius, a creatura mundi 1 . per ea quae fqcta aunt,.
intelleeta, _conspiciuntura sempitema quoque et.uy
virtu.s , et divinitas-: ita u:t sint i.n~sabiles. 06

l03phillips) i,g'• $i~., II, 293.
lQ4 Ibid.• , P• 292.

1051bid.
106Romans 1:18•20.

CHAPTER XII
lMt-1.ANUEL KANT 1'S CRITICISM OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THEISTIC PROOFS
tnttGduCtion
The purpose of this chapter ts to introduce Immanuel
The autho1: wll:1 f1~$t (a) point out the 1Pfluential

I<ant.l

role wbich l<ant, pla)"s t,n the h1s~ory of modent thought.·

Then he will (b) note Kant's special. problem. and (c)
su:nmarize bo·t h hie theocy of knowledge and his theory of ·

ethice.

Fianl1y ·t he author will (d) ttate Kant• s criticism

of the eighteenth ¢entury a~guments for the existence o.f
God.2

Kant's· Influence
Immanuel Kant stood aear.eely five feet tall.
was deformed ancl he suffered f,:om poo~ health.

His chest

He never

travelled mere than about sixty miles from his native city
lBorn 22 April; 1724i, di~d 12 February, 1804. "The poet

Heine once 11-emarked that .~o .1i£e hia:t ory of Kant was possible
for he had nei.thet ·ttfe nor hlstto:r y •.1t ill§. Theodo.r e Meyer

Kif

Greene, ttint:rodUction,"
§eJ.es;tJt$ns~ited by Theodore
Meyer .Greene (New York:
Sc
briet-fs
sons, e.1929). p. xvi.1.
.
2

st. Thomas is
8tit1?821?hJ~S2! htigiop

Kantfs ,critS.ctsm of

Fulton .J . Sheen,

Century~Croft:s, 1

· , P•

;,.

indirect. ~
(New Yorks Apjireton""

..
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of Koenigsberg.3 Yet he is undoubtedly the most influential
thinker of the modern ewa. 4 Oswald Spengler even thought

tha.t Kant's death marked the end <>f philosophy in wester.n
e1vili.za~$..on,..5

During Kant·•·s lifetime the ocritical pbilo,;.

sophyt• wae

• • • ~ught in eveey impo~ant German...spealdng
university; and young men (loeked to Koenigsberg as
a shrine of philosophy. In S8me case.$ ~he Prussian

Gove,:nment even undertook. the expense of their support.
t<ant ·came to be conwlted as an oracle on all kinds
Qf ques.t ions, including sueh subjects as th~ lawful•

ness of vaccinat~n, Su~h homage did not interrupt
Kantis regular habtts ••• he maintained throughout
hi.s life a severe ~efimen. It wa$ a,:ranged with s~ch
regularity that peop .e set thei~ clocks acco~ding to
his daily walk along the street named for hlm the
Philosopher• s Walk. Unti~ old age prevented him, he
is s.aid to have mi$$ed -t his ~~gula~ appearance only
01,1 the- occasion ~en Rous·s eau•·s E~Jle at;, enggessed
hll.tll tha~ for several days he $taye at home. ·

Rheinhold, one of Kant• .s «,ntel\porartes, predicted that
within a c;:entury Kant ~uld tthave the reputa:t:ion of Jesus
Christ." 7

This· las~ ap.p raisal is quite extravagant b~t one

thing is certain, namely, Kant "p,repared the grQund for all

3ae visited ArnsdQ1:f.
4Pa\11 J. Glenn·, Ill!
sion.; St •. Louist Herder.,

ii§~EX Qi .Phi\o·§C)phx (11th
94 · , P• 26.

imptes-.

5sheeni PJ.?.·• ~it •• p. 212..,

· ~0Vtds

the anon;YtOOus ·" Bio~r~phioal Note" in "Kal_\t•" Qreat
B9..Qka: o . th~ ·¥ii:s't tm ~2r~d~ 5:4 vo,lumes., edited by Robert
Maynai-TRutch~sffllicagQ: Encyctopaed1.a Brltat"..nic~; e.1951) •

XXXII~ vi.

w.

.

·,

7Quoted by Wilbur M. Smith. ;rherefo[e·, ·stand ·(Bdktefn:.
/h,. Wi~de• l9~9),. p. 14. . .
'· · . • ·. ·
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subsequent thougbt."8 After I<4n.t all epistemology is

Jsin,n

compel.led to take 1nto c:;o;nsidera1;ion JSi)tik •
VelW,!JlfJ;;!9 9

The major portion of pt;esent day "modernism"

in Chnst:ianity can. be twac~d
that there are

two

to Kant.10 n It has been said

kinds of theo·l ogiani,, those before, and

those ·after Kant." 11

It was Kan~ls essay on

iJ&. Religion

inne.rbftlb. $l!,£ Gr,n&§l .s!$i, P&9@M Vesia9£512 which ga'7e Schleiermacher his first lesson con¢eming "the pc>llsibilf.ty of :recon•
struct.ing the oldl)lltime reli.gi.on~ . . . . «13 Rit$chl held "the
Kantiai:1 secularized eonceptio~ · ~f the Kingdom o-f God" 14 and
considered Kant tQ be ~he
p11i1osoptu.~r R!J
.:
the. Protes,ant Reformation.15

ex,c,J&Amse
.

of
.

Hermann declared., u1 have

8comeliu.e van Tll, pto.f es·scn: of A.PQ~Ogetics at

wesminster Thec::,logi~al SerniJ).ary. T·b e authot' etudled MQdem
Philosophy with Dr. Van 'i'i.t ·i t) 1952.

9Th1s wovk ap~~ed in 1781. (Kant declared that the
actual writing of thi$ boot ~equired only four or five months.)
lORarol,d Bar.nes Kuhn{ P!Ofess.o r of Philoso,ph;t of Re1i..
gion at Asbuey TheQlo.g tca Seininary.. or. Ruhn was the authorts

philosophy teacher at the B.: D. level.

11 eome1ius Van· Tit, ~ ~ M~e1:111sn (Philadelphia;

The Presbyterian & Refo-rmed?uolls.h .
12Thj.:s work appeared

g Company,

1947) • P• 9.

tn 1793.

130. w•. Heick, fi,sto.rx 2£. P~t@stant Theologx, ""11th
con1:ributions by J. • N$ve. Voume· il of K Hist.op; 2!.
£;~ttan, 1:pou1!h;1 by J. ~. _r:eve (2 volumess Philadelphia:
Muh en erg, c.194:b.),. II, 106w

i4Ibid., P• 199.
15p~;.d., Pl! 152 • .

43S.
adopted the teaching of kant in 1ta separation of theoreti•

·cal f~om ethical knowledge because I see

~

1t the libera-

tion of .t heol0.gy from the fetters of a philosophical world
IDlnt'* e

view.nl6

system ttfelmd its climax

in • • • Hege1·. ttl7

Kant:·• s influence upon the Romantid .mevement18 was ve~ nega-i,
tlve. 19 lt $eema that James Mar·t ineau the greates~ of
1

Unitar!;.,g.n scholars; waa influenced by Kant:, 20 Even Harnack

followed

Kant.ts

anti'"'metaphysical tendencies.21 Walter

Rauschenbusch, the outst•dtng .Ameri~an prophet of the

social go.s p~lt was infl.u eneed by ~t\922 Moreover Kant:•·s
systet1 forms the philQ·s o-p hic.al backg,;ound c;,£ Ethical
Intuitionism~23

In J}j£

i!Jr'g~n ~~ .-..Ggmg JlU

blosep Vern~f~ he attempta a CQlllPLete teconstruction of
rellgton upo:n the p¥-in~1ptes of l!&t1onalis.t·t c mo1al1sm. 24,..
,

...

•,

16quoted by Heick, ibka.•
1·7Ibid. •. P• 2.3' 3.
18we must be. ouriel.ve~. Morality is· not ve~ importanb.
1;elattve,. not absolu.t e.

Laws are

19This is the v~ew of Cornelius Van Ttl.
20H.
·
_..,_.1,.,
11...-~
- .,lj.
8.•
· ei..,,;..
~'l'i-., Q.l!.~
~... ,
~

2.l;_b~f!· t: p. 154.
22 .·

,' . .

W,sl•·t

P•·

3.1 6•

Z3Fla1.'0ld Barnes Kuhn • .
24
This ls an ex.ampie of whtrre tbe Reformation has swung
·to.11> far to the "Left."
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This one book alone has exerted an enormous impact upon the
thinking 0£ the western world.

Its doctrines are still ·

alive today in Germany• s "Neo,-Protestantiem" and contemporary
"modernism.o 25 The twentieth century can no more . dodge .

the moral thrust of Kant than it can escape the infiltration
of Greek philosophy or Roman law. 26 The philosophies of
both Barth and BJtUnner ttal"e based chiefly upon Kant." 27

Craig asserts that

11

neo;.supe;naturaU.sm is rooted in the

Critical philoso.p hy of Kant, especially as modified by
Martin Heidegge.r and Soren Kierkegaard• • • • n 28 Comeltus

Van 1'il points outs
At eve.e y stage of their development• Barth and B~er

at'e out to destroy the idea o( God as ~ver having
existed by Him.s elf•· In this ·respect Diale¢ticiS'ql ts
quite similar to '11hat Barth and Bt'wuulr call modem
Protestantism. Both have their origin, to a great 9
extent, in Immanu~l Kant •·s CN;l~1sue 21·!3!a Reason. 2

All lnfo~ed sources admit that Kant•·a influence was enormous
and

far-reachtng.30
25He1ck, 22•, .c it.,. II, 76.
2 ~ Smith, 21?.•

2

s!S•,

P• 10.

I·ffiSf:8
~ Mn. l}!rth (London:
· ; P• 2 ~

7a. Birch Hoyl,e., lbs
Student Chriatian Movement;. ·

28Samuel G~ Craig, Qbrtft\!Pit;7 Rig\}11~ Ca~ed
(Philadelphiat The Presbyte~an &. Refo~e~
H!ishg Company,

1946), P• 21.

29van TU,. sm• s.u,. • P•· 14.
30on the positive side Kant showed us that when pure

Pantheism is "marrted" to pu1re, De1Slll it does not produce
Theism" (Van Tll considers this to be Kant•s great eontri•
button to the Chr.istian ChUJtch.)
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t<ant himself was n9t unaware. qf h18 great importance.31
He considered his philosophical system to be Che meridian

of Greenwich of the his:toey of thought... Re even suggested

that he \vas the Cope:r:n1cu$ of philo$0phy,32 and it was almost
true.3.3

He shitted the emphas!·s from ~he ol,ltside to the-

inside.; from the external ~t-ld to the perceiver; from

structure to epi.stemology.

Before Kantis time philosophers

asserted; "1 u..11derstancl. my universe; I find there God and

his absolute laws ; hene·e ·t t is clear what I ought
But Kant x-eversed .tl1i,s attitude.

1

do."

His view . was. "I see what

3lvtc1e John T·1 illQch. Modern theories in

.Md 'e1~! (Ed~burgh 6: London:
TIJ'8"4 , p·. 4 6.

~

f~sophY

wtlli&it Biac~d &

Son*3.t

32According i:o Kant experience is an item which results
from the meeting of (a) chaotic raw materi.al and (b) certain
!! 2riori elements of the human i.n·t el.lect. Thus ~perience
~'- 1e ts a ••ta'ilored11 pr~duct• it .1s man-made. CTh'-s is
s!milar to a per$on wearing colored glasses. I.f the lenses
are dark he w1:11 see a datk world; the a prioti elements
are already sitting upon his nose and when Re ·applle$ then
to the .$ enS1ble world: he f inde that it t .a dark.) This :ls
the Co.pemiea.n tum in philosophy; to understand the object
you must study the aubject. Cope~icus ~uld say, ttTo
understand the rising and th'it setting of the sun you must
study the movement of the eaioth.

The

Slm

is relatively

steady;· tt 1a the earth whtch p~~c.es ~he apparent motion
of the sun.• " Likewl$e Kant dece·l ,a~~~. "If you wt.s h to ;s tudy
the relation$ between~- objects linked by causality. study
the mind:w oausallty ls in t:he mind. fl Th!.$ of course is
treseendental. Kant bids ug look beYottd experience and
di·s cover that these ¢0ncepts originate wt.~in the mind.

(The

autho~ is indebted to Balduin v. Schwan for this insight.
Dt' Sch-.~ _-~ s one ol hia· pxofesilQra. in the area of ~odern
European ~hi1oe~phy at F~rdham University.)
t,·

33aamtd· Bame.-s K~. ·
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I ought to do; hence God and the univer:se in th~ir relation
to me be.Qome elear.u34 TQ take (;hi& position is
• • • to make a danng asse~tion of . man•s mQl!'al com•
peter.iee and autonomy. It means claiming the 1right to
reint;erpret the na~tlre of· God in terms of ()tn" tn(i)ral

e.11;.perience s lln$tead of humbly subm~tting that expeTi•

ence to the judgment Qf a God bel.iev~d to possess
moral character and autho'X'i,ty independent of our
.
interpretations. It is to a.ay: God must be what man··• s
mor:alc:tnsight
d·a nands that he. be.; 1.f not, he is no
GQd. 3J
.
.
Cornelius Van Til affirms;
Men were beginning t:o feel that it was time £ot; an
open declaTation of independenee f~orn God while yet
- they dared not quite aecept the consequence of such
a step. It was 110t till Kant that modern 11hllosophy
became self,-..e onscio\1$ly anti•metaphysica1.J6

Fulton J. Sheen37 obse~es:
• • • I<ap.t ttused'' Gdd to g®~antee the validity · of moral
Instead of man: 1ooldng to GQ4 to justify ·
h'1raan -e xistence, God was - now asked by man tQ prove· His
rlght to ex1stenc.e . The i:-esul.t was that religion,
which was thee~entrlc,. became atithroPQeen.t ric. Pre-

ex.pertence.

viously, it had been argued tha·t since God ex.ts ts, man

onght to he religious-;- now it was al:'gued that since

ma..n is religious, God ought to be.Jti

. 34.Edwin A~ ~u~t.t ~ ~!¥9~ at ~el,&iops P~ilo§9PbX (Revised
editi,.on.; N~w Yoritt Harper ·s ,. c •.111 , P• 2.T ..

35tbl;rq•
36cornel1~s Van Til, ~'Natu~e and S~Tipture,tt ·t he

Infallzi~s
~ , edi~e.d by N-ed B. s·t onehouse &
1

Pa.u . Woolley

(!ncl' p'r · tingf Phi.lade\phia.: The ~sbytterian Guardian
Publish!ing COrpo~tiOfl·~ 1946), P- 284 •
.37A, personal

frteri'a of the au.tho,:.

. . .~ 8she~,. ~- -'_ ·:..t~ . pp~ 11_
9 'f. · C.f. J. M. Spier; . CbxiJttt~ltf .mi-4 iste,n .. _i . , translated f ~ the DUteli"liy
·p aviJ Hugr1F~eeinan P il adelphia ~ Presbyterian & Reformed

Publishing Company, c.1953), p. 5. ·
'

....'

.

....
,.t i

• •,·
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According to 1(ant we g1ve meaning to the world by applying
c.o neepts instead of listening to the world and deriving our

concepts f~om it.

Thus we a~e impressed befpre <we express.39
Kant·• s Spe.c ial Problem

Empiricism versus rationalism
Kant is indeed: tbe gJreate·s t ph11oso·p her of modem times,.40
yet he was quite ignorant of Scholastiqism. 41

No·r did he

possess any spec1ai insight into Greek thought.42 The major

influences which moulded him were ~s~artes, Wo~ff,. and
HU4-ne. 43

l<ant was reared µi a rationalistic tradition but

it was Hurne who aroused. him ftom his "dogmatiscben Schlummer. 044

He paused to consider what 't-l:>Uld be the next best ~.t ep, and

then attempted a reconciliation beo>Jeen I:mpi~cism and

39According to St. Thomas the intell.ectual life is a light. It goes into "geart• when we feed the pmper ·material
~to it; the ttmill" workEJ aftet; the "g~1st" is thro,-m in.

40vig,e Smith, 22• sJ:.S.. i P• 9.
41Glenn, 22• s!t.•t p, 330.

42Tulloch,. 22~ cf.~ •• P• 416.
43Glenn~ ~ . Q~t.
44tmmttnuel I<ant., •1 Proleg9mena zu e1ner jeden kuenfitigen
l·~etaphyaik, die al$ Wissenscbaft wird auftreten koennen,"
~ (GesB.t-rmtauagabe in zebn Baenden•
Lepig: M7s ~u.rnann, 1838)-1 Drltter Band, p. 170.

1ftet e•s
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Rationalism. 4S

He thought that a combination of (a) the

.! p;r;1gri certainty of the lattei- with (b) the A posterJ.eJ1.
modesty of the forme~ would ma:l<e an excellent system~

Science ve~sus rell$1on
Howeve~ the explanation §upr~ is only partial because
underneath it all Kant; wa~ interested in .s omething far· more

important: that j1.u;t halfflJ!i>nizing these two divergent systems.
t<ant wa.s disturbed by the w:1.denmg cl,.eff: whj.ch be di.seemed

between science and religi,Jn.46

Poettivl$m had denied the

possibility of knowing metaphysic;al realtt1es ~d Francois
. Arouet47 had even ridtcul~d re11gi.Qn.

It had actually

become disrespectful in Kar,tt:s day to believe 1n Christianity. 48
It t-niS an age of skepti.c1sm and Kant made a sincere effort

to stand for something noble and high.49 He sped to the
45.rhe t'WD main philosophic currents 9f the day. Kant
complain·$ that (a) rattona11st~.o metaphysic$ 1& merely
analytt,.:c, and (b) Emptrlc.1$11 does not get beyond .a.~
knowledge. (Thie dogmati·c slumber l• the emp"iristlc~ety

of his dQgmattsm.)

46Bu-rtt, ~.. ct;t., p.. 239. ·

47ae is c;t>mmonly known as Voltai.re.
ra-th~r than. an Atheist,. )

(He is a Deist

48corneltus van '1~1.1.

49Kant fl!'Owned· upon $ensational. psy~hology.
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~escue of morality and religion,50 thoroughiy convinced
that in order to save them ft'om utter ruin it was necessary
to dest;roy the theistic proofs •.51
~

PI\2P.:: synthe,tio judgments
Kant: t,ms dissatisf led with Cartesianiam and armoyed

by Hume·• s 8keptieism.

Hence he sought for a new answer to

the age~old question, "What can we know with ce~tsinty?"52
In o't:her words,, "Wie sind synthetische Urtheile !. pri9rl

moeglich?"S3 His investigations extended into two major
fields, namely (,a) specu:i,.atlon, and (b) faith: (a) ttWhat

can a person know for sure?" and then, (b) "What ~ght one

do and expect as a \"f!SUlt of this certain knowledge?" Kant's
answer to the first question ls found in

Krl~iJs SK relnfa.l

v~munft which appeared in 1781; his answer to the second
SOtn this ~espect h1s ease is pa~llel to that of
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schletei:macher, the father of modern
Protzes.tant theology.

According to Schleiermacher "not he

has. te11gi.on who beli~ves i1:1 a Holy Scrl.pt:u~e, but he \\ho
needs no Scripture and himself might be able to make one.• n
Quoted by Heick,$!!.•

ci~.,

I1 1 108.

51eomelius van Til.
521.e.; How can we have objective lU10wledge?

531mmanuel Kant, tt:Kritik de~ rein.en Vei:nunft," Jlm@DUel

l<~t'·s lii.m

(Geeammtausgabe 1n ~hn Baenden• Leipzig:

McFes uiiaBaumann, 1838) • Z1,et:t er Banda p. 49. Th1s is what
Dr. Schwarz calls "a loaded question.. because it assumes
tpat causality is in ~he mind. (Thia. is like asking, 11 When
did yo1,1 last; beat Yo~ ®ther•~··l aw?") Moreover if we
accept Kant•s question we a1te compelled to accept his answer
al$().
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1.s in !}r1ti{s der praktis~hen VemJl:Pft that was published in
•

I

•

•

•

1.788.
Twt,.

td.nds of reason
Kant distinguishes
two kinds of reason. namely the
.
'

pure and the practicat.

PU&:Sh or discursive reason, is

limited to- Qne realm . o-f t'e41tty; 54 wberea.s p-ractica1 1 or
moral reason; 5·s is 11:-mited to another. 56

In the sphere of

ptU;'~ reason ma.n is an architect; in the sphere of practical
reaSQn he is a legi.$ 1a tor..

Flttat he c.reates h1$ own uni•

verse; then he create$ his own m()~al standard. 57 The
essence of Kant's criJti.ca,l system

"u

the princtple of the

-s pontaneity and au·tonom:y of the human mind."58 He elevates ·
man to the level of nan autonomous god, sufficient unto

himsetfu59 and even app'l'oachee the later Hegelian• Fichtean
~.Q neept of t.he abso\u;e sel.f. 60
Kant• s Theoll'Y of· !Cnowledge

54vtz• ., the. phenomenal world.•
550omelius Van TU asse~s that for Kant the practical
reason ,-s almost s)'bQnymous "~th what we c:ould call fai~."
56v1z~,- the ·noumenal wotld.
57H•t,:;ld Ba,:t1es Kuhn •..

·

58Leonhatd Stahlin, ~ . IQta, Md ·i itscbf, translated
w~ S!mcin (!a!nburgns T. & • Clark•

frQm the Gentan by o.

188'9)• P• 81.
59sheen,: 22• ~... p. 96.

60corneliua Van Til.
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Noumene. and

phenomena

The ttwave of doubtn61 has neve,r surged any highei- than
Hume•s skeptic1smi and Kant determined to answer Hume by
sho"tdng that 1--.nowledge is objectiv~. 62

The basis of his

famous theory of knowledge is "synthetischen Urtheilen !.
priom:i,•1 63 that is ., judgments of experience.64 Kant sharply
divides the wrld,:of i-eality into two · sectors, namely (a)

noumena, and (b) phenomena.65 The noaena\ ,orld consists
of thingswin•themselves, that ts, -things as they really are;66

whereas the pht!lPIDffllA~ l«>rld is 'What one experiences.
Classical philosophy atrives to as~ertain the thing•in""
itself; for example, Hegel assumes that the intellect is
capable of grasping the metaphysical entity itself,

Kant insists that thls ts sheer impossibility.

But

One can

know absolut~ly nothing wlth· ce~tatnty except the '10rld of
61Tu11och, 21?• .s.1$.•, P• 426.
62stahlin., 22• cit., P• 7.
6'tcritik der relnen Vetnunft,"
6fi.

~ll~eh., $!.2•

s.U.• ,

sm.• ~·-• It,

44.

p.. _
43"2.

65W&."I>er tran~scendentalen Doctrln. d~r Urtheilakraft•"

Jri.t;ik i.!t .!'SN!ffl. yet1W9f$, 21!• clt. 1 II 1 2.36..-53.
661·• e. • es•en~es,
.
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possible experience.67 That. which is l<!Jewable muet alwaya
r-emain within the bounds of aenle experience. 68 One. can
never obtrude any further..

Expe.r ience 1$ the basis - the

starting,..point, and the limit of all human knowJ.edge.69
Htmce it ls not e~~rising to leam . that Kant ha-• been

called

11 the

apostle of experienee.tt70

Order ver.sus chaos
Knowledge results fmm a veey unique inCeraction of
mind and matter.

The functton of the intellect ts "to

CO"!"

ordinate the phenomena of expet1enc;e,tt 71 and the confequence
is that all of man• s knowledge 1$ "shaped" and ttcolol!'ed"
by the struc-t ure of his,

wonderful mind+

The intellect thus

creates its own wrld from the confueed, chaotic itppressions
67see· fi:Mue! gantlt C£1.ttgue d ~
lated from ·.:. e German ·Gy Norman ·Kemp Smitff'"'(

i,~•
n1

1953). p. 174.

trans•

Macmillan,

68Borden Parker Bowne $ppa,:ently misunderstands Kant
· at thls potnt. · He thinks tbat••aecordlng to ltant-.•the
absolutely .necessary bej.ng ia part of the l«)rld of sene.e
-i>erlence" Set, -~
.S 2 S2S.SII (Boetont Houghton Mifflin
Company., 1912) t p-;-2<fl!t

6 ~ Tullodl1 U• s!$.•, P• 423•

101!?W.-'

P• 424.

vol~!~~:ia=~·=~ JI~--~

&

T~ Clark• 1863) • I, 27.S .

-i i.
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which it receives fx-om the extenor. 72 The world out there
is not orderly as we suppose.

Rather it 1.s a seething,

buzzing, blooming mass of confuston."73

However the amazing

bQman mbid separates and SQrte this jumbled data according

to three criteria, 74 namely., (a) sen$ibility, (b) understanding, and (c) reason.

Faculties of the mind
The fa.c ulty. of sepsibiJ,i$Y7.5
first receives the dies.
orderly ph~omena and impre·s ses them wi.th the subje~tive

forms of spaee16 and tlme.77

(This is "Der transscendentalen

Aesthetik.")78 The t'e~Lt i$ empl"tical 1.ntuitlons.79 The
facu],.,ty of yngpr§~$5Jin&8G the1, takes the empirical intuitions

72

tmm5~

\8'f saa;,.
C#ftlue ~ !:!ID. l\e&SQn, translated
~ . ~-, P• Irr.

by Norman Kemp Sm t: ,

73aarol:,d Barnes Kuhn desG:rl'bes it as
74o~ "pigeon-holes."

SsJw!emn~re1.

75
Ibid• ., P• 6S~
76see. u1<r.t ~ik der rein~ Vei:nunft., " -2•

ei.t.,

11, 62•69.

77see ibid •., ·PP• 69•8~ •

78tf the reader is.'una<:q~inted \ri.th Kantian technl~al
· terms he will ura.doubt.edly ptofit from re$d11'.lg Jostah Royce,

''Kant• s 'l'ermil'lolegy.;.tt

D1$"'L¥
2' m1199phY ~ Pfflpplqg,
.r , Bal:d . · -New cott"ec e

3 volumes, edited by Jam.es .·

ed~ti.on; New Yorkt Peter Smith, 1940) 1 1, 588•598.
.

79see

~1

lated by Norman

&mftft Gtt1,!1SM
d. ~ Rgasgn,
111•, p-;-'8'5".

emp Sm. · ,. Q.R.•

801.• e. ,, the intellect.

See

iW•,

PP• lOS•llO.

trans•
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and stamps them tdth "den ~e1nen Verstandesbegr1ffen"81

(J;he pu.t 'e co~cepts of the -u nde11$:tanding) or the twelve.

Categori.~s). n.amel;y.,
A.. Of Quantit.y
1 •. Unit y

2• Plu~l.i t;y

3. Tot;a1tty

B. Of Quality

1•. Reallty

2 •. Negia-tio11
3. Lim-: 1,.tation

c.

Of Rela.t!on

1. Of tnher.e~~e and Subsistenee82

2.. o~ causality Slid Depend~nee
3~ 0£ Community (te¢1.p,to.c t.ty between agent and ,.tlent)

D. Of l-1oc1ality

1. POS$1bili-ty•!'li! ~i:,ossibllj.ty
2.. E~ftenee•~N<Jn•e...·a t'1tce .
3. Nece$sity..•Contil'lgency.. tJ 3

The lteffult ie judgment$~

F-inally · the f.a ~lty of

ltnpresse.a the$e. judgments. wit!\
·•• ., .@ • • '.

:·· ,.~ ~ : •. • -I •• , • l ..

.f1B -

gason

$!!9&SCQ~t7P$fl!l)
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Idpen,

namely, (a) world 1 (b) ·soul, and (c) God. 84 The

~esult 1$ na.soning.85
Now (a) time and space are f9rms; (b) the twelve cate•

gories ~e patterns,.
and (c) the th~ee ideas are re,gulat!xs
. .
.
~

csms,eet's . 86

One mind does E\ll the syntheaizlng but the

ptt,cess occurs at three different levels.-87 Moreover (a)

waff\e~~ro~;
ba~t~i. and (c)

the categories are like a

(b) the raw data of

experience i'3 like the

the world of possible

expertence is, like the waffle.88
,
Thus all knowledge begins with experience; tha.t ts;
conceptions are empty apar.t from sensations. 89

Intelli•

genqe gives both fotm1 Md objective reality to sense impres•

sions.90
~~
~ 3f •
i!!.4.,
PP• ~o
8 5 ~ Burtt 1 22• W• t

84
. See

PP• 247•49.

86ffamld Barn~ J\Um. To. the:e e thtee Ideas conespond
th~.ee dtaiectical syl.],.dgisms of reason.. They are the sophis·•
tications, not of man, but of pure reason herself. First
is (a) Psyehological Parallel1$tttlt directed to the idea of
the soul as the sitnple substance~ second is (b) Cosmo~
lo·g ic~l Antbiomi.es • d'irec;ted ro,~,ai,d a tmive,:se.. Third is

(cJ Praofs fo-r the exist.ence of God, dit'eeted toward the
existence of -~
r.p};ts~. Wt, "Der transscenden~len
Dia~ektik,!' " ~ k ~~ Z'.e en V.ernq.nft,.tt 11?• ~ . ,, Zweiter

Band, PP• ~07•532.

.

.

.

87eorrie11us Van Til.
8.8'.the author i.s- indebted to C~rl Michal son for thla
atr!.ldJ;tg Ma1,.ogy. ~. Michaleon. fo,:me~ly the as.d istant
of Edwb Lewis; was the m.~er•s pb11oaophy e.&cher at nrew

lhrl.veratty.

89~llocb, !m• .s!t,,-, P• 419 •.

90l!U4~; P• 433.
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• •. .. certain waves, as 1t were• pass ove'I:' the surf~ce
of our mind; and those wave-itnpreasions a~e the primary
embeyoni~ conditions of all knowledge.. They do not
constitute e1eperience, for experl.ence is the material

wrought up.!il

I<ant distinguishes between the materl.al supplied by the mind
and the material which is given to the mind.92 SenQe data
alone is not knowledge. 93 A mere 4 ~rl.gl1, concept is
empty.

Thinking

w

,as

ia void of content.

The "m111tt can

gri,.nd endlessly ·but no "meal" is pi;-oduced; that is, a parti•

cular never becomes a univer,ai.94
Perh~ps the majo~ d1fferenc~ between Kant and St. Thomas
is in their definitions c,f knowledge E,S£ .a&•

can ?e gail\ed

by

If knowledge

immediate experience only.95 then (because

one tet.'li'l transcends experience) it 18 impossible to gain an
insight into God•·s nature by analogy.. For Kant analogy

yields, not knowledge,. but only "des regulativen Princips

der vern.un£t.u96

Yet sci81'.1Ce (o,; ttknowledge") is helpless

to pro.c eed in the absence of such principles.

91~1!~2•.

Hence the

p.• 420.

92stahlin, 22• ~ · . p. 7.

93Tulloeh1 2!?• c\t., P• 425.
94see ~•• P• 432.

9Sow at leaet in a context where experience constitutes
an immediate element.
96
"Kritik der ~etnen Vei-nunft," $2•

s.t.• ,. It,

405.
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Angelic Doctor labels such inevitable conclusiona97 as

"knowledge." 98
Kant's Theory of Ethics
Rant•s views on moral philosophy first appeared tn

Grundle8!:!Bg !!!£ Metaphysik SJ!t Sitten.99 Three years later
;

•

.

i

(1788) he published his full Statement,. iuunely, Kritik der

ru;aktischen vemunft.

In this second work we learn that

the deficiencies of ttder reinen Vernun·f t" a~e supplied by
"der pra.ktischen Vernunft."

Pure reason is indispensable

but it fails to disclose the most important · truths of life;

for example,

11

der retnen Vemunft" knows nothing about either

the origin or the nature of duty.
Pflichtf du erhabener groszer Name, der du nichts
Beliebtes, was Elnschmeichelung bei sich fuehrt. in
di.r fassest, sondern Unterwerfung verlangst, doch auch
nichts drohest, was natuerliche Abneigung im Gemuethe
erregte und scttreckte, um den Willen zu bewegen, son•
dem blos ein Gesetz aufstellst, welches von selbst im
Gemuethe E1ngang findet, und doch sich selbst wider
Willen Verehrung, (wenngleich nicht immer Bei olgung)
erwirbt, vor dem alle Neigimgen verstunm.e n, wenn sie
glei ch in Geheim 1hm entgegen wirken, welches 1st der
deiner ·wuerdige Ursp!'Ung, und 'WO flndet man die
Wurzel deiner edlen Abkunft, welche alle Verwandt•
schaft mit ~eigungen .stolz ausschlaegt, und von welcher
97which arise from experience.
98Xl4e Francis P. Clarke- "Kant and Thomas Aquinas on
the hoo s for the EXist.e nce of God, tt P91i9so hical »sseays
J;a pong.,: 52.f ~ Ar~uf Singer, a•, e !ted y F. P. Clarke
& M. c. Nalim--:n>nlladelp ia: university of ~ennsylvania Pre,s;
Londons Oxford University Preas, 1942), PP• 315£.

6

.

99see immanue& Kant's Werks,

PP• l'!"()S.
, 1

I

i

.

Sl,2•

cit., Vierter Band,

.
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Wurz.el abzustammen die unnachlaszliche Bedingung
desjenigen Werthe ist, den aich Menachen allein selbat
geben koennen?lOO

Kant placee the concept of duty at the veey heart of morality.
This is indeed pralsewotth7, especially when one remembers
~hat the pmblem of obligation 1s absent from Aristotle's
101

N\~omachean Ethics.

Pure reason is inadequate, but the practical reason
comes to our rescue with its authoritative commands.

In

fact I am more certain of this moral oughtness within than
anything which I can leam from

Ba ?,.~inen yemunft

alone.

This inner voice of autho~ity i s ~ }fategqrischer Imperativ. 102
Only this is real to Kant,103 and fi-om it he deduces three

noumena.

This famous Categorical Imperative appears ln three
forms, one of 't°*1ieh ls., Hffandle so, dasz die Ma rime deines
Willens jeder,;e1t zugleich als Princip einer allgemelnen
Gesetzgebung gelten koenne."104

lOOtnmanuel Kant, "K~1t1k der praktischen Vernunft,"
JJ?.is!•, Vierter Band, PP• 200£.
101~ "Ethica Nlcomachea•" translated from the Greek
by W•. D. Ross, Ih.i. 1lUJ& ~ 2f. Ar1a~t;J.e, edited by
Richard McKean {IltllprrnB:ng; New Yo~: Random House, c.1941),

PP• 927..1112.
102see "l<ritik der praktiachen Vemunft, 11 22• cit .. ,

Vierter Band, P• 117.

lO'itarold Barnes Kuhn.
1041!?1.4., P• 130.
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This is a p~ud assertion of the autonomy of man~

ttAutonomie des Willens 1st die Beachaffenhelt des Willens,
dadurch derselbe ihi"TI selbst ('w,abhaengig von aller Beschaf f• ·

enheit der Gegenstaende des. Wollens) ein Gesetz 1st.nl05
With the aiq of .s!!i .praktiscben

Vetsunft man is able to

reach out; into tbe . eternal, a feat which is utterly impossi•
ble by means of der F@HJS V$Ji1iJ\lBft.

Kant supposes that

faith penetrate.a more deeply into the nountenal world than
pure reason. 106 In fact he stresses the prtm,cx107· of the
For Platc> fai~h is the lowest type of

practical reason.

knowledge, but fo~ Kant faith is the highest.

J2!I. ~te.-

ggriscg~r kW2~;a&,1v is the vety voice of God. 108
But whence the origin of this inner oughtness?l09
From experience?

From God?llO

No, we derive the "thou

shalt'' and the n thou shalt not" from the very structure of

l05ttGrundelgung zur ·M etaphys1k d~r Sitten," 22• ci~.,
Viert.er Band, p_. 66 •.
l06Alfred Ernest Gatv~e, 4 Hfnd)Ngk Qf. Christian
A31l;.og·
g attcs
(New York.t Scr:1.bner•s Sons,. 1'9T3) t P• IS.
•
.
. .. t. .

9Iit!9Y:t:

·
· ·10.11mmanuel Kant,
~ .fractical 1ea'tn, trans•
lated from the Gel'man by T . mas .~ i.ngsmill Abbott London:
Longman·s 11 Green, & Company, 1889) 1 P• 21-6.
10
st;~Slt sm~ ~~t;. *· P· 13.

8:rnEr'i~tsa,s,

l09see "Gnmdlegung zu-r Metaphy~ik der Sitten,11 22• cl~.,
V~et'ter Band, pp,. 3S.5$; 811i!o83.

cfftst*fl

llOv..tde John Calvin 1.
Q.[ ~
ft,'liglon,
2 '1Qlumes, .t t-anslated from '. e Lat · oy Ji1ira
en
t .
Amencan edition, revised;; Grand Rapid·s : Eerdmans, 1949),

1K5itutf;

I, 54ff.
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the human intellect its.elf••the subtle implication being
that the· mind of man is aktn to some noumena.

This is. a

bold affil.,"ll'lation conce:ming the God-likeness of man•·s
intelle¢t,.. liflJ.99. ~aai!ffi§ is -mw a legislator, 111 a "facth
which reinforces the innate pride of his heart.

Na.ture

herself has designated the human will to give un~v~sal
laws; moreover the only statut~$ which are binding upon a
man are those which he himself makes!.

Man sahe den Menschen dux-ch seine Pflicht &1 Gesetze
gebunden; man liesz es slch aber nieht einfallen, dasz
er nur seiner ei.genen _und dennoch allgemeinen Gesetz•
gebung unte~qorlen ·S ei, und das~ er nur verbunden sei,
seinem ~igenen, dem t~aturzwecke nach ab.er j lge.raein
gesetzgebenden Willen gemaesz zu handeln. 1

2

u. •

•

Kant atti'i.butes to man '-Jltimate legislati'7e powers." 113

He thinks "the will of a t"ational being must always be
regard~d as legislative."114 He even refers to £·i 11tte: 1.nen

as "gesetzgebenden, Wesens, (die da1rum auch Personen heiS•
zen) • • • •" 115 Hence the categorical Imperative is not
a restatement of the GoLden Rule.1 16
ll-lsee. ttKntik der pra.kt1.schen Vernunft. 11
Vierter Band, P• 123.

sm~ s!t•,

ll2no~1ndleguns zur Me~aphys1k de" Sitten,.."' 22•

Vierter Band, p. 57.

Th~

ill•,

_P!!!~~:i!:s&V:!!f~;!~d~bif:h~~S;;®Wn~:h~~4~;!p~:a~3.
_J.14,;ti;.t~~ue

2-2~ cit.~ P• !i

2f. -~ Bc~ioa!
1

J\S&so13t tt;anslated by Abbott,

115-tGrundt~gung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," gJ?.• sll••
Viert~r B~~d, p. 63.
lltlz.uke 6:31.
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Der praktische Impe~ativ wt.rd also folgender setns
'Handle so., dasz du die Menschheit, aowohl 1n deinel:'
Person, als in de:r Person eines jeden Anderen, jeder•
zeit zuglyt~h ala Zweck, niemals blos ala Mittel

brauchst.

Ra th$l' der k§t~go_r1.acher lmpefaSJ;.v is a means whereby mortal

man be<x>mes "ein Grund bestimmter Gesetze •• · • •"118
Kant•s major premise is that (a) moral duty is supreme,
and (b) theology must bow bef'ore the moral insight.

The

Categorical Imperative is absolute, unconditional, and a

noumenon in itself.
Der k.a.tegorische Imperative ist also nur ein einziger,
und zwar dieser: handle nur nach de~jenigen Maxtme,
durch die du zugleich wol}rn kannst, dasz sie ein
allgemeines Gesetz werde. ~
The implication is that t:eligion must be based upon the
moral element, and hOt on the speculative.120
A "Good Willtt is the only thing in this WQrld (or out

of it) which can be termed &Q2Q. without qualification.
"Es ist ueberall nichts in der Welt, ja ueberhaupt auch

a1.i$zei- de1tselben zu. denken moeglich, was ohne E'inschraenking

fuer gut koennte gehalten werden, al.s allein ein gy.tei:
W1lli•ttl21

Put:l)Ose does not dete~ine the moral value of

117warundlegw:ig zur Metaphyslk der Sitten," QR.•
Vierter Rand, P• $3.
1181J:!M,' P• 51.
1191bid.• • p. 43.

120Haro:ld Sames Kuhn.

12llJ?.is.,. P• 10.

~it.,
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an act when it is performed from a sense of duty•
• . • . eine Handlung aus Pflicht hat ihren moraliachen
Werth nicbt in der Absicht• welche dadurch erre1cht
werden soll, sondem tn der Marime• na~h der sie
beschlossen wird, haengt also nlcht von der Wirkl1ch•
keit des Gegenstandes der Handlung ab, sonder.n blos von
dem Prlncip des Wollen$, nach welehem die Handlung,
unangesehen aller Gegenstaende des Begehrangsver•
moegens 1 geschehen is.t . l2Z

Moreover unless philanthl'Opic deeds spring from this soil

they lack

that

0

11

aechten moralischen Werth.«123

conscience needs no guide ••• •"

"a conscience .s uffices" 124 he tell.a us.

Kant declares

The possession of
Furthe'rmore he

assumes
• • • das·:t das Gebot: du sol.1st nicht l~egen, nicht
ettwa blos fuer Menschen gelte• ax:idere ve~uenftige

Wesen sich aber daran nicht zu kehi-en haetten; und
so alle uebrige eigentliche Sittengesetze•• ~ • 1 25
(a) We are supposed to obey the CategQr1eal Imperative

regardless of happiness, and ;yet (b) every man has a right
to be happy.126 Kan.t even states that it is our duty to be
happy.

"Seine eigene Glueckseligkeit sichem, ist Pflieht,

122lbid., P• 18.

i23Ib.id., P• 16.
1241mmanuel Kant. ~ll.Sia.n Within the Limit! !!, ~eason
·A12Pt, translated frome Germanby Th.eo&>re M. Greene and

· Hoyt H. Hudson (Chi.c age: Open Court, 1934) ,. p. 17 3.

22•

l25"Vorrede," ttGrundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,•
Vierter. Band,
P• s.
...
..

ctt.,
.. .

126aarold Barne.a. Kuhn points out that Kant is 1nconstst.e nt at this point.
·
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(wenigstens indirect.)' ••• •" 127 Apparently he consider&
happiness -to be the sunmuq ~ of llfe.128
A correct. undet'Standirig 0.£

S!£ ka·t'~aqri§;Cl)eg

M!lPfPtiJ

is impo~tant fo~ our discuS$ion because this is the basis
for Kant•·s. one and only tllei.s.; ic pxoof.129
The Onto logical Pi:oof

The Proof Stated
According t.o Kan·t , "Es .s·t nd nul:' dfei B8"""e.i sarten \tOm

Dasein Gottes au$ spreculativer Vernunft moeglic;:b."130

They are (a) the Ontolo.gical, (b) the Cosmologlcal• and (c)
the Physico•theological.131

He add-s eonf1.dently, ••Mehr gibt

es ihrer nicht und mehr kann e• auch nicht. geben~"132 He
states. flHit

tte\lel'l Bewetsen

oder au,gebesserter Arbeit alter

1271,a~dlegung zur Metapbysik ~er Sitten-. n al• ~ . ,

Vi-erter Band, p. 17.

·

_ 128see "t<r-U :tk der praktteehen VeX"ntmft~" ga. f?11:.,
V'ietter Band, PP• 229~32.

129see

!k!sl" ,

pp. 245-54. ·

130ttKrl.tik deJr ;i-einen Vem.unft," 0.1?- ~ll. 1 Zweiter
Band, p. 455.. By ~··spec:ulativeK t<ant means"""iitheot-etical •.0

~ N0.,:man,_ K~p Smith

~

-.g ii;affi' (2nd edition rev1.s•d.; New
P• 52"/ •

Prtl8S ,.
0

r ·),

YoYi

The l~tlrlianities

13.lKant ho~ver llst;s them ii,. the reverse order.
~1tik der i'einen Vermmft,tt 21?• sll~, p. 456.
132~.

·

6. QsmpeJ!$:!D' & ~~t•s· •gnptgus; 51£.
See

4.56

Bewet-se wuerde ich bitten 11.llch zu verschonen."133 He
classifies the fit-st as .transcendental and the other two

as

em:p:l.t·ica.i.134

loh werde darthun, dasz die Vemunft, au£ dem einen
Wege (dem empirischen) so wenig, als auf dem anderen
(deu1 t;ans-s.c endentaten) etwaa ausrlchte, und dasz sie
vergebli~h ihre Fluegel auaspanne, um ueber die
S:i.xmenwelt durc;:h die blose Macht der Speculation
h1naus zu kommen. I3:>

The famous Ontological proof for t:he existence of God was

conceived original1y136 within the fertile b~in of st.
Augustine.137

thusi

st. Anselm to

However it is

,dlom

~Je

are indebted

.Max Muellet paraph1;ase-s the original
ask to be excused fram listening to new

133I,bif!. , p. 4S8.
0

1

must

proofs, or to the tinkered workmanship of the ol.d.tt ~
••ct;itique of Pure R.eason,tt translated by Max Mueller, ~
Silg~tigns., , ·; c~.t • ., P• 265. Fot a more accurate renaerlng
o t e text v . e-w:fhe Critique of Pure Reason,« t~anslated

by J.M. D• .Mei• ejobnii GJeat Dgoks
22• cit.~ XXXII, 192.
c
134w-:nanu~J. ta~-•~ Crifi<JU!

u. .

21 the Western wo;ldt
-

··

2!: ~ R!3ason.,

translated .

by Noman K.emp Sm· t , 22•
p. 5 ~ Kant evidently for•
gets this because a few pages ater he classifies the
CoSmological PJ."OOf as transcendental. See ~bid •., P• 514.
tn Krtti,k d~4
VegG'ift Kant ."'111.tea conceming the
f iret · two prool~, ··1fei:de -~ ·she~ gefuehrte B~~t:ee waren
transscendental • • • •" See 22• ctt• ,. P•· 471.
135 b
.11:d•, P11 456 • .

1

reinfii

_1 3 ~ Paul,. J. G1~1

ibSPd.!c;r

Louis; Herder, 1952), p. 3~.

(14th impresston; St.

137.Y:Wfi ._Conce~ing Th~ Nature ~£ Good," ge:s \c Wrltings
g£, §a~t ~oUs~e; translated from the La~Ul . y A. H.
Newmanj e~~t&l Tt4111tn$y J. oateEJ (New York: Random House,

c.1948J, I; 431.
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for the very f iret classi¢al S·tatement of this argument.138
It ha·a· been foi:mulat:ed in vanoua ways by Descartes, Leibniz,

Spinoza, and saxnuel Ola~ke139 but. Ut is usually stated in
this manner:_140

1. God ie_that neceasary Being than wl"u:?m (4) no higher
can exist, or (b) be thought· to exist. l'tl
2. A Gc>d conceived of as ~isting is. gioeater ~ (a)
a god conceived as not ~is.t ing, or (b) a god not
conceived as existirlg~ 1·

3. Therefore, God exists.143
138

· ·
Vide "Pro~l;.ogium," a,. ~-~· :translated from the
Latin by . Sidney No1:-ton Deane (2ir ~~tion; Chtcago: Open
Court, 1910) 11 p.p. 7£. Cf. the $l,Jmm'1ry statement in Jolm
Miley, s~str;atis; ~qglogy, 2 volume~ (New Yorki Hunt &
Ea ton~ 14'3 _, I, 7 ··• se. · Ntselm also had another theistic
proof corresponding to the Fourth Way of . St~ ·Thomas. ~
Maurice De ·Wulf, HiS·tQa _
of.. Mediffi! ?hi~o19phY, translated
from the French by P. Cof'ley (London: Longmans, Green and

Companyt 1909), P• 164.

l39yi9e Miley• 211,!. cit« t I_. 75..
l40The author 1s indebted to Harold Barnes Kuhn for

this brief statement.

141Anseimf s words are, " - • • s Qihil ~ ctgitafi
Quoted in an anonymous article entitle<r"t e
Ontoogieal Argumen_t ,." ~eLettiQns f\'Pa ~ L!~erature o.f
~ ,. edi.t ed by Alfre Ca ·dee()tt an H• R. Mackintot.:in..
~urgh-; T. and T. Clark, 1904) 1 P• 3. Cf. "Pr.oslQgium,"
MS§~tn, Jm• <;it., PP• 8 1 10.

potert·"

a.·

142st. Anselm asserts that God is even ttgreater than
~
· • p~ 22 •.
.

can be coneeived~tt

,•\

.

143Leande~ s. Keyser affirms, "We are Jure that when
prope~1y stated it is conv~~1ng.• See~ sx,·
tem ~ ~~·&Si.an
7

Evidence (8th edi·~ ion, rev~sed; Blttlingt.on, owa.: Luhran
1942), P• 197. James Off is very favorably
impressed. see
lltl! ti£ iQd. and $he Wgrld

LlEeraey .Boat:d,

IbaJllf.•~
• ·
) • p. 1'0'3.

(Grand Rapids·: Eer

'..

.
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or

we can epitomize it

thus:

1. God i~ the substance qualified by the sum of all
positive attributes.

2. Existmice is a positive attrl.bute.144

3. Therefore; God exists.

This

is

11

the non.-empirical !. pp.;ri, proof from mere con-

cepts.n145

Thi.s argumentl46 is na b-1ind-,man's proof".i147

that is, one need not touch or observe anything. The only
requirement is that a person analyze the innate148 contents
of his O\vn mind.149 This of course is pure Rationaltsmli
In substance Descartes states .the pt'OOf as follows:

1.

I11

ai~

everybody's mind there is the innate idea of

absolutely perfect Being~

2. Now, exist;e.gee is a quality of perfection.

a·

ll.Z.1n general Kant refutes thts proof by denying this
second premiae,
e A. c •.. Ewin_g, .t:. Sh9rt ~ment:3tt 2n
~t•tf Cgitigue . ~ g~sAA (Ch~cago, unTersity of
C cago Pres·s ·, l oy;·-p .. 241.

~45No-rman Kemp Smith, ~ ~~t11n@9tar;z S£ Kant's ~rit1gue.

a&. !)are i~fiUff?il" t SW.• ci~.,

P• ·

7.

146Technically this is net a pure !!4ori proof.
Rather it ;..s an argument A s.YDY:1taneo. v
Glenn, 'U}eoM,cx,
~· <:!i$•' P• l~.5.
.
.
147car1 Michalson.

148&en~ Descartes insists that ttthe first and chief"
lluulte idea is the idea of God.

M~ttat~§•

~

"Fifth Meditation,"

triuist.ated fi:om the fieiich by ~urence J.
La~eur~~ew Vot-k: Liberal Arts PJte1s~ c.1951), P• 60.

149\vhence the or,igtn of this sublime concept? ~
William E"'T&'lS.~ ~ ~~eat ¥;ct_r ipes s.f. Jm.11 J!ible (Chicago:
Moody Pres-s., c.ffl9 . ,. P•
•
·
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3. Therefore, God ex!.$ta.l50
This has appeared tmpreseive to man1.

But Maritain affirms

that Desca~tes•: formulation of the Ontological proof "has

had no historlcal lnfluence-."1Sl This &1:'gument is based
upon the familiar equationl52 which underlies the bulk of
cla&sical philosophy, namely, "Thought corresponds to being,"

that is, the concept corresponds to the reality. 153 The
mere idea in onets mind signifies the extstencel54 of a car.res•
ponding objective t'eallty somewhei:e.1-55 There can be no
reasonable ·doubt because the ht.'ifflS.n ln~ellect ts never mis•

taken.156
Moreover if thie being dc)es not exist, he is not perfect.

150carl Miehaleon•s sum.iM1ry. cf .. the restatement in
Miley! ~· ·ctt., _I, 1S. ~ Dee.c a,:tes~ complete statement
in "F1fth Medi.t atiQn," 22·· s.n,-. ;· PP• .56"!"63 ..
151Jaoques Maritain · The -~
ii D131c,rteg, translated
from the French by Mabel{e ·1,~ An<Rion (Neworlt: Philo,sophical

Library, c.1944); p. 107.

152tt is regre·ttable that this point eludes James orr.
See 82• cit.~
. P• 103.
153virJ~ St. An-sei.11• a ttadmis.8ion" 1n his 1•Proalogium,"
212.• pit., p. 8.
,

154oescartes asserts that the knowledge thus ga1.ned of
God1·s e,d.stence is "t:l'Ue and e~rtain." !.!9! np1fth Medi.ta•
tion, 11 22• cit. , p.,. 62.
15Sst. Anselm writes, 11 The-refo,re, if such a being can

be conceived to e..""ti.st, net?esttarlly it does ex!.s~~" ~
ttAnse1m' s Apologeti.c·,tt SJ. Anl~lul 1 22• ~- • P• 154.

l.56This is a classtc thesis of ancient philo$0phy.
!ls.q Ma1:'itain, ala• ~ . ; P• 108.
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One may de..11y the exlstei\Qe of ·s uch a being, but that Being
wh-i.ch exists i.s greater than tthat being to whom one attributes non•exis-t ence. 157 One can .always conceive of a
being greater than the non""·e ~i.s~~t,. namely t the Exis·terit.158

This is obvious because to e~st ta greater than not to
exist •.
How~v-er one.. ;must be cauti.ou..s a.t ·t h,.. s point lest he
fall into the subtle en'Or of Ga~U.on, the aged monk of

Marmoutier., who attempted to .r educe .thl,s proof to an absurdify.

Re declared derisivelr, "l have an tdea Qf a perfect island.
He wri.test

Let'' s · .embark. 0 159

If a man should ·try tb pz-ov~ to me that this island
truly er.ists, and that it~ exi~tence lhould no longer
be doubted. either I. should believe that he was jesting,
or I know ·n ot which 1 01,1:gbt to regaltd as the greater
fool: myself t · supwsing that l s·b o~l.d al.low this proof;
or. him>- if. he ehculd suppose that he had establi-f&8d
with any .ce.r tainty the ~"dsttence of this island. ·
One may state Gaunilen·' '8. po.s.t tion syl.log~s,tical!y thus:

1. I h:a,ve an idea Qf a most bea~tiful and perfect
island.
2. But it is not. the idea of sueh an island161 unless
t his· island actually e,ti~ts.

___ ____
,;,;,,.,,;

157 St!.: Anselm thlnl,d3. 11: is· tmpossi.ble to conceiv-e of
~
. tiPtoalagiun-1 11· g,e. cit .. , pp. 8-10.

God as not. existing.

158c£. Burtt, 22• ~ · , P•· 188.

159'!'h.e author ts !nd~beed eo cax-1 M1cbal.sen for this
pa:raphrase.!t

l60u1n Behalf of the Fool," ~.•

1611. • e.• ,,

O f·

a -pe
· ·r· f'. e· c·t.,.;Qn.e.

Alli,~&m,

&• cit.~ P• 151.
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3.• Therefore, the island exiets.162

This is a sophism-163 which amounts to a serious ertor.
Hen~e we a~e no-t S1Jl1>rl2'ed .t o team that St. Anselm treated
this reply with contempt •. Anyone

~

conceive of beings

which are ptJrely ima3tnery; for example, Descai;tes met'ltion~
0

a winged horse." 164 Gaunilon·•·s objection is valid only

in the realm of finite beinss "because in _their case aetual

exis.t ence is· not of ·the neces·$ 4ry content of ~he idea. • • • " 165

His abjection is worthless in ~he sphere of infintte Being
because (a) exi8tence i.s a necessary predicate of pei-fe.c tion,

and (b) such a Beiltg ie nece~saey to explain the pres~ee
of the exalted idea existing i.n human consciousness.166

st. Anselm ,-s not -eoncemed wt.th pe~eat.i on
· with PERFECTION!~~ 167

in

a genua, but

The human intel.lect has an innate

idea of an abs<>lutely perfeC!t., :necespry Being, and there
can be but one example168 to co.rrelate with this cont:ept•

163cf. John J. ·T oohey, AD.

(3rd edition; New York:

pp. 104•09.

El!ienlftt Ha,dboq~

of ~

Appleton~~ntuty•Cro ts.; c.ff4~

164-,Ftfth Meditation,"·
Qi•· cit-., p, S9.
.
l65t
·
·
· -f i~ey 11 G• ~ · , I ., 74.
.

l66~•-t· PP•· 74£.
167cf·. Glenn• l'bf!Rdiox, $ta•

c\t.,

P• 35.

168nescarte$ as~eJ:ts, "· • ~ l cannc,t conceive anything
but God al6ne,. to ·wbc:)se· e$senee ex.tsten9e belongs.ff ~
'*Fifth Meditati.On,-" 22• sit•,. P• 61..
··

.....

4.62

:namely. God.

St., Anselm, in his £$nous reply to Ga1.D'l1lon,

challenge$ hi.s, oppon,mt with t~ese 'UJOrds-1

Now'! promise cionfidetitly :that if any man shall devise

anythitlg existing either in reality or in concept
· ·
alone ( except that than which a greater cannot be con- ·
ceived) to wbi~h he Qan adapt the sequence of my
reasom.ng, . l will dtscover that thing, and wtll give
him his lost island, not to be lost again. 169

Kant's ~ritielsm
To t<ant 170 this argument is "a me.re innovation of
scholastic $Ubtlety.ul71 Men in all ages have discussed an ·

;lQSolutelx J't8C'fssa·a ~eing and have attempted to prove:'. .its
existence.. The c~ncept may. be defined as "dasz es naemlieh
so etwas sei, dessen Nichtsein Ul'llnOeglich ist. • . • "l 7 2

But this definition fails

t()

explain ml73 non-existence

is inco11ceivable ..
It is ·t rue that the me:te concept of

tt eln

T.r iangel"

-

169"Anselrn• s Apologet1e ," SW.• cit., P• 158.

170tt is unfQrtunate that John Miley misund~t:stands
I<an,t at this poittt.. ~!d.e bis book• ~· cit., I, 76.
.

11_11ffi~pe1

Rf.''~
--ti I t ~ li!SOJ!, t .ranslated
, 22• . t .. , P• 5 ~ It is 1nte~sting

by Notml\11 Kem1, Sm

to note that Kant .accepted tis p.rQOf at one time. ~
F • . E_. F;ngland.1 !<@S!!'·,S Q?n e t1s,Q ~ ~ (London: George
Allen and UnWll'l; LTD,. t!·. l 21 .. P• 53.-

99

172~nt·jUs ~ ;etnen
VfUrPJ!!ftt 22• sa.t,., Zweiter Band,
· ·
- ....

p. 4S7 • . ··

173"There w11.l always be· a place for the man who knows
hg~; but the man \«lO knows
will be his boss."

m
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implies the· eKis.tence of "drei W1.nkel-."l74

This is abso•

lutely necesaary because the predicate is contained within
the subject. 175 Mo~eover a oontradiction results if one
attempts tQ retain the subjeet and reject the predicate.
But 1f one t'ej,e·c ts the triangle t ·t self, he the;eby l'ejects

also the thi-ee angles and no (:Otltradiction ensues.176
Now the same is true conce.tning the existence of a
being which i :s absolutely nec:.essary.. If one rejects the

existence of this betng177 he t;he~eby automattcally rejects
its predicates ••und. es zeigt s1ch in dlesem Ce&t-nken nicht
der mindeste Wider$pruch.tt118

lf ·one a.ffii:'ti'ls• "Gott 1st

allmaechtig,,u.17·9 then subject and predica:te are ident1ca1 •.l80

1741.2!4.
11'5i<ant di.stinguishe.s sharpl1 between (a) ·analytical,
and (b.) synthet.i eal judgmenis. See .EmJ.@~SU.s $ ~¥
F\1$3!7;e i(J~t1aph}'fl.9f ~ the ~ahaffy•cartts trans ation ~l;'Om the
Ge~an, e:x;tens\ve~y r&.'lised by Lewi.e· White Be~k (New Yo·r k:
Liberal Arts Pres$, c.1950), PP• lif.20.
176 . e HegeP'.s c.rttic1sm of thi,s in Josef Maie~, Qn
,.i ue 2!.·· Kan;t (New Yo·rlu Columbia University ·
Press, 1 ;., , P• ~9-.

Heget·•·s. c :.t

l17sesca.rte:s admits ehat God may be conceived as non•
eX:istent.

V+cJ~ tt·Fifth Hed1ta1;ioni." 9Jl,• · .c_
\ t. 1 P• 59 .,

. ~78!i.nt·1 k .sw.I. reipen
P• 459. . . ' ·.
•, :-

&eJ:mm€t,,
9,2.•
. .
.. ·.

cit.• Z~ieiter Band,
-

179·
·.11.,1.sa., p. 461.
1301£ by the term .GQ.d one means "an infinite being."
~ee. X ~ lSfJ~'-s g.r illgyp ~ ~~~ .R~fiRn• ~rSl_lslated by
Nor.man Kemp Sm t , Qll• c~~·, P•
••
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Hence it is impossible to ~eject the ~ncept of omnipotence
without involving one• s self in a Contradiction, unless
one deni.es the exis:t .e nce of the subject.181

If a person

asa~rts, "Gott 1st nicht,ttl82 then he is at liberty to deny
the predicate terl.tho.u t danger of in~emal contradiction.

This is a consideration

tttn which every one must concur• •

. ·" 183

In other word$; iiR!~ffl9$ is not an attribute of p.er""

fection.

A

perfect bei.ngl84 can e~st in the intelleet

only.
Furthei:more it has been arg1,1ed that existence is in the

realm of the possible becauJe it is included in the concept

of

0

all realit;Y•"

If Qne ~eject$ all reality he the1eby

rejects its internal possibility and thus contradicts himself.
l81oescartes decla1re.s:1

..-. . . .

I find it manifest that

\fe can no more separate the e2tistence of God from bis
essence than we can s~pa.ta-te f~m t..'1e _
e ssence of a triangle
the £act tha.t the size of ite throe angles equals two

right angies, or£~ the idea of a mou.nta~ the idea of

a valley.tr

P•

!~

45

See ttFifth Meditation,u lgc., p.it.

2
1Ji1!i~ ~$1

~h \n~

V.~ tp~f.t, ~·. cit.; Zweiter &and,

183l;manRfr;l ~ t t s cntigue of tyn ~ t i , translated
f -rom the German eyorman· Ketnp Sm'tth~p~t;New Yorke
'n,.e lliunanities Pre$.$, 1950), P• S03 ..
lB'•o?: ~ pex:f~c~ apple pie,.
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The proposition,, 11 dieses Ding i,t,tt 185 is obvtoua1yl86

B)'J!lthetic rather than analytic.

hif it 1s analytic •. the

assertion of the existence. of the things adds nothing to
the thought Qf the thing itself.• " 187
~

cannot even be classified as a genu1tle.

From

the standpoint of logic it is "ledigltch die Copula eine-s

U~theils.n 188 If one affirms, "God is omnipoten~,ttl89 the

tiny verb merely relates the predicate to the subject~

It

does not add a new predicate.

eo

The addition of the verb

the subjectl90 adds- nothing to the con<:ept of Deity.

"tJnd

l8S.lrn der ~ Jlem18}ft, 22• c_
i t., Zweiter Band,
p. 462., ~ Max Muellett$ very fi-ee ttranslatton1 "Critique
of Pure Reason,'' ~ Se~ect\ops.; 22• ~ . , P• 24~. J. M.
D. Meiklejohn 1 s veiifon s more fatthf'ul"'"to the Kantian text.
~ ·IJ-The Ct:1
. tiq~e of Pure Reason" in "ttant,u GJ:eat· D99k~
2! ~ Westeg,. Wor~a, 92• clS•·; XXXII, 181.

186nEvery reasonable per~n" is compelled to make this
admission. See ft;ntapue;L ~t·•,; ·,t-\ tiaue !U.
Re~e,
translated from t ·e Gerqtan y NoJ!TnS.n emp Smit:· · (Lon n:
Maanill.an, 1953). ~· c\t., P• 504.
1871.b tq.

~ge

m

188l<rj,,tits
P• 461.
..

reiJUW
·Y!!!ll!Dft,
~··
ill,., Zweiter Band.,
.
. . ..
.

18-9suppose t attribute

W3d9rsfdUli~

te the Sup'l"eme

Being. The only concept of U.nderstan lig which I have. ta
that of· my Qwn .understanding. suppc,se I attribute sU, to
the Supreme Being. I ha,1e derived tl'.lts concept from my own

inner experience ..

"· • - ·uttd alao Si?anlichkeit zum Grunde

liegt•• • •" Vldf. lmtnan'1el ~ t , "Pi:olegemena zu einer
jeden kuenfstigen ·M(?taphystk; die ale Wissenschaft wil:d
auftreten koenn$\;tt ~ e5!s~911c,,.{sorgfaeltig :
teltitU.rte Gesammtaus~
,Ba
en; 1-eipzigs Modes
untl Baumarm.J 1838) 1 Il'Jtitteir &lnd~· p. 282.

ze

~, 190need· ·1 ,,11 or ever,, ttThere is a God."

•

.. ,...

t
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so enthael t das Wlrkl~che nichts mebr, als das blos Maeg•

liche.

Hundert wirkliche Tha'let: enthalten nicht das Mindeste

mehr; als hundert moegliche." 19.1

In other ~rdss E::dstence
adds -nothing to one•·s idea of Godt1 92
The celebrated ontol,ogical or Oe.rtesian argument fol;"
the. exist~ce of a Supr~me Being is therefc;,re in•

sufficient; .and ~e may as ·well ·hope to incr~ase our
stock of knowledg~ by _t:he ·aid of. mErre idea,t as the
me,;ehant to augment. h.1 s ~a,li~ by the addition of
noughts to his cash..a,co~t. 3·
·

The concept of an unconditio~l ~e1.ng194 lacks intelligible
content.195

The Cosmological Proof
The area covered
Cosmolg3ica1196 is the term which Kant emplGys to
1911!»:itik ~ rein§.9 Ve·tntrmft, 22• ,..i. tt- .• , Zweiter Band,
p. '•61.
~
~
I

Z

.•

voi~!!!.~~;~:;t;~e~·~;~:~g~ te~fii-~· ~~S~!;e?t~~;~~ •

Macmillan, 1924), II, 66..
.
19 3~t Th~ Critique of Pure Re~so~:, ,.- t;an.s1a~ed f l!Om the

1ts

G~i-man by J. M:a o ... Me.i klejo~, ttK~t," ··~
Bo
of the.
we:3tffl W9~ld,4
· .• ci~·· :, ~I'~, ~82.. .. ·~ ~ e·g e· · "s . _.~ riticism
iri ¥i.a. e~, SU2.·· ·e•., P• 4.8. Vtpe N0~1' Kf!mP ~~-th'-s ..~1"E!;8
t'i:an~latiori . of ·is P?S~e 1n .,~ tch be omtt$ !: ~upreme· Being

~d adds· ~~.t ;a;t:,es. See 22• c1( ,, p. · 507.
l 9L
. t 1
.
·. ·,
-ri .e_,. a bi!,,,..1
~,1..u
e y necessary.
19~Sm1.eh,. A. .9,QfMlf:~ta:P! ~
cit •., P• 5=1.. · ·
•

R&ason, · ·22•
• I

_l96·t .c,, lrQ@P'Q&esis;hen.
.
. .....

·

KeDS.'·s "Cr,itigue gt ~

.
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·indicate the ground covered by the first three Ways of st.

Thomas.

This is a proof "from indefinite experlenc~, 1•!!.•

fl'Om the fact that any existence at a11n197 is given enpir1•
cal1y.

'!'he argument consists oft,~ parts,198 namely, (a)

the inference of necessary exi-stenc;e from contingent exist•
encei and (b) 1:he inferenc:e of ·m! )!egli;.s,sitm£n from

necessary experience,199.
Sometimes this proof is called the First Cause Argument.200
Like the Ontological proof• it al.so involves the notion of
a necessaey being.

But; whereas the Ontological argunent

starts from. the ldea o·f s:c,.ch a being• this proof st.arts from
experience. 201

Kant summarizes it thus-:· "Er tautet also;

Wenn etwas existirt, so mu·s z auch ein schle¢hterd1ngs

nothwendiges Wesen existiren.

Nun edstire zum Hindesten

1974,b&_q~

l98teibniz calls such proof "!. copt~en.tia ImmSl!." and
has- divided it into three parts, viz.~ '(a7tf anytlu.:rig
e.xtsts, an absolutely necessary Being exists. (b) Nov, at
least:• I myself exi.s t. ( a) Therefor~~- an -absolutely
nece$Sary Being ex:lat,s. Se.e Ib!, Ph-~ Qh;z 2f. ~ . translated from the German by John Wat~ ew ·edttioti; Glasgow;
James· MacLehose and sons, 1S94), P• 211.

i 99.rhe author is .i nd.e bted to Jo~"'1 V. Flynn for thia
infol;'mation. Fr. Flynn was one Qf bis teachers 1.n the area
of 'theQ.dicy -a t Fordhe.m University.
200Ewing,
. ·
ell• cit~; p. 242,.
201N.,B.. The Physico•Theological proof starts "from
the specific natm:e of ~ertain experiences" whereas the
Co$molog1cal p1.00£ s·ta-r~s "from the mere fact that there
ie some experience." ~ .

468

ich selbst; also existirt ein absolutnothwendigee Wesen.u202
Kant's critici~m203
Kant describes this proof as '' den gmesztmoeglichen

transscendentalen Schein.• •• u204 He insists that 1n the

final analysis it is based solidly upon the Ontological
argument ..

In fact thf! coimection between (a) sup:r:eme

reality and (b) absol.ute necessity in the two proofs is

identicai.205 The Cosmological argument pn:,fesses to be
distinct from the Ontological because lts foundation is laid
upon experience.206 Yet the former employs this emptrical
evidence

a.1;

only ene point in tb~ entbte argument, namely,

to infer that a necessary being exis~s..

Since experience

is impotent to enumerate the ptedicates of this necessary
202.Krifik .d ~r g;eind v.·e rnunft, s;m..· -c it:., Zweiter Band,
p,. 465. ~ I · anythi.ng e~ . sts, an absolutely ne<'.!eseary
being mu$t al.so exist. Now Ir at l.east, ex!st. Therefore

an absolutely necessary being exists.'*

ls!.£• cit.

QUoted by Ewing,

203 It is intetesting to note that at one time in his
life Kant himself employed this ve~ proof. Vide England,
21?.• cit., P• 53.
.
det; fewen Vemun tt 22• ~ . , Z.weiteT Band,
·t ~: is ..po nt Max M1.~ er . s tr.aiisration ( ~
Sstsas~a:on§, . 22•
,1· P• 253). ~s mQre 11.teral than---eiat of
J. M. D. MeiklejQ .· \Gt"e,;t D99ks;_9!. the Wef!tem Worlq, $ill•
cit.• , XXXII, 183).

20~1t1i;

p. 466.

~f:;.'•

~f*t £riti93+e _g! bti:re Reasg:=i,
by 1~orman I,.1~mp Sm!t: , QJl.. cit._, p. 5 •
, 205Imtf;anuel

1

$

206.rhe Ontological proof is based upon!.

translated

mgri

concepts.
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being , t he Comnologi.cal proof abai1don s empi rici sm completely
and depends upon :rationa l i s m for an answer, t hat ifl, "welches
unt er allen moegl iche11 Dingan die e xforderli ch~ Beding\ll'lgen
( i:eguisita)

2.t.t

enthalt e . u207

ei ner a b 0ol1J.ten l'iothwendigkeit in s1 ch

It i s assumed- that they a r e to be feund in

only on e pl ace , namely,. in t he concept of S!'?J!, r.ealis~imurg_.
Hence t hey conclude that t;he absolutely neces sax-y bei ng is
id~t:l.cal 'i•Tlt h the ens ,real issimu.m.

'rhis conclusion is

based upon the ert"o:neous assumption t hat t ha i dea of an
absolutely necessary existence can be inferr~d from the
i dea of the highest r eality.

Now t his is t he exact pro•

pos i tion alleged i n the Ontologtcal proof , and it lies

hidden at the very base of t he Cosmological argument, even
though t he l atter has profeosed to omit i t.

h!)e nn

die

absol u te .1.f otr wendi gkeit 1s t ein nasein a.us blosen Begriffen.u208

Hence if t her e is any cogency i.11 t he Cosmologi cs l argument
1t has been borrowed f :t,/)m t he Ontological, a pr oof derived
from mer e con~epts alone .

In fac t i ts appeal to empiricism

is quite unnecessa~-y.
The Cosmologi ca l proof is just a s deceptive as the
Ontol ogica l, but in addition "er eine ignora t 1o elenchi
begeht, i;,1dcm e r uns verhaiszt, einen neuen Fuszsteig zu

207t<ritik der r eine.."l Ve1:ntmft- on. cit., Zweiter Band,
P• 466. , ·
t rn

208Ibid~ , P• 467.
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fuehren 9 aber nach einem kleinen Umschwelf uns wiederum
auf den alten zurueckbringt. den wir seinetwegen verlassen
hatten.u209

Beneath the surface of this fallacious argument

one can detect the following deceptive principles:
a.

cause is inferred from a contingent••& principle
which is meaningless beyond the phenomenal world
because synthetic propositions, for example, causality,
cannot emerge ft0m an idea of the contingent.

A

b. A fi.rst cause is inferred from the fact that a series

of causes 1n the empirical world cannot extend back~"llr d ad infinitµm--a principle which is not valid
in e!ther the real world or in the world of appearances.

c. The unj u stified assumption of reason that this
fi rst cause is. an ult1rnat~, and that the intellect
can proceed no f.urther.210
·
d. " Die Verwechselung der logischen Moeglichkeit eines
Begriffs von aller vereinigten R.ealitaet (ohne
i nnerren Widerspruch) mit der transscendentalen,
welche ein Principiu.~ der Thunlichkeit einer sol•
chen Synthesis bedarf, das aber wiederum mlJ: au£
das Feld Moeglieher Erfahrungen gehen kann u. s.
w.•, 2l l
.
This proo f tries desperately (but fails) to avoid the onto•

logical pitfall of a t t empting to prove through}! ·prj.ori con•
cepts that a being exists necessarily.

It begins on empiri•

cal ground a.'ld proceeds to a condition of this existence

lvhich is absol utely necessary.

2091bid . 11 p. 468. Norman Kemp Smith translates, "It
professes to lead us by a new path, but after a short cir•
cuit brings us back t o the very path which we had deserted
at its bidding...

See 22• cit. ·• p. 511.

210see K:E=tik aa£ reinen Vernunft, 2P• c!,t., Zweiter
Band, PP• 468.
211Ibid. P• 469.
9
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In order to attain more information concerning the
essence of this being, one searches for the conditio sine
9ua n2n 212 which would render this being unnecessary in an
absolute sense.

But one discovers that the condition which

he seeks resides in only one being.

Furthermore the con•

cept of t hi s being must be such that one can infer absolute
necessity from it.!. priori.

Moreover the entity to which

one applies this idea must be absolutely necessary, other•

wiee one falls back into the ontological abyss.

The!. priori

questions concerning the intemal determinations of something ar e all satisfied by the concept of the supreme
be1ng 9 but the concept is unsatisfac·tory in regard to the

matte~ of its own exiatence.
Er thut aber der Frage wegen seines eigenen Daseins
gar kein Genuege, als warum es doch eigentl!ch nur

zu thun ""iar$ und man konnte au£ die Erktmdigung dessen,

der das Dasein eines nothwendigen Hesens annahrn und
nux-· wissen t\'Vllte, welches denn unter allen Dingen
dafuer angesehen werden muesse 92y cht Antworten: Dies
hier ist das nothwendige Wesen. 3

One may postulate a first cause to explain observable effects
but if one becomes immodest and presumes that this being
exists necessarily, then he is guilty of "einer apodiktischen
Get,rlszheit.n214 Only that which follows its concepts

necessarily can be recognized as absolutely necessary by

2121.e., the negative condition.

213Ibip •• P• 470.

214lbi.9.
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reason.
Two dialectical lllusions appear in both the Ontological
and the Cosmological proofs, namely (a) The ideas of supreme

reality end necessity are connected, and (b) a mere concept is hypo·s tatized.

The Cosmological argume..11t is based

upon the erron~us assumption that existence implies
necessary exis-tence, whereas

kein Ding aber an sich selbst
als nothwendig zu denken befugt bin. . . . . . 21 5 Reason,
11

without contradiction, can always annihilate the idea of
absolute necessity for "whatever it may be that exists,
nothing prevents me from thinking its non-existence." 216 .

In fact

0

in Gedanken aber lag auch allein d1e absolute

Nothwendigkett.n217
Oas Ideal des hoechsten Wesens 1st nach diesen
Betrachtungen nichts Anderes, als ein regulatives
Prineip der Vern~ t, alle Verbindung in der Welt so
a11zusehen. • • •

8

The en@ 4 eali§simym is like space, 219 that is, it is nothing
215tbid.~ P• 472.

21 ~
P• si-s-;-

2161mmanuei I<ant•s Critigye
by Norman Kemp ~ith, 21?•

sit.• ,

Reason, translated

2171<:ritik der reinen ve.rnpnft; 22• cit., Zwe1ter Band,
p. 474.
218 Ibid., P• 474.

219yide Ralph William Key, '*The Religious Implications
of Modern Astro-phys.1 cal Thought,'' an unpublished doctoral
dissertation in the library of 'l1le Biblical Seminary in New
York (Dated April, 1934), pp. 161£. or. Key was the author's
philosophy teacher at this institution.
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but a principle. yet one regards it as absolutely necessary.

We ev,s r confe r upon it the status of •1 fuer s1ch bestehendes

a Rll9t1 an sich selbst gegebenen Gegengehalten, wird . . . . . . 220 Thus a mere regulative S!n·

Etwas und einen
s ta.nd

ciRl ! i s changed into a constitutive one.

" The concept of

necessity is only to be found in our reason, as a formal
conditi on of thought; it does not allow of being hypostatized
as a ma terial co111diti.011 of existence.u221

The v~ry heart of Kant•s criticism i s this: the procedur0 i n ar guing from necessary being to infinite
being is a pzocedure of seeking a foun~ tion for
necessity i n t he concept of infinity.2 2
One may epitomi-ze t he essence of Rant•s criticism of this
proof as follows : When a person infers infinite being from
necer.;sary being 0 he is attempting to base necessity 111 the
idea of infinity.

For example, suppose one could begin

with experiei1ce and proceed logically to necessary exist•
ence .

If this were ooss
i ble one would then be confro11ted
•
,;:Tith three pro,bl enis. (a) What is the nature of t his being?

P• 47~~°K,-j..tik ~ rcainen

Vemµnft, 22• SS•t

221Immanuel Kant's CJ:.ltgue S!.f Puxe
by NOl."il\an Kemp Smitfi, 22•
t., P• sw.-

Zwe1ter Band,

Reason,

translated

222John V•. Flynn 0 "Cosmological Proof for the F.Xistence
of God and t h e Kantian Criticism,n Ex\st~se and Nature 2!

92d ( Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annualonv'eiiiion of the
Jesuit Phil0 sophical Association at t-iarquette University,
Milwaukee, Wiscons~.n, 19 April, 1954), edited by Robert F.
Harvanek, s. J. f rom Woodstock, Maryland, p. 13.
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(b) Why is it necessary?

(c) What kind of being would it

have to be so that non-existence could not be attributed
to i t ?

As reason wrestles with this three•fold question it
seeks an explana t i on in a concept which will be adequate
to the idea of necessity.
of infinitude.

This it discovers in the concept

The choice is natural but it is 110t necessi-

tated logically.

Rather it results f1.-or11 a dialectic of

rea son B.J., d places r eason in an illusion.
A necessary being is conceived of as infinite and the
idea of ne ces s ity emer ges from the concept of infinity,
t hat i s 0 a s the mind proceeds to prove the existence of

infinite bei.ng i t argues from necessary being to UJ.
realissimum.

However when reason takes this final step it

stands upon a mere concept, and this naked idea is accepted

as the basis of necessary being.

Thus the concept of

infinity is r ooted firmly in the concept of necessity, and
this is nothing less than the old Ontological proof in a
new dress. 223
Kant at tempts to show that the error inherent in the
Cosmol ogical a rgument is more dangerous and subtle than the
error in the Ontologieat.224

--------223see
·-·- --Immanuel

The latter is based upon mere

Kant's Cr iti{ue of ~d~ Reason, trans•
lated by Notman Kemp Smith, 22• c t. ,'.p.
•
224John

v.

Flynn, s. J.
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!. P&:1orl concepts, whereas the former begins with empirical
evidence, ptt>ceads to necessary being, and finally rises

to das Ideal der re1nen Veltlµnft.225
Kant insists that reason leaps from n~cessity to illfinity
by natural dialectic rather than lngical necessity.

This

step involves reason in a natural illusion concerning the

ens realissj.my.m because the only possible objects of human
J

experience a~e in the phenomenal world.

In order to under•

stand the nature of this dialectic one must realize that
for Kant all human experience is confined to appearances.
llefo:re one is able to determi11e226 any o·b ject one must

first know i.t in its context• that is, the area of experi•
e..""lee.

Weil ab~r darl.n dasjenige, was das t>ing selbst (in
der E:1:'scheinWlg) ausmacht 11 rtaeml:l.c:h das Reale, gegeben
sein musz, ohne welches es such gar nicht gedacht
werden koennte, dasjenige aber, t«>rin das Reale aller
Erscheinungen gegeben ist. die einige allbefassende
Erfa.hru:ng ist, so musz die Materle zur ~<oeglichkeit
aller Gegenstaende der S1nne, als in einem Inbegriffe
ge.geben, vorausgesetzt werden, auf de.s een Einschraenkung
allein alle Moeglichke1t empirischer Gegenstaende,
ihx Unterschied von eina2~,r tJnd ihre durchgaengige
Bestimmung bel'Uhen kann. ·

In this one sentence K.allt lays bare the governing principle

225vide i<ant, Jritik der re!!3en Venmuft, 9.2• cit.,
Zweiter Bana, P• lf. · •
2261.e.• , to know it definitely, and also to know its
nature.
227Ka?lt 1 ltp,tik 9eI

Band, PP• 449f.

;:einen 'f.e~µnft, ell• .£!.t•• Zweiter
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of his ent ire discussion.228 All objects are determined
by limi tation in a single whole, but this whole is only an

idea of the to tality of "the material for the possibility
of all obj ect s • • • • n 229 This concept is never known
empirically& yet it is presupposed as one of the conditions
which make experi ence possible.

The natural illusion emerges

when this mer e concept is interpreted , as an ontological
principle whi ch i s val1d 1n both the phenomenal and the
noumenal realms. Z30 Totality,. necessity, and even !W!,

r ea,1ssim.l!!l are all in this classification, that is, necessary

pr esuppositions to regulate human experience.

However t he idea of pure reason 1s not the whole series
i n Kant• s syst en.
indiv idual .

The

Rather it is WJ!que, concrete, and
~

realtssimum may be determined !. priori.

I f , in f ollowing up this idea of ours, we proceed to
p.ypost atise it; we shall be able to determine the
prL--nordial being through the mere con~ept of the
highest reality, as a being that is one, simple, all•
suff1cient1 eternal, etc. tn short, we shall be able
to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness,
through all predicaments. The concept of such a being
i s t he concept of God, taken in the transcendental
228John V. Flynn, S. J.

2!!:eJ:1n~nl't;~~t~l:~ ~i~N!!'~k: t=s·
lated
Runanities Press, 1950), 22• s!t.•, P• 474.
2l0Jobn V. Flynn, S. J.
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sense; and the idea of pure reason, as above defined,
is thus the object of a transcendental £beologg.231
But 1Cant is careful to wam his readers in the ensuing

paragraph that it t«,uld be incorrect to assume that this
Ideal is exi.s tent.

Reason places this ideal

11

nur als den

Beglt9iff von alter Realitaet der durchgaeng1gen Bestimmung

der Dinge ueberhaupt zum Grunde, ohne zu verlange, dasz

alle diese Realitaet objectiv gegeben sei l.D"ld selbst ein
Ding ausr.aache.ci232 Then l{ant continues in1nediately:
Dieses Letztere 1st eine blo~e Erdichtung,. durch welche
wir clas Nannigfaltige Ul'lserer Idee in einem Ideale,
als einem besonderen Hesen., zusammenfassen und realisiren,
toJO~ ..l wir keine Befugnisz haben, sogar nicht einmal die
i.'~oeglichkeit einer solehen Hypothese geradezu anzunehme-.a , wie denn auch alle Folgerungen, die aus einem

solchen Ideale abflieszen. die durchgaengige Bestim•
nzung der Oittge uebemaupt, als zu deren Behuf die !dee
all ein naethig ,,iar~ nichts ansehen und darauf nicht
den ml.ndesten Einf1usz haben.z~J
equates 0 the concept of a11 reality4' with
tto·r iguval b eingu 234 he is suff~ring from a Kantian illusion,

Hence if

for t he

,il'lS

reality.

X:@i:nm

0 1'le

r@aJJ:ssiinµm is merely a concept, not a concrete

I t is a serious error to identify das

Ideal

der

VemµnfS, with the original source of all finite being.

2~1Jmmapyel,bl~t','! Crit1gue 2f .~re ~!!9p• translated
y Norman · emp Smith Lon on: ·1aem1 11
, an,
1953)~ 21!• cit. 9 p. 493. ~ the original statenent in
Kri.tik. der .teingp v~mw;ift, QJa• c,-t.g Zweiter Band, P• 4lt8.
f rom tue German

232tbid., pp. 448£.
233tb~. ~ p •. 449.
234John

v. Flynn• s.

J.

(Fr. Flynn 1s the authority

on Kant at Fordham University.)
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Vielmehr wuerde der Moeglichkeit aller Dinge die
hoechste Realitaet ala ein Grund und nicht als Inbe•
griff zum Grunde liegen, tmd die Mannigfaltigkeit der
ersteren nicht au£ der Einschraenkung des Untesens
sel bet, sondern seiner vollstaendigen Folge beruhen,
zu we l cher denn auch unsere ganze Sinnlichkeit, sammt
a lle r Rea l i taet in der Ers·c heinung gehoeren W\lerde, die
zu der I dee des hoechsten Hesens als ein Ingrediens
nicht gehoeren kann.2JS
Kant contends that t he Cosmological proof presupposes the
Ontological.

He ·writes:

Es i st also eigentlich nur der ont~logische Beweis aus
lauter Begrlffen, der in den sogenatmten kosmologtschen
alle Beweis kraft enthaelt, und die angebliche Erfahrung
1st ganz mueszi g , vielleicht um uns nur auf den Begriff
der absol uten Nothwendigkeit zu fuehren , nicht ab~r
um diese an irgend einem bestimmten Dinge darzuthtm. 236
But t he Ol'ltologica l argument is invalid.

Therefore, the

C~smological proof is automatically wrecked. 237

lf a person

holds the Ont ological proof, the Cosmological is superfluous.
Kant is not implying that the Cosmological argument alone
is incapable of proving the existence of a necessary being.
Rather he means that without the Ontological proof (a) it
would be imposs.i ble for us to know the natu-re of this necessary
be1ng and therefore (b) we could not call it God. 238 Fur7

ther, Rant even objects to the very concept of a necessary
being.

Yet in h is treatment of the antinomies of pure

235Ibi d., P• 448.
2361b··::t.a.
1

:t

P• 467 ~

237~ Ewing, 21?.•
238~

.£1t.•• PP• 242£.

. , P• 243.

-e:
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reason239 he speaks as though he assumes it to be possible~
The Physico-Theological Proof240
The last possibil ity

This proof is commonly called the argument from Design.241
Kant dismisses the first two proofs as of no value hut he
has a profound respect for this one.

In fact he thinks

it is almost sufficient to justify belief iJ.1 the existence

of God.
Since the iaea of general entities and the experience

of a general existent have both failed to p:covicle a basis

for a theoretical proof, there remains but one path open
for discursive reason to investigate 0 ob n1cht eine besti.'il!llte
Erfahrungl) mithiu die der .Dinge der gegenwaertigen Welt,

ihre Beschaffenheit und Anordnung einen Beweisgrund abgebe,
der uns siche~ zur Ueberzeugung von dem Dasein eines

239Kant •s fourth antinomy is: (a) Thesis: "Zu der Welt
gehoert etwas, das entweder als ihr Theilt oder ihre Ursache
ein schlecht hin nothwendiges Wesen ist. 0 (b) Antithesis:
"Es eristirt uebe~ll kein schlechthin nothwendiges Wesen
weder in der Walt, noch auszer der Welt als ihre Ursache. 11
See Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 22• cit., Zweiter Band,
pp.
.1

•

364f.

---

or ,t:~leologiea.J.. ~ Smith, A ~ommentazy m, isant• s
cg:itigue 2f. ~ R~aso11 1 " 21?• .s,ts., P• 27.
240

241Ewing, 21?.• cit •• P• 244.
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hoech sten Wese11s verhelf en koen:ne." 242
of t he physicor;i,t heological.

Thia is the realm

This is a pmof ttfrom definite

expe~ience and the specific nature of the world of aensen243

as i t is revealed in expertenoe..

I(

out' quest in this field

should prove fruitless the enquiry must be discontinued
because there a.~e no .:other possibilities l~ft.

In the light of the foregoing discus s1~n it is quite

obvious that we may be asaured of a facil e and unanowerable
solution because a concept can never equal an experience.
The transcendental ooneept of infinite being lies outside
the sphere of empi ricism.

One has nothing in his experience

with which~ approxi ma t e it, and one•s investigation is
invariably conducted inthin t he realm of the conditioned.
Wuerde das hoechste Wes en in di.e ser Rette der BeginooUngen

gtehen~ so wuerde es selbst ein Glied der Reihe

derselben seil1 8 tmd eben so, wie die nieder en Glieder,
denen es . vorgesetzt is·t ,. noch feniere Untersuchung
t;egen seines no.oh hoeheren Grundes erfot'deni. Will
·man es dagegen von di.eser Kette trennen und als ein
blos intelligibles Wesen ni cht in der Reihe der Natur-

ursachen mi t begreifen: welche Bruecke k.ann die Vemunft

a l sdenn \~hl schlagen, um zu demsel ben zu gelangEm?

da all.e Gesetze des Ueb~ganges von \:11.rkWl.gen zu
Ursachenl j.a. all e Synthesis und Erweit~ru.ng unsere1:

E.rkenntn sz ueberhaupt auf nichts Anderea I als moeg•
l i che Erfahrung, mi.thin blos au£ Gegenstaende der

2421<ri t il;t ~ rgin@! .Vem,unft, 22• cit., Zweiter Band,

· PP• 475£.

243smi th~ A g,ommentag .£2. l{ant• s "Critique g!, ~
S2.l?· SS• , p. s21.

~asmi. "
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Sinnenwelt gest~llt sein ~d w~ in Ansehung ihrer
eine Bedeutung haben koennen.i44
The wonders of natural law aJ!'e so marvellous that a person

is left speechless.

Chains of causes and effects are

appare11t eve.r.ywh.e~e, and in order to pJ!'event the very
universe from slipping "im Abgrunde des Nichtsn245 one

assumes that it is supported by a being ~,hich is n10re perfect

than anything else poesible.246
This proof ia worthy of respect because it is (a)

older than the others. (b) the easiest to comprehend, and
( c) the one tvhich agrees best «with the common reason of
mankind. 11247 ttEr ist der aelteste, klaereste und der
gemeinen Menschenvemunft am mei"sten angemessene. 11248 This
argume11t quickens our study of the natural world and suggests

teleology ~t~ere one would not have detected it otherwise.
Moreover the kD.oliledge thus gained from observation incraases·
olie: 0s faith in the e,dst@ce of Uc,bersten und unbedingten
Urhebert• 24·9 until it cl.pens into a conviction.

24~~ritik dsr UW~n Vexpunft, 22• cit. t Zweiter Band,

P• 476. -

=-

245Ibid. t P• 1.,,-77 •

2462i;cts! Kant' s four poi.nts,. ibid,., p. 479.

247:tnmwwmal. Ktiit' s Cr'3ti91:m ~ ~ Ref:89D, translated
Smit• S!.2• Sit• , p. 52o-;-

by Norman Kemp

248Kant .t t~g;it3,k ~ reingp

Band, PP• 477£.

249~ . , p •. 478.

V.eID3mfJ:, 22• si£• 1

Zweiter
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It t·~ 'l.tld be utterly futile for anyone to attempt to
impair the authorit.-y of this proof.
its claim to

11 apode1ctic

Yet we cannot ratify

certainty." 250

•• .~ und as kann der guten Sache keinesweges schaden,

die dogmatischc Sprache eines hohnsprechenden Vernuenft•
Lers auf den Tonder Haeszigung ,md Bescheidenheit
ei11es zur -Be1'"Uhigung hinreichenden, obgleich eben

nicht unbedingte Unterworfung gebietenden Glaubens
herabzustitnmen. 251

This proof elon-e can never denonstrate the existence of God.
It must al.ways seek ass,-stance from the Ontological, the
only possibl e ground for proof.

In fact this third argu-

me11t is zwthi,r1g more than an. introduction to the Ontological

proof .
lch behaupte demna~h, dasz der physikotheologische
Be~a!s das Daseirl eines hoechsten Wesens niemals

allein dat'thun koenne, sondern is jederzeit dem

outol ogi schen, ('<telchem e r nur zur Introduction dient,)
ueber.lassen muesse, diesen Mangel zu ergaenzen, mithin
diese~ iumer noch den einzigmoeglici\e.."1 Beweisgrund,
(wofern ueberall nur ein speculativer Beweis Statt ·
findat,) e11thalt:e 41 den keine mensehliche Vemunft
vorbe:1.gehen kifl1m . ~52
One must refrain from tra cing t:he design in nature to the

will of a SupL"eme Being.

This is not natural theology.

250Pe1:haps t' dea10nst rative certainty" '<«>Uld be a more
accurate translation. ~ Meiklejohn' s version, i!DS,
W?• .£!t,.• 9 XXXI! 1 188.

251Kantl) rnti k .s!!£
Band, P• 478.
252
•
l.!w!•,
PP• 478£.

te1nen Yemunft,
.

9.2• ~ . » Zwiter

483
Rather it is "a confes.s ion that we have come to the end of
it.n253

Endlich muessen wir nach einet' riehttgen .taxi.me der

Naturph!l.osophie ~s alle; Erklaerung der Naturein•

richtung., die aus den Wlllan eines ·h oechsten Wesens
gezogen t~rden, enthalten• weil diese-s nicht mehr
Naturphilosophie ist, so11.dern !~ Gestae11dnisz, dasz

es damit bei u11s zu Ende gehe.

Purpose and adaptation in nature can prove only the con•
tingency of form,. not of substance.

It would require a trans-

cendental pi"Oof to de.o0nstrate that matter is cohtingent.
Hem::e the very most whi~h can be proved from this argur.llent

is the edst:ence of a finite architect,255 not an infinite
'l'her efore, one infeits that the order and pur.-

Creator to 256

pose in the i.~ rld a-:ce solely contingent and that the under-

lying cause i s p:roportionate to it.

This proof is incapabl,e

of rendering a Hbestimmten B.:!griff von der obersten Welt•

u:rsache. • •

u257

•

It is ab.s olutely 1n\possible to deduce

infinite being £ran, empirical evidence.

25Jitprpanuel Kant, l'rglep1na ~ ~ Fut~~

The l·iahaffy... car.us t~anslatic5n
WhitG .3eck~ 22• cit., p. 79.

·

·

n6taph;\:1ca,.
Le s

extens-i ve y revsedy

·

2.54 Immanue1 Kant , .fn?le~mma ml e~er ~~ kugftigsm

1s

~Ie£:a.Rb;Lsilt, w.s. Ala Wtssensc
'4rsl au · tre~ennen·,. ~2.a• . £it.•, Drltt~r Baud, P• "ffl.;
255cf . this concept with (a) Plato's deity in the
TirQa~t and (b) Edgar Sheffit'.!ld Brightman•s finite god •.

256tm[¥Qlsel

HfiJ:·l~

by Notw4"'1 Kemp Sin

gr_msW! g.t. ~
•, P• S ~

,. im•

Reson,

translated

257K£itik der ,;einen Vemunft .. on.. cit., Zwetter Band,

P• 4Sl. -

.-

• ~
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How then is the ¢h~·sm bridged?
ly do nothing more

thai1

This proof can obvious•

cause us to admire the wis·dom,

power 9 ~ cet::era» of "des Welturhebe~s.n258 Hence one
abando11s the empirl.cal evidence and flees to the contingency

whi ch he infers from order and purpose.

Then from this

premise alone one a-dvances through transcendental concepts
to t he exi stehce of a being that is absolutely necessary.
The physico•theo1og1cal pn:,of is poss1ble only because
of t he a s sistance which it receives f .rc,m the Cosmolog,-cal.

Hence even though this argument claims to be based upon
empirical data, the final goal is achieved by means of
s pecula tive. ~eaaon. 259

!<ant: 9 s major criticism ts that if this proof is employed
-

t o esta bl t sh t he existence of the Christian GQd , it is again
neces s ary to pr esuppose. the Ontologi~l proof~ 260 At best

this argument proves only the existence of a very good, very
wise~ veey powerful god , but no·t a God who i .s perfect and

omnipotent.

I t does n()t even give us a creator.

If the

Physie-0° theological argument ever proves more it must be
supplemented by the Cosmological proof, and the Cosmological
presuppos-es the ontological.

258:th~:·

259i ms!!f!l IS!!J.t~ Cr,LtiSJU! ~ ~ ~eS.§Olb transKemp ~iEli; Qfi• ·SU.•, p·. 24.
260Eldng; QB.. cit. , P• 244.

lated by Norman
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Conclusion
In this cha pter the author has empha$ized the enormous

influe11ce exerted by Kant upon Westem thought and has

shown why he a ttacl!'..ed the eighteenth century proofs for
Gode

Kant's criticism of the theoretical theistic proofs

may be epi tomized as follows:

a . Th.er.e are only three possible speculative proofs
fo r the existence of-™ t;AAJ.i~imum, namelyJ (a)
the Ont.ological, (b) the cosmog1cal, and (c) the
Physico-theological.

b. But the Physico•theological rests upon the Cosmological.
c •. Horeo,,ar the Cosmological is based upon the Ontological.
d. 2@. fastg both the Cosmological and the Physi.co-

theological a r e mer ely different forms of the

Ontologi ca l.
a .. Hence the r e is actually only one possible theoreti-

cal t heist ic argment, namely, the Ontological.

f . However the Ontological proof is invalid because
it r ests upon a false premise.

g.

it is ut terly impossible to demonstrate the .
existence of Sll§. ;teali·ssimum by means of · ger reinen
y e"U!W'1:U, alone~

~e

Accor ding t o Kant t he ontological argument

t1

irnmer noch de.1'1

einzigmoegl ichen Beweisgrund, (wofem ueberall nur ein
speculativer Beweis Statt findet,) enthalte, den keine
menschli.che Vem unf t vorbeigehen kann. 11261 Moreover Hendlich
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doch alle blos speculative Bewetse auf einen ei.nzigen,
naemlich c1en ontologisch.en h!nauslaufen• • • •"262
Kant a~-s.umes that (a) the Ontological proof is the
keystone which supports the ent!.r e metaphysical arch, and

(b) since the keystone has been demolished, (c) the entire
structure has Ct"Umbled.

All possible theoretical th~istic proofs rest ultimately
upon the Ontological argument.
But this proof is invalid.

Therefore 11 all theoretical theistic proofs are invalid.
There ar,e no rational proo.fs for ens realissirgum.

Pure

speculative ~eason can neither pxove nor disprove God's
exis tence,.

Das hoechste Wesen bleibt also fuer den blos speculativen Gebrauch der Vemunft ein bloses, aber doch
fehlerfrei.es Ideal, ein Begriff, welcher d~ ganze
menschliche Erkenntnisz schlieszt und kroent, d.e-s sen
objective Realitaet auf diesem Wege zwar n1cht be~ 263
wiesen~ aber auch nieht wider-legt werden kaim • • • •
There is a ttdialektischen Scheiri.e« 264 in all transcendental
proofs for the existence of God.
0

Moreover Kant declares,

nas Ideal des hoeohs.t en Wesens ist nach diesen Betrachtung.en

n1chts Anderes~ als ein regulatives Princip der Vemunft •• •:

P•

t~s!~ 1S£!M..1,s; ~
2

:£~iDml,

263lb1:zd., P• 490.

264~. ; p. 471.
265tbid.t P• 474.

yernunfS-

92•·

cit.•

Zweiter Band,

.'1

265
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Thus Y..a.nt is able to affit:tn with confidences
Zwar wird f reilicb sich ?:U.emand ruehmen koemen, er

wisse, dasz ein Gott und ctasz ein kuenftig Leben aei;
denn wenn er das weisz, so 1s gr gerade der Hann, ·
dEm ich laengst gesucht habe. 6

2.

Thus it i s sheer impossibility to prove the existence of S£,
,reat._issinl$il by means of s.p eculative reason alcme.

J2!sl

reine V§!J;nl,!Pft stretches its "wingsu in vain.

266lbig., p. 617.

"• •• no one, indeed, will be able

to boast that he NJ9r that ther.e is a Gode. • • • 11 See
~mm,a~t~l J!ant'l Crit :Si!:W Q t ~ 'aaq9, translated by
I, orman Kemp Sm.. tii, 9.2• cit • ., p. 6 O.

CHAPTER XIII
AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE ABORTIVE KANTIAN ASSAULT
IntrQduction
. The purpose of the a\tthor in this final chapter is
tt10•fold 11 i1&nely, (a) to present an UJlbiased evaluation of
Kant 8 s criticiSJ..n of the etghteenth century arguments for God,

and (b) to relieve Rant of the charge of agnosticism.
The Ontological Proof
C'1hy defective

It: is a great error to suppose that

st. Thomas based

his famous pz-oofs upon the Ontological argument.
is, he rejected it.1

The truth

This is not a classic proof and from

the standpoint of discursive reason it is perhaps the
weakest argument of all.

This is ebvious because it is

built upon an erroneous formula, namely, «Thought corres•
ponds to being.ti

Essentially this proof attempts to impose

the laws of mind upon the existing reality; 2 it makes an

1s. Thomae Aqu1.nat1s, "Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum,"
S\fl!!I@ I!1eologiae, cura et studio sac. Petri caramello (Cum
textu ex recensione Leonina; tomi tres; Marietti, Taurini:
Romae, 1952), Prima Pars, Quaestio II., Art'iculus 1, Ad

secundum, Tomus I, P• 11.

2This is an exai-nple of circular reasoning.
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illicit l eap from the logical realm into the reat.3

Kant realized that the Ontological argumen·t is under•

girded ,"11t h a false equation.

However his criticism loses

much of i ts, cogency because he failed to understand

!b.z• 4

Consequeiitly he fal ls prey to f1ve fatal errors. namely,
(a) He equates ne cess ary being with contingent being.

He

laui, ches his a t tack by stating that the thought of "ein
Triange1° i s i nsepar able from the idea of "drei Winkel."5
But the thought of a triangle implies only the concept of

thr e e angl es ,, rather than the existence of three angles.
Hence thi s proof gives us, not God, but only the possibility

of God.
is wrong.

Kant• s shrewd conclusion is correct but his method
Thi s is apparent because the finite can never

equal the Infi n i t e.

No one will deny the non-existenae

of a "x1ecessar,i'' t r iangle, but l{attt overlooks the fact that

St., Anselm is not discoursing on triangles.

st.

Anselm is

3vide Frederick Copleston,. A ijistor,y 2t Philosoph~
(8 volumes ; Westminst.e r, Marylana: The Newman PTess, 1 55),
II ; 163.
4Perhaps Kant•·s major difficulty lies in the fact that
(a) he assune~ diffe't'ent types of reason, and then (b)
attempts to e.pply them to different spheres of knowledge.
Y-i:_2.,e Robert Flint, Agpostictsm (Ne,1 York: Scribner• s 1903) •
pp. 234£11
5Imnanue.1 Kant, " Kritik der reinen Vernunft,"

iwmanuel

I<ant• § W~r\s$ (sergfaeltig revidirte; gesammtausgabe in zeht1
Baenden; Lei pzig: Modes und Baumatu,, 1838), Zwaiter Band,
p. 457.
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talking about infinite Being.

God is in a genus of wich

Therefore., Kant• s analogy is- not

He is the sole member.

valid and it does not destxoy the Ontological proof.
(b) Moreover, Kant £ail$ to appreciate the necessity

of an absolut-e l.y necessary Being.
conceive 0 £

0

He states that he camot

a.ny particular things as in itself necessary, 1.16

and asks , "Was 1st die Ursacbe der Unvermeidlicbkeit, etwas
als

ai.,

s i c h no thwendig unter den existirenden Dingen an-

zuner..men und doch zugleich vor dem Dasein e1ne9 solchen
7
Wesens a l s einem Abg~-"tl?1de Zurueckz.ubeben • • • :?"

(c) l{an.t defines

11 a11

!lbsolµt.e lY necessaey being" 8 as

"dasz es naeml ich so et:was sei, dessen Nichtsein unmoeglich
1st• • •

But this is a false definition because it is

possibl e f ol' a ~ reon to conceive of non-existence without
contl."ad i.ction; f or C!'{atllple, one can imagine the :non-~~stence

of the contents of $pace and time without supposing t.he
0

~~m~r,,t.~1:. !<ant•.§. Critiaue Qt ,F( R..?n; translated
Lon , ns Macmillan,

from t e German by Norman Kemp Smit

2953), P• 515.
7K,ru"lt , K.r itik de£

Band 3 P• l:72., -

reinsm veg:nunft,

'

0

1

W?• F1,t.. • Zweiter
,

8:tmmanuel Kant; "The Critique of Pure Reason,." trans•
lated from the Geni&.1 by J •. H •. D. Heiklejohn, "Kant," ~
~ 2.f the Westep1 ~ . edited by Ro.be~t Maynard Hutcnins
"(57i"velumes; ch£cago~~n. Toronto: Encyclopaedia Brittnnica,
c.1952), X&TII, 179,.
9
1<.a.nt ~ K,i;.,.1£;},s ~ _£einen VemU:l.f.t~ 22• cit., Zweiter

Band, P• 457.
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ann2.hi la~itJn of either.lo
( d) Kant argues that one hund.r ed poastble thalers are
just as real as one hundred actual thalers.
~xist.s,n,ea adds nothing to God..
of God wit:hout having God. ll

In other words.

A person ca..t'l have the idea

Thus an imaginary !l.U!.

r.enliss~ is just as useful as a real God.
t~a.tio11 is not only unfortunate, it is even

Kant's illustt somewhat

mis-

leading. tt l2 Rega,:dless of how we define the eurn of Jmndert
13
Thalsz:
our definition ~-Muld not include all possible

attributes.

Hence "the argument given would not apply to

it ~ven if it applied to God." 14 The ease of God is unique.

H.o is the only being in the universe ,mose existence follows
necessarily from the concept of Deity.

••Existence is not ·

a property 8 real or l ogical·, flowing from the essence of
God.

R.athor God is existence, so to speakt at its utmost.

- - -·---.. ----·-·re::a,-

lOJames Ott; Tha £!.lristian Y};i§ of. ~ sn.q J:ha W,ot'ld .
( Re·p rint; Gr.a nd Ra·p i s: Eerdinans,
4'1'), P• 95.
llThe author is indebted to Harold Bames Kuhn for
thi.s in.eight. D~. Kuhn was the writer• s philosophy tleacher

at Asbury Thool.og1cal Seminary.
·

12A. C, Ewing. A Short. ~ntaH 9!1 l{ant 1 ·s

Critigus

Qf ~re 13.ea~ (Chicago: TheUniiersty of Chicago Press,
!9'5 , P• · 2 •
.
.

I<rf

.

l3ll9,i Kcll-1.t .,
tik SU: r!,iflJ:B Vernw;ift, 2.n• sJ&•,
Zweite,: Band, PP• 2.6 ~.
14I!."wing s

12.£• .s.!£.
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God is the fulness of existence:." 15

(.e) The major ·weakness of f{ant• s criticism lies in
the f act f;hat he t:oo is WQrkir1g with a fallacious formula,

namely 9 "Thought :ts neve,~ equal to being.u 16 This metaphysi.c a.l equation is just as untrustworthy as the "magicaltt
011e empl oyed by the classical philosophers of a11tiquity .17

The

sml.2:. in

b.."tttai·

formula is~ HThought cox-responds to· being

the mind of God.rt .St. Thomas declares:

Et :mde e·s t ql.lOd res artificiales diC1mtur verae. per
ordinem ad intellectum nostrum: dieitur en!.m domus
vera, C{Ua<;l as sequitur similitudinan fonnae quae est in
n1ente a:ct:ificis; et dicitur oratio vera~ inquantum est
s i gnum :L,t ellectus veri. Et similiter re$ naturales
dicunt:ur esse verae; secundum quod asaequuntur similit:·1.1di....-,.em spec:i.erum qus.e ~unt in mente divi.na: dicitur

-~-------·lt-CQU~
15

J orn, v~ t lynn, "Cosmological Proof folZ' the Existence
of God and the Kantian Criticism," Exiatence !!!.d l!!tufe of
Q.99 ( Proceedi ngs of the Sixteenth Annual Convention o the
Jesuit Philosophical Association at Marquette University,
Hil\faukee , Wi s consin, 19 April., 1954), edited by Robert F.
Harvanek~ s . J., from Woodstock, i'A.aeyland, p. 23.
16r.he autho'l" is :tndeb.ted to Carl Michalson for thi.s
statement. or. Micha.lson was the writer's philosophy
teacher at Dziew Uni.versi~y.
1 7one cannot think a non•existent entity into exist•
en<!eG 1~1~ Josef Maiel", Qn H$U:' s Qu.£,i,aut g! ~ (New

Yo~kg cofumbia University Pr~ss, l93'9"f; p.6. John Grier
Hibben obs~rvesl) "God in the mind is not necessarily God
in . the tr~rld~t1

y~de hia b~ok, ~ PJlil~~ gt. the i!ff1ght•
& Company,
10), P•
•

O!Pt. (London~ Longmans, Green

.'Ii.ner Raymond calla this proof a ~pbism.

Vide his ~rk,
i99'
1
pgy,
3 volumes (Cincinnati: Uitchcock
~a aen~ c.l 7, I, 270.

~itqu,at:ie;,

&
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enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propri.am lapidis
natura-m, seetmdum pra.econceptionem intellectus divine.-18
Latex he adds, "Et sic, licet plures sint essentiae vet
forcnae r e rom, taraen una est veritas divini intellectus,
seeundum qua.m omnes res denominantur verae.ul9 However we

should remember:
Ad tertium dice.i.,dum quod ratio intelleetns divini
aliter se ha.be t ad r~s quam ratio intellectus humani.
I11tellectus enim humanus est menauratus a rebus, ut

scil i cet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter
seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebuss
~ . bos., ~ S.\!QS ~ ~st v.el DSl! est, s>Bi;nj.o, vera veJ.
! ~ ~ . Intellectus vero divinus est mensura re'%'Um:
qu ia tmequa.eque -res intantum habet de veritate, inqt1..an tum imitatur i1.'ltellectum divinum. ut in Primo
dic tum e s t: . Et ideo intellectus divinus es·t verus

secundum se.

Unde ratio eius est ipsa veritas.20

Ultimately thought corresponds to being

sma in the divine

intellect !

Hence true speculative reason is not impressed
t1lith the value of the Ontological argument. It leaps21 from
t he realm o f t.!,1inkj.ng into the realm of

~ctual

being~-an

1 8s. Thomae Aquinatis, "Utrur,, veri.tas sit tantum in
intellectuQ.u ~Ublmao Th29lpg-!.a~, 9.2• .sit•, Prima Pars 1
Quaestio ,WI, Articulus I, Respondeo, Tomus I, PP• 9~f •
. 19.Ibi q,. • '9Utrum sit una sola veritas, secundum quam
omn1a su.nt ,:era ," Prima Pars., Quaestio XVI , A~ti.culus 6 !)
Respondeo 1> Tomus I, P• 97.
20
rbid. 9 °utrum ie1t aetema sit sununa ratio in Deo
existens";1t'Pri~ Secundae Pars, Quaestio XCIII, Articulus lt
Ad tertium, Tomus I, P• 421.
21Tbis fatal leap from (a) the logical order into (b)
the real is called saltus ~talis. Gerald Vann rejects it
~or this r eason. . Yi.g§. his
~ t .:?.°ffi!+s. Aguina§ (Mew
Yo:rlq Benziger. Brotliers, c.1947 J • p.-Y2 ..

ok,
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unpardonable error in metaphysics.

However it is the Angelic

Doctor imo has laid bare its hidden fallacy, and not Kant.

The Cosmological Proof

Infinite regress
Basically Kant has but two criticisms of the Cosmologi•

cal proof.

First he objects because he believes that (a)

:infinite regress 22 is possible.
cai.1

He thinks that causation

be spontaneous; a phenomenon can be self •caused tdth-

out reference to a prior reason.

Kant complains that when

he attempts tQ apply the cosmological "ldea" theoretically
he finds his mind involved in antioomies, that ist self"!

co1'ltradic tions.
But this is most unconvincing.,

These antinomies are

ac·t ually contzadictory alternatives which do not rest upon
the same basis in regard to their admissibility; for example,
the concept that the ~;iorld either had a beginning in time

or it did no·t.

The.s is:

11 Die

Welt hat einen Anfang in der

Zeit, und ist dem Raum nach auch in Grenze11 eingeschlossen.1123
AntiJ.the.s,ts; noie Welt hat keinen Anfang und keine Grenz.en

22ICAnt might be indebted to Epicurus for this concept.

Vide H. Vaihinge~, Thq _fhil,oso;eh;z Qi. *'Y. li.," translated
from the German _by G. K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt; Brace
and Company; 1925), p .. 273.
2
"I{an~i Krl.t}~ .Q!I £8~
Band.~ P• J44•.

yernwJt·, 2J?•·

cit. t Zwe.i ter
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im Raui.ne; sondern ist sowhl in Ansehung der Zeit, ala des

Raums unendlich.u24 One is compelled (a) to accept "an

eternal retrogression of phenomenal causes and effects," or
one must (b) a dm:1.t ttan extra.phenomenal First Cause••God.n 25

Now reason automatically (a) rejects the first tm)positlon
as contradictory and untenable, whereas (b) it experiences

a rational satisfaction in admitting the latter.

Moreover

spontansgu~ causation is a contradiction 1n terms because
·w hatever produced the effect is the cause.26

Infinite

regress is a d.e ni.al of caua.ality27 and is simply unthinkable

in the order of simultaneously existing~§.!. subordinat~
causes (as opposed to a temporal

series of J?G accideps

related ca~ses). 28
Two

tt W
orldsn

Second, Kant tnsists tha't (b) it is· sheer impossibility

...

.,. 2 .

:x ·

.....

2411?~•, P• 345.

25orr 9 .9..1?.• £it., P• 414.
26The author is indebted to Carl Hiehalson, \~bo was
formerly the assistant of Edwin Lewis at Dl'8w University,
for this insight.
2 7Borden Parker Bowne; ~ and §~cer (Boston and
New "lork: Houghton Mifflin Company; canir{dge: Riverside

Press, 1912), P• 204.

28. The
·
author is .g rateful to James H. Somerville,

s. J.,

for calling his attention to this important distin~tion.
Fr. Somerville was Chaimnan of the Phllosophy Deparbnent
at Fordham University when the writer received his degree
ft'Om that institution.
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to bridge the chasm separating the phenomenal and the
noumena l ~,,~ rlds.u

He is· firmly conVinced that "never the

twain shall meet.,n29 He writesg
1 propose to show that reason is as l.i.ttle able to
make proitress on the one path, the emp!ttcal; as on
the other path, the transcendental, and· that it
stre t ches i t s wings in vain in thus atrempting to

soar above t ~e world of sense by the me;re powr of
specula:tion. o

However one ought to remember that °Kant is. strongly wedded

to certain p~esuppositions."31 H.is strong rea<:tion against

Leibniz and Wolff drove him into a dogmat ism Qf his own.
This is pa rticularly apparent in his 1!persistent determi9'

nation~1 32 to s0patate f orever the realms of the pure and

t he prac tical reason.
But this dual i stic division of a.11 reality is qµite

unsatis factory.

There is somethillg lacking here between

t he see11 and the unseen; 33 and one gropes. in vain for a
bridge t o span the yat1ning chasm.

It bas been obs~rved

tha t both "Plato a nd Kant created so sharp a contra.s t be-

tween phenomena and ooumena that they seemed to regard the
29As Harold Baines Kulm ~'t(p-resses it.

crtmue 2f ~ geason
~:r.,
P• S:OO;

30.rrnmanueJ.i Kant's
by Norman Kemp Smith s

1

translated

31John Tull och, Hggem :th~r!ft! 1n Philg~ BS!

~e1.1 ,1op ( Edinburgh & LQn&rii
lJa2f'.- r. P• 414.

tri

am Blackfuo

&

Sons 1

32Ibi d..
33J •· W. Scott , Kant 9J1 t;;h:,~ Mo9}; ~ (LQndons A. & C.

Black 9 1924) , P• 153.
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e mpirico.l ns

,:1.

shu<low or

m1

illusion. 11 =1L•

This is U1'"1.f or-

t-una tc bec au s e "uhen subject end object ~re acparated in
th.is &.bstr.-3.c ·;: manner , it becomes irnpossiblt: to retain our

hold o n any reality at a ll; • • • 1.1 35

This le.ads one. to

deny the rea l existence of everything, including God.
Thi.e second objection presupposes

fu.

trtmsce.ndcntc.le

i:.nalytiJ? 6 in which i t states tha t experience37 is impossible

Qpart from certain!!. priori principles, n amely , "u.ie ,;;.:i.hren
~to.uru1t,e.g r:i.ffe ues reinen Vers·i:andes.

. . . 1138

They m-e

opera.ci ve on l y within. the phenomenal r e.a'.l m and the i:- f unction is to construct and synthesize.

I<La-,,t 1 s peculiar

ex:>l annt i on of c aus ality and causal inference rr~y be traced

to his emphasis upon synthesis.

~s John V. Flynn observes:

.34 ~<l~er J 11e.f f i e l d Brightman, 11 The ?resent outlook in
l'hiloso phy of }{eligion: From the Strui.dpoint of o.n Idealist,"
l:.merican J:>h ilos onh.ie s of Religion, edited by Henry Nelson
i·/1.em~m and Bernard Eugene Meland (Chicag o ~n d New York:
·.r-·11
·,
19· .;)O
'r.:. ) , p. J7 21 •
l ,J._ et·t , ....,)
.., . ru:~1,,: nnd company,
0

0

#

l""

~.:.,J....eonh.1r d St ahlin, Kant, Lotze, and Ri tscb.l, transl ated f rom t he Germ.an by D. H. s imon ( Edinour~h: '~. and T.
Clark , 1 889 ), p . 81.

-

3Gvi de Kant

- ---- -----

Kritik der reinen Vernunft, _o~.

Z;-icite r Band, pp ., 99-153.

£j.J:..,

37The Cosmoloe icnl argument i s grounded on experience
r ather than reason (like t he Ontolog ical). However l(a11t
s ·e es no intrinsic differe nce between t hese two proofs ooc,'iuse
he regards e:.q )e.rience as just another f orm of reason. · He
£ail s to realize that W'here.as (e) the Cosmologic.:u. proof is

inductive, (b ) the Ontologiccl. is deductive.
3 8 Ibid ., p. 112.

( J'~t 1;:ieans the. Twelve Categories.)
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·B oth a'J!!e concerned w1.th the uniflcation and inter•
pr e tation of the unity of appearance which is always
in t ime. They ha;,~ to do with d(!pendence in time,
a n d th.at only in tetms ef the unity of experience.
Con sequently, it is not with the existence· precisely
as such of appeat""ance, but with the order an~ unity
of appearance that Kant's category -o f cause is con•

cer11ed.

The idea of

toSUW

SYnf:het!5um is uppermost.39

Rant fail s to appr eciate fully the existence of phenomena
as r ea lity, no matter how conditioned they may be by!.
miio.r;t, pr inci ples.

He labels his system "empirical idealism"

and h i s ca t e$0:t'Y of ~xi_stense. 18 intended fo-r phenomena.

Yet the f inal s y1:1t het ic result as an existing entity disa ppea r s.

In thi s respect he is similar to the ancient

philosopher·s of Gr ee.c e.

Their speculations on essence and

· nature absorbed so much o-f their attention that they forgot ·

about exi.stenc e-1> that :L-s,. the reality.

Likewise Kant seems

t o forget t hat when the entir e pl;'.'ocess is complet~ the
phenomeno2.1 is some t hing more than a category or an idea.
It i s no-thing less t han ~a sol.id, existential realiey.u40

I f one does not know noumena, how can he be certain that
he knows evei·l phenomena? 41

When Kant' s system42 is carried to its logical conclusion
39Flym1 u Cosmolog.ieal Proof for the Existence of God
and the Rant!an Critieism 9 " $21!~ ci~., P• 20.

40Jolui V. F1:,i:m, s. J.
41~}.qe H. A. Pritchard, Kant•s Th@SlrY 2f

(Oxfor d:; Clarendon ; 190·9), p~

ii!..

42v1z.~ Tran.seendental Idealism.

··
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it actually denies noumena. 43

noumei'Ul, ~"'hat becomes of

l~ow since one ~st reject

all lmowledge? It vanishes.

Only the individual consciousness re:nains.44 One's ego
is the sole reality, a position '(mich leads inevitably
into solipsism, that is,- the view that one can lalow absolutely nothi.ng except his own inner concepts.45

In the end

Kant• s critical .system leads "necessartly to bare 111.u•
s·ionism and nihilism. • • • u 46

Scientific met;aphysies is

forever impossible because it stands merely upon the threshold of knowledge. 47

One must always be agnostic conceming

th.a e~istence of the self, the world, and even of God.

In

fact God is nothing but a postulate of ,dE praktischm
;

~DU&~• 48 Thus :Lt is apparent that Kant1 s negative
e fforts have rendered all kl'IOwledge illusory.

His

0

kritischen

Idea.liSmustt 49 is subjective and leads from solipsism to

43stahlin,. 21?.• pi~.; P• 29.

'i4r,~
~.. , P• 31 •
45ttarold Barnes Kuhn observes that solipsism is like

a dunce cap, i.e., it is invariably made for somebody else
to w-ear ..

46lbid. 1 P• 82.
l~7Tu1loch~ 22• ctit;,, P• 418.
48a. J. Paton, Th~ Q@tegorteal lmperanve, (Chicago:
University of Chicago· Pt-'~·SS, c.
•
I P• l

4rn

49tmmanuel Kant, ttptolegomena zu einer jeden kuenftigen
Metaphysik, die als W:l.ssens-chaft wird auftreten koermen,"
Imman~l l{a.nt~ ~ ,·Jerk~ (Sorgfaeltig revidirte, ge~anmtausgabe
in ze · Ba.en-den; Leipzig: Modes und saumann, 1838)t Dritter
Band, p. 210. (This Prole8RJ?!M appeared in 1783.J
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il.luaio.nism and finally int<> the ab-yss of nihllism. 50
~toreover it i.s exceedingly d1ffi.cult to conceive of
space as ~'only a principle of sensibilityu51 rather than an

If I<ant was :t"eally sertous one wonders
just: how he could have been aware of the numinous52 as he

objective reality..

gazed into "the starry heavens abQve."53

Furthexmore it

is e..~tremely doubtful ~ether he needed so many categories.54
James warc155 makes this judgment co1,eeming Kant• s ){!tegorism,
e

"His whole enterprise in this matter is unique as an instance of perverted and l«.lrs·e than fruitless ingenu1ty.n 56
Nor is t here any such entity as

n.rloa.

!in

smsnetJ.esh Urt~9il !

The example$ tmich Kant himself gives are e.itber

(a) synthetic 11129sts;iQ5-i, or (b) they are merely analytic. 57
50stahi:tn. 22• cit.• , P• 32.
51 I.rnmanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason,•t ~
Selectio»,~~ translated from the Ge1:man by Max Mue!ler;
edited l)y T'.a.eodore Heye:J;: Greene (New York, Chicago, Boston,
and Atlanta: Scribnf;r's Sons;, c.1929). P• 258.
52.rhis term originated with Rudolph Otto. Vid9 his
ax-ticle·i "The Rational and the Non•Rational,tt Qg~tempore.p
ijeliI~S, l'..hQ~~. compil~d by Thomas s. ReplerMew Yor
& Nasl:!le:"'Ablngdon•Cokesbury Pieess 1 c.1941) , PP• 120•24.
53Andre Bremond•· "Is Belief Out of Date?" ibid .. , p-. 106.

54aarcld Barnes Kuhn remarks, "Of course Aristot:le had
ten, and he wasn•t going to be outdone by a musty old Greek. 11
551n his Giffo:rd Lecture.s .•
5
6James ward; Nat~~ !ll4 ~st1c1y;, 2 VO·l umes (3-r d
edition; London: Adam &
r ·es B.lac. , 190g, 11. 188.

57.Pau~ J. Glenn, lb£ ~istoa Qf Phils!sopq;y (11th impression; St. Louis: Herder; 1 45), p.'"""'3'38.
·
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Rant• s whole theory of knowledge is "weak 1n itself.11 58

The ei1ti re struct ure a~uses onets suspicion because of
its neatness.

It is too ••si1nple.tt

answers f rom the human level.

It pD>vides too many

cartainly the perceiver

brings somethi n g into the knowing p,:ocess, but it is less
than Kant: supposed . Dietrich von Hildebrand59 declares,
n Kant

has tried to give knowledge a new meaning. , • •

He

s e e s knowledge as a construction., a result,. a production
o f ( a ) our il:1t e l lec·t, and (b) unfcn;med macter which is

given us t h:rough the senses, for example, horse, tree, man-that is a r e sult i-m. have conatructed.."60

But according to

Ch1.'"isti an 'l'heism the world was created by God and its

chief chm:ac t eg-istic is structure.

It is over-against~

and it rania ins an objective reality whether or not anybody

ever exper iences it.
Moreover it is quite amazing to realize that this

entire api $tem<>logical edifice is a pxoduct of that very
entity <tv hich Rant spent most of his time attempting to dis•

credit~ namely, r eason.

He frankly admits,

11

Ich muszte also

58o~in. Afred Curtis, Ib§. ChJ;i~t~an Faitj1. (New York:
Eaton & .,re.insi Cw.1905),. P• 23"1..

r.o

59or. von Hildebra,nd was one of the author's profet:Jsors
1n the are~ of epistemology at Fordham university.
60class lecture 18 Sept.ember, 1958. The author is
responsible for puncbiatiou and numbering.
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das Wissen aufhebe11, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekotmnen. • • •1161
have ttlerefor e found it necessary tc;, deny kpowltsJge, in
~rde,: to make r oom for faith." 62 Kant employs -r eason to
tt I

discredit r eason and thus undetmines the credibility of
his entire system.
Waer e nun an einem wesen das Vemunft und einen Willen
hat O s e ine Erhaltung 1_ sein Wohlergehen, mit e1nem
Wor t e seine Glueckseligkeit der eigentliche Zweck der
Na tur, so haette sie ihrt'! Veranstaltlmg dazu sehr
sohlecht . getroffen, s.i.ch die Vernunft des _G eschoepfs
zur Ausri chterin dieser ihrer Absicltt zu ei"sehen.
Denn alle Handl.ungen, die es in dieser Absicht auszuueben ha t ti und die ganze Regel se,t nes Verbal.tens
wuerden ibm weit genauer durch lnstinct vorgezeiclmet
und jener Zweck weit sicherer dadurch haben erhalten
werde"'l koel'ij!n~ a.ls es jemals durch Vernunft geschehen
kann . • • •

·

Since human it1s tin:ct is a more reliable guide for ethical

actions than pure rea-son,64 we can hardly trust it to tell
us

.bmL

11a1,

knowle dge i s possible.•_65 If the fountain it.s elf is

61Immanuel Rant 51 "Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe vom Yahre
22, s!S·, P· 26.

,t ~i'"iti~ ~ If:!J.11!!3 Y~mvn£t,,

62rmmru:,.uel, Kant'§ p,itiSU@ 2! ~ Rea!J2n, translated
from t he German by Notrnan K<i!mp Smith (New York: Humanities),
sm. cit . 9 p. 29. Heiklejo·h n: u1 must, therefore, abolish
l~~~, to make room f~r bjlfef. n See. ~ . 21?• sll• •
Vo:XXXII , 10. Max Muell~r: ti had therefore to remove
~wledg~ , in. order to make room for belief. 0 See ~
, e 1c.ti 9n§ • 2:Q.• cit., P• 22.
631nrt1anuel Rant, uarundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,11
Im11u~l ~t~ s H@Jk#,· 22•
Vierter Band1 P• 12. ••Denn
a'.e Handlungen;" is the beg !ng of a seventeen-line sentence.

£ft;

64cf . Irmnanuel I<ant, 0 Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysics of Horals," translated from the German by 'l'bomas
Kingsmill Abbott, Kmt., §Ee,t l:WQJ.sS U .th! t-1$!SteP) Wprld,
22• c\t.• j XXXII, 2 ~
65oietrich ~on Hildebrand characterizes Kant'9 system
as follows: oo·p eration successful.

The patient died.••
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pollut.e d certainly the stream is impure. Hence it is not
surprising that Kant's system contains "difficulties, and
even hopeless o bscurities and contradictions.tt

66

His separation of· the sphere of the sensibility, the
undex-standing_~ and the reason, with the conditions
or categorie.s ·which he applies to the operations of
t he under standing, .i s a tangled. mass of c:onf usion,

and divi sions of which, by his own admission, overlap
and ar.e involved in one another. No attempt is made
to clear t hen up, or fix their boundaries, for. indeed,
no such bow.1-daries exist. His most app1a.U-sive exposi•

tor s can do no mor-e here than ask readers to remember
that, 'While t:he author is saying one. thing, he is
r eally presupposing another t:hing, and that what he
says in t he rtAesthetic" 1.s only true undelt the modi•

fications set forth in the Logic. 0 1
Saisett suggest s:

I n pl a c e of these empty,. ~~concepts. we must
substi tute t he immediate, real";and living intuitions
of consciou sness. In place Q,f these arbitrary and
usele s s princi ples, that lead nowhere, we must subs titute true principles_, holding by their roots to
e..'.'S(pe r i ence • and in their ample develgffMents enfolding
the uni verse, and leading on to God.
The phe.."lOmena l and the noumenal realms can be connected

66Tulloch, 2.1?• cit., p. 435. It is unden.i able that
Kant contradi.c ts himself. in the Crittgue of ~re ~eas~, e.g.,
(a) on p. 500 of Norman Kemp Smtth•s trans at on Lon n:

Macmi llan) ~ 22• c,t., he classifies the Cosmological proof

as empirical and the Ontological aa transcendental. On
p. 514 he states that they are ·both transcendental. (b) On
p. 504 Kant de.c lares that the proposition " ~ SI.I. ~
thing e3dsts" is positively synthetic. Yet on th"e very next
page he cias.s ifies the proposition, "There is a God," as·
analytic. Kant . evidently forgets on one page what he has

written on another.
67Tulloch, 22• p!:t•·t: PP• 414£.

~ 2!l R.eli&&ous Phil,sopbx, 2
volumes, translated from tne~-French anonymouslyEdinburgh:
68
Emile M. Saisset,

T. & T. Clark, 1863), I, 284.
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a naJ,..ogically. 69

Kant supposes that St. Thomas has bridged

t he gulf by at tempting to deal rationally with the noumenal
world,: tl\at i s , by appl yi ng speculative r eason to the realm
of ethics.

To !<ant thi s is anathema because in his system

of .dualistic metaphysics the noumenal t«.>r1d can be dealt
with

011:ty

by t he pTactical reason.

However when St. Thomas

i dentifies God wi th t he First Cause he is not speaking

µ.n ivpc~ll:t 0 t hat i s i he does not mean that God is exactly
t he same as o ther causes which one knows.. Nor is the saint
discour s il'lg £CIHtsxocallY, that is, he does not mean that
God i s totaU..y different from. anything which one understands
by the t erm

cause.• ~, Rather the Angelic Doctor is writing
§Dalggi cal}.. z 9 70 t hat i s, he means that God ia like a first

cause. 71

O

Thus it is possible fo~ one to pass from the

realm of the phenomenal into the realm of the noumenal, and
Kant• s scathing criticism falls impotent to t he ground.

trans~~;d
&

~::~u~he~~;~~~~Y~.1t~1f~kf*°{t.o~~;1~;~1 ' ·

Ward, c . 1951?) .,. P• 197.

70y~
s. Thomae Aquinatis, "Utr um hoc nomen ~ univoce
di·c at ur"cie'"Deo per partic:t.pationem secundum naturam, et
s ecundt.tm opinionem," J ~ ,Th!.QloglaeJ SU!• ~ . , PriUl8. Pars,
Quaest i o XIII, Artie us o, Respondeo, Tomus 1 1 p. 73.
7lwhenever a Thomi st affirms that God is a Father he
is. speaking analogically, i.e., he means. that God is UB..
a father. Cf. Comeli.us van Til, ~ Def~nss; 2f.
f!!Sh
(Phila delphia: 1'he Presbyterian & Rilorme PubITs
g

ff14

Company, 1955) 9 p. 56.
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The Physico•Theological P·r oof
Kant 0 s obj ection

Kant r espects t he Physico•Theological proof because
i t produces conviction~ yet he denies that it is scienti•

fically vali d.

72

He has but one objection, namely, this

pr oof gives us merely an ar chitect rather than a builder.73

If Kant 's cr itici sm is valid it is not serious because this
a rgu.nent :ts not i ntended to stand alone.

In fact St.

Thomas has alr.eady accounted for the Builder in his second

Way.
Metaphysically the Thomistic proofs are not th~ee or
eve11 f i ve:, but ~

. 74 The strength of a btmdle of rods is

not r e ckon ed by the str ength of individual ~ods but by that

of the entire packet.75 Sti rling points out that togethe1:
the s e proofs const i t ute " but the three undulations of a

72Friedtich Ueberweg, Histou gt Philosophy, trans lated
f rom t he fourth Ge.rma.n edition by Geo. s. Morris, with
additions by Noah Por ter (2 volu01es; New York: Scrlbner' s

Sons , 1892) , !I 9 177 ..

73Kant, "Cr i t ique of Pure Reaso11," t;.r.anslated by ~tax
Mueller, l,ant; ~~lect ions, sm,. cit. , P• 262.

74ntienne Gi lson, I.ht\ Phil~sophy 2!. st. Thomas A u1nas,
t r a1;slated f r om the . Freiicn by 1Cward Bullough (Cambrlge:
.-1. Heffe1: & Sons, 192·9 ), p. 95.
7
5vtd~ Wi l liam Evans! Ib!. G;eaf pgctnpes gt ~ Bible
(Chicago: Moody Press, c. 939J, Pis ,4.

3
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single wave • • • • 11 76 Together they fem an inseparable

unit y.

Thus it is not an evidence of weakness to admit

that " t he design argument presupposes the cosmological • • • . ••!

Pal ey~s watch
However Kant vs t hinking is super£ icial at this point
because a bl ue...pr int , for example, has never been the effi.s,i~t cause of a buil ding.

Suppose a native in the south

sea islan_d s is stn,l l ing along the beach one moming when
he e s pies a gold wateh78 that haa been washed up by the

wav~s.

Now if he i s called upon t:o account for its origin

( even though he has never befor.e seen a watch) he will be

compe11ed79 to infer t hat the efficient cause is an intelligent· being who is capable, not only of designing the watch,
but of a c tually produ~ing

it as welt

41

80

Nor is it even

probable that he ·would accept ua fortuitous concourse of

. 761n his book _entitl ed ?.3ilosqphy aad '.th!219SY,, P• 45.
Cited by Ot'r , 22• si.t• , P• 9 ·•

77 Ibig. t P• 102.
78see

.fal~;-8
t~~ufal IPffA~•
. .c . r es Be . ~ •

by H .. L . Broug

1

Harper's, c . 1839?), II, 118.

2 volumes, annotated

Potter (New York:

79Grante.d t hat he e.'llJ)loys his intellect properly.

o

S°'rhis argument fmm Paleyr s watch is unanswerable.
Rayalond., ml• .c i ~, It 274. ~ also Benjamin Field,
§.tugent .~§! .' a n · o Sl! Christig theolggx, edited by
c .. Symon s n~w e ition; New Yo1r:
He t hodiGt Book

Concern, n.d.) , P• 12.

~e

77
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I

8 toms"

as an explanation. watches do not n just happen."

The very prese11ce of a watch argues. the existence of a

watchmaker .

Even a savagE;? can comprehend this.

Some theistic proofs uare conclus1ve by themselves;
and wlten taken together,. t hey compose a mass of evidence
which must give complete sat is-faction to every person who
fai rly con siders them 5 a.nd which nothing can resist but
prejudice and obsti.nate incredulity." 81 One should renernber that all five of the class ic Thomistic proofs are based
u pon Romans 1:20 in the New Test ament:82
\
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Fa rrel l observes that the Five ways "have their foundations

deep in the solid earth whil e their superstructure sweeps
up to t he heights of di vinity.11 83 Hence the present writer

is unmoved by t<ant • s immodest claim that all transcendental
proofs contain ttdes dialekt ischen Sc.heina. 084 Nor is he
81
John Didc, L§?fit urt! 2n heoloff, 2 volumes ( New York:
Rob ert Carter & Brot ers, l851 , Ia
1 ..
82,Y.i de· Et i enne Gilson, lb.! Sptrl:t 2f. M dia va J!hilosophY,
trans lated from t he Fr ench by A. H. c. Downes New "iork:
Scribner's , 1940) 1 p. 72.

1

8.\1alt er Farrell, ~ (fpmffii on .tg_ the SUflE!!, 4 volumes
( New York: Sheed & Ward, c. 1 ) 1 I,. 44.
84Kant, Kriti k ffer reinen Vernunft, 21?.• s!S• • Zweiter

Band, p. 471.
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impressed with Vaihinger • s confidential boast that Kant has
shown the t:heo:retical proofs to he "broken reeds.ti85

Kant's Concept of Deity
His moral argument86
Kant ass~rts that "die Vemunft in thren1 blos specula-

tiven Gebrauche zu dieser so groszen Absie~t bei Weitem
nicht zulaenglich 1st 9 naemlich zwn Dasein eines obersten

Wesens zu golangen• • • • u87

(This was written in 1781.)

Pure rea son can investigate God but in the end it results
in nothing but antinomies. 88

Later (1788) ~ant wrote Kritik de[ praktischen Veniunft89
85 vaihingerl) 2ll•

cit. ,

p. 276.

86cf. Immanuel Kant, "Der einzig moegliche Beveisgrund
zu einer Denonstration des oase1ns Gottes," Immanuel Kant's
Werk5!-, m?• cit.! Sechster Band, pp. 11•128. (This work
apper:n:ecl'-inl16J.)

81
.
. Kant1 !S_ritik, der rein.!11 YJ!rpunft, m?•
Band, P• 48~.

cit.•

Zweiter

68v1de Immanuel Kant, "Prolegomena zu einer jeden
kuenftigen Met.aphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten
koenneni>" lmt11anuel Kant~s ~ . SW.• ill.., !>rltter Band,
PP• 261- 93e (This book waiwi:Itten inI783.)

891<.ant identifies (a) the will with (b) the practical
reason; St. Thon,as does not.
Francis P. Clal!ke, ''Kant
and Thomas Aquinas on the Proo a or the Existence of God• tt
Phtl0!9shi5al Essays .tn .h(mQx ~ E~ar Asf:hur S~fffa_ ~-,
eel tedy F. P. Clarke~ c. l~ m (Pn-ladelpa;
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942), p. 316.

lidf
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and

O

so rt of lets God in through the b11ck door." 90

In this

work be states t hat das mggalische Ge§.etz must postulate
hdie E.xistenz Gottes. als zur Moeglichk.eit des hoechsten

Guts • • • • c, 9 1 Unless we presuppose a Supreme Being the
J,ummum bonYJB is irnpossible. 92

In fact "es 1st moralisch

nothwendig i, da.s Dasein Gottes anzunehmen. tt 93

Kant bases

his argument upon dm;: kategorj.sche lmperativ94 and reasons

thus: ! have with.in my breast a. moral oughtness which commands authoritatively, 9S "Do this!'' and "Avoid that! tt

I

am more certain that I ought to avoid murder than that I
am either hot or· cold . 96 Now since I am enjoined to live
in a certain ~,ay I must be free to obey. 97

But I am

90aalph William ·I<ey, class lecture. or. Key was the
author• s philosophy teacher e.t the Biblical Seminary in
New York.

911mmanuel Kant, "Kr itik der praktiachen Vernmft,u
Immanuel I<!Dt' a Herke• ml.• cit., Vierter Band, P• 245.

92iant' s Criti:9..:~ g!

the German

by

rract*C~.·Rcsm·
translated from
·
edition revised;

•rfiomas Kingsmllib tt

London: Longrnans, Green

&

Compa.ny, 1898), PP• 221£.

931<al1.t,. nI<1:itik tier praktischen Vernunft," m!•
Vierter Uand 9 p. 247 •

cit.,

.94Prom which Rant deduces (a) freedom, (b) immortality,
and (c) god.
95According to Balduin v. Schwarz kategorlsch9 means
feS9{1Q!t~M1. Dr. Schwarz was one of the author's pro•
essors
tfie area of Modern Euxopean Philosophy at Fordham
University.
9h..

~

Glenn, S!J?• cait., p. 337.

97For l<ant the moral will is autonomous.

Pelagianism pure and simple.)

(This is
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commanded to be pe rfect and this mortal life is too abort
1n wilich to achieve such a lofty ,goal.

Hence there must

ba ano t hor world in i,;hich I can become perfect.

But

&

1s going t o guarantee immortality? Well, there must be a
god. 98

Thus

w

1:>asain Gotte& is only ttein Postulat der

reinen praktiachen Vernunft.u99 1'he existence of
moralische Gesetz i s an absolute certainty.

even i nfer the exi.s tence of ii!!

realissimum

.d!!

A person may

from this law.100

Of course this conclus ion is not absolutely certain but it

is "adequate for all practical purposes • .•• •" lOl
Maybe Rant did answer Hume better than the Scottish

Realisto but when he denied ttthe constitutive as well as

regulative value of t he ideas of the pure reason, he fell
back i n to sceptici sm; from which his postulates of the
practi cal rea son of f er only a sorry means of escape." 102

The ~ritigu~ of Ptactical Reasop is really an admission of
defeat.

Hume he.d attacked certain fundamental beliefs of

Pietlsm but Kant , ,.nstee.d of joining battle in the intellectual

1F,L~;~Jfii~~a~e~ka{e6icago:
trane~!¥~ef~~:~a!~t~d!~~
Universit y of Chicago Pr ess,. c.1949), pp. 227-34.
Si!•,

99v3:de Kan t, "I<ritik der praktischen Vernunft," 21?.•

V!arter Band, pp. 245•54.

.

lOOEwing, 9J?• cit.• , P·• 265.

lOlle!!i•

( Reprint; London: Methuen, 1961) 1 P• 266.

102Atfred Emest Garvie, A Handffl~ S!!_ q~latian
Apologetic.s (New Yo rk: Scribner's, l
t P••
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arena, quie tly :;cetr eated 111.to the blissful realm of faith. 103
l<an t• s greet s ystem is classified as Agnosticism.

No•

whe1:e does h e actually deny the existence of God; but on
the otl"l..er hand he i nsists that we can never know scientifi•

cally.

Re a ffirms chat ttreason, in its purely speculative

appliea t:l.cn , is utterly insufficient ••• to prove the
existence of a Supreme Being •••• " 104 Kant himself has
been classif i e d as ua.t'l agnostic on the side of faith." lOS
This mi gh t be a n accurate description of the Kant one finds
reflected in the pagea of Kritik

SE m;a!5tischffll Vernunft,

but a more thorough investigation reveals that this judg•
ment i G prema ture and true only in a limited sense.

I<ant•s pre.ct:J.cal atheism
!<ant wa s not t he kind of person who lies awake at
night and wor r ies lest God be non-existent.

For him it is

sufficient i f a. r,erson just realizes the possibility of God• s
existence. 10 6 He be lieved that when one recognizes ''all

103
Fulton J . Sheen, Phi~s)phY 2f. Re\igio:n (New "iork:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, c.i 8 • p. 65.

104i{antl) 0 critique of Pure Reason,tt translated by Max
Mueller, I5ant_.Sele5;tions, im• cts., P• 266.
l05Accord!ng to earl Michalson.

Dr. Hichalson was the

author's philosophy teacher at Drew University.

106rmmanuel f{Qnt, Reli~!Rn Within tha Limits 2i h!!9P
AlQQe, translated from theeitoan by Theo ore Meyer Greene
and H. H. Hudson {Chicago: Open Court, 1934) 1 p. 142.
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du.t i e s as di.vine commands" he need not bother with theistic

proofs because the mE"~~e

"12.rul 2f. 22£"

is suffici .ent.

For I<ant t;he God•irlea is an expedient.
he c ites t he old dictum,

"Iimor

Occasionally

fecit ~.ul07

He asserts.

"Es k l ingt zwax, b~dankl ich, ist aber keinesweges verwerfllch,
zu s .nge_ng dasz ei.n jeder Mensch sich einen Go tt mache, ja
nach mcn·alischen Begrtffian • • • • n 108 In 1791 the University

of Berl

1

sponsored a cont est.

I<ant participated and wrote

Ueber di~ FortSS;h;j.t tf; der. Metaph;ysik.

Mis essay ·was never

publ ished but in it he decl ares:

• • • we make for. ourselves object·s , strictly in
acco~dance with the demands of moral law, and arbi•
t rartly endo't'~ t hem with objective reality,. viz. , ~d,
Freedom of the practical order• and I mmorta1it1. 1
La t e r in this same paper he adds:
Practically w~ creat e these objects ourselves* according
as we consi der t he i dea of them to be helpful to the
purpose of our pure reason; and this purpose. because
i t is moi~lly necessary, i s able to produce t he

i l lusion that what possesses reality subjectively,
namel y f or t he use of men (because it has been exhibited
to experi ence in actions which conform to its laws)~
i s t.o be tak.an for knowledge of thi l8~d.stence of t he
object corre sponcl:lng to this fotm.

10 7" Fear c reated t he gods.,"
103I<ant :> n Die Religion imterhalb der Or enzen der blosen

dJ:it. •

Vernunft 1 tt Ipqmaf!el J,ant•s tier5e, 22•
Sechster Band,
p. 351. "'l'n~:.n.i'g it does Innee sound angerous , i t is in
no way repr.ehensibl e to say that every man saa t es i. ~

ylithin lb!. Limit~ s>1. Reason
s,...s.See
, P• r1~;s1on
•

for hims e l f . 0

Al<msh

212,.

.

cit,• P• 303.
i!?!s!•, pp. 303f.

109q uote d by ~,aihinget", sm,
llOquoted by Vaihinger,

513
In the san1e composition Rant declares that in reality "tltese
ide as !".lave b(;;e.ti a rbitrnrtly cr eated by us.nlll

Thus the

Horal az-gwr.e11t is a proo f Hfrom the rationality of a g s ~
such ( a be1ngj.u1 12 Without shame Kant admits, ''I merely

posit the Idea of such a Being in order, on the analogy of
a causal detei:mu1ation , to look upon phenomenon a$ systemati•
cally interconnected." 11 3 Again he affi?:ms:

God onl y fuxnishes us with the idea of something upor.
which al! e.ilpixical reality bases its highest and

neeesa.e:ey- unity& and which we cannot piG:t ure to ou,:selves othenrl.sm than on the analogy of a real sub.s tan ce that is t:he causa of all things accordil1g to

laws of zea.son"lI4

I<ant boldly asserts th.at "the concept of a Supreme Intelli•
gencca is a me,:e, !c:lea •.n ll5

He wrttes:

'!'his rational entity is, of course, a mere Idea, and
;_s not simply and in itself to be accepted as anything
real but is only problematically assumed • • • in order
that all the eonnec:tions in the t-~rld of sense may be
rega~ded as if they had their basis in this entity,
simply andsot~l y however t;;ith the object of building
thereon a syst<;matic wiity • •. • which may be indispensable to the reason and is
gvery way halpful
to the empirical unde.rsta."1ding ... 1

1y

-------

lllquoted by Vaihin.ger, ibid., P• 304.

-

ll~u~ted from the same essay by Vaihinger, ibid.
113Qu.oted by Vai.hinger, ibig.:: p. 282.

lll~uoted by Vaihingez-, i,J,1-,d. 1 P• 281.
ll5At the begim,.:lng of Endabsicht, etc.

Vaihinger~ il:t;sl•, P• 279.

116
Quote<l by Vaihinger 11
at the e11d is doubtful.)

iJ>iJ!.,

!~• 2Sl.

Quoted by
(Punctuation
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Kant taught th.at ttwe must think of God as the supreme head
1n a rno-r al kingdom of purposes." 117

It is permissable for

one to ente·r tain an anthropomorphic concept of God because
11

it is after all only an ldea.nllS

However Kant admits,

"Der Begrif£ eines hoechsten We sens ist eine in maneher

Absicht sehr nuetzliche Idee. ~ ••• u 119 tn fact it is even
necessary in this kind of ~rld.

But it is a matter of

indifference i-mether any objective reality corresponds

to our concept.120 One may even be religious without
assuming the existe11ce of God. 121

Kant declares, "We can

swear by God without admitting his existence.

To swear by

God ~n.thout admitting (affirming) his existence, simply
indicates conscientiousness •.t•l22 Moreover he adds, "That
statement: does not directly imply that I know that God

exists8
•

I simply take upon my conscience the risk of being
u wa:ww

«004

ll7Quoted by Vaihinger. ibid.9, P• 302.

118quoted by Vaihinger. ibid.,_ P• 282.
ll 9Kant,, t-~rit~

ss.£ ain{n

Vernqpft, 22• cit., Zweiter

Band~ p. 463. ••The concept o

a supreme be!.ngTs in many

respects a very useful idea."

See

Xmm@Qµel

~nt•s Critique

2f. ~ Ria§9n, translated by Horman -I<1!1-np Sm th, !m-• cit.,
p. 50-6~

4s5ehyp.S!!.· 96.Rg11gi9n (New York:

120Fulton J. Sheen, Phiff

Apple.t on-Centuzy°Crofts,,

c.1 ·8

f

121vai"n~er,
···
"'"..· • 1<tp
":117£ •
22• ~
1"' •
"'
122Kant:1 s Posthumous Pa~rs.

!Ju&.,

p. 318.

Quoted by Vaih:1.nger,

51S
called a liar if I utter an untruth."123

The moral atheist

can be a practical atheist because he acts !! !! God and
immortality were reai.124
For Rant

tta

pe-rsonal Godtt is a mere idea without any

objective existence.125 In fact he classified "the existence of a Supreme Beingn 126 among "heurist1c127 fictions,olZS
that isj) n something absolutely unreal definitely substituted

for something real." 129 Rant affirms, "Da-s Ideal des

hoechsten Wesens ist nach diesen Betrachtungen nicbts
Anderea, als ein 1:egulatives Princ:1p der Vernunft . .. . .
This 1s logical because for Kant (a) "heuristic fictions"
and (b) "regu1at:1.. ve principle.a of pure reasontt are synon-

ymous.131

These Ideas do not even supply a person with the

possibility of acquiring objective knowledge.132

1231<.ant -os Posthumous Papers.

Quoted- ·by Vaihinger, ibid.•

124~., P• 307.
125vide ibid., P• 272.
126Quot:ed by Vaihinger, ibid.

127The German term is b!9#stisch. ~ Kant's JSritik
.9,U reine..'1 Y,~munft, 22.• cit., Zweiter Band, P• 473.

12£. sit.
129va,i hinger• s definition. Ibi5l., P• 39.
128Quoted by vaihinger •

l30R'.ant.; Krit\k

Band, P• 474.

.£2£ ;:eµien Xemµnft, Slll• cit., Zweiter

131~ vaihinger, 22• cit., p. 273.
132~ ibid.
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A "thought: entityttI33 is nothing but a product of the
i.'llflginat:I.on9 yet Rant declares ccncerning God and the soul,

"We cannot be permitted to introduce • • • thought•entities
as real and de·finite objects,.

They should nQ·t therefore

be accepted as reaU.y ex1stent.u 134

·when Kant died he left some manuscript notesl35 from
which it is evident that he had lost much confidence in the
moral proof 't.zi'lich he had developed in

Kritik der praktischen

Yer;punft.

Nor.man Kemp Smit.h ; in the second edition of
his c o111mentary13 6 01:1 J.S!~tils de; re1?en Ve~unft, h~s sum•

marized the general trend of Kant' s thought as reflected
in these notes.

He asserts,

H•••

Kant now rejects as

heL,g untenable~ and as being ill~gitima.tely theoretical,
the pro.of of God• s existence u.pon which he has relie.d in

the ~i.:t;J;gu~ Ql. ,P;;i!Cta:cat 1eas.91i. namely, by reference to
the ,Sunm.s£ »on'!n.ttl37
"God is

llOt

In these posthumous pap~rs he affirme 1

a. being outside me; but mereiy a thought in me.

133Quoted by Ve.ihinger, i big., P• 280.

134

Quoted ·by 'Vaihinger,

!!?is!•

l35E~ch Adickes published an exhaustive digest of

these private notes in 1920 ·u nder the ti.tle ~ ~
!Ja·§tWPWh da£gestetlt 5£ beurteilt~
tlieriiter s
note i n ~ Seieetiops, 91!.• cit. t PP•
Of.

V!9e

136A Commentary S9, JSans' s $;3i:tj.;9u~

137Quot:ed l?Y Greene,

9.2•

s.i.t•, p. 371.

0

9!

Pure ge_
ason.

Tbeory of Ethies," ~ Selection§,
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God is the moral.ly practical self-legislative Reason.11138
Kant s t a tes further th.at ••there can be no controversy as
to wheth.e·i:" there be a God in substance

or

not; that 1s oot

a subj ect for contro ver sy (objectum litis)." 139
Fo r Kant t he great Creator of the universe is nothing
more than the h i ghest liQI of which the human mind is

capable 9 "the i dea of t he highest: unity, of the one Absolute
Whole includil1g and encompassing everything." 140 Rant
supposes t hat people first (a) form " the idea of the whole
of experi(ance, n and then t hey (b) "make an a.t1tity of this
whole and per s onify it . " 141

DieS<=B 1.d~ l des al lerrealsten Wesens wird also, ob es
zwar ei ne blose Vorstellung ist, zuerst realisirt d.
i . zum Object gemacht, darauf hypostasirtt endlich,
durch einen 11atuerLichen Fortschritt der Vemunft
zur Vollendung der .Einheit, sogar personificirt. wie
·wit:' bald s.nfuehren t,Terden; weil die regulative Einheit
der Erfa.hnmg ni cht auf den Erscheinungen selb-s.t (der
SiJ.'U'llichkei t allein), sondern auf der Verknuepfung
i hres ?.fannigf.alt igen durch d~"'l Vers t .a nd (in einer

Apperception) beruhtt mithin die Einheit der hoechsten
Realitaet und die durchgaengige Bestimmbarkeit
(Moeglichkeit) aller Dinge in einem hoechsten
s t ande,
mith:ln in einer Intel l igenz zu liegen scheint.

Y!2

13~uot ed by Norntan Kemp Smithi 12tsl•, P• 373.
139Rant' s Posthumous Papers.
~•:. P• 316.

Quoted by Va1hinger, m?•

,SM;

140s. E. Fros t :, Jr., lb!.
Tg~ch~s QI,
Phil£s22ber s (New Yoz-k: Perma G· ants~ c.i ), p.

t!~2.o;reat

14llbid•.

l42l{ant,

Band, P• 450.

Krltik ,m reiJlm!

Ve,aunft,

22•

cit., Zweiter
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Thus for I<ant the O~. l?: >rj)~':143 i s "a neces$e.ry unknown,"144

just: na va l ue judgment .11145 Hence it is not surprising that
when a guest at Kant's table remained standing to offer
grace Kant Hwoul d tell him to slt down." l46
It i s quite apparent that one can refer to Kant as "an

agnosti:c on the side of faith11 only i f he employs the
••proof•textU method.. 147

When one observes Kant in broad

gener al outlinel48 he will multiply words to no ava11149 if
he pl aces Ka."-t in any other cl assification than that of

practical nthGism.

Conclusion
Summa ry
Ka nt att<Ftmpts to refute the ancient Ontological proof

143 ueuteronomy 33:27.
144Frost ~ 9.2• s.!$.• P p-. 133.

145sh
....- o p. ci
· ·t • , p.. 45 •
·- e...,.~,

·
Sm~l:w;

1463. u. w. Stuckenberg, IWl 1J.ll 2!. l;mmt;tEG
(London , 1882 ) ~ p . 354. Quoted by--WUbur N.
~reforsh
~ (10th e di tion;. 6th printing; Boston: Wilde,
9
,
p.-i-4. Ytde his footnote b35 on P• 525.

l4.7one st riking e~ple is his frequently quoted affirma•

.m

tion in lt'rit:ik
a;:e:Lnen Y@:r;p)mft,. Yi!• , tt • • • ich fes.t iglich
einen Gott glaqoe, •• •" iJad!. m?• C t., Zweitet- Band, P•
616. ( I n vi ew of the foregoing di:scussion his ~rds have a
very "hollow'' signifi~ce")
·

148or in " s·h arp focus."
149cf . Job 38:2.
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by asserting that existence is not a quality of perfection.

Thi8 is quite ohviously false t-b.en applied to God.

Kant attacks the venerable cosmologica:1 proof (a) by

affirming the possibility of infinite regress, Qld (b) by
stating that the gulf separating phenomena and noumena 18
impassable.

The present writer has called attention to

the irrationaliey of the first position, and has shown
that the cb.asn1 between the seen and the unseen worlds can.
be spanned analogi.c ally.

Kant objects to the impressive Physioo.i;.Theologieal
proof because it gives one merely an architect instead of
a builder.

If this critici-sm is valid it fails to destroy

the argument.9 beeause the existence of the Builder has

already bee:11 demonstrated.
In th.i$ chapter the author has (a) pointed out the

fallacy of l<an:t•s logic; and (b) has shown that Kant•s god
is not the God of Christian tbeiem.

Remarks
I<ant made a sincere effort to defend tl:Uth as he saw
it.

He thought he

l-18.S

saving morality and religion but so

far as orthcdc~ Christianity is concerned his influence
has been almo·s t totally neg~tive.

Yet he died under the

delusion that he had discove,:ed the trt1e philosophy1 and
even confidently predteted that succeeding generations would
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acknowledge the truth of his system.150
example of n1oral blindness.

l<ant 1.s an excellent

now reasonable his doctrines

must have appeared to him!
I..:11. viev1 of

the fact that Kant• s parents ,-.,ere both

sincere Luther.an Pietists,151 th.at he was a theological
student et sixteen,152 and. even preached occasionally in
neighboring churches, 153 it is not surprising to hear him
quote Scripture a nd hanclle evangelical te,:ms.

well but he failed mi~erably.

It.ant meant

Perhaps the root of the

problem can be traced to i<ant' s negative reaction t-9 the
pure f~tth of his childhood.

He wilfully rejected the

truth and God pe·r mitted him to follow his own pernicious
ways~

( In th.i s world his path led to fame; but whither in

'

.,- 0

l50Glenn, 2£•

sit•, P• 330.

151v14e the anonymous 0 Biographica-l Note," Kant, Vol.
XX,'{II in g;m~t poot,s g1 .t he tiestgrn Wofld, 2.2• ctt., P• v.

152Kant enrolled at the university of Koenigsberg as
a theologi~al student in 1740.
153tbomas Kingsmill Abbott, "Introduction," CQ~i9ue
Qi. Ppcttf&t Beasm1~ tr
. ans1.ated from the German by Tho:nas

l<ingsmii A bott · (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1889),
P• xv. Perhaps he did no·t pres.ell more tha.11 twic~. Vide the
anonymous HBiographical Notet" ~ ' Vol. XXXII in Q7::eat
po~y ~ th§ t1estem World, Jss-;-cit.

15411 Thessalonians 2;10.
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Ideo mittet illis Deus operationem erroris ut ct-edant
menda:cio,. ut iudicentur omnes, qui non ~ediderunt
veritati, secl consenseirunt iniqUitati.- 1
These are tthe apostates who
, ,

"(OV

-roll

A

v~ou

~\!~ ~ T~u

1

c-

,

KA\

<

o~-1-r11iI

J

rr~t<>.OE-ltr-o.-r-c

-

t~ 11 1"oc.s

01/-.d..!•

'

-r"o

v

156 How

sad t.o think that a keen. brilliant,. talented person like

Immanuel Kant might be among their number.

What a tragedy!

21. Melius enim e·r at illis non cogno.s cere viam iustitiae,
quam post agnitionem, retrorsum converti ab eo,
quod 1111.s traditum est sancto mandato.

22. Contigit enim eis illud ver1 prov.erbii: cants re-ve.r sus adcsuom vomitum: et, Sus lota in volut:abl'O

luti.r~,

In general we must classify the Kantian metaphysics as a
perversion of the truth, the vain speculations of a depraved

mind which had rejected Christ as the di.vine Son of God.15S
11

One modem Christian philosopher to:ld h_is students;

1 swould

rather appear at the Judgment as the worst drunk in Wilmore,·
rathe·r than Immanuel KanttnlS9

expressed it this way:
,

,,

o

(1.-/TJru>-rrot

_A.

J

~6.).~i

,..

E't(H'IOS•

Jesus would probably have

;v'

160

()tT~

Et

o~I('

~\(:"'1-b- 1

15511 Thes,s alo11ians 2: 11, 12.
156z-1ebrews 6:-6.

15711 Peter 2:21,22.
1 5 ~ Wilbur M. Smithe l';he~~foJ.e t Stapd• 22•

PP• 9f.

l59H.arold B.arnes Icuhn.
l6°t.iatthew 26: 24.

cit.•

( Claes lecture at Asbury SeminarY •)
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Hence it 1.s not surprising that one of Kant• s biogiraphers

wrote:
Mis l i f e , as a tvhole, was a sad one, in s-pite of his

intellectual pleasure and his great fame • • • • Of
inspiring faith. and enthusiastic hope there is scarcely
a trace~ and, in realityt his religion was as emotionless practi cally as it was in theory~ . . . . One of
his friends and biog~hers said, 11 Who has not read
in hi·s writ ings~ and t-mich of his friends has not

hear d him say f r equently tha~ he ~uld not be willing,
for a.11y pri.ce, to live hie life over again on condi•
161
t ion of l i v ing from the beginning just as he had done. 0

Wilbu~ M. Smi t h remarks, "While fully recognizing the great
importance o f l,ant n we should not forget that his type of

reli.gionr, wi.th i11 the limits of pure reason, brought him
no11e o f the j oy and peace that result from fa.1th in Christ. 0162

l6lstucl«!11ber g, 22• ill•, pp. 423£. (Quoted by Wilbur
M. Smitht QR.• ci t , 0 P• 520.footnote 35.)

162J;bi d.

CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION
St. Thomas Aquinas formulated five classic arguments
for the existence of God, namely, (a) ~·;otion• (b) Efficient

Causation 0 (c) Contingent Being,, (d) Gradations of Being,

and ( e) Governance of the world.•
Immanuel 1.:ant contacted thete .p roofs through the "eyes"
of Ch'!:'iE;;tian Wolff and ureduc.edl• th~ir number to thi:ee;

namely :1 (a) The cintological, (b) the cosmological, and (c)
the Physicoc,1Theological.

Furthermore he attempted to prove

that all possible theotetical theistic p1roofs .are based
ultimat·e ly upon the invalid Ontological argument.

The pz;esei1t writet' (a) has demonstrated the utter
failure of Kant's sincere but misguided. effort, and (b)

has shot·m that the term iB'!Q:~ ;ic·j.sm is inadequate to describe

Kant's position.

Kant•s aborti.ve effort: is an illuminating commentaey.
It cmpha.s izes a truth which Roly Scripture has taught for
C-'

-r,,

centuries,. namely i; o"u I( E \., uJ o I( o er\ • r b ~ o.
s G9 o
-r-J v -fr t o' v • • • • 1 Even today tmbelievers are " semper
JI

C

I

cP'
/ t ,d

dis.c entes, et n~quam ad scientiam verltatis pervenientes.n 2

lt Coltinthians 1:21.
2t1 T imo·t hy 3: 7.
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k fact2
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tio\ 3 ·many have become fools.

7

I t is s i gnificant that the theistic proofs are valid
only f or Believe~s.

These pl'Oofs will undergird a faith

wbioh a b:ea.dy exists, 4 but they are impotent to induce that
faith iu the heart of an obstinat.e u11believer.s

The regenerate

mind does not discover ant1nom1ea when it investigates the
evidence presented in these arguments.
proofs» 6 only for the man outside

f (' , ",- o ~.

•

• •7

·ro

the

shaky Onto log;_cal argument

0

-ro ~

They are "supposed
I

<r u>

r-

O\i" o t

,o . ,
-

nasci denuott8 Christian even the

pos.ses.ses

enough value to elevate

it far above "a meze innovation of scholast icism."9

The genui~e Disciple finds these proofs very illuminat ing but quit.e u.nnece.e sary.10 He does not require evidence for God' s e-~istence any more than a man with a toothache

31toma11s 1: 22.

1{hd
Theol~t;:~
f=t~~
~:!8~h!;11~~a~Gg~u~n~dC~;gai
American edit ion; Philadelphia: J. w. Moore, 1854}, p. 88.
Si.1arold Barnes Kuhn.·

6

Edward Caird$ lb! Cfitica\ Khirsgphy 91 lenuel
2 volumes (New York: Macm iian, 1 89, II, 109.

™·

7Ephesi ans 4:12.
8John 3:7.
9Imma.nueJ: Kant's C,;itigge g!. ~Reason.translated

from the Gennan by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Hacmillan,
I929) , p. 531.

,r.1ow

1 ~ L. Be.J"khof, SYstematic
(4th revised
edition ; Gr and Rapids: Eerdmaiis, 194 ' , p. 27,.
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needs evidence that he is experiencing pain.

The true

Believer does not find it necessary to speculate conceming

the existence of God because he Ims>:w;s. He knows beYond
the shadow of a doubt that be has passed

'1"

E:'<. s

j

ti(

-&o.t1~T'"o u

-rou

w r{", ll and in that mystical experi•

ence he has p$rsonally "metH One whose exi.stence he can
At times he may wander into the dark night

never doubt.

of uncertainty; he may

$Ven

descend with Descartes into

the ya'.<'m.i.."1.g abyss o·f doubt.

But there is always one factor

whtch remains constants, namely,~ e~s;.
least is certain.

~

\

Even though

~ a l.2 yet D!.Y1 est.

,rvt-J

ri"J!tl

C

o

.)

f ~"

ou

\

0

I

In fact the Christian finds it

impossible to doubt because he
To the

do{

7r

This much at

,fl.
f-1' \J ~

who ie truly

19Rw:S.
~ ~ ~ E- "\I'\

r /v t
E:

o

0

>

~ I{

.,- O

r ~ -ro s13 .these theoretical proofs• are. culminative and

sat\$fy his intellect; but if he is an unbeliever these
proofs may be quite unconvincing.

W" Xc.

I(

~r •

e

•

~"

-&(' uJ -,r- o s 14

This is logical because

laeks the capacity to judge

spiritual matters the

SQm.e

to comprehend color.

As~st~ Augustine astutely obse-;"Ves,

llr John. 3-i !4.

as a blind man lacks the ability

(Cf. the experience of St. Paul on the

Damascus- 1:0a.d b1 Act·s 9:Ji-9.)

l2t,.1atthew 5: 18.
13John 3i8.

141 Corinthians 2:14~
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only God's children can employ their intellects properly. 15
1
·

•Animalis autera homo non percipj.t ea, quae sunt Spiritus

De1: stuJ.ti.tia enim est 1111, et non potest intelligere:z
quia spt.ritu.~1.ite,: eXiai"llinatu;r~" 16 Of any man expects to
"seeu he must f1.rtt, believe, because this new nsight11 is
given only to those who believe in the Son of God.

.O r in
the classic t,ords of St. Anselin, ttcredo ut intellig~m." 17

-------.--

15st. AugustLne, "On the Spirit and the Letter," trans-

lated f1-om the Latin by P. Holmesp Chapter VI, Basic Wrj.tings
9i SaWt- ~~CJt~n.@, 2 volumes• ed1.ted by Whitney J. Oates
( 2nd p,:1ntmgi f.iew York: Random House_
, c.1948), I> 464 ..

161 Corinthians 2:14.
17u1 believe that I may m:iderst~d, 0 i.e., I do not
seek to underst and ce1:t ain things in ot"der that I may justify
my faith ; on the contraey I f1nd tha·t my faith is a 11 11ght"
which enable s r11e t.o acquira a preper understandbg of other

matters.

·

APPENOUC: LATIM VERSION OF THE PROLEGOHEl{A

Quaestio

Quaestig 29nitur:
De Dei existent.ta multi Stoici antiqui difficaitatem
gravem nu·mquam habuerunt, nam ad Deum tenendurn in univeJ;'.s a

reruu1 natura adesse inclinabantur.

Stoicus enim rectus~

rem ne..t ur ae quamquam tangena • in ea re adesse Deum potest

certus a£fi rmare.
Plat.o autem 9 qui ad eltissimi boni notionem pervenit,

Aristotelis 9 qui ad irnmoti moventis notionem pervenit,
argument:i s suis ad Deum tenendum uno sue mode proprio ~8se
inclinahantur; atque quamquam veteros Graecorum d.e os accipie-

bant, metaphys-icas causas ulttinas quaerebant per qua-s omnes

res intelligerent.
Praeterea a.utem in operlbus a Sancto Thoma tredecimo

saeculo seriptis, baec causae antiquorurn ultL'ilae acceptae

sm1t ut similes Christianorum Deo.

Nam exi.s tentiae Ejus

quem anti.Qui ens realissimum vocabant Sanctus Thomas quinque

antiq.~s probationes pro-posuit~

Attamen centum quattuor anriis postea Emanuel Kant;

confuwts u·ehe badly presented rationalist arguments of
Wolff , 1• refutationem eruditam difficilimorum Thomae pm-

bationum finx.it, qua ~efutatione doetos Europae stupefecit.
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Nobis quaerendum est nuzn refutatio Kantiana sit recta an

non rec:ta sit .
Quaeatig justificatur:

Pr'hao ql.113d et Sanctus Thomas; theologus Ecelesiae
Romanae acceptus ~ et Kant, vocatus "the pnilosopher of
Protesta..-."'ltism 11 1: mult:um a.uctorltate valent:, haec quaestio
anin.10run1 nostro rum intentione digna est.

Nam hi viri

doctis s im:l apud thaologos mul.tum gra.tia vs.lent, atque doc,..
ti11ae utri usqu.e cog1tat1ones sapientium nostrae aetatis

multum a dficiunt.

Haec quaestio etiam est di1igenter exquirenda quod his
diebus iter um ort us est uiaterialiS1.nus dialecticus atque
qui ma.te x-ialismu.'U sequitur, atheismus; ita ut a .quibusdem

quaerat ux num vir sapiens Deum esse tenore possit an debeae

notio Dei nobis a majoribus tradita describi ut philosophta
imag1nata.

guaesti9 dp£inityr:
Pt-oba tione s omnas extentiae Dei in genera descrlbi

possunt attt ut ratione versatae aut ratione non versatae
sed alt.quo modo aU..o cognitae.

Quo'l'tlin probationum illae

ratione versatae 11 quae graviorls momenti sunt~ et inductione

et dedttctione probantur.
Probatione,S per i.nducti.()nem factae funduntur in rebus

quae vere extra mentern sunt.

Ha~ ptobationes a posteriori
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sunt in quantum mens assentit solum postquam quaedam quae
a ~ensibus data s unt cognoscU:.

Sed tamen plurlmi harum

probatiolrrum initium habet in princ1piis in animo insitis et
quibusda.:.1 a. sem.sibus datis.

Atque omnes hae probation-es

in eausalit a t is principio ex Aristotele derivate funduntur.

Pri ma pro bati o existentiae Oei per inductionem facta
cosmolog:tca e st.

quae probatio in Stagirltae causa effi•

cie-n ti funclitur a t que tres gradus hahet; videlicet motionis
et causa-e eff:t.cienti-s et ,t2Y e~se contingentis.

Altera

probatio 1n causa Ariatotelis finali f unditur a t que ori.tur

ex !9l1 c sse. gradibus qui in natura inveniuntur.

Denique

est p robatio et 1n causa Aristotelis formali et finali

fundat a, quae probatio ex mundi gubematione oritur, id
est e:t h.omin:l.s experientia m\)lldi ordinis.

I'robati o aut em per deduc:tio·ne.il facta sol.um una est

prornota. ad existentiam Dei probandam, id es·t argumentum
ontologicum.

Haec probatio multas formas diversas habet,

s.e d vere e s t una. probati o

~

simultanea notione conclusa.

Probat i on ibus quae ratione vet'satae sunt jam descr1ptis,

descr ibe11dae et iam eae pr obationes quae ratione non vet:satae
sun:t , quae pr obationes i.n g.e n·e.ra describi:. possunt ut aut

dir ectae aut non r ea t ae.

Quorum dir ecta probation existentiae Dei solum una est,
videlice t roys.t ica.

Nam mysticus

existenti,am Dei probatione

quae r a tione ver t:itur non p'i:Obat., sed tamen De1.ttn directe
cognoseit.

Exemp1i gratia, episcopus quidem trans oceanum
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navigans athetun audiebat existentiam Dei socie vectori
negantem..

I ta.que ad ath~uro veniens dixit quam mirum hoc

esset quod Deus non esset nam eo mane se cum Oeo locutum

ease.
Probati.o aut em non recta prima est argumentum pragmaticum philosophi sapienttssimi Gallici nomine Blaise
Pascal .

Hoc argumentun in vitis et animi culturis funditur

eorum populorwn qui notionem Oei tenent gravem.

Nam experi-

en tia nostra eos ostendit me1icres esse qui Oeo credant quara
eos qui Deo non credant.

Pxaeterea atheum esse est in ludo

ma.."'..imo ludere; .nam si r>eua est., nihil am1ttitur; sed si

Deus non est , omnia perduntur.
Alt.e ra probati o non recta est a:rgumentum existentiale
Erick Fr ank& qui declar at existentiae De1 probationem
quae homi.11es ma,:ime suadeat esse excrucientem conatum ad

existenti am Dei negandam.

Quaes tio pircwnscr~b~tur:
Ciun nostra quaestio per fecte exquiri non potent; in
hoc opere l im~tati on1bus exactis conscribenda est.

ltaque

non inquirent ur omnes existentiae Oei probationef3 quae
theologis et medii aevi et nostrae aetat1s propos1tae s:unt,
setl circura.ac-ribetur quae.s tio ad Sancti Thomae quinque argu-

menta antiqua et ad judicium Kantianum quod haec argumenta

negat.•
Ad ha.nc autem qu&estionem intelligendam, ttonnutlae
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notiones philosophicae etiam intelligendae sunt quae ad
hanc quaestionem pertinent.

Nam confutat1o Kantiana argu-

men t<>rum Thomae non intelligetur nisi 1.ntelligentur prime

existent'iae Dei probatio una et unica a priori sumpta, tum
notio causae in usu et exper!ment1s sumpta, denique quaedam
notiones prl.ncipales Scholasticorum.

Primo adhibita sunt in hac lnquisitione Summa The>logiae

a Sancto Thoma Aquina.tis scripta et duae responsiones
Emanuel !<a,.1.t ll videlicet, ISxj.tik dar

otnen

et l.C~itj& ~ p·r akt!scltm Veptunft (1788.).

Ve·m unft (1781)
Etiam multa

opera phlloaophica et theologica quae ad nostram quaestionem
pertinent adhibita sunt.

Primo in hoc operG argumentum difficillilm.ml ontologicum

ut in propos!tum scriptis unius philosophi medii aevi et
duorum philosophorum nostrae ae·t atis diligenter 1nqu1ret\1r.

Deinde causalit:i.s Hume notio controversa exponetur.

Ttun

nonnullae notiones Neothomismae ad ·n o.stra.m quaestionem pe~ti•

nentes explicabunt~ atque nonnulla Scholasticorum vocabula.
Post quillt}Ue sancti Thomae viae diligellter exponentur atque
explicabitur ha1:Ultl viarum Kantianum judicium.

Postremo sub
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rationc et Sanctae Scripturae et notionum nostrac aetatio
aestimabitur confutatio l<:antiana.l

l Auctor Daniel Kister, ~. J. m.ultas gratias agit pro
ejus l aboribus ad hoc Latinum proernium corrigendum SUti."Lp'cio.
Qui pater Iu.ster Latinae linguae magistcr est atquc auctoris
rnnicus.
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